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Naboth's Vineyard

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1844-1924

BY

SUMNER WELLES

Sometime Chief of the Latin-American Division of the Department of State of the United States and
AMERICAN COMMISSIONER
to the Dominican Republic from 1922 to 1925

With a Foreword by
THE HON. L. S. ROWE
Director General of the Pan-American Union

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CHAPTER VIII

THE DICTATORSHIP OF ULISES HEUREAUX (CONTINUED)

1.

AT the time that his financial needs were pressing for solution, the Dictator was forced as well to turn his attention to serious complications which had arisen at home and which menaced his peaceful re-election.

For some years the prestige of General Generoso Marchena, who had rendered signal service to Heureaux as his Financial Agent in Europe, and who had negotiated the earlier Westendorp loan, was rapidly gaining ground. A man of much solid ability, notwithstanding Luperón's detraction of his qualifications, General Marchena's personal charm and culture, as well as the singular skill with which he had represented his country abroad, had been the preponderating factors in causing European capitalists to come to Heureaux's assistance at a time when the credit of the Dominican nation was non-existent. Opposed through personal prejudice to the development of American influence in the Caribbean, and realizing that the increasing disorder in the national finances might eventually necessitate recourse to the United States, Marchena had published a plan, the adoption of which he urged upon Heureaux, providing for the reform of the Republic's financial system through the indirect intervention of the European Powers.

His project was widely known, and gained the author added fame, although in many minds it provided for a deplorable impairment of the nation's sovereignty. Designed primarily to offset what was believed to be the increasing influence of the United States over Heureaux,

there is no doubt that Marchena's recommendations
with the warm, though secret, support of several Eu
pean Foreign Offices, with which they had no doubt b
discussed. The project itself in this connection is of
terest. It provided that a European syndicate composed
citizens of Great Britain, France, Germany, the Neth
lands, Belgium, and Spain, should undertake the con
sion of the Dominican Republic's outstanding indeb
ness, both internal and foreign, and should carry ou
program comprising the following points:

1. The conversion of the outstanding bonds of
   Republic, both foreign and internal, by bo
   of a new series;
2. The creation of a reserve fund of $5,000,000 to
   deposited in the National Bank of France for
   in emergencies affecting the international r
   tions of the Republic, of which no disposi
   might be made without the consent of
   National Congress;
3. Whatever balance might result after the refund
   of the debt, was to be applied to the developm
   of the resources of the Republic;
4. The rate of interest upon the new bonds was to
   fixed at 6% per annum and the life of the c
   tract was to be limited to a period of 99 years
5. The establishment of the gold standard in the
   minican Republic;
6. In return for the advantages obtained by the
   public through the proposed contract, the
   to the syndicate by the Dominican Republic
   the northern coast of Samaná Bay with the c
   gation on the part of the syndicate to for
   within three years the keys of Samaná.

Not only were these proposals as advanced by Marchena profoundly disturbing to Heureaux, since they implied the derogation of his power to utilize strategic territory in the Republic as trading points for his own advantage, but the Dictator was still more concerned by the apparent popularity which they brought to his former agent. This popularity, in fact, had induced General Marchena to announce himself as a candidate in opposition to Heureaux for the Presidential term commencing in 1893, and secretly to plot for the Dictator's downfall. To add to these grievances, which were significant enough, Marchena, in his capacity as Inspector of the National Bank of Santo Domingo, created a few years previously by a French syndicate to which the concession had been granted by Heureaux, ordered the suspension of the credits previously granted the President and his Ministers, on the ground that the latter's indebtedness to the Bank had not been canceled, and even directed the French Director of the Bank to embargo certain private accounts of Heureaux as collateral for the payment of his obligations.

When Marchena had been easily defeated in the elections, as might have been foreseen granted the powers of coercion vested in the President, Heureaux, with the vindictiveness inherent in him, determined to avenge himself. Seizing Marchena as he was on the pier, about to sail from the country in the latter part of December, 1892, he cast him into solitary confinement in the Fortress of the capital. Then commenced for the man who had dared to oppose the tyrant a period of martyrdom which lasted more than a year. Incarcerated in his small damp cell in the Fortress, without means of communication with the outside world, Marchena only saw the

light of day when the Dictator embarked upon one of the Government gunboats on one of his sudden expeditions. He was then removed in chains from his prison and thrust into the hold of the vessel, to be returned to his cell in the Fortress upon the termination of the voyage.

Fearing, apparently, the outbreak of a revolution in the southern Provinces should Marchena be at once executed, Heureaux delayed his final fate until General Joaquín Campos, the Government's Delegate in Azua, had been shot from ambush by an opponent of the Administration. Then finally the prisoner, now only a wreck of his former self, was haled for the last time from the Fortress, and transported to Azua. He was there shot, with several others whom Heureaux suspected of conspiracy, on the morning of December 22, 1893, as a ghastly warning to all malcontents, and to the Azuans in particular.

The fate which had befallen Marchena and which was to culminate in his execution proved too much for the nerves of General González, Heureaux's Minister for Foreign Affairs. Secretly taking refuge, a few days before Heureaux's fourth inauguration, on a Spanish warship which had anchored in Santo Domingo, General González escaped from the Republic to Puerto Rico, where he at once broadcast a violent arraignment of Heureaux, and claimed that his sudden and informal resignation had been due to his discovery of the intention of the President to cede Samaná to the United States. It was far more probable, however, since General González had known of the Samaná negotiations from their inception and was likewise apprised of their definite failure, that he had become involved too deeply in the Marchena conspiracy, and con-

quently, with reason, feared the swift vengeance of the ictator.

Heureaux's first reaction to the fulminations of Gonlez was indicated in a communication at once addressed the American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Durham, then sent in Port-au-Prince, in which he stated that Genal González was the leader of that portion of the ominican people opposed to American preponderance d favourable to the increase in the Republic of Euroan influence. Claiming that the connivance of the panish Government in González's escape had been due its desire to foster the revolution against his Administation then commencing in the north of Haiti with the pport of the Haitian Government, he begged that the merican Government be at once fully informed of this pect of the situation. His further retort was to muster hat troops were at hand and march at their head to the aitian frontier. On March 25, 1893, the revolutionists, ho had been provided with arms and ammunition at ape Haitian, crossed the frontier and were routed by e few hundred troops under Heureaux's command, hough the revolution itself was supported by the great estige of General Luperón, General González and Genal Casimiro N. de Moya, and of a leader later to become ore famous even than these, General Horacio Vasquez. As soon as he realized the complete failure of the tempted revolution, Hippolite became pressingly desirs to gain the good will of his Dominican colleague. A eeting between the two Presidents was arranged on April th, on board the Haitian cruiser *Dessalines,* in Manillo Bay, which lies but a short distance from the Haiin frontier. One of the customary understandings was ached between the two, and an accord was likewise

arrived at for the eventual submission of the boundary question, which had remained unsolved since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1874, to the arbitration of the Holy See.

2.

Surmounting these difficulties with vigour and despatch, Heureaux was now called upon to confront an international problem which threatened even graver consequences.

The retention by the Director of the National Bank of Santo Domingo, by instigation of General Marchena, of the funds claimed by Heureaux, had given rise to a resounding incident. The President had obtained a loan from the Bank in return for his promise to enforce the act making the use of stamped paper obligatory, an act which had been generally disregarded and in which the Bank was deeply interested, since the revenues accruing under the act had been affected to the discharge of a prior loan made by the Bank to the Dominican Government. In course of time Heureaux had desired to transfer his obligation to one of his friends, a proceeding to which the Bank naturally objected, since the security offered by the President's promise would have been valueless except as an obligation on the part of Heureaux himself. When the President persisted, the Bank, to secure itself, withheld funds accumulated in Heureaux's other accounts. At length the Director of the Bank brought suit against the President to attempt to secure the repayment of the loan made to him. Finally brought before the Supreme Court the case was decided in favour of the President, and the Bank was ordered to repay the deposits claimed by General Heureaux as withheld without legal authority.

Upon the refusal of the Director of the Bank to carry

ıt the order of the Court, the Alcalde, by judicial au-
ıority, proceeded to the Bank, obtained possession of two
ɔn safes which contained funds of the institution, and
ɔmmanded the Director of the Bank to open them. The
ɾench Consul thereupon appeared upon the scene and
aced the official seals of the French Government upon
ıe safes. These were immediately removed, however, by
ıe judicial authorities, and when the Consul demanded
the name of his Government that the Judge and other
ficials leave the Bank and suspend the execution of the
dgment until his Government had been afforded an
ɔportunity to examine the verdict rendered by the
ıpreme Court, Heureaux refused to permit any com-
iance with this request, claiming that the charter of the
ınk provided that in the event of any dispute between
ıe Bank and a Dominican citizen, the dispute should be
ɛtermined by the courts of the Dominican Republic.

The next event in the drama was the arrival of two
ɾench men-of-war, under the command of Admiral
bel de Libran. The Admiral, proceeding post-haste to
ıe Presidential Palace, demanded of the President, in no
easured terms, that the sums seized from the Bank by
ıe judicial authorities be deposited in escrow in the Con-
late of a third Power until the French Government had
amined the verdict rendered. The story is told that the
ɛsident, after the Admiral's demands were concluded,
ıs silent, appearing to be engaged in deep consideration
the French claims. Finally, he turned and asked, "Ad-
iral, are you familiar with the Darwin theory?" The
dmiral, offended by the apparent flippancy of the Presi-
nt's interrogation, replied that he was unable to un-
rstand the relevancy of Heureaux's question. General
eureaux then apologized, adding that his inquiry had

perhaps been badly phrased, since he should have taken
for granted that the Admiral was familiar with the theor
of the origin of species, and he should rather have inquire
whether the Admiral believed in it. "I myself believe in
thoroughly," he said; "I am convinced that the negro is
descendant of the monkeys, and you know, Admiral, onc
a monkey gets his hands upon something he never lets go.

And, in truth, Heureaux did not relinquish that t
which he believed he was fully entitled. The French Gov
ernment, incensed at the obstinate refusal of the Domin
can Dictator to heed the protests of its agents and by i
failure to impress him with a show of force, at onc
resorted to dire threats, including with its demands fo
restitution of the properties seized from the National Ban
a claim for damages for the continued detention witho
trial of one Boismare, a French citizen. For a time a solu
tion of the dispute appeared to have been reached whe
Heureaux at length agreed to submit it to the mediatio
of the Spanish Government, through the Spanish Amba
sador in Paris. But suddenly the hope of this solution w
dashed by the murder of Samaná, in November, 1894,
another French citizen named Caccavelli. While it w
evident that the murder of Caccavelli was solely due to
private dispute, since Caccavelli was shot down by
Dominican who believed the Frenchman was leaving t
country without paying him a small sum of money whi
he claimed was due, Heureaux was informed by cable th
the French Government refused to continue negotiatio
until the murderer of Caccavelli had been executed. Up
the refusal of Heureaux to comply with this demand un
the murderer had first been adjudged guilty in the D
minican courts, instructions which were made public we
given by the French Cabinet to the French West Indi

PRESIDENT HEUREAUX IN THE PATIO OF HIS HOME

et to concentrate at St. Thomas. On January 10, 1895, e French Government further declared that its West dian fleet would establish a blockade of Dominican ports d would offer its moral support to the Dominican revo- ionists always in the offing, should Heureaux persist in refusal to execute summarily the murderer of Cacca- li; to agree to pay in cash 400,000 francs as indemnity the murder, 150,000 francs cash as indemnity to ismare for his long imprisonment, and to agree to sub- t all other matters in dispute, principally that involving e claim of the National Bank, to the arbitration of the anish Government, consenting at the same time to dge the customs revenues as guaranty for the payments manded.

Once more, the Dictator refused to accede to the pro- sals, contending, with perfect justice, that the customs renues of the Republic were already pledged to the provement Company and that consequently no prior n could be placed upon them. Immediately, he turned assistance to the Government of the United States, questing through his Minister in Washington, at that ne General Woss y Gil, American mediation. Secretary esham, by direction of President Cleveland, responded th alacrity to the request and instructions were sent by e Secretary of State to the American Ambassador in ris to interpose the good offices of the United States. hile the results of the American intercession were as yet nding, Heureaux, on February 6th, determined to com- with the first, and to him the simplest, of the demands de by the French Government, and ordered the execu- n in the capital of Caccavelli's assassin. It is probable t then, as the result of the moderation demanded of ris by the United States, the questions at issue could

readily have been solved through the renewed mediation of the Spanish Government, had not the French Consul in Santo Domingo informed his Government, and made his report public, that the interests and lives of no foreigners, and of no Frenchmen in particular, were safe in the Dominican Republic, and, as of even greater importance, that it was the habit of the Dominicans in the capital to sing upon the streets songs insulting to France.

The absurdity of this anti-climax must have appealed to Heureaux's sardonic humour, but in all solemnity he caused his Minister for Foreign Affairs to address a circular note to all foreign diplomatic and consular officials in the Dominican capital requesting their opinion as to the truth of the Consul's allegations. With equal solemnity, after a meeting of the Diplomatic and Consular corps had been called by its Dean, the Haitian Minister, on February 11th, the foreign officials resident in Santo Domingo jointly and severally replied that the charges made by the French Consul ware unfounded in every particular. After that, the French Consul lost all control, and urged the necessity of the immediate despatch of the warships of his nation, one of which promptly anchored at San Pedro de Macoris. All effect which this display might have created vanished, however, with the simultaneous arrival of three American war vessels, under the command of Rear-Admiral Mead, which entered the harbour of Santo Domingo ostensibly for gun practice in the waters near the Republic. President Cleveland's robust enforcement of his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was once more made evident.

The open support so rendered by the Government of the United States necessarily forced a peaceful settlement of the disputes. On March 11th, Gabriel Hanotaux, the

rench Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced in Paris
iat the controversy between the two Governments had
een solved through the mediation of the Spanish Ambas-
ador in Paris, Señor León y Castillo, along the following
nes: by the agreement on the part of the Dominican
Government to pay Boismare a total indemnity of 1,000,-
00 francs, 150,000 francs thereof immediately, the re-
iainder in monthly installments to be guaranteed by the
hole of the Dominican revenues; to pay for the murder
f Caccavelli a total indemnity of 225,000 francs; and
o submit all other claims advanced by the French Gov-
rnment to the arbitration of Spain.

On April 16, 1895, M. Stéphen Pichon arrived in the
Dominican capital escorted by three French men-of-war,
o reëstablish diplomatic relations between France and the
Dominican Republic. The interviews between the Dic-
ator and the French Envoy passed off in the midst of
xtreme cordiality, Monsieur and Madame Pichon being
odged in General Heureaux's private house. Publicly ex-
ressing his regret that any "unfortunate misunderstand-
ngs" should have caused the suspension of diplomatic
elations, Heureaux declared that their renewal was a
natter for rejoicing to the Dominican people, and in the
hrase of the *Listin Diario,* concluded the settlement
f the difficulty with "consummate ability and exquisite
act." [1]

Hard pressed as Heureaux was at the time for funds,
e, as usual, had recourse to the neighbouring Republic,
he Government of which supplied him with a portion of
he necessary funds with which to pay his immediate obli-
ations to France, these sums being ostensibly credited
pon the debt due the Dominican Government under the

[1] *Listin Diario,* April 16, 1895.

pending boundary settlement.[1] The remainder was obtained by a new loan from the Improvement Company. Expressing his due appreciation of the assistance so opportunely rendered by the United States and

"the moral support seasonably offered to the Dominican Government by the Government of the United States in defense of its interests,"

the non-recognition of which undoubtedly would have affected the "principles of Dominican autonomy," [2] Heureaux further showed his increasing inclination towards the United States by accelerating the transfer of the concession of the National Bank from the French syndicate backed by the Crédit Mobilier to the Improvement Company, which obtained possession of the Bank charter on September 9th of the same year.

3.

Two more instances of Heureaux's hankering towards international politics during these years are noteworthy.

The undetermined boundary line between Haiti and the Dominican Republic had been for many years, and still is, a thorn in the side of all Dominican administrations. The relations which Heureaux maintained with succeeding Haitian administrations were of so close a character, by reason of the ties which he maintained, not only for his own security, but even, there is valid ground for believing, with a view to the eventual domination of Haiti by the Dominican Republic, that proposals which could not openly be made, for fear of public opinion, could

[1] Mr. Smyth, American Chargé d'Affaires at Port-au-Prince, to Secretary Gresham, April 4, 1895.

[2] General Alejandro Woss y Gil, Dominican Minister, to Secretary Gresham, April 2, 1895.

eadily be made by him through his secret agents or in per-
onal conference with the head of the neighbouring State.
Heureaux's interview with President Hippolite at Man-
anillo Bay in 1893, had resulted in the agreement to
ubmit the boundary dispute to the arbitration of the
Vatican. When he had gone through the formality of
btaining, as required by the Constitution, the approval
f the Dominican electorate in a plebiscite held in June,
895, for the submission of this question to arbitration,
Heureaux despatched a commission to Rome to plead the
Republic's contention, the scope of the arbitration being
mited to the determination of the correct interpretation
f the fourth article of the Dominico-Haitian Treaty of
874. Upon the refusal of Leo XIII to undertake the arbi-
ration of the dispute were the submission to be limited,
s the Haitian delegation contended, to the interpretation
f certain words the meaning of which, in the phrase
mployed by the Papal counsel, could be ascertained by
ecourse to any dictionary, the delegations of the two
Republics were urged to agree to the ample submission of
he entire dispute. While the Dominican delegates acceded
ladly to this request, since it in no wise prejudiced their
ase, the Haitian Government refused to recede from their
osition, and for the time being the solution of the dispute
ad once more to be postponed.

Heureaux viewed with ever increasing uneasiness the
rowing disturbances in the neighbouring Spanish colony
f Cuba. The policy of strict neutrality which he osten-
bly maintained was due probably not solely to his belief,
s he once expressed it, that while "Cuba might be his
istress, Spain was his legitimate bride," but also, that
ere the ideals of liberty for which the Cubans were sac-
ificing their lives to prove successful in their struggle

against Spanish domination, those same ideals might readily find ungrateful repercussion within his own domain. And again, although he made no apparent attempt to check the departure from the Republic of those memorable Dominican patriots, such as General Máximo Gomez, who had unsheathed their swords in behalf of Cuban freedom, the constant setting out of filibustering expeditions from the territory of the United States in contravention of the law of nations caused him to fear that the lax enforcement by the Government of the United States of its obligations in this regard might, under similar circumstances, redound to his own disadvantage. That war between the United States and Spain over Cuba was imminent he had no doubt, and the possibilities of such a contest as they might affect his own security were ever present in his mind. A solution short of war was his hope and his consistent ambition. In consequence of the fears thus engendered he determined at length to communicate directly with President Cleveland. On April 10, 1896, he urged upon Cleveland the resort to mediation:

"Inspired by the worthy purpose of supporting the noble efforts, of which the Government of Your Excellency has given splendid proofs, towards finding a humanitarian and just solution of the armed conflict which exists on the Island of Cuba neighboring this of Santo Domingo, the undersigned has the duly prized honor of sending to Your Excellency in the enclosed document the expression of the thought which is suggested to him by your worthy purpose in that sense, and does not hesitate to recommend to the benevolence of Your Excellency the examination of the said suggestion, confident that you will appreciate it not so much because of its terms, more or less useful, but rather because of the high purpose and

the good intentions which have inspired the undersigned in permitting himself to take the present step.

"May Your Excellency accept, at the same time, the assurances of the high consideration with which there signs himself, of Your Excellency,

"Most humble servitor,

"U. HEUREAUX." [1]

The memorandum is headed:

"Plan of an International Jury to put an End to the Effusion of Blood in Cuba.

"The diffusion of human ideas in our age, the community of moral and material interests uniting nations to one another to appeal to the consciences of statesmen and urge them to leave no effort or action untried in order to prevent the outrages of force and violence; in order to establish the reign of reason and justice wherever, owing to any cause whatever, the equilibrium of human rights and duties and the harmony of social interests, without which nothing but ruin and desolation can be expected among nations, are found to be disturbed.

"Not, however, by intervention, which is a last resort and one always opposed by international law . . but by judicious advice, by kind persuasion, by the employment of good offices exercised with discretion . . We see this practised in Europe at present by the Governments friendly to the Sultan of Turkey in the Armenian conflicts, and the United States have practised it in many cases of civil disputes as happened in the cases of Chile and Salvador and even in cases of international rupture like that which occurred between Chile and Peru and that which was on the point of breaking out between Mexico and Guatemala a short time ago.

[1] President Ulises Heureaux to President Cleveland, April 10, 1895.

". . experience . . has strengthened and promoted a general zeal for the wholesome principle of arbitration which North American statesmen have the glory of having advocated with energy . . and to which principle the Government of the Dominican Republic, with the previous approbation of the Government of the Mother Spanish Nation, has had recourse; it cannot be denied that the present situation of the Island of Cuba, drained by a war which partakes of both characters—that of a civil war owing to its nature and origin, and that of an international war owing to the foreign elements which have been swelling the ranks of the insurrection, . . demands, as one of the most urgent and imperative social necessities of the day for both America and Europe, that an end be put to this disastrous struggle.

"The noble, disinterested and impartial effort for the re-establishment of peace in Cuba would not be badly received by either of the contending parties . . .

"If they are left to their own Spanish and Cuban impulses, animated by the mistaken idea that it would be disgraceful to yield and that it would be shameful weakness to propose any reasonable settlement, at what point will the struggle stop? When will it end? Never! Because the violence of their passions will increase day by day and the character of the combatants and the topographical and climatic conditions will all combine to make the war endless.

"Let a friendly voice speak to the noble Spanish Government and to the armed Cubans. Let it conjure them both to grant a truce to the blind hatred which divides them . . This voice will perhaps be listened to as a voice from heaven because it will be the voice of reason . . .

"No one is better fitted than the illustrious President of the United States to utter these words of conciliation,

which will be heard with approval throughout the whole civilized and Christian world. No one has better right than President Cleveland, who has so well proved the moderation of his character and his respect for the rights of other Nations, to address himself to Spain in a friendly and persuasive manner and to induce her and to persuade the Cubans to submit to an international jury the impartial decision as to their respective rights, wrongs and wishes . . .

"The undersigned, placed by the will of his fellow-citizens at the head of a small Nation which relies upon no other strength than the protection of Divine Providence and the respect for all rights, does not scruple to go so far as to entreat the Supreme Governor of the great American people to interpose his good offices in a manner acceptable to Spain in the pending conflict in Cuba.

"This may take the shape of a proposal to refer the settlement of the difference to the decision of an international jury to be composed of three delegates appointed by three European Powers to be chosen by Spain and three delegates from three American Nations to be designated by the American Government.

"The Presidency of this great jury might be conferred upon the Chief Magistrate of the country in which the conferences as to the settlement shall take place; or the delegates themselves might elect a President from among their own number. The expenses would be borne by all the Nations intervening in the settlement.

"The jury would fix the material bases of a convention founded upon right and equity and both Spain and the Cubans would be bound by the decision arrived at by the jury.

"If this thought should be found deserving of being carried out by President Cleveland and should be enter-

tained by the Spanish Government, the most fervent wishes of the President of the Dominican Republic will have been fulfilled.

"U. HEUREAUX."

April 11, 1896."

This proposal, unexceptionable as it was, received but a brief, though courteous, acknowledgment from the President of the United States. Heureaux, ignorant of the real issues involved, was likewise doubtless unaware that public opinion in the United States had reached such a pitch of excitement that the Chief Executive, indomitable personality that he was, could hardly then have controlled it, hampered, moreover, as he was by the powerful opposition to him in Congress.

4.

As the years sped by, the incessant strain, the unending threat to his own security—to his own life; the utter impossibility, by the very nature of his position, of deputing any of the responsibilities of his office, the inability to place confidence in any man, began to show their marks upon the tyrant. As is psychologically so often the case in those of Heureaux's race, responsibility could be borne only up to a certain point. The mechanism of the nervous system, of the mental functions, the character itself, finally break down. And Heureaux was no exception to this rule. His control over himself, which for many years was remarkable, gradually diminished. He became unable to restrain himself even when he realized that his lack of restraint would inure to his own disadvantage. The Dominican people are docile, with the docility of innate kindliness, and with the docility, among the less advanced classes, of inertia. Furthermore, in the latter years of

Heureaux's rule, the great proportion of the youth of the country had been either corrupted, persecuted to a state of inanition, or driven from the Republic. But the populace was still capable of being roused from its seeming apathy, and enraged at the evidence presented to him of this fact from time to time by renewed efforts, futile as they were, to shake off the authority of the Dictator, Heureaux forgot to conciliate and remembered only to oppress. The last years of his Administration were an unmitigated reign of terror.

The man was implacable and as astute as he was vindictive. There was not a town, not a village, hardly a group of two or three countrymen's huts, which did not harbour a paid spy of the Dictator. Accustomed as he was to tour the country from one border to another at frequent intervals with the greatest rapidity, and usually without giving notice of his coming, he maintained in each settlement a mistress in whose house he would lodge. These women were invariably the source of much information useful to Heureaux, and the information so gained, together with the reports received periodically from his spies, provided the President with the most minute and detailed record of the opinions, the words and the actions of every citizen within Dominican boundaries.

His secret agents in Haiti were innumerable. Upon his death it was ascertained that the spy system which Heureaux had organized not only covered Dominican soil and that of the neighbouring Republic, but extended to foreign countries also. Copies were found of his correspondence with his agents in Venezuela, Cuba, Puerto Rico, New York, Paris, London and Berlin as well. The reports of the various spies were entered only under the

heading of their pseudonyms. The great majority proved to be former mistresses of Heureaux, whose loyalty, with singular felicity, he had apparently been able to retain. His agent in Paris, from whom he received information of the greatest importance, notably at the time of his controversy with the French Government, proved to be a Frenchwoman, the wife of one of the former officials of the "régie," whose intimacy with Heureaux had commenced upon her arrival in Santo Domingo and had continued until the transfer of her husband to Paris. There she remained in constant communication with Heureaux under her pseudonym of "Rosa de Francia." The title of the spy in Havana was "El Cura con Estrellas."

During the Dictator's earlier years in office, his amatory affairs were carried on, nominally at least, under cover. As time passed and the Dictator's self-assurance increased, all attempts at pretense were thrust aside and his wife, a woman of Puerto Plata, who at first had lived with her children in Heureaux's private house, was removed to Puerto Plata and there set up in an establishment of her own. The house on the Calle Mercedes, adjacent to that of the Dictator, was thereupon furnished as Heureaux's seraglio, and there a Spanish woman from Puerto Rico, beautiful and of considerable charm, for a long time the President's favourite, was enthroned. No woman, whatever her position, black or white, native or foreign, was safe from the Dictator's advances, should she happen to attract him. His jealousy of his favourites for the moment was inordinate, and any male who ventured to encroach upon the President's prerogatives almost invariably met sooner or later with a violent end. Heureaux never forgot.

His gradual loss of self-restraint made itself peculiarly manifest also in the increasing cruelty which he displayed

n his latter years. Notorious ever for invariably refusing o avail himself of the Presidential prerogative of pardon- ng those condemned by the courts, he was at first at least occasionally capable of tempering his own severity. After ne had condemned General Patiño and General Espaillat o death for their participation in a revolutionary con- spiracy in Santiago, he had acceded to the supplication of he aged widow of Ulises Espaillat and remitted the death penalty. In his later period he would have been incapable of such evidences of mercy. With the taste of blood, he craved more. The prisons of every city were replete to overflowing with the best in the Republic. Frequently, when the President started on his return to the capital upon his gunboat from one of his frequent journeys, the vessel's holds were filled with captives; as frequently when he ship entered Santo Domingo harbour, the holds were empty of a portion of their human cargo. The missing prisoners, generally individuals of no importance who had incurred the Dictator's displeasure, had been tossed into he sea. Often prisoners of the same category in the Fortress of Santo Domingo, whom the President was un- willing to release and whose continued detention proved a burden, were disposed of by being thrown into the waves at the foot of the cliff upon which the Fortress stands, to be devoured by the sharks which swarmed there, attracted by the city's refuse which was daily deposited in the sea.

But the victims singled out for special persecution were those who were suspected of fostering an ambition for the Presidency. For long Heureaux employed the strategy of secretly promising to support the candidacy of those whom he believed desirous of supplanting him only to cut them down ruthlessly when he deemed the time ripe. At length, there were none so guileless as to be seduced by Heureaux's

promises, but it availed them nothing if the Dictator suspected them. Luperón and González and Casimiro N. de Moya saved themselves by flight; Marchena and Isidro Pereyra were assassinated. General Abelardo Nanita died opportunely. Through unusual clemency General Tomás Morales and General Wenceslao Figuereo were permitted to secure themselves by public disavowal of all pretentions to the honour.

In 1898, General Ramón Castillo, Heureaux's Minister for War, and General José Estay, Governor of San Pedro de Macorís, both encountered the Dictator's suspicion. Pursuing his devious but definite plan, Heureaux at first provoked a quarrel between the two men. The history is that of a cat playing with two mice. Imprisoning Estay on the pretext that he had attempted to assassinate the Minister for War, Heureaux called Castillo to him and ordered him to proceed to the fortress in the company of the Procurator General of the Republic to formulate his accusations against Estay in the latter's presence. As they confronted one another, Castillo broke out into a series of charges against the Governor of San Pedro de Macorís. No sooner had the interview ended than to his consternation Castillo found himself likewise incarcerated in the prison. Two days later the prisoners were placed upon a Government gunboat and landed on the beach near San Pedro de Macorís. There they were welcomed by the President of the Republic with a firing squad. Taken before the squad, Castillo was at once executed. Estay, who still apparently believed that his own life would be spared, was immediately thereafter despatched in turn. For requiem, the murmur of the Dictator as he bent over Castillo's body, "He looked for trouble, and he found it"; for epitaph, the following circular telegram, sent to

Heureaux's Delegates and Governors throughout the Republic:

"To preserve political morality and as an example to traitors and assassins, today I have caused the execution of General Ramón Castillo and General José Estay."

In this atmosphere of constant apprehension, when no man's life was safe, when no one knew what horror the next day might bring forth, the avenging spirit of countless sufferers among the Dominican people at length found its weapon of salvation.

5.

The initial impulse which brought about Heureaux's final downfall was due primarily to the plans concerted by the "Junta Revolucionaria de Jóvenes," formed in 1893 in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, by General Horacio Vasquez.

No better means of depicting the life of the average man in the period now under consideration can be devised than by the relation of these stark details of General Vasquez's own life. At an early age, compelled during the revolution proclaimed by General de Moya to assist in the protection of his own town of Moca from the marauding bands of soldiery, Horacio Vasquez had been elected by the Ayuntamiento Colonel of the National Guard of Moca, and after he had won distinction in the various engagements in which the Guardia Nacional was forced to participate as a means of self-protection, he eventually brought upon himself the attention of Heureaux. Promoted, although reluctantly, to a position of greater importance by order of the Dictator, he was present at a meeting in Moca of General Heureaux's chief officers with their commander.

Heureaux, who had recently concluded crushing an outbreak headed by General Espaillat, met his generals in the town's public square. Arrayed, as was usual on his campaigns, in "campesino's" clothes of striped blue and white, and wearing a panama hat, Heureaux presented a striking contrast to his forces who had been on the march for many weeks and were a tattered and bedraggled lot. As they came straggling into Moca behind their officers, it was apparent that their morale had nearly vanished. With the intention of ingratiating himself with his troops, Heureaux called to his side General Cabrera, his second in command, and in a loud voice gave him the following order:

"Wherever you go, you will understand, your soldiers are to consider as their property all horses, cows, chickens —and women—that they may find."

Upon hearing this order, which affected those who were closest to him and those among whom he had spent all of his early life, Colonel Vasquez, as he then was, protested to Heureaux. The Dictator attempted to pacify his subordinate, and assured him that his order would affect no friends of his. Vasquez, thoroughly revolted, however, proceeded at once to the Ayuntamiento to present his resignation of the offices which he held.

Refraining thereafter from engaging in any occupation which might bring him into contact with the Government, he devoted himself for some years to his private affairs and to the commercial relationships which he had formed. He settled later in the town of La Vega, where he consented to serve as President of the Ayuntamiento, a position which at that time held no direct connection with the National Government. Forced to resign his post

y intrigue, the rumour was spread that he and the mem-
ers of the Moya family, into which he had married, were
lotting against the Dictator. Although the report was en-
rely unfounded, General Vasquez and his two brothers-
n-law, Don Samuel and Don Manuel de Moya, were
aken prisoner and remanded under guard to Samaná.
ubjected to the most brutal treatment, prevented from
ommunicating with his wife, whose death was hourly
xpected, he was later transferred to the prison in Puerto
lata and subsequently to the capital. It was then, and
ot until then, that General Vasquez, outraged in every
ber of his being by the unjust persecution to which he
ad been subjected, determined to struggle with all his
ower to secure the downfall of the tyrant. In its original
nception, his desire was not based solely upon abstract
notives; it was largely conceived in a spirit of vengeance
gainst the man whom he held directly responsible for his
ufferings. After his release from prison, although still
nder supervision, he came into contact with General
Marchena, and joined the latter in framing a far-reaching
onspiracy for the overthrow of the Dictatorship, until
Marchena's sudden imprisonment rendered the plot abor-
ve. Suspected once more by the Dictator, Vasquez was
gain imprisoned in Santiago, whence he had gone from
he capital, and was once more brought back to Santo
Domingo. In an interview which he was later accorded,
ith some of his fellow-prisoners, by Heureaux, the latter
ssured him that he himself had no desire to continue in
he Presidency and would permit the free election of any
andidate other than General de Moya, since, he alleged, his
fe would not be safe were General de Moya to become
resident. Believing apparently that the danger of rebel-
on was for the time being quenched, Heureaux then per-

mitted General Vasquez to return to the Cibao, but the latter received this significant warning before his departure from the capital from Archbishop Meriño—

"No sooner will you pass the Puerta del Conde on your way from the City than you may well anticipate the presence of an assassin behind every tree you pass."

In fact, Vasquez's position of open opposition to the Government had rendered his life insecure for a single day. His business connections had been utterly destroyed, and the health of his wife had completely broken down under the strain she had undergone. The sole recourse remaining was exile. Reaching St. Thomas eventually, he joined there General Luperón, General de Moya, General Carlos Morales, General Francisco Antonio Gomez, and General Carlos Anderson, and participated with them in the unsuccessful revolution on the Haitian frontier in 1893.

It was thereafter that he conceived the idea of the formation of the "Junta Revolucionaria de Jóvenes." Collecting about him many of the braver spirits of the younger generation, and having as his associate and private secretary Don Federico Velasquez, who likewise had been forced to flee the country, General Vasquez formed the Junta which engaged during the years 1894 and 1895 in the formation of plans for the launching of a further revolution. One by one the leading generals and men of prominence who had dared to oppose Heureaux adhered to the Junta with the understanding that no move would be made and no military operations undertaken except under the supervision of the Junta itself. A French resident of Cape Haitian named Laurensen was employed as

he Junta's agent in Europe and succeeded in securing a mall measure of financial support for the enterprise. Casting about for a prominent figure to support as the chief of the revolutionary movement and as candidate for the Presidency, were Heureaux to be overthrown, the Executive Committee of the Junta addressed a cable to Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, the wealthiest merchant of the Dominican Republic, who had been forced to flee the country hrough the enmity of Heureaux, and who was then esiding temporarily in Paris, urging him to accept their ffer of support as chief of the revolution. Jiménez, who ad plans of his own, excused himself from accepting the osition proffered him on the ground of ill health, although is vanity caused him to make the cable addressed to him ublic, caring little apparently for the fact that the publcation of the message was responsible for the imprisonnent of many of the men who had tendered him their upport.

For three years the Junta laboured, but it finally disolved owing to the spirit of discouragement which had ome over the leaders of the movement, as the result of epeated misfortunes. Vasquez, at length, was permitted to return to the Republic, where he temporrily abjured politics and devoted himself, once more n Moca, to a small commercial enterprise, having s his associates Don Federico Velasquez, and his cousin nd closest friend, General Ramón Cáceres. The plans f the Junta Revolucionaria had failed, but the spirit f Horacio Vasquez never faltered, and his early desire or personal vengeance against the tyrant merged into he overwhelming ambition to free his country from a yranny which was day by day becoming more insupportable.

6.

On June 2, 1898, occurred the last serious attempt at revolution during Heureaux's administration. Although he had refused the support spontaneously tendered him three years before by the Junta Revolucionaria, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez had at length planned a conspiracy of his own. Purchasing a steamship known as the *Fanita* from an American named McKay, Jiménez sailed, under the American flag and the commercial flag of the Clyde Line, from Mobile. On May 31st, the vessel arrived at Inagua, where she obtained a pilot procured by the American Consul, and on June 1st, anchored in the harbour of Cape Haitian. Confident, apparently, that his mere arrival in Monte Cristi, where he was a popular hero and the town's leading citizen, would be sufficient to cause a spontaneous revolution to break out, Jiménez had but a few men with him, although his vessel's cargo comprised 3,000 rifles, 2,000,000 cartridges, 250 saddles and bridles, a large quantity of dynamite, 12 cannon, and a considerable store of clothing and provisions. The leaders who accompanied him—among them Generals Agustín Morales, Manuel de Jesús Mercado, and Pedro Lopez Villanueva—received assurances at Cape Haitian from agents who met them there that the moment was ripe for insurrection. Reaching the port of Monte Cristi at midnight on the second of June, the invading force disembarked silently and, encountering no opposition, captured the Governor of the Province, General Miguel Pichardo, and thereafter occupied the city. The revolutionists were thrown into utter confusion, however, by the unexpected assault of a few guerrillas headed by the local Comandante de Armas. In the disorder which ensued General Pichardo

escaped, and rallying a considerable body of Governmental troops, dispersed the invading party before the populace learned of its arrival. General Morales and many others among the revolutionaries were slain, while Jiménez succeeded in escaping to the *Fanita* upon which he at once fled to Inagua. Upon his arrival at the latter port, the British authorities held him for violation of their neutrality laws, although they refused to surrender him to Heureaux, who had immediately proceeded there upon the gunboat *Presidente*. Discharged at length by the British courts, Jiménez removed to Cuba.

Thus ended in complete fiasco the expedition of the *Fanita*. And casting ridicule upon the chief of the filibusterers by claiming that Jiménez had fled from Monte Cristi before a shot was fired, Heureaux avenged himself by forcing Jiménez's relatives in the Republic to pay a large indemnity from properties purporting to belong to Jiménez, notwithstanding the vehement protests of the German Legation that these properties had been mortgaged to various German banking institutions by Jiménez in order to raise the money necessary for his unsuccessful coup.

The fact that there had been found among General Morales' papers after his death a despatch addressed to the Assistant Secretary of War of the United States conceived in these terms,

"The landing has been successful. The Provisional Government has been set up. I trust that you will continue always to lend your very active coöperation and your aid,"

gave weight to Heureaux's immediate official complaint to the American Department of State that the outfitting of

the *Fanita* in the United States had been connived at by officials of the United States Government. It later appeared, however, though whether Heureaux was convinced of the fact or not remains uncertain, that while certain subordinates in Executive Departments of the United States had been apprised of the intention of Jiménez to employ the *Fanita* upon a filibustering expedition, they had been led to believe that the conspiracy was directed against the Spanish authorities in Cuba and not against the Government of the Dominican Republic.

7.

The spasmodic improvement in his finances occasioned by the periodic assistance rendered by the Improvement Company had tided Heureaux over many times before, but the immense drain upon his resources occasioned by the increasing payments with which he was forced to purchase his own security, had brought the Dictator by now once more face to face with imminent ruin. Recourse to the expedient of issuing large quantities of fiat money, guaranteed by no reserve, might momentarily relieve, but could eventually only create general discontent and dissatisfaction among all classes. The paper money in circulation, without funds for redemption, at length reached $5,000,000 and the so-called "silver" money, the intrinsic value of which was only ten cents upon the dollar, amounted nominally to some $2,000,000, hoarded for the most part and not in circulation.

In 1897, unable to obtain further advances from the Improvement Company, whose resources had been materially reduced, the Dictator had been forced to permit the 1893 refunding loan to go into default. At once the Republic's credit again hovered around zero mark,

and the bondholders clamoured for the creation of the international commission, guaranteed by the loan contract, to supervise the "régie." Thereupon, after repeated efforts had been made, upon the most onerous terms, a further loan was issued through the Improvement Company, which hoped to save the investments already made by this reckless venture. Purporting to comprehend the refunding of the total bonded debt of the Republic, the new loan provided for the issuance of two series of bonds aggregating £4,236,750 in nominal value. The Republic's funded debt had therefore in the course of Heureaux's administration risen to an amount ten times greater than that which existed when the first Westendorp loan was made, and with the inclusion of the internal floating debt, the indebtedness of the nation had reached a staggering figure.

By 1898, the Dictator possessed neither money nor credit, since all the Government's revenues were pledged. Forced loans, customs exemptions in which the President participated, further issues of fiat money, were recourses which had all been exhausted. A sullen discontent was rife throughout the country, and the crisis became so acute that even the market people refused to come to the cities to sell their produce for worthless paper. Rendered desperate by the situation, Heureaux saw but two resources remaining to him as the means of obtaining those funds without which he could not hope to remain in power—Haiti and the United States. In a new conference with the Haitian President, Hippolite, which took place in April, 1898, it was determined to submit once more the boundary controversy to the arbitration of the Holy See, with the proviso that not only the boundary question, but the question of the amount of the indemnity

contingent upon its settlement as well, should be determined by the Pope's award. A secret convention resulting from the interview, forced through the Dominican Congress by the Dictator in a secret session on October 31, 1898, provided, however, that should that portion of the territory in dispute which was actually occupied by Haitian squatters, be awarded the Dominican Republic by decision of the Vatican, the territory in question would be retained by Haiti in return for the payment of $1,000,000. As compensation to Heureaux the Haitian Government paid to him $400,000, in return for which the Haitian President received a receipt for the entire million, and it was further agreed that should the disputed territory be awarded Haiti, and the Dominican Government be awarded an indemnity therefor, the same sum would be deducted by Haiti in paying the compensation decreed by the arbiter.

His Haitian neighbours had once more been bled. It was now high time that the United States Government pay liberally for the privilege of leasing Samaná, which Heureaux was confident the McKinley Administration was as set upon obtaining as had been its last Republican predecessor. As early as April, 1898, he was sounding out the way in the course of negotiations with the Department of State for the conclusion of a new reciprocity agreement, the path for which had been rendered easier by the abrogation of all most-favoured-nation treaties with the European Powers. Observing to the American Consul that he had received word from New York that the United States desired Samaná Bay for a coaling station, he said that he had replied, "Let your Government come and take it," adding significantly, "You understand me." He continued, speaking of the larger Powers,

'They take by force what they want if they can get it n no other way, and settle with the weaker powers afterwards. If this were a great Power this policy would be precisely the one which I would pursue in similar circumtances." [1]

With the outbreak of the Spanish War, Heureaux made his intent even plainer, stating in effect that while popular opinion was too much opposed to the voluntary cession of Samaná to make it possible for him to lease it, should the United States seize Samaná to satisfy some alleged claim or claims of American citizens, the Dictator would raise no objection to such action. He even authorized the despatch of the following cable, signed by the American Consul, to the Department of State:

"Rumor Spain to seize Samaná Bay; no opposition from Dominican Government if American Government take immediate possession." [2]

Acting apparently upon the instigation of two directors of the Improvement Company, Heureaux, a month later, suggested the need of urgent action in the matter, and placed the following plan before the American Consul: that the United States send a confidential agent to Santo Domingo to negotiate the cession of the Samaná territory; that a few days before the agent's arrival the United States should take forcible possession, ostensibly in satisfaction of the claims of American citizens.[3] As soon as word was received from the United States that an agent was on the way, the Dictator agreed immediately to leave Santo Domingo for Samaná for the purpose of quieting

[1] Mr. Grimke, American Consul, to Secretary Day, April 7, 1898.
[2] Mr. Grimke, American Consul, to Secretary Day, April 29, 1898.
[3] Mr. Grimke, American Consul, to Secretary Day, May 12, 1898.

popular apprehension, and stated that he already had in all parts of the country secret agents preparing the populace for such an event.

Stating that by the use of money in liberal allowances he would undoubtedly be enabled to dispose the people and their leaders towards a friendly reception of his schemes, Heureaux requested the American Consul to advise the Department of State of his need for some $300,000 for that purpose, immediately following the forcible seizure which he had suggested. So sure was he that the scheme which he proposed would meet with immediate response in Washington that Heureaux even sent for his Governor in Samaná and gave him confidential instructions as to the conduct which he should pursue should the United States take forcible possession of Samaná, ordering him by no means to interfere and to take no action beyond advising the President.[1] It was likewise suggested by the Dictator that should it be deemed desirable in order to secure more secrecy, he would gladly meet a confidential agent of the United States at Jamaica, should one be sent there with full powers to negotiate for the desired cession upon satisfactory terms.

The sole response which Heureaux received, however, and one which was far from satisfactory to him, was the assertion on the part of the Department of State that since the United States possessed no imperialistic ambitions, it was interested in nothing beyond a convention providing for a lease of Samaná similar to that negotiated in 1892, and the suggestion that to avoid any protests which foreign Powers might interpose, no objection would be raised by the United States to the insertion in the proposed convention of a clause providing that the United States, in

[1] Mr. Grimke, American Consul, to Secretary Day, May 24, 1898.

return for the concession granted by the Dominican Government, would lease to the Dominican Republic a coaling station on some American island.[1]

8.

The financial situation grew more and more desperate with the dissipation of the sums received from Haiti. Already indebted to leading Dominican merchants for large loans advanced to him at a high rate, upon which not even the interest had been paid, it became impossible for Heureaux even to obtain small advances in the Republic for his personal pressing requirements. In April, the Government was forced to default on the unified loan of 1897.

Popular agitation by May of 1899 had become so great that the Dictator deemed it opportune for a period to leave the capital, and announced his intention of proceeding to Monte Cristi for the purpose of holding an interview with the new President of Haiti, General Sam. The meeting between Heureaux and the Haitian President, which was to be attended likewise by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two Republics, Don Enrique Henriquez and M. Brutus Victor, was scheduled to take place at eight o'clock in the morning of May 28th at Môle St. Nicolas. Seizing the opportunity afforded by the presence in the Republic of the newly appointed American Minister, Mr. Powell, the Dictator summoned him to an interview in Monte Cristi at one o'clock in the morning of the same day.

The conference between the two gave Heureaux a chance to make a final plea for assistance from the United States. Expressing his entire willingness to conclude im-

[1] Mr. Grimke, American Consul, to Secretary Day, May 12, 1898.

mediately the reciprocity treaty which the United States Government had had under consideration, Heureaux urged the inclusion in the formal draft presented to him by the American Minister of the following clause:

"The United States Government shall take such measures as it may deem sufficient and necessary, when appealed to by the Dominican Government, to prevent, either by force, threat or intimidation, the conclusion of a treaty granting equal or like commercial facilities to other nations, under the clause above mentioned,[1] by such nation as may desire to make a treaty of the above character." [2]

After the Minister had expressed his willingness to transmit the suggested amendment to his Government, Heureaux touched briefly upon other subjects. He expressed his surprise at the rapidity with which the United States had defeated Spain, and expressed the opinion that the Cubans would give the United States great trouble; that they were divided into various factions which would show no gratitude to the United States, and which would feel, on the contrary, that they themselves unaided had achieved their independence. He stated his conviction that annexation of Cuba by the United States was the only solution. He adverted once more with considerable bitterness to the assistance which he alleged the Government of the United States had rendered Don Juan Isidro Jiménez.

Coming then to the real motive which had caused him to summon the American Minister, Heureaux presented Mr. Powell with the draft, in his own handwriting, of a secret political treaty which he proposed should be con-

[1] A clause granting to the United States exclusive commercial benefits not accorded other Powers.

[2] Mr. Powell, American Minister, to Secretary Hay, July 10, 1899.

cluded immediately between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Urging the prime importance of his proposal, the Dictator expressed the need of immediate action. The project was no more nor less than the plea for the assumption by the United States of a contractual protectorate over the Dominican Republic. The provisions of the proposed instrument were as follows:

Article I. The cession by the Dominican Republic to the United States, in the event of the outbreak of war between the United States and some foreign Power, of the exclusive use of the Dominican ports;

Article II. The joint obligation on the part of the two countries to prevent the outfitting of revolutionary or filibustering expeditions from their respective ports;

Article III. The obligation on the part of the two countries to prevent the sale of vessels, ammunition or supplies for such purposes;

Article IV. The extension of the provisions of the two foregoing articles to Cuba and Porto Rico so long as the latter territories remained under the control of the United States;

Article V. The agreement by the United States to prevent "morally and materially" any attack against the Dominican Republic and to constitute itself the arbiter in any international dispute involving the Dominican Republic. The similar obligation on the part of the United States to "protect morally" the credit of the Dominican Republic.

Article VI. In the contingency that the proposed treaty should become known and become a motive for hostility on the part of any foreign Power towards the Dominican Republic, the obligation on the part of the United States to attempt to compose

the dispute and in the failure of such attempt to employ the army and navy of the United States in the preservation of its treaty relationship with the Dominican Republic.

Article VII. The obligation on the part of the Government of the United States to guarantee the independence of the Dominican Republic and the integrity of its territory.

Article VIII. The announcement of the willingness of the Dominican Government to permit the warships of the United States to defend themselves within the territorial waters of the Dominican Republic should they be there attacked by the vessels of other Powers after the outbreak of war.

Article IX. The obligation on the part of the Dominican Republic to close its ports in case of war to the public vessels of all Powers at war with the United States.[1]

The proposed convention was at once submitted by Mr. Powell to the Department of State. The Dictator's project not only met with the blunt rejection of the United States Government, which had at the time no desire to increase its responsibilities in the Caribbean and which had in no event any inclination towards assuming the protectorate suggested, but caused likewise a severe reprimand to be sent by Secretary Hay to the American Minister for having transmitted such a proposal to his Government.

9.

Upon his return to the capital from the Haitian frontier, Heureaux found that the situation had been eased somewhat during his absence by the receipt of an advance in ready cash which his agents in Europe had

[1] Mr. Powell, American Minister, to Secretary Hay, July 10, 1899.

obtained for him. Employing the larger part of this amount as a means of pacifying the more clamorous of his creditors among the merchants in Santo Domingo and San Pedro de Macorís, the Dictator was well aware that the favour thus shown to the merchants of the South would increase the discontent of the Cibao. Announcing the immediate intention of his Government to redeem the paper circulating in the Republic by a new issue of fiat money at the rate of three to one, Heureaux set out in person for the Cibao to hold a series of interviews with the leading merchants of the northern Provinces, to attempt to pacify them, and to make arrangements for the conversion which he had promised.

Now at last the impulse arising from the labours of the "Junta Revolucionaria de Jóvenes" was to bear fruit.

In the spring of 1899, Ramón Lara, whose family had for many years been closely connected with the families of General Horacio Vasquez and of General Ramón Cáceres, had returned to the Cibao from Paris. While in Paris he had been a member of the group surrounding Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, and it was there that the plan to abandon further attempts at revolution and to concentrate solely upon the assassination of General Heureaux had had its conception. Returning to Moca, Lara had communicated the intent of his fellow-conspirators to General Vasquez and to General Cáceres. The idea was at once caught up with enthusiasm by Cáceres, who had been led from early childhood to believe that Heureaux had been involved equally with Cesáreo Guillermo in the murder of his father, General Manuel Cáceres, and who was elated at the opportunity to distinguish himself in the minds of his countrymen by ridding the Republic of the tyrant. To General Vasquez, the concept of assassination was inher-

ently repugnant, and he favoured rather a renewed attempt to overthrow the Government by open revolution.

By the beginning of July the conspiracy included a group of the closest associates of the two cousins, among them Casimiro Cordero, Domingo Pichardo, the Maza brothers—Vicente and Blas—Evaristo Nival, and José Brache. It was determined to strike during the announced visit of Heureaux to the Cibao. On the 25th of July, the plans had been perfected. The original plan, to assassinate Heureaux as he entered the residence in Moca of Don Carlos Rojas, with whom he intended to lodge, was later modified to an attempt to shoot him at a meeting which the Dictator intended to hold in the Club de Recreo. This in turn was subsequently abandoned for the plan to shoot Heureaux down as he was passing through the street on foot. At the last moment, General Vasquez placed before his cousin, Cáceres, who had constituted himself the leader of the conspiracy and who burned to fire the fatal shot himself, the gravity of the situation, and the many obstacles which lay before him—the difficulty of escape even were it possible to perpetrate the assassination, and the ruin and desolation which would engulf the families of them all were the plot to fail. But Cáceres was not to be moved from his purpose and replied defiantly, "Lilis may be brave, but he is no braver than I; and as for his followers attempting to capture me, there is not one of them who will not run for his life once he sees that Lilis is dead."

Arriving, in accordance with his announced intention, in Moca on the evening of July 25th, General Heureaux passed the night in the residence of Don Carlos Rojas, and after obtaining the next morning the assurances required from the local merchants that they would co-operate in his

conversion scheme, announced his intention of leaving Moca in the early afternoon to proceed to Santiago.

The conspirators had separated. General Vasquez with seven or eight companions, all fully armed, determined to await the passage of the President beyond Moca on the highroad to Santiago and there make the desperate attempt to annihilate Heureaux and his escort in an open onslaught, should Cáceres' attempt to shoot him fail. Upon turning to those who had agreed to accompany him, Cáceres found that their courage had failed them, and in the end his sole companion was Jacobito Lara, the younger brother of Ramón, who was at the time barely sixteen years of age. Carrying out his original intention, Cáceres, as soon as he reached the central square of the town, dismounted from his horse, and with young Lara walked to a point past which the President must pass on his way to join his followers. As the President was speaking to an official in the doorway of the local office of the Hacienda Department, Cáceres came upon him. Raising his pistol, he shot him through the body, and other shots, both from his revolver and from Lara's, were fired in quick succession, all finding their mark. Instinctively reaching with his right hand for his pistol, Heureaux shot back, but his right hand, mutilated so many years before in the affray in Haiti, was slow in responding; the shot went wild, killing a beggar crouching in the street near-by. Finally a shot from Cáceres' revolver penetrated Heureaux's mouth, crashing through the base of his skull, and the Dictator fell to the ground. In a moment the body was riddled with bullets, and Cáceres, escaping with his companion through the midst of Heureaux's armed followers, ran to his horse and fled from the town.

Meanwhile the conspirators waiting with General

Vasquez on the road to Santiago remained uncertain even that the attempt at assassination had been made, since the music of a band playing in the President's honour in front of the garrison of the Guardia Nacional, had drowned the noise of the shots; it was not until a youth running from the city passed them crying, "They have murdered Lilis!" that they knew the plot had been successful. Riding hard and spurring their horses they fled first to the Vasquez plantation at Estancia Nueva; but realizing accurately, as events subsequently proved, that the troops of the Government would proceed there first to apprehend them, they finally took refuge in the bush.

As soon as night had fallen, General Vasquez, who had been chosen leader of the revolutionary troops, with a small band of twenty-one followers rode into Moca, and in the street leading from the Ayuntamiento proclaimed the famous revolution of July 26, 1899. The acclamation of the crowds who had gathered and the cries of "Viva Don Juan Isidro Jiménez," declared then by Vasquez to be the supreme chief of the revolution, apprised the officials of the Dictatorship of the turn that events were taking, and, dispersed by fire from the Governmental forces, the revolutionists were forced once more to seek cover in the hills outside the city.

For some hours the body of the dead President lay in Moca, until his faithful supporter, General Pedro Pepín, Governor of Santiago, came with a small group of friends and bore it to Santiago, where it was hurriedly laid to rest in the Iglesia Mayor. So died Heureaux.

10.

The Dictator's own estimate of his achievements may be found in the inaugural address which he delivered upon

commencing his final term of office, on February 27, 1897:

"Among these fatigues of governing, being present in one spot, flying to another, giving no rest to my body nor to my spirit, I have at length concluded the first and great day's work, and have been enabled to present to you now as a synopsis of our administration until the present moment the following salient features:

"1. The definite guarantee of peace which has come as the result of a supreme effort and with it the assurance of the maintenance of local authority;
"2. The establishment of various railroads;
"3. Submarine cable connection with Europe and America and the creation and extension of telegraph lines throughout the Republic:
"4. The development of agriculture and commerce with a consequent increase in the public revenues;
"5. The growth of public instruction, the increase in printing and in newspaper publication, and the founding of libraries;
"6. The creation of a navy;
"7. The organization of the army;
"8. The creation of new political entities such as provinces, districts, communes and cantons, thus making possible the expansion of our democratic system;
"9. The construction of public buildings and of public works including wharves and docks."

Upon the page opposite that on which Heureaux so proudly blazoned the tale of his life's accomplishment, his countrymen might well have inscribed another, truer, fuller estimate:

The substitution of corruption for integrity as the norm in administration; the suffocation of that impulse towards liberal government by Constitutional methods which had brought González first to the Presidency, and which had later shown signs of growth under Espaillat; the immense increase in the public debt by loans of which not one penny had been expended for the public profit; the stifling of all national agricultural and industrial development except that promoted by foreign capital; the centralization of the opportunities for commercial expansion among the favoured few; the imprisonment, execution or assassination of numberless victims; the impairment of the nation's sovereignty and the barter of its territory; the disintegration of political parties through the corruption or removal of the leaders of public thought among the educated classes; and above all, the consistent effort to obliterate those ideals of liberty and patriotism, maintained by the founders of the Republic, from the hearts of that younger generation upon which the hope of the salvation of the Republic rested.

MOCA

The Scene of the Assassination of Ulises Heureaux

CHAPTER IX

THE LIBERAL REACTION

1.

THE news of Heureaux's assassination dumbfounded the Dictator's satellites. Consternation seized the capital. It was only under protest that the aged Vice President, General Wenceslao Figuereo, whose initiative his chief had long since crushed, was finally persuaded to take up the reins of government. But fortified by the assurances of those surrounding him that the murder of Heureaux met with no popular response, Figuereo in turn encouraged the Congress, declaring in the official announcement of his Constitutional succession to the Chief Magistracy, that the indignant protests of the inhabitants of Moca made it certain that the assassination of Heureaux was devoid of any connection with an attempted rebellion against the Government. In the message of response presented by the President of the Congress, Don Isaias Franco, the new President was consequently assured of the support of the National Legislature and was advised that the news of the Dictator's death

"had caused intense sorrow to the Congress, which thus sees depart forever, and in so tragic a manner, the citizen whose efforts had succeeded in obtaining and assuring peace in the Republic." [1]

Retaining his predecessor's Cabinet, General Figuereo despatched to the Cibao the Minister of Fomento, Don Teófilo Cordero y Bidó, to secure the support of the governors of the northern Provinces for the faltering

[1] *Listin Diario*, July 31, 1899.

Government in the capital. It was, however, a foregone conclusion that the attempt to stem the current was hopeless. With the removal from the scene of the personality that had dominated the Republic for two decades, the latent power of the multitude was at last gathering renewed life. There was no one among Heureaux's sycophants man enough to fill the shoes of the dead tyrant.

But, in truth, the people were long in rousing from their seeming apathy. It seemed hardly credible at first that the days of despotism were past and that they had become once again in all reality their own masters. Here and there, little by little, the dam of oppression and terror constructed by Heureaux crumbled away before the rising flood of the demand for popular liberty. At length, in a tidal wave similar to that which had arisen after the overthrow of Spain and after the six years' tyranny of Baez, but more imposing in that it was truly popular, the last vestiges of Dictatorship were swept away.

2.

But to the leaders of the revolution, the apparent initial indifference of the public proved a bitter disappointment. Disheartened by what they deemed a lack of popular response, the great majority of those who had at first joined General Vasquez and General Cáceres deserted, to conceal themselves near their own homes. Pursued relentlessly by troops under the command of General Pedro Pepín, the Governor of Santiago, the small band which remained was surrounded at one time by a force of 800 men. For days the rebels existed without food and fled from one point to another without sleep. Word reached them that the properties of General Vasquez and his

cousin had been utterly destroyed, their cattle carried off, and their crops burned. So bitter was the persecution of all those believed to have in any way connection with the revolutionists that even the peons on the Vasquez plantations were murdered by the pursuing forces, one of them suspended by his arms from a tree for twenty-four hours and brutally tortured before his execution. To render the capture of the members of the group which still remained faithful more difficult, it was finally determined that they would separate. Vasquez and Cáceres, however, continued together, taking refuge each night in some different locality, until at length, after innumerable hardships, they succeeded in reaching the residence of their relatives, the Ventura family, which stood at a little distance from the city of San Francisco de Macorís in a spot known as El Pozo. There they ascertained that even now, the middle of August, of all the leaders who were known to favour the revolution, only those of Salcedo had dared publicly to proclaim their determination to support the movement. Driven from their retreat at El Pozo by the news of impending pursuit by an expedition of Government forces from La Vega, the two leaders fled secretly, on August 16th, to Moca, where they succeeded in gathering together a group of thirty-five adherents.

On the 18th of August, determined now to take the offensive, after notifying the local authorities of their intention to occupy the town, the revolutionaries entered San Francisco de Macorís without opposition, since the local officials were lukewarm in their loyalty to the new President. Taking up his headquarters in the city's Fortress, General Vasquez at once addressed the following telegram to the national authorities in Santo Domingo and to all the Governors of the Provinces:

"We have just proclaimed the revolution in San Francisco de Macorís. We are now completing preparations to attack you."

With the publication of this resolute defiance the tide now turned and ran swiftly in favour of the revolution. The Minister of War, General Patiño, who had been sent from Santo Domingo to Sánchez, with a force greatly superior to that mustered by the revolutionary commanders, in order to attack the revolutionary outposts along the line of the La Vega-Sánchez Railway, turned back and re-embarked his forces, fearing that the revolutionists outnumbered his own troops.

Sending General Cáceres with a body of 150 men to strengthen their adherents in Salcedo, General Vasquez despatched a commission headed by Don Domingo Ferreras to La Vega to treat for the surrender of that city and to assure the inhabitants through the Government's representative, Don Zoilo García, that all lives and property would be spared by the revolutionary forces. García at first attempted to throw the commissioners into prison and to hold them at the disposition of the Government, but the temper of the citizens of La Vega was such that he feared to carry out the project, particularly in view of the report that General Cáceres at the head of a large body of men was then marching upon the town. Consequently, soon afterwards, General Vasquez was enabled to occupy the city, and since, after these initial successes, the forces of the revolution were constantly increasing and a large portion of the Cibao had come out openly in support of the revolution, General Vasquez decided to push on to Moca. He entered the latter city at the head of approximately 1,500 troops.

It is doubtful if that quiet town had ever previously been so congested. The passing of the cavalry sounded like thunder as the mounted revolutionaries rode through the usually deserted streets. It was then determined to attempt the capture of Santiago without further delay, since the redoubtable Governor of the Province, General Pepín, an illiterate negro, ferocious and cruel in all his dealings, whose services Heureaux had found invaluable, was away, engaged in quelling the revolution proclaimed in Monte Cristi by General Andrés Navarro. Notwithstanding the absence of the Governor, Santiago still held a strong detachment of Government troops under the command of three members of the Cabinet. Despatching General Cáceres, with the strongest detachment under his own command, to take up his position at Pontezuela, General Vasquez sent General Nolberto Tiburcio with a smaller detachment to El Puñol and General Domingo Pichardo to El Bambú, all strategic points at no great distance from the town. At dawn on the day of the attack, General Eugenio Valerio, a supporter of the Government, surrendered to the besieging forces and withdrew from the town.

The attack was commenced by the detachment under the command of General Tiburcio, General Pichardo occupying El Castillo. General Vasquez took over the command of the troops under General Cáceres, who were ordered to abandon their horses and proceed on foot in order more readily to breach the defenses of the city. Due to erroneous information which had been conveyed to them regarding the disposition of the Government forces, the revolutionaries were at first checked in their assault upon the town. Ammunition also had run short owing to the fact that the majority of those composing the revolutionary forces were young and inexperienced

in warfare and far from expert riflemen, who felt, apparently, that their prowess would be determined by the number of shots which they fired. But in the early afternoon, the revolutionaries reopened the attack and succeeded at length in reaching outlying positions near the fortress. A messenger with a flag of truce was then sent out from the city and an interview was granted by General Vasquez to representatives of the Government. There came to the interview sixteen of the Government's Generals and the three Cabinet Ministers then in Santiago, Generals Alvarez and Valverde and Don Teófilo Cordero. The commander of the revolutionary troops thereupon demanded the unconditional surrender of the city. The terms proposed were necessarily accepted, and sending first a commission to take over command of the fortress, General Vasquez later entered the city at the head of 1,000 men.

The night of August 28th was passed in fortifying positions of strategic importance in expectation of the approaching return of General Pepín. At dawn of August 29th, outposts of the revolutionary forces captured two men of the advance guard sent ahead by General Pepín, and from them it was learned that the Governor had already reached a site known as La Emboscada, not far from Santiago itself. Later in the morning a messenger reached General Vasquez under orders to advise him that General Pepín had determined to surrender to the revolutionists, and to request that the revolutionary commander agree to meet General Pepín outside the city in order to determine the conditions of the surrender. The request was likewise made that there be present at the interview Heureaux's three Ministers. As General Vasquez was preparing to leave the town to attend the interview,

he was called to one side by Don Teófilo Cordero, who stated that since his own days of power were now waning and General Vasquez's star was in the ascendent, he felt he might well afford to advise him to be on his guard in the proposed interview, since General Pepín was undoubtedly preparing an ambush. "There is not a man in the Republic more treacherous or more dangerous than that negro," concluded General Cordero. Taking the precaution of surrounding the spot where the interview was to take place with his own troops, General Vasquez came to the meeting place agreed upon at noon. Pepín announced his willingness to surrender, but insisted that his troops be granted the pay due them and that they be permitted, to avoid unnecessary humiliation, to carry their arms through the city of Santiago on their way to the Fortress. While General Vasquez consented to the latter condition, he absolutely refused to consider the payment of the surrendered troops, and rejected Pepín's final appeal to force Heureaux's three Cabinet Ministers to pay the sum demanded on the ground that they could well afford it, since the Governor charged that they had stolen a strong box containing $150,000 which Heureaux was carrying with him at the time he was assassinated. Marched by fours through the city to the Fortress, Pepín's troops were forced to surrender their arms to the revolutionary authorities, and were thence despatched to their homes.

3.

On the night of August 29th, the revolutionary generals gathered in the Governor's official residence in Santiago unanimously proclaimed General Vasquez Provisional President of the Republic. At once the Government was organized. Appointing General Cáceres Minister

for War, Don José Brache Minister of the Interior, and Don Domingo Ferreras Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Provisional President distributed the other portfolios among General Samuel de Moya, Don José Maria Nouel, Don Arturo Zeno, and Don Francisco Guzmán.

On the following day, a commission sent by President Figuereo, headed by General Vasquez's brother, Don Leonte Vasquez, reached Santiago to attempt to parley with the Provisional Government. Refusing to hear of any conditions other than those of absolute surrender on the part of the Government in Santo Domingo, General Vasquez set out at the head of his forces for the capital. Before he reached Santo Domingo, General Figuereo had already accepted the inevitable and resigned the Presidency, leaving control of the Government in the hands of those members of his Cabinet who had remained in the Capital. The cabinet itself had, however, been forced to resign on the following day, August 31st, by an uprising in the city, and upon General Vasquez's arrival at the gates of the capital on September 4th, the entry of the members of the Provisional Government was unanimously acclaimed. The streets were thronged with people crying "Viva la Revolución." Wherever the commanding General passed, the flowers thrown by the women from the balconies were so numerous that they formed a carpet beneath his horse's hoofs. The inhabitants turned out as one man to honour the Provisional President, who was heralded as the harbinger of the regeneration of the Republic. Proceeding immediately to the Governmental Palace, General Vasquez there took over control of the Government from the members of the Junta formed by the citizens upon the overthrow of the former Cabinet.

As soon as the Provisional Government was installed,

a brief investigation sufficed to show that the economic situation of the Government was desperate. The treasury was empty, and the sole heritage of concrete value received from the preceding Administration proved to be some 40,000 rounds of ammunition which by some chance had not been dissipated. The first step taken by the Provisional President was, however, not to amass funds for the use of the Government itself, but to attempt to relieve the condition of the poorer classes in the Republic, who, with the progressive depreciation of the paper money issued by Heureaux, had been left without resources of any kind. Announcing that his Government would immediately commence to redeem the paper money outstanding by an appropriation of $10,000 gold a month, a large proportion of the meager customs revenues, the President at the same time proclaimed the gold standard for the Republic and established the rate of the national currency at five to one. His next step was the issuance, on September 19th, of a decree convoking the people to national elections for the election of a Constitutional Government, and upon the same day General Vasquez announced his own support of Don Juan Isidro Jiménez as a candidate for the Presidency in the following terms:

"My fellow citizens: Since it has been far from my own mind and from the minds of my companions in this government to benefit ourselves through the confidence which the country in these critical moments has placed in us, I believe the time has come to make the following announcement for the public benefit.

"1. Since, as a simple citizen, I possess the right to declare my support of a candidate for the Presidency, and as I am convinced that the people find in Don Juan Isidro Jiménez peculiar merits and peculiar qualifications, he is

the man whom I desire to see elected Chief Executive of the State; and if through any personal influence of mine I am able to assist in obtaining that result, I will confidently make use of that influence in behalf of that citizen.

"2. Since the revolution of the 26th of July was undertaken with the firm intention of doing away with the disastrous rule imposed by the man who had subjected everything in the country to his own ambitions, I do not intend to fulfil this ambition of mine by creating conditions which would render the rule of despotism still stronger; but I hope, on the contrary, that my desire may be realized through the faithful practice of those liberal and honest methods which have been the ideal of my whole life. The Government over which I preside will consequently guarantee the most absolute liberty and the most entire honesty in the coming elections."

This public announcement of his support of Jiménez made clear beyond a doubt Vasquez's desire to promote the best interests of the Republic as he conceived them rather than to further his own ambitions. The vigour and tenacity with which General Vasquez had conducted the revolution had earned for him a host of supporters throughout the country. His popularity was tremendous. The fall of the Dictatorship, it was recognized, had been largely due to his efforts and public gratitude was overwhelming. The armed forces throughout the country were loyal to him, and the control of the public administration was vested in his hands. Yet now, for the first time in the history of the nation, a man who had made himself a popular military idol, who might have retained the Presidency with the approval of all, announced his determination to step aside in favour of another candidate because he believed that the interests of the nation might thus better be served.

The candidate so indicated possessed, moreover, none of the qualifications for which Presidents had in the past been selected. The son of that General Manuel Jiménez who had been President for a brief period in the early years of the Republic, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez was a man already well past middle life when he was thus summoned to the Presidency. Becoming a merchant in his early youth, he had lived a great part of his life in Europe and in Haiti, although he had always maintained a residence in Monte Cristi, where the prestige of his family and his own increasing wealth had caused him to be generally regarded as the foremost citizen of the Province. Devoid of military capacity, the only attempt he had ever made to gain martial renown, the filibustering expedition of the *Fanita,* had failed ignominiously. Neither had he ever given any proof of possessing the qualities of statesmanship, since he had never held public office. To the great majority of the Dominican people he was personally unknown, and even General Vasquez, who had proclaimed him his own chief, had only come into casual contact with Jiménez many years before. Although Jiménez was a man of culture and refinement and of great personal charm, there seemed therefore to be no apparent reason why he should have acquired such undoubted popularity and undeniable preëminence in the public mind.

The cause of his widespread prestige was an odd one. To the great mass of the more ignorant portion of the populace, Jiménez represented a man of unbounded wealth disposed to share his fortune with all. It was commonly believed that by his election as President, the money supposedly at his disposal would relieve the impoverishment of each and every one, and that by the distri-

bution of his wealth immediate prosperity would come to the Republic. Even by his chief supporters it was thought that Jiménez, during the years prior to his rupture with Heureaux, when he was at the head of the largest commercial enterprise in the country, had invested great sums in Europe. This current belief was, however, unfounded. When actively engaged in business, before the hostility of the Dictator had forced him to leave the country, Jiménez had been the possessor of what was presumably one of the largest fortunes in the Dominican Republic. As a result of a series of reverses and his enforced exile, however, as well as the persecution of Heureaux's Government, his business had been well-nigh wrecked and the last remnants of what property he could dispose of had been expended in the *Fanita* enterprise.

During the revolution the phrase, "Jiménez viene con dinero,"[1] was general among the lower classes. As a matter of fact, as a local wit in the capital later said, a more accurate version of this phrase might well have been "Jiménez viene por dinero."[2]

For not only had the lure of political life seduced Jiménez after his flight from his country, but it had also become his fixed purpose to recoup his personal fortunes, and this he hoped to accomplish at the same time that he achieved his political goal. At the time Jiménez was proclaimed the Presidential candidate of the revolutionary party by General Vasquez, he had been stripped of the last vestiges of his fortune; he had barely escaped imprisonment at Inagua for the infringement of the British laws of neutrality, and he was living in Cuba under the close surveillance of the American military authorities, who had

[1] "Jiménez comes with money."
[2] "Jiménez comes for money."

been warned by Heureaux of his revolutionary tendencies, and who were additionally prejudiced against him through the fact that the *Fanita* had been outfitted within the jurisdiction of the United States. The news of Heureaux's assassination and the outbreak of the revolution, of which he had been proclaimed the chief, came to Jiménez as a gift from heaven. As soon as the Provisional Government had succeeded in obtaining his release from the American authorities in Cuba, Jiménez embarked for Puerto Plata. Pending his arrival, the Provisional Government proceeded to undertake what measures of reform were practicable in the brief time which would elapse before the installation of a Constitutional Administration.

In its difficult task the Provisional Government was supported by the exceptional unanimity of public opinion. The assurances contained in the first proclamation of the Provisional President to his fellow-citizens on August 30th re-echoed:

"The law will be my sword and its triumph the only recompense to which I aspire, the only ambition which causes me to undertake the responsibility of heading a government which in itself is abnormal and by its very nature makes my task difficult.

"My first step will be the re-establishment of peace and the preparation of the elections in which shall be chosen him who will relieve me of this enormous burden and who will raise with patriotism and honor the financial burden which crushes us. Have confidence in me, fellow-citizens, and in those young, honorable, and enthusiastic patriots who share with me the labors and the responsibilities of this Government. Let all those who have the interests of their country at heart join the ranks of this crusade . . . We have no peculiar flag, no political badge; we do not

turn to the past . . . What we seek is the regeneration of the Republic, to see her prosperous, free and independent, occupying amidst the civilized nations of the world that position which the bravery of her deeds and the ability of her sons may conquer for her."

The cry of reform was raised by all. For the first time it was to the younger generation that the Government turned for assistance. Honesty in administration was the watchword of the Provisional President's policy. For the first time a Provisional *de facto* Government promulgated a budget within which, by decree of the President, the expenditures of the Government must be maintained. Scanty as the revenues of the nation had become, and diminished additionally by the President's decision to devote a portion of them towards relieving the general distress by the gradual conversion of the depreciated paper money, the orders given by the President were scrupulously obeyed. For the first time no rumour was heard that any of the funds of the national treasury had been expended for the personal profit of members of the Government.

In the elections held October 20th, Jiménez was elected President without opposition and General Vasquez Vice President, although the latter's name had originally been put forward by his friends upon their own initiative without their leader's consent. At the same time there were elected to the Congress many of the most representative men to be found within the Republic. Called into special session on November 7th, the Congress declared Jiménez and Vasquez to be legally elected, and the date of their inauguration was set for November 15th. In a final message to the Congress, the Provisional President related the

accomplishments of his Administration during the brief two months and a half it had been in power; its efforts to improve economic conditions; the suppression in the budget promulgated of all allowances other than those for services actually rendered the Republic; the measures of liberty bestowed upon the citizens of the Republic; and the granting of complete freedom to the press. As the Provisional President announced, his Government

"with the most limited resources, desirous of shortening the existence of a government not created in accordance with the Constitution, might not have been able to accomplish much and it might have erred; but it had in any event held high the standard of those principles which triumphed with the triumph of the revolution and which should save, and save forever, the Republic itself."

4.

The inauguration of the Jiménez Government might well have marked the dawning of a new epoch. It had everything in its favour. The horrors of the tyranny were done away with; the standards of reform in administration had already supplanted those of corruption; the figures of the old régime were in exile or in hiding; the finest flower of the younger generation, mercilessly suppressed for so many years, had now come to the fore; and among all men throughout the country there existed a general longing for integrity and capacity in government, for decency and honesty in public life; and for the free opportunity to turn to peaceful occupations with the assurance that they might now enjoy, without molestation, the fruits of their own labours.

The Cabinet appointed by Jiménez was by no means

composed in its major part of men who had figured prominently in the revolution, although upon General Vasquez's solicitation his companion in arms, Don José Brache, was appointed Minister for War, and General Ramón Cáceres to a position of almost equal importance, that of Governor of Santiago, the key Province of the Cibao. The Vice President himself, receiving appointment as Delegate of the Government in the Cibao, proceeded to Santiago, where he fixed his residence, shortly after the installation of the new Government. Resentment was undeniably created at once among the foremost leaders in the late revolution by Jiménez's selections for his Cabinet, which broke out in public criticism of the appointment of Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of Don Alvaro Logroño as Minister of Justice. It was felt by the prime movers of the revolution that only those who had been identified with the rebellion should participate in the Administration.

But public attention was suddenly withdrawn from such considerations by the fact that scarcely had the Government been installed when the legacy of unpaid debts bequeathed to it by Heureaux caused a sudden crisis. The difficulties occasioned the Dominican Government at this critical moment were once more caused by the exigencies of the French. Although considerable sums had been paid upon the old Boismare and Caccavelli claims by Heureaux, there still remained due upon them at his death some 280,000 francs. Upon the inauguration of the Jiménez Government, the latter was immediately pressed to settle the obligations of the nation by representatives of several claimants, among them the French Consul, and a delay was asked until the Government might have time to prepare a project for the payment of all of the amounts

due by installments. The French Consul, however, refused to consider any proposition other than immediate payment, menaced the Government with a proposal to embargo the monthly allotment of $60,000 received by the treasury from the Improvement Company for budgetary expenses, and failing in that purpose, threatened, unless his demands were complied with within three days, to announce a blockade of Dominican ports by the French war vessels then maneuvering in the Caribbean. In a public appeal addressed to the nation by the President and his Cabinet, the President outlined the situation, stating that the French Consul had refused the offer of the Government to pay the amounts claimed in three installments within the following four months; related the inability of the Administration to meet the demand for immediate payment owing to its scant resources; and announced its determination to stand firm against concessions which it could not afford to make.

The Presidential message created so much popular agitation that committees were appointed at public meetings to solicit subscriptions to enable the Government to meet the French demands. Notwithstanding the impoverishment of the country, subscriptions were actually received in an amount sufficient to enable the Government to pay the sums demanded. Thereupon the French Consul, apparently still more unsatisfied, protested loudly that the Presidential message had constituted an insult to his country, and that his personal security was jeopardized by the public indignation which had been aroused. The rumour then became current that the French Government was sending its Atlantic Squadron to enforce redress for the alleged indignity offered its representative. On January 7th, the French flagship *Cécile*, with two other men-of-

war, arrived in the harbour of Santo Domingo, to be followed three days later by a United States warship once more opportunely engaged in gun practice. The attitude of the French Admiral upon his arrival proved consequently to be so conciliatory that Jiménez was enabled without loss of dignity to announce that the incident was closed.

The widespread indignation created by the pressure imposed by the French Government upon the Dominican Government at a time when it was confronted with almost insuperable financial difficulties, predisposed the public to anticipate a similar attitude on the part of the other foreign Powers. Secretary Hay, desirous of emphasizing the friendly disposition of the United States, had despatched clear instructions upon this important phase of policy to the American Minister in Santo Domingo:

"Owing to the difficult situation which confronts the Dominican Government it is not to be pressed for immediate payment of American claims, although the American Government is necessarily insistent that all rights of American citizens be fully protected." [1]

Unfortunately, the American Minister, disregarding his instructions, and seeking to emulate the dubious success of his French colleague, was unwise enough to add fuel to the growing anti-foreign feeling by delivering an ultimatum to the Dominican Government pressing for the payment within eight days of the last installment due upon the claim of an American named McKay. This claim, involving the loss of the concession for the construction of the bridge across the Ozama River, had

[1] Secretary Hay to Mr. Powell, February 15, 1900.

already for many years been the subject of an acrid dispute between the former holder of the concession and the Ayuntamiento of the capital. While the American claim was promptly satisfied by the Dominican Government as an evidence, according to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,[1] of its desire to strengthen its friendly relations with the United States, the attitude assumed by the American Minister caused widespread condemnation, and provoked, not unnaturally, actual hostility towards the American Government.

While anti-American feeling was vigorously displayed at this time, it had in fact been rising during the latter years of Heureaux's Administration, owing primarily to the increasing influence of the Improvement Company. Identified in the popular mind with all that was iniquitous in the Dictator's Government, the demand now became general that the Government take measures to cancel the Company's concession by any means within its power. Jiménez at first announced his hearty sympathy with this desire. In his initial interview with the American Minister, when the recognition of the United States Government was officially tendered him, he criticized bitterly the mismanagement of the customs service by the officials of the Improvement Company, called attention to the fact that for years the Company's contract had not been fulfilled, and dwelt particularly upon the fact that it was alleged the Company was spreading injurious reports in the United States regarding the good faith of the Jiménez Administration.[2] The active hostility of the Government and of the people towards the Improvement Company was heightened by the complaint of Jiménez that the humilia-

[1] Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal to Mr. Powell, February 3, 1900.
[2] Mr. Powell to Secretary Hay, January 18, 1900.

tion caused the Dominican Government by the measures so recently adopted by the Government of France was solely due to the failure of the Improvement Company to discharge its just obligations, since the balance due upon the French claims should, under the agreement entered into with the Company by Heureaux, have been paid for the Government's account by the Improvement Company.

Encouraged by the advice tendered him by the members of his Cabinet, and stimulated by the increasing clamour of the press, the President undertook without delay negotiations with Judge John T. Abbott, the Vice President of the Improvement Company, for the withdrawal of the Company from the Republic. While the Improvement Company had by now become far from reluctant to abandon its venture, the Government was unable to offer it any security that its original investment might be repaid. After prolonged conversations, Jiménez reversed completely his original determination, and the negotiations resulted merely in a new contract between the Government and the Improvement Company, providing an arrangement whereby the Government's financial needs might be relieved, and a project for the settlement of the public indebtedness of the nation and the defaulted interest thereon. This contract, signed on March 20, 1900, and ratified by the Dominican Congress on the following 18th of April, provided that the customs revenues up to an amount of $2,000,000, excepting the export duties set aside by Governmental decree for the conversion of the paper money issued by the National Bank, should be divided according to the following schedule during a period of three years dating from April 1, 1900:

49% for the budgetary requirements of the Government;
3% for the salaries and expenses of the officials in the "régie;"
5% to meet outstanding obligations of the Government, inclusive of certain privileged concessions;
43% to meet the payment of the interest and amortization charges of the outstanding bonds of the nation.

This latter provision included the stipulation that after the majority of the bondholders had consented to fund their coupons, the application of this 43% of the customs revenues should be undertaken as follows:

During the first year:

17 parts for the payment of the interior debt;
15 parts for the payment of the foreign debt through the agency of the Improvement Company;
5 parts as an additional advance to the Government;
6 parts to be devoted through Governmental channels to the payment of claims and revolutionary debts.

During the second and third years of the period provided for:

21 parts to the payment of the interior debt;
16 parts to the payment of the foreign debt through the Improvement Company;
6 parts to meet claims and revolutionary indemnities for distribution by the Government.

Further provisions of the contract specified that the Improvement Company must obtain the consent of the majority of bondholders that the payment of the coupons held by them, inclusive of those dated April 1, 1903, be suspended and funded; that within a period of six months

subsequent to April 1, 1900, the 4% bonds belonging to the Government, amounting in all to some £350,000, be delivered by the Company to the Dominican Government; and that the Company present within the same period a detailed accounting. Were the Improvement Company to fail to comply with any of these provisions, the contract was to be considered null and void.

The disregard by Jiménez of public opinion in so reversing himself provoked a campaign of instant opposition peculiarly venomous in its character, the charge being at once made that only under the compulsion of bribery could the Government have consented to defraud the expectations of all classes in thus prolonging the intervention of the Improvement Company in Dominican affairs.

The position of the Government was furthermore gravely prejudiced by the manner in which the Improvement Company proceeded to carry out its obligations under the new contract. Announcing, on the 1st of July, that a majority of the bondholders had approved the new agreement, it commenced the distribution of the 43% of the customs duties retained by it under the new contract as if such full consent had actually been obtained. It was soon made apparent, however, that the necessary consent of the majority of the bondholders had not been granted, since the Belgian bondholders, whose holdings represented a very considerable percentage of the Dominican foreign debt, formally repudiated the contract and withdrew their authorization from the Improvement Company to continue as their representative. On August 25th, the Dominican Government was officially informed of this fact by the Government of Belgium. At once, the Dominican Government notified the Company that until it might be

definitely ascertained whether the consent of the majority of the bondholders had actually been obtained, all customs revenues collected since the first of April not set apart for Governmental expenses should be retained on deposit by the "régie." Protesting, however, that it had complied fully with the terms of the recent contract, the Improvement Company continued to disregard the orders of the Government and proceeded to distribute the customs revenues in accordance with the terms of the contract through the "régie," and in November likewise tendered its accounts as by virtue of the contract. These latter the Government refused to accept unless the Company agreed to declare that they were tendered independently of the provisions of the act ratifying the contract.

The Government now found itself involved in what showed every indication of becoming an international dispute, since while it had officially been informed by the Belgian Government that its nationals repudiated the contract and denied the continued representation of their interests to the Improvement Company, the Government of the United States had likewise communicated officially to the Dominican President its desire that the "American bondholders" should "not be prejudiced in any manner by any negotiation undertaken by the Dominican Government."

Upon the declaration by the Dominican courts soon after that the National Bank was in a state of bankruptcy, Jiménez was compelled to take drastic action. By a decree dated January 10, 1901, the Improvement Company was at once excluded from further participation in the collection of the public revenues. Detailing the various misdemeanours of the Company and specifying the manner in

which the Company had failed to comply with the terms of the contract of the preceding April, the President directed that thereafter the officials of the national treasury should undertake directly the collection of all public revenues. All customs duties, again excepting the export taxes, were to be divided into two portions, 54% to be devoted to the budgetary requirements of the Government, and the remainder to be turned over to a "commission of honorables" consisting of the American Vice Consul, the Dutch and Belgian Consuls, and two private persons appointed by the President, which commission was to retain on deposit the amounts to be applied to the charges upon the foreign debt and to the payment of the Republic's floating indebtedness. The Improvement Company thereupon, claiming that the President's decree was not only illegal but destroyed the security guaranteed the bondholders, appealed to the American Government. Confronted with a situation which appeared to be fast growing beyond his control, the President despatched his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, to Washington.

Upon the refusal of the Department of State to intervene officially in the dispute, the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs, after a discussion continuing over a period of several weeks, at length succeeded in reaching an agreement with the directors of the Improvement Company providing for the purchase by the Dominican Government of all interests held by the Improvement Company. Since this contract excluded the two-thirds interest in all bonds outstanding held by the French and Belgian bondholders, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal subsequently proceeded to Europe and succeeded likewise in concluding a contract with the European bondholders. This second contract

placed upon the Dominican Government the obligation to segregate 15% of its customs revenues, calculated upon a minimum basis of $2,000,000 gold, for the service of that portion of the foreign debt represented by the interests of the French and Belgian bondholders. The payment of this sum, assigned from the revenues collected in the custom house of Santo Domingo, was to be made in twelve monthly installments of $25,000 each, and relieved the Dominican Government, until an increase in its revenues should make possible the payment of the full amount of interest, from the payment of the semi-annual coupons. Advantages regarding the amortization of the principal and overdue interest were ceded the Dominican Government in the contract, and while the European bondholders, through their committees, were authorized to appoint agents to receive the amounts payable by the Dominican Government, the further operation of the "régie" was discontinued, and on January 1, 1902, the "régie" ceased to exist. Previous to that date the "commission of honorables" had likewise gone out of existence.

5.

Returning to Santo Domingo in August of 1901 with the contracts which he had succeeded in negotiating, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal found the Administration plunged into a bitter political dispute centering upon the ratification of these contracts.

In fact, during the many months in which the Administration had been continuing these negotiations, Jiménez's policy had resulted in splitting widely apart the groups at first supporting him. The negotiation of the first contract with the Improvement Company, as has been seen, had been vigorously denounced. Opposition to it was nowhere

stronger than in the Cibao, where Don Federico Velasquez, the private secretary to General Vasquez, had conducted a determined campaign against it through the newspaper *La Redención,* published in Santiago. As open opposition rendered it impossible for him to continue any longer his official association with the Vice President, he had been consequently replaced as secretary by Dr. José Dolores Alfonseca. But while the Vice President, through loyalty to the Administration, was unwilling to embark upon open opposition to the Government's policy, his personal position was well known. His opposition to the new arrangement with the Improvement Company was due largely to the current report that in return for the negotiation of the contract, the director of the "régie" had guaranteed Don Maximiliano Grullón, the President's closest adviser, a considerable portion of that 6% of the customs revenues which should have been destined to the payment of claims and revolutionary indebtedness, for "unforeseen expenses" of the Government, a euphemism, in view of the fact that no accounting was rendered of such expenditures, which had in the past concealed a multitude of sins. Proceeding to the capital from Santiago, the Vice President advised Jiménez of the reasons for his opposition to the contract, but agreed to waive his objections were the President willing to agree to appoint Don Emiliano Tejera Minister of Hacienda, since General Vasquez had entire confidence in the latter's absolute integrity. While the President first agreed to make the change desired by General Vasquez, he later modified his decision by agreeing to offer the appointment to Señor Tejera after the ratification of the contract. Since this would by no means have met the objections of the Vice President, the latter, while maintaining

his objections, felt further protests to be useless, and returned to the Cibao.

So acute did popular agitation become that the Ministers in Jiménez's original Cabinet who had been appointed because of their close connections with the Vice President either resigned or were dismissed, their places being filled by partisans of Jiménez of whose support of his policy Jiménez felt there could be no question. Don José Brache, who had resigned his office as Minister of War, did not, however, limit himself to opposition in the press. He attempted to launch a revolution, which was promptly suppressed, and upon his release from imprisonment commenced plans immediately for a further revolution. In his second attempt at revolution, which was proclaimed in Moca, it fell to the Vice President, as the Government's Delegate in the Cibao, to crush the movement commenced by his former intimate. The revolutionary movement failed to gain headway, and after a vigorous campaign instituted by General Vasquez, General Brache and his principal lieutenants surrendered and the leader of the insurrection was permitted to leave the Republic. This rebellion headed by Brache and his associates was by no means the sole attempt to resort to revolution. The discovery of several further conspiracies provoked the Government into limiting temporarily the absolute liberty which the press had at first enjoyed, and strict measures of repression were undertaken.

It was inevitable that Jiménez, aware of the opposition of the Vice President by the latter's frankness, should eventually suspect that these attempts upon his Administration were connived at by the Vice President and by his leading followers. A contributing cause to increasing friction between the President and the Vice President had

been the vast increase in the latter's popularity throughout the Cibao as the result of the expedition to the Haitian frontier which General Vasquez had led in the first year of Jiménez's Administration.

For some time it had been rumoured that the Haitian Government intended to invade the Republic in order to foster internal disturbances in Dominican territory with a view to bringing about a change in the Dominican Government. This rumour, repeated generally, was swiftly magnified and distorted out of all proportion. Popular feeling in Santiago ran so high that it was believed that an invading army from Haiti might any day appear at the entrance to the city. Popular appeals were addressed to the Vice President to proceed at the head of a body of volunteers to the Haitian frontier to protect the Cibao, but Jiménez refused to authorize the Government's Delegate to take any action, despatching instead the Minister for War, General Leovigildo Cuello, to Dajabón at the head of a body of regular troops. The presence of these troops at the frontier at once increased the rumours of impending hostilities, and finally, the President authorized General Vasquez to take part in arrangements to be made for the protection of the Republic. So intense was the excitement in the Cibao that some 6,000 volunteers assembled at Santiago to await the orders of the Vice President.

Setting out for the frontier at the head of a small body of some 300 regulars and the mob of undisciplined volunteers, General Vasquez undertook a forced march to Dajabón to reënforce the troops commanded by the Minister for War. The concentration of so large a force upon the Haitian frontier might readily have given rise to the outbreak of hostilities between the two Republics, although it was later ascertained that the rumours of the

impending invasion from Haiti had been completely unfounded. Fortunately, however, by the exercise of considerable tact and even greater ingenuity, the Dominican Minister in Port-au-Prince, General Ignacio Maria González, and Dr. Louis Bornó, the Haitian Minister in Santo Domingo, who were present upon the scene, dispelled the suspicions of the Dominican Government. The orders to return to Santiago promptly given by General Vasquez caused no little dissatisfaction among the Dominican volunteers, eager for a chance to show their mettle against their old-time adversaries. But however reluctantly, the orders issued were obeyed, and the volunteers were perforce obliged to content themselves with wasting a considerable quantity of Governmental ammunition by shooting into the air as they straggled home.

The evidence of his popularity, shown by the assembling of so great a number of volunteers to wait upon his orders, was promptly interpreted by the President's advisers as a proof of General Vasquez's intention to launch a revolution against the Government. It was even alleged that he would have done so during the course of his expedition to the Haitian frontier had he not been prevented by the presence of Jiménez's Minister for War and the troops under the latter's command.

The discord between the President's followers and the partisans of General Vasquez was intensified by the ambition of each camp to secure the election of one of their own number to succeed Jiménez. While there had been no understanding between Jiménez and Vasquez as to the next Presidency, it had at first been generally assumed that Jiménez would support General Vasquez as his successor in office. Whatever may have been the original intention of the President, it became more and more apparent as

the months went on that he would support as his candidate one of his intimates, and his choice appeared to have fallen plainly upon his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal. To confirm the President in this determination, no opportunity was lost to widen the breach already existing between himself and the man who had raised him to the Presidency, while, at the same time that the partisans of Jiménez were alleging the disloyalty of the Vice President, reports were constantly brought to General Vasquez that President Jiménez was plotting against him.

Shortly after the suppression by General Vasquez of the rebellion headed by Don José Brache, he had been secretly warned by Don Genaro Perez, recently appointed Minister for Justice, that it was the President's intention to summon the Vice President with General Cáceres to a conference in Puerto Plata, and that should it then prove impossible to obtain definite assurances that the two would support the Administration's policy in all its phases, their immediate imprisonment was to be decreed on the ground that they were obstructing the course of Government. Placing faith in this admonition because of his confidence in the honour of his informant, and realizing that this warning was the more striking inasmuch as his own relationship with Señor Perez in the past had been by no means friendly, General Vasquez had felt it obligatory upon him in self-protection to reach an agreement with his supporters in the Cibao as to the measures to be taken should the Government in fact adopt a policy of open hostility towards the growing number of the Vice President's party.

The personal relations between the two highest officials of the Government had become still further strained when

it was ascertained by the Vice President that President Jiménez had resumed his active interest in commercial affairs by reopening his exporting and importing houses in the capital and Monte Cristi, as well as their branches in Sánchez and Puerto Plata. Upon learning from one of the President's partners that Jiménez was actually profiting from the returns of this enterprise, General Vasquez had remonstrated with the President. He pointed out to him that the fact that these business houses were controlled by the President of the Republic would result practically in creating a monopoly, since foreign concerns would naturally transact their business with Jiménez and Company as a means of ingratiating themselves with the Government, and that owing to the nature of the business itself it could hardly be proved to the satisfaction of the public that the President was not profiting illegitimately through unfair advantages and illegal concessions in the customs houses. These protests, however, proved fruitless of all save additional friction between the two men.

6.

Consequently, upon the return of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal from Europe, the situation between the two camps—the Jimenistas and the Horacistas, as they were later to be termed—had already reached a crisis. The presentation of the contracts negotiated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Dominican Congress for its ratification was the signal for a still greater manifestation of the divergence which existed between the two parties. While it ratified the contract negotiated with the French and Belgian bondholders on September 23, 1901, the Congress, composed in its great majority of men who had identified themselves with the fortunes of General

Vasquez, resolutely refused to approve the contract entered into with the Improvement Company. By every means within his power, Jiménez attempted to force the Congress to adopt his recommendations and ratify the contract, but all his efforts proved of no avail. Despatching then a messenger to the Vice President with the request that he come immediately to the capital to discuss "matters of the gravest importance," Jiménez called General Vasquez to a meeting of the Cabinet.

On behalf of the President, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal advised the Vice President of the reason for his summons. Apparently upon the instigation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the President and his counselors, infuriated by the opposition of the Congress, had under consideration the plan of attempting a coup d'état by surrounding the building in which the Congress was holding its sessions, and then arresting and imprisoning such of the deputies as maintained their opposition to the Government's policy. Upon the announcement by the Vice President that he would never countenance such a measure, which would in his opinion have so violated constitutional government that public confidence would have suffered a blow from which it might take many years to recover, the project was abandoned, but due to the attitude then assumed by General Vasquez, the relations between the two parties now reached the last stage before open hostilities were declared. A Cabinet crisis was provoked resulting in the temporary resignation of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal.

The opposition of the Congress grew more intense and more acrimonious. Dissatisfaction with the Government became general, since because of the inability of the Administration to solve the financial situation in the

manner it had proposed, it was unable to pay the salaries of its officials, and the deficit in the revenue incurred by an unwise modification of the tariff compelled it to embark upon a policy of obtaining local loans at a rate of from 3% to 4% a month.

Negotiations with the Government of the United States for the renewal of a reciprocity agreement, which it was hoped might stimulate local production, resulted in the conclusion of a treaty which failed, however, of ratification. These negotiations were at once reported by the President's adversaries to include a provision for the cession of Samaná, and the rumour was spread that the United States Government had ordered the landing of troops in Samaná Bay to proceed to take possession of the Province. To pacify public opinion, the President despatched Don Federico Henriquez y Carvajal as his Commissioner to make public a report of the unfounded nature of these charges. The report made plain that the rumours were entirely unfounded, although the fact that the U.S.S. *Dolphin*, in completion of a naval survey of the waters adjacent to the Republic, had anchored near Samaná, had lent weight to the rumours raised by the critics of the Government.

By March of 1902, Jiménez's opponents in the Congress were openly charging that the Government had failed to account for the expenditure of a considerable portion of the yearly revenues. Critics were not wanting to claim that the President and his Ministers were guilty of defalcation. Relations between the two branches of the Government were hardly improved by a decree issued by the President raising the salaries of certain public employees by 50%, infringing, as the Congress claimed, one of its own prerogatives. The charges so formulated against the

Executive resulted finally in open defiance of the President by the Congress. On March 17, 1902, it passed a vote of censure upon Jiménez based on the following grounds:

That the President had exceeded his Constitutional prerogatives;
That he was personally responsible for the large deficit alleged to exist in the national treasury;
That he had authorized the increase of certain salaries in contravention of the rights of Congress.

Upon the passage of the vote of censure in the Congress, the Vice President came immediately to the capital to attempt to reach an agreement with the President upon a new policy which might remove the causes for dissatisfaction which had resulted in the crisis now existing. In his interview with Jiménez, General Vasquez assured him that there was still time for the Government which they had both been responsible for setting up to obtain general popular approval. If the reasons adduced by the Congress in passing the vote of censure were unfounded, he argued, it should certainly be possible for the President publicly to demonstrate that they were false; if, on the other hand, the President were unable to demonstrate the injustice of the attack made, he should be willing as a patriotic duty to follow a new policy which would meet the objections raised; and he assured the President that were the latter willing to adopt either one of the alternatives proposed, he might count upon the sincere and loyal support of the Vice President and of his partisans. The Vice President pointed out very clearly to the President that the latter had forfeited the support of the most influential men in the country with the exception of a small group in Santiago and the clique of office-

holders in the capital, while he himself had little to lose by a break with Jiménez since the majority of those who had first supported the President were now openly supporting the Vice President and urging him to a definite break with the Administration.

Trusting that Jiménez would modify his course, General Vasquez promptly used his own influence with General Wenceslao Figuereo and General Juan Francisco Sánchez, in dissuading them from participating in the launching of a revolution against the Government from the southern Provinces. They were assured by the Vice President that should the Government continue to pursue a policy contrary to that insisted upon by the Congress, he would make public his own protest, although such protest would under no circumstances involve the countenancing of armed rebellion. Notwithstanding the attitude adopted by the Vice President, shortly after his departure from the capital the cry of revolution was nevertheless raised in Azua by General Luis Pelletier and in Barahona by Don Carlos Alberto Mota. Incensed at the manner in which his own admonitions had been disregarded, General Vasquez advised the Government by telegram that he had ready an armed force of 500 men whom he was willing to lead at once to the south to quell the rebellion, but distrusting Vasquez's intentions, Jiménez refused the authorization requested.

Rejecting in its entirety the policy urged upon him by the Vice President, Jiménez lent a far more willing ear to the counsel offered by Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, who had once more taken up his portfolio as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and laid plans publicly to refute the Congressional vote of censure by resorting to a popular referendum in which, his Ministers assured him, he would be enabled to

obtain the evidence of the unanimous approbation of his fellow-citizens. The insurrection proclaimed in the southern Provinces, which spread rapidly, compelled the President to abandon temporarily his project and to concentrate upon putting down the rebellion. Martial law was decreed on March 31st. Placing an armed force in the field amounting to some 2,400 men, the Government succeeded in crushing the insurrection, although its leaders made good their escape. Jiménez, however, was soon called upon to face a far more serious outbreak.

7.

Upon the refusal of the President to permit him to lead his troops against the revolution which had broken out in Azua and Barahona, the Vice President traveled to Sánchez on his way to Santiago. He was met in the former city by the Minister of the Interior, Don Manuel Ubaldo Gomez, from whom General Vasquez learned that the President was more than ever determined to reject the counsel which he had offered him, and had decided to resort to a popular referendum to obtain a vote of public confidence. Journeying with him in the train towards La Vega, the Vice President stated to the Minister of the Interior that should the Government insist upon this course, which implied, in his opinion, a disregard for constitutional government, and an attempt to nullify the prerogatives of the Congress, there would necessarily ensue a final break between the Vice President's party and the Jiménez Administration. Announcing to Señor Gomez his intention of returning to the capital at once to attempt once more to dissuade the President from the course which he was threatening to follow, General Vasquez left the train at Pimentel, where he was astonished to receive this

reply from the Minister as he bade him good-bye: "I will advise you later whether you will be permitted to go to the capital or not."

These words were necessarily fraught with the utmost significance, since, had the President intended to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Vice President, it was inconceivable that any restrictions should be placed upon the movements of General Vasquez, and the implication appeared plain to General Vasquez's companions that some plan had been considered for the sequestration of his person. Copies of intercepted messages sent to the capital by partisans of Jiménez alleging that the Vice President had already launched a revolution against the Government were transmitted within a few hours to General Vasquez, and he received, as well, messages from his own supporters in the capital advising him that one of his chief followers, General Manuel de Jesús Castillo, had not only been imprisoned, but had been imprisoned after being captured by General Pedro Pepín and General Rafael Rodriguez y Rodriguez, both of them among the most bitter personal enemies of the Vice President, who had been safely lodged within the fortress as prisoners of state when General Vasquez had last left the capital.

Notwithstanding the fact that this accumulation of evidence all tended to show that Jiménez had now determined upon open hostility to the Vice President, General Vasquez continued his preparations to go to the capital with the hope that there was still time to avert an open break, and all the attendant disasters which such a break would of necessity entail.

At this juncture, however, he was given the copies of two further messages which had been intercepted, and from the contents of these telegrams there seemed no

longer to be any doubt that President Jiménez had determined to force civil war. The messages in question were telegraphic instructions, signed with the name of Juan Isidro Jiménez, addressed to the Governors of Puerto Plata and of Monte Cristi, to attack Santiago immediately and to assume on behalf of the Government the authority formerly vested in the Vice President as the Government's Delegate in the Cibao. It was ascertained long after that these messages had been drafted by Padre Carlos F. Morales Languasco, then a Deputy in the National Congress, and a determined opponent of the Vice President. While the President had refused to sign the orders when they were presented to him, on the ground that he was unwilling to take the first step leading towards civil war, he was aware that the instructions were subsequently despatched in his name, and took no steps to countermand them.

8.

As soon as General Vasquez was apprised of the contents of these telegrams he appreciated the futility of proceeding to the capital, and left at once for his home at Estancia Nueva. From there he called to a meeting in Moca all of his chief adherents in the Cibao. He advised his followers that for months he had resorted to all possible means of averting a break between the national Administration and his own party; that he had made every effort to induce the President to eliminate from the program of his Administration the features to which such grave objections had been raised both in and out of Congress; that he himself had disregarded his personal ambition and had forgotten his personal pride in order to avoid forcing the issue with the President and the Cabinet, and that he had consistently rejected the counsel of his own friends who had urged him

to assert himself openly against the Government. He declared that his long-continued efforts in that sense had proved useless, and that as a measure of self-protection both for himself and for the members of his party he felt it now incumbent upon him to resist by armed force the attack upon Santiago ordered by Jiménez. This decision of General Vasquez was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm by his adherents, who had for months been straining at the check imposed upon them by their chief.

Little time was wasted in further deliberation. Determining to attack the Government before an attack could effectively be launched against his own partisans, General Vasquez journeyed first to La Vega and then back to Sánchez, obtaining on the way pledges of support from the Governors of Samaná, San Francisco de Macorís, Santiago, Moca, and La Vega. On April 26, 1902, the revolution was officially proclaimed in La Vega. Detailing the causes which had led him to attempt the overthrow of the Jiménez Government, General Vasquez published the following proclamation:

"In the triumphant revolution of July we had no other thought in mind than the political regeneration of the country and the reëstablishment of civic rights, which during a long epoch had been disregarded and trampled under foot.

"In that solemn moment, perhaps the most striking in the history of our Nation, all Dominicans, thirsting for liberty, cherished the greatest hope and believed that the moment had arrived when they might see the realization of their aspiration for national prosperity, confident that with the arrival of a new era, the august majesty of law, the sacred principles of right, the efficacy of justice, and honesty in administration, would become an impulse

towards salvation . . . In that moment of supreme elation, the Dominican people, who for so long had suffered every class of outrage, put aside old passions, political antipathies, personal prejudice and sordid rancour, to commence with joy and to undertake with an enthusiasm which can never be forgotten the task of redemption proclaimed through all portions of the Republic . . . But when the country and the supporters of the revolution thought to find the Government of Juan Isidro Jiménez partisan to the high purposes which inspired their leaders, they found themselves bitterly defrauded in their hopes, and confronted with utter disillusion. We, the leaders of the revolution of July, constantly combated and daily antagonized, with incredible ingratitude, in our ideals, in our policy, and in our political interests, by those very individuals whom the revolution placed in control of the Government, rise today to defend our creed which the ambition and the consuming partisan feeling of some members of the Executive are threatening to destroy, with the gravest danger to the Republic . . . Before we will permit the rights of the people and the interests of the country to perish once more as a sacrifice to the ambition, the incapacity, and the bad faith of the evil government which is giving free rein to anarchy, we raise our voice in protest as a means of staying the appalling economic and political ruin into which, unfortunately, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez has transformed in less than two years the generous, patriotic and redeeming impulse of the revolution of July. We call to our side all Dominicans, without exception, that united we may exert our every effort to avert the destruction of the Nation . . . The insurrection which commences today in the Republic is not the work of ambition. It is a task of duty and of patriotism imposed upon us in order to restore the principles proclaimed in the revolution of July."

To this proclamation of the principles for which the rebellion had been launched, the President lost no time in publicly replying. In a proclamation issued three days later, Jiménez claimed that the insurrection was solely due to the "impatient ambition" of the Vice President, who had desired his chief to remove all obstacles from his path in his longing to obtain his election as President to succeed Jiménez. Stating that his own refusal to accede to the demands of General Vasquez was the sole cause which had determined the latter's resort to revolution, he terminated in the following arraignment:

"No honorable man can approve the conduct of General Horacio Vasquez, who has raised the standard of civil war in our midst, especially in this anxious hour of imminent danger to our beloved country. No honorable citizen can fail to condemn as one guilty of high treason a man who, invested with the Vice Presidency of the Republic and with the office of Delegate of the Government in the Provinces and Districts of the Cibao, has abused his official position and my own unlimited patience in evoking the phantom of civil war and in drawing upon the Fatherland the deadly consequences of every class of disaster."

The President at once promulgated a decree summoning all citizens from eighteen to sixty to take up arms, and at the same time all political prisoners were released upon condition that they would side with the Government. The revolution spread with fantastic rapidity. After two days, the Government only retained control of the cities of Puerto Plata, San Pedro de Macorís, and Sánchez, in addition to the capital.

On April 30th, General Vasquez, at the head of his troops, arrived within three miles of the capital and

established his headquarters at the sugar central, "La Fé." The Government troops which had opposed his passage of the River Isabel were utterly routed. On the following day, a determined assault upon the city commenced. By a successful ruse, the Government forces which had made a final stand at San Carlos, an outlying suburb of the capital, were defeated, and by the middle of the morning, General Miguel Andrés Pichardo, who had been sent ahead by General Vasquez with a strong body of troops, was able to wedge his way into San Carlos. As soon as an entrance had been forced into this suburb of the city, the Government troops which were posted there laid down their arms. Six brief engagements had taken place, each lasting but a few minutes. The reënforcements which had been sent from time to time from within the city, had deserted in great numbers to the revolutionary commander.

The defense of the city was so feeble that the Vice President sent messengers to the commanding generals within the capital announcing that unless the Government at once surrendered he would capture the city by assault. Through the customary intervention of the members of the Diplomatic Corps, Jiménez thereupon entered into an agreement with General Vasquez providing for the peaceful capitulation of the city. In return for the surrender of his troops and his own resignation as President of the Republic, the revolutionary commander conceded full guarantees of life and property to all, as well as assurances of protection to President Jiménez and to his Ministers, with the stipulation, however, that the officials of the former Government were not to be permitted to leave the Republic until all of its authorities and troops should have surrendered.

General Vasquez, at the head of his troops, entered the city, issuing orders that all Executive departments and official buildings of the Government were to be taken over at once by the officers under his command, but that the persons of the President and of the members of his Cabinet were not to be molested. Jiménez, who had at first taken refuge in the French Consulate, consequently returned peacefully to his own private residence, where he remaind until he left the Republic some days later for Cuba. All manifestations of hostility against the members of the former Administration were strenuously suppressed, and both Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal and General Woss y Gil, appointed by Jiménez in the last moments of his Administration Minister for War, against whom special animosity was felt by the revolutionists, were likewise permitted to leave the country.

9.

As soon as General Vasquez had taken over command of the capital, a Provisional Government was installed. Assuming office himself once more as Provisional President, rather than as President, to which office he had constitutionally succeeded after the resignation of Jiménez, General Vasquez formed a Cabinet composed for the most part of men of proved ability, among them Don Emiliano Tejera as Minister of Finance, Dr. José Maria Cabral y Baez as Minister of Justice, and Don Rafael Justino Castillo as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Proclaiming the platform of his Government on May 9, 1902, the Provisional President announced his firm intention of destroying forever that system of corruption in the Government which had been "the cancer which for many years has been devouring the entrails of the country." He concluded with the following assurance:

"On a broad and solid basis of administrative honesty will be founded the administration of this Provisional Government. Each functionary appointed by my Government will be held responsible for the duties of his office; even public rumor may cause a close investigation of his actions. Only such severity of principles can coincide with the austerity of the policy which I intend to implant, and it is made plain as well in my firm resolve to show no pity for any individual who may attempt to obstruct public order."

The standard set was high. Every effort of the Provisional President was now bent upon making good his assurances.

As soon as peace had been restored throughout the Republic, General Vasquez, in accordance with the precedent set in his earlier Administration, undertook to frame a budget covering the expenditures deemed essential during the ensuing year. The revenues of the Republic were determined to be approximately $1,900,000 and the expenditures provided for in this budget, for the fiscal year commencing June 1, 1902, totalled $1,720,000. No innovation could have been of greater benefit than this public assumption by a Provisional Government of due responsibility for the disbursement of public funds.

The overwhelming desire of General Vasquez to place immediately in effect the reforms for which public opinion in 1899 had clamoured, and which the Jiménez Administration had ignored, was made further manifest by a series of decrees of the Government issued during the first months of the new Administration. One of the first was a decree intended to stimulate agricultural development by establishing the obligatory standardization of the native crops intended for export. A national Bureau of Educa-

tion was created, and a law drafted some years previously by Don Eugenio Hostos, the Puerto Rican educator whose services had been of such great benefit in the education of Dominican youth, was promulgated. To commence the actual pacification of the Republic, a decree was likewise issued prohibiting the importation of arms and ammunition. The legislation so decreed constituted the four basic principles of the program of administration upheld by the Provisional President—honesty in public administration; disarmament of the individual; development of the agricultural resources of the nation; and the provision of a national stimulus for education.

At the same time the Provisional President determined to strike directly at what he believed to be the root difficulty of the financial condition of the Government. Entering upon negotiations with Judge Abbott, the Vice President of the Improvement Company, General Vasquez indicated his decision to terminate the connection of the Improvement Company with the Dominican Government by purchasing the Company's interests. Rejecting the proposal of the Company that the valuation of its holdings and all disputes between itself and the Dominican Government be determined by arbitration, the Provisional President at length concluded an agreement with the representative of the Company whereby the amount of $4,500,000 was fixed as the recognized value of the Company's claims. The figure so set was arrived at as follows:

$2,000,000 as the value of the national bonds held by the Company;
$1,500,000 as the value of its interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago; and approximately

$1,000,000 representing the value of the shares held by the Company in the bankrupt National Bank and other claims and accounts of the Company.

This figure was agreed upon by the Government as the price to be paid as the means of procuring the Company's immediate withdrawal from the Republic, but when the President later found that prolonged discussions brought about no agreement as to the number and amount of the annual payments to be made by the Government in liquidation of the total sum agreed upon, negotiations were once more terminated. The principal cause of this disagreement lay in the insistent demand of the Government that the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago be delivered immediately after the new contract with the Company was ratified, whereas the Improvement Company demanded the continued retention and operation of the road as security for the payments due it. When negotiations, later in the year, were resumed under the auspices of the United States Government, both parties to the dispute agreed upon the sum originally fixed as the amount to be paid by the Dominican Government in settlement of the Company's claims, but further agreed to submit to arbitration the manner of payment by the Dominican Government, the amount of the installments to be paid, and the nature of the security to be offered the Improvement Company.

Recognized by the United States Government on July 8th, and by the other Powers soon thereafter, the Provisional Government made every effort to better the Republic's credit abroad by meeting the burdensome obligations resulting from foreign claims recognized as valid by the Governments of Heureaux and of Jiménez.

The Vasquez Government, notwithstanding the slenderness of its resources, discharged such obligations promptly at a time when it was strenuously engaged in the same attempt undertaken during the previous Provisional Government of General Vasquez to relieve the economic distress prevalent in the Republic. The reciprocity treaty with the United States was withdrawn from further consideration, for the purpose of negotiating a new convention designed to prove more effective in fostering the development of Dominican agriculture. Absorbed during the first months of his Administration in injecting the spirit of reform into all branches of the Government, and in the consistent intent to promote the prosperity of the nation, the President was enabled, despite his many handicaps, to accomplish much through his own initiative.

10.

Not six months had passed since its installation when the Provisional Government was suddenly confronted with the outbreak of revolution.

The immediate cause of the outbreak lay in the dispute which had arisen between Don Federico Velasquez, Administrator of the Public Revenues in Monte Cristi, and the Governor of that Province, General Andrés Navarro. Both General Cáceres, the Government's Delegate in the Cibao, and Señor Velasquez reported to the President that General Navarro was not only a declared enemy of the Provisional Government, but had likewise aided the Haitian opponents of the eighty-year old Haitian chieftain, General Alexis Nord, who was at the time struggling to attain the Presidency of Haiti, and who had lent assistance to General Vasquez in the days of his exile. Notwithstanding the protestations of General Navarro of

his innocence of these charges, the President gave in before the insistence of General Cáceres and removed him from his post, although upon such terms and such conditions that General Navarro declared his firm intention of remaining wholeheartedly loyal to the Government. But a feeling of grievance persisted, which inclined him to see intentional hostility towards himself in every act of the Government, however innocent such acts may in reality have been. Incited at every opportunity by his brother-in-law, General Desiderio Arias, Navarro finally proclaimed a revolution against the Administration in Monte Cristi in October, 1902.

After the initial defeats suffered by the troops despatched from the capital to quell the outbreak, General Vasquez found it necessary to take command himself of the forces sent against the revolutionaries, and after a severe engagement in the town of Monte Cristi, the revolution was checked temporarily with the capture of General Navarro. The insurrection soon recommenced, however, in the interior of the Province and degenerated into a disheartening guerrilla warfare which was destined to continue for eight months. After an absence of six weeks, the Provisional President returned to the capital early in November, to find that the cost of the revolution to the Government had already amounted to more than $98,000, creating a deficit in the Government's budget for the quarter ending October 1st, of more than $100,000, and that the assault by the rebels upon Monte Cristi had resulted in the presentation of a claim by the Italian Government of more than a quarter of a million dollars for damages caused the properties of Italian nationals. Almost immediately, the Provisional President was called from the capital once more by the outbreak of disturbances in Moca and in La

Vega. The fighting on the Haitian frontier of Monte Cristi Province was desultory and long-continued, and with the commencement of the rainy season over fifty per cent of the men composing the Government's force fell ill with malaria. The revolution then spread to Azua, and illness and discouragement caused many of the troops sent by the Government to the boundary Provinces to desert.

By the beginning of the new year, the outbreak of a general revolution was imminent. Filibustering expeditions, which Generals Eugenio Deschamps and Rafael Rodriguez had been attempting to fit out from Puerto Rico, were only prevented by the prompt action of the American authorities in that island. Dissatisfaction with the Government was rife throughout the Republic, due in part to the increasing economic crisis caused by the outbreak of the various insurrections, but in greater part to the Chief Executive's firm refusal to continue the system of regular subsidies granted by President Jiménez to local political leaders. The hostility created by this new departure centered upon the President as well as upon his Minister for Finance, Don Emiliano Tejera, who was generally believed to have been initially responsible for refusing the "caciques" the payment of the bribes to which they had long been accustomed. Another contributing cause for dissatisfaction was the postponement of the general elections in which a constitutional Administration was to be chosen.

Notwithstanding the dangerous condition of unrest which prevailed throughout the country, and which had been responsible for the delay in holding national elections, General Vasquez at length came to the belief that the immediate holding of elections might relieve the exist-

ing tension, and issued a decree upon January 30, 1903, fixing the election date as before the end of February.

Proceeding to Sánchez, the Provisional President summoned to him the Governor of the Cibao to determine upon the candidates of the Horacista party for the Presidency and Vice Presidency in the coming elections. It was the unanimous opinion of those who attended the meeting that the Presidential candidate of the party should be General Vasquez himself, with General Cáceres as candidate for the Vice Presidency. This suggestion, however, was rejected by General Vasquez. Stating that it was impossible for him to consent to run upon the same ticket with General Cáceres, who was closer to him through friendship and family ties than his own brother, he urged the nomination of Don Emiliano Tejera for the Presidency and of General Cáceres for the Vice Presidency. Upon information that this proposal was not acceptable, it was finally determined that the delegates of the Horacista party in the Constituent Assembly, called to assemble in the month of March, should be instructed in their revision of the Constitution to suppress the office of Vice President, and thus eliminate an office believed to hold elements of danger to the tranquillity of the country, as well as remove also a cause for dissension in the party. It was likewise decided unanimously that with the elimination of the Vice Presidency, General Vasquez should be his party's candidate for the Presidency.

After General Vasquez's return to the capital, he was astonished to ascertain that not only had the decisions reached at Sánchez been modified by his supporters so that no provision for the elimination of the Vice Presidency should be made by the Constituent Assembly, but also that General Cáceres, in letters to his supporters, con-

tinued to urge his own nomination for the Vice Presidency. This action on the part of General Cáceres involved a danger of peculiar gravity, since before the agreement to eliminate the Vice Presidency had been reached, General Vasquez, with the hope of conciliating the Jimenista and Horacista parties, had agreed to support the candidacy for the Vice Presidency of General Luis Maria Hernández, a former Jimenista leader, were he himself to be nominated for the Presidency. Should General Cáceres persist in attempting to obtain his own nomination for the Vice Presidency, any reconciliation between the two parties would be rendered hopeless. The situation appeared so grave that General Vasquez feared that he could not continue at the head of the Administration unless General Cáceres withdrew his candidacy, which he was by now openly proclaiming. In the course of an interview between the two cousins in Antosí, General Vasquez used all the arguments in his power to convince General Cáceres of the necessity of postponing the attempt to satisfy his ambitions, but without avail, and General Cáceres returned to the Cibao determined to obtain the nomination which his influence and popularity would doubtless procure.

As the days went on, General Vasquez found himself involved in ever increasing difficulties. The man in his own Cabinet upon whom he chiefly relied, Don Emiliano Tejera, had insisted upon resigning his portfolio because of his refusal to acquiesce in the President's determination to come to a friendly understanding with the Government of the United States for the settlement of the outstanding American claims. The ambition of both General Cáceres and General Hernández for the Vice Presidency, which neither was willing to relinquish, created, apparently, an impasse which could hardly be overcome without resort to

civil war. The disquiet and unrest which had gradually been increasing throughout the Republic, with the constant outbreak of violent disturbances, had made it impossible for the Government to carry out its program of administration. Political intrigue was constantly on the increase and the election of a Constitutional Government, for which General Vasquez had intended the Provisional Government to pave the way, seemed, owing to the inability of his own party to agree upon a ticket, more remote than ever. The President finally came to the bitter conclusion that the only hope of solving the country's difficulties lay in the sacrifice of his own ambition to be elected President of the Republic for the constitutional term.

He thereupon left at once for Santiago and in a long interview with General Cáceres advised him of his decision. He told him that for many years, in spite of every difficulty, he had fought for the ideals of government which he had proclaimed the preceding year; that now his Provisional Administration had proved almost barren of results, owing to the egotism of many of his leading followers and to the incompetence of many of the men whom he had appointed to office, and that the ideals for which he had sacrificed his life had not been realized.

The old unselfish loyalty and devotion of General Cáceres to his chief were once more called into life. Again in entire accord, the two cousins determined to abandon their own ambitions in order to enable their party to support other candidates concerning whom there would be no discord, and they decided, as soon as elections had been held, to resign their offices and leave the Republic. Hastening back to the capital, General Vasquez was called to the telephone at Moca by his cousin, who reminded him

that in their hurried conversation they had omitted to reach any agreement regarding the names of the candidates to be supported by their party in the coming elections. It was only then determined that the two would recommend for the Presidency Don Tomás Cocco, a prominent and respected citizen of Puerto Plata.

Hardly had General Vasquez proceeded further on his journey to the capital when he received word, on the morning of March 23rd, from Don Emilio Joubert, who had succeeded Don Emiliano Tejera as Secretary of the Treasury, that an insurrection had broken out in Santo Domingo.

11.

The insurrection had come to a head under the leadership of certain of the military chieftains who had followed the fortunes of Heureaux.

For some months, the old-time partisans of Heureaux had been playing upon the popular dissatisfaction with the Government, and had preached the doctrine that Heureaux's times, when peace had been enforced, were at least preferable to existence under the present liberal Administrations, which had proved unable to maintain the pacification of the country. As an outgrowth of this propaganda, Heureaux had almost become a popular hero. The Dictator's tomb was daily covered with flowers, and addresses were delivered commemorating his achievements.

Many of the more prominent of Heureaux's adherents, suspected of conspiracy against the Government, had from time to time been sent to the capital from the north by General Cáceres, notwithstanding the protests of the President against the concentration in Santo Domingo of so great a number of political prisoners—the prisons were so crowded that some of the suspects were perforce re-

tained as "confinados" or prisoners kept under surveillance within the confines of the city, but not incarcerated in the Fortress. Among the most prominent of the old-time followers of Heureaux held as "confinados," or imprisoned in the Fortress, were General Pedro Pepín and General Leopoldo Espaillat. Through agents these two formed a conspiracy in which participated both prisoners and "confinados," and many of the dissatisfied Jimenistas. General Alejandro Woss y Gil was determined upon by the conspirators as the leader of their revolt because of his prestige and personal popularity.

Through the influence of the Vice President of the Improvement Company, Judge Abbott, General Woss y Gil had been released by order of General Vasquez from the custody of the Military Governor of Santo Domingo and permitted to return to his own home. This freedom from supervision had enabled General Woss y Gil to seize the opportunity which he had long been seeking.

At approximately one o'clock in the afternoon of March 23, 1903, while two-thirds of the inhabitants of the capital were indulging in their noon siesta and the military and civil authorities of the capital were at their own homes, an insurrection was proclaimed in the Fortress by General Remigio Zayas, who proceeded immediately to release the political prisoners, whose leadership was assumed by General Pedro Pepín. The guards on duty were at once disarmed, and at a given signal the partisans of General Woss y Gil within the city attacked the officials who remained loyal, and subdued the police force, securing after sharp fighting full control of the capital. By seven o'clock in the evening the authorities of the Government, including the Governor of the Province, General Casimiro de Moya, had been forced to surrender in the Puerta del Conde

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where they had taken refuge, and a Provisional Government superceding that of General Vasquez was at once proclaimed with General Woss y Gil as Provisional President.

As soon as General Vasquez was apprised of the full extent of the insurrection he at once took energetic steps to put down the rebellion. For the time being, the insurrection showed few signs of support from the remainder of the Republic. Assisted on the Haitian frontier by the fact that General Alexis Nord had by now secured the Presidency of Haiti and had massed Haitian troops along the boundary to prevent the invasion of Dominican territory by revolutionists from that quarter, General Vasquez was enabled to recall his Minister of the Interior, General Cordero, from the frontier Provinces with his troops. Obtaining, as well, effective support from Puerto Plata and from Sánchez, General Vasquez marched with the reënforcements he had obtained towards the capital by way of Los Llanos in the east, in order there to join the forces mustered by General Luis Maria Hernández, Governor of the Province of San Pedro de Macorís. The Government gunboat *Presidente* was despatched to Azua, whence it returned with the encouraging report that the revolution which had broken out in that Province had been promptly suppressed by the adherents of the Government.

Upon his arrival at Los Llanos, General Vasquez was informed that General Hernández was marching rapidly to his support with large bodies of troops under the command of the Governor of Seybo, General Julián Zorilla, and General Zenón Ovando, and upon the concentration of their forces the march upon the capital commenced. General Vasquez retained command himself of

the major portion of the troops, but sent ahead a smaller body of artillery under the command of General Ovando. At Guerra, the forces of the Government routed the band of revolutionists which had marched out from the capital to meet them, and the revolutionary army was forced back to Villa Duarte, upon the bank of the Ozama River opposite Santo Domingo. By the evening of April 5th, the main body of the Government troops had reached a distance of only a few kilometers from the capital. The day following, an energetic assault was initiated by the Government troops for the purpose of forcing their way to the banks of the river commanding the eastern fortifications of the capital. Notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the revolutionaries, the Government army finally reached the outskirts of Villa Duarte and advanced to the very bank of the river, forcing the revolutionary troops across the river to the banks below the city walls. While many of the revolutionaries were shot as they retreated across the river in small boats, the Government forces, in maintaining their positions on the opposite bank of the river, were obliged to come under the fire of the machine guns placed upon the Fortress walls, and the losses on both sides were considerable. It was evident, although the Government had reëstablished its control over all the territory surrounding Santo Domingo, that no breach of the capital's defenses could be forced from across the Ozama River, and consequently General Vasquez determined to cross the river some distance above the city, to invest the capital from the west and north, and then force his way through the lines of defense at San Carlos or through the Avenida Independencia upon the west.

So sharp had the fighting become that the foreign Consuls, shut up within the beleaguered city, cabled to their

Governments for protection. On April 2nd, the U.S.S. *Atlanta* had landed a body of soldiers to protect the American Consulate and the La Fé sugar estate, and on the following day the German warship *Vinetta* had landed 150 of its crew to protect the German and British consulates. Shortly thereafter, Italian and Dutch warships likewise arrived without the harbour. All the streets of the capital were barricaded, cannon and machine guns being placed at every intersection of the streets, and the defenders of the capital, encouraged by their partial success, determined to prevent the Government troops from entering the city, at the cost, if necessary, of their own lives. On April 8th, General Vasquez had succeeded in crossing the Ozama River, and in the assault made that day upon the suburb of San Carlos two of General Woss y Gil's most able supporters were killed—Generals Pedro Pepín and Juan Rojas.

Dissension was, however, already spreading among the Generals upon General Vasquez's staff, which their chief, prostrated at the time with fever, was unable to dispel. General Luis Maria Hernández, unable to obtain definite assurances that he would obtain the nomination for the Vice Presidency, and his companion, General Zorilla, were both disgruntled. The arrival from the Cibao of General Aquilés Alvarez, one of the ablest lieutenants of General Cáceres, had done little to improve the situation. His arrogance, and possibly his superior ability as a commanding officer, had aroused jealousy on the part of the other generals supporting the Government. The lack of proper discipline among a large portion of the besieging forces contributed more than any other element towards rendering capture of the capital more than ever difficult.

An armistice agreed to on April 11th at the instance of

the foreign Diplomatic Corps was no sooner signed than it was nullified by a sudden sally of the revolutionists from within the capital. This disregard of his imperative instructions by his own troops resulted in the resignation of General Woss y Gil as commander of the revolutionary forces. On April 12th, the fighting again became intense, and in its course the suburb of San Carlos was completely destroyed by fire.

The stubborn resistance put up by the defenders of the capital had been unexpected, and a continuation of the siege placed the Provisional President in an increasingly difficult position. The progressive concentration of the Government's forces about the capital had encouraged the outbreak of local disturbances throughout the Republic, and on April 15th, word was received by General Vasquez from General Cáceres that the revolutionary leader, General Andrés Navarro, had reached Samaná with a large number of men and with ample munitions in order to capture that city and then proceed against Monte Cristi. It was therefore evident that were the Government to maintain itself, no time must be lost in capturing the capital. On April 18th, at four o'clock in the morning, the besieging forces made a final and desperate effort to overcome the resistance of the revolutionary troops, who were now, after the resignation of Woss y Gil, under the command of General Miguel Febles, assisted by General Dionisio Frias and General Francisco Deetjen. The struggle for supremacy was now fairly launched. The losses were very great on both sides. General Antonio Hernández succeeded in breaking his way into the capital through the barricade erected on the Calle Padre Billini, only to be killed in the assault. The troops under his command were routed in disorder after his fall, as were those commanded

by General Cordero, who had been shot after he had forced an entrance through the barricades in the Calle Palo Hincado. General Alvarez also fell in the assault.

General Vasquez, although incapacitated by the illness which had persisted throughout the siege, attempted to force his way into the capital through San Carlos, without success. He then turned to make a final desperate effort to breach the barricade on the Avenida Independencia. Had it not been that the troops under his command were panic-stricken and refused to obey the orders issued by their leaders, the resistance of the revolutionaries might then have been crushed, but the besieging forces could make no further headway. Stricken by the death of his ablest and most loyal supporters, ill and disheartened, General Vasquez made no further attempt to withstand the counsel of the surviving officers upon his staff to raise the siege.

Forced thus to consent to a temporary abandonment of the siege, General Vasquez determined to remain at the head of the Provisional Government until an honourable agreement could be reached with the revolutionaries, which he believed would be possible should he retreat temporarily to the Cibao. Word had reached him from General Cáceres that the situation in the northern provinces had improved and that the Cibao still remained loyal to his Government, and therefore General Vasquez, whose illness by this time had become so grave that it was only with difficulty that he could be transported, returned to Santiago.

The fortresses of the city were then provisioned and plans were made to hold them against the expected attack from the south. The situation proved untenable, however. Even those of his friends who at first had urged resistance soon counselled General Vasquez to give in.

Weary of struggle, disillusioned, the whole country appeared willing to accept the rule of those whom so short a time before it had rejected upon the downfall of Heureaux. In less than four years the hopes and ideals of liberalism seemed to have been dispelled.

Ill, broken, profoundly discouraged, General Vasquez, with a small group of friends, among them General Cáceres, set sail from Puerto Plata upon the *Independencia,* to take refuge in Cuba.

CHAPTER X

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE

1.

UPON the withdrawal from the country of the chief figures in the former Administration, General Woss y Gil rapidly obtained the nominal recognition of his supremacy within the Republic. He determined to establish himself at once as a Constitutional President through recourse to general elections.

Notwithstanding the fact that the group supporting Woss y Gil was far smaller than the number of Jiménez's partisans, the strategic position of the former was infinitely superior. Not only was Woss y Gil firmly entrenched in the capital, with an ample armed force at his disposal, but the customs houses, the sole source of revenue, were under his control. It became evident that the Government could readily force its election at the polls, and that should Jiménez persist in his determination to secure the Presidency once more, he could only do so by resort to revolution, to which the exhausted country was not prone. Consequently, Jiménez was forced reluctantly to adopt a conciliatory attitude, and authorized one of his principal lieutenants, Don Eugenio Deschamps, to accept the nomination proffered him by Woss y Gil for the Vice Presidency. The difficulty with which Jiménez resigned himself to the withdrawal of his candidacy was reflected in a proclamation which he addressed to his followers at that time. He announced that he had determined to abandon his candidacy for the Presidency notwithstanding his settled conviction that his triumph at the polls was assured, and added that this withdrawal of his name was solely due to his desire to prevent further dissension in the

Republic, since a small group, "incredibly enough," was opposed to his election. Upon the inauguration of General Woss y Gil as President of the Republic, on August 1, 1903, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez was in part compensated for his sacrifice by his appointment as Financial Agent of the Dominican Government in New York.

The Cabinet appointed by General Woss y Gil, notwithstanding the Jimenista support which the Government had obtained, was not in its major part of Jimenista complexion, and General José Brache, one of the principal associates of General Vasquez in the revolution of 1899, was given the appointment of Minister of Hacienda.

The Government of General Woss y Gil, at best barely tolerated by the Dominicans themselves, was tottering upon the day it was installed. Lacking all semblance of popular support, it faced immediately the danger of becoming a victim to the rivalry of the several creditor Powers.

The Henriquez y Carvajal contract with the French and Belgian bondholders, granting the customs receipts from the ports of Santo Domingo and San Pedro de Macoris as security to those creditors, had been disregarded by each succeeding Government since the day of its ratification. The French Government now pressed for the execution of the contract, a demand which the Dominican Government frantically opposed, since the revenues from the customs houses at the two chief southern ports were the sole revenues enabling it to maintain itself, the receipts at all the other ports being expended by the local authorities in their vicinity, or pledged and repledged to satisfy specific claims. In the face of this refusal, the French Government refused recognition to the Government, and threatened stronger measures.

As early as the month before Woss y Gil's inauguration the German, Spanish and Italian Governments also had made joint cause, forcing the Provisional Government, as it then was, to agree to a series of protocols pledging the monthly payment of definite installments upon the satisfaction of the claims of their nationals which they had advanced. Not satisfied with this achievement, the German Government despatched a warship, the *Vinetta*, to Santo Domingo, to obtain an increase in the amount recognized by the Dominican Government as the total of the German claims. So successful was this display of military force that within three weeks the Dominican Government had more than satisfied the German pretension by agreeing to settle the German claims for the sum of $325,000, instead of the sum of $212,500 originally demanded.

On October 17th, an urgent demand was made by the Belgian Government for the settlement of the claims of the Belgian bondholders. Expressing its desire to undertake joint action with the United States for the settlement of the claims supported by the two Governments, the Belgian Government proposed that the two creditor nations seize all the Dominican customs houses, granting the Dominican Government a percentage of the revenues, the balance to be paid in pro rata sums to the respective creditors, the direction of this task to be assumed by an international commission composed of representatives of the United States, France, and Belgium, as the largest creditors of the Dominican Republic.[1] Upon the query as to the possible action which Italy and Germany might take, were they to ascertain that they had been omitted from representation in such a commission, the reply was

[1] Mr. Powell to the Secretary of State, October 29, 1903.

advanced by the Belgian Government that after the experience so recently suffered by Germany at the hands of the United States in the Venezuela incident, no difficulty would be encountered in that quarter, and that 10 per cent of the revenues destined for the settlement of claims might be set aside by the projected international commission for the Germans and Italians.

The Government of President Woss y Gil found itself at this moment in such financial straits that there literally was not held in the treasury one dollar with which rations might be purchased for the troops.

The customs revenues were constantly diminishing, owing to the exemptions granted the merchants who had loaned money to the Government; the export tax on cacao was mortgaged to the Italian Government; specific revenues allotted foreign creditors as security had frequently been repledged to others; the defaulted interest alone, due the Belgian and French bondholders, amounted to more than $600,000; the recognized claim of the Improvement Company amounted to $4,500,000, and other American claims totalled an additional $1,000,000. The debt was daily growing and the Government had no credit with which to obtain relief. For a while the old-time fantasy of bartering national territory was re-created, but without result:

"General Woss y Gil confidentially stated that the United States should control Samaná and Manzanillo, but stated that he could take no action until he knew how far the United States Government would support him. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Manuel de Jesús Galvan, is opposed to this program and anxious to have an agreement of this character made rather with Germany." [1]

[1] Mr. Powell to the Secretary of State, September 14, 1903.

2.

But the struggle of the Woss y Gil Administration was short-lived. A revolution was launched on October 24, 1903, in Puerto Plata, by General Carlos Morales, who immediately constituted a Provisional Government in that city and imprisoned the Vice President of the Republic, General Deschamps, who had arrived in Puerto Plata to treat with the revolutionaries. Within a week the revolution had spread throughout the Cibao, had gained the adherence of the towns of Sánchez and Samaná, and before many more days had passed the revolutionaries had entire control of the Republic with the exception of the capital itself. Initiated by Morales upon the pretext that the Jimenista party had not been sufficiently well requited by General Woss y Gil, the revolution was supported likewise by the Horacistas under the leadership of General Cáceres, but recently returned from Cuba, who intended to assure himself that his own party would obtain the lion's share upon the overthrow of Woss y Gil. Upon the announcement by General Morales that his Provisional Government had been constituted in order to pave the way for the election of Don Juan Isidro Jiménez to the Presidency, it seemed for a while as if the Jimenistas and Horacistas participating in the revolution might postpone their attempt to overthrow the Government in the capital until they had annihilated one another. At Monte Cristi, the revolution was joined by a group led by General Andrés Navarro and General Desiderio Arias, who announced that they were supporting the revolution in order to overthrow the "audacious hypocrites" composing the Administration of Woss y Gil, so that Don Juan Isidro Jiménez

might once more be elected to the office of which Woss y Gil had defrauded him.

Decreeing the blockade of all the northern ports of the Republic, the Government took steps to defend the capital against the anticipated siege. Of 20,000 persons concentrated within the city, more than 3,000 were refugees without money or food. Behind the walls of the city additional barricades were placed, and the city gates reënforced to a height of six feet by iron water pipes, behind which were placed barrels filled with stone and clay and bales of sand. Against the force of some 4,000 men, composed of Horacistas and Jimenistas led by Generals José Bordas and Manuel de Jesús Camacho and by Generals Ramón Tavares and Demetrio Rodriguez, the Government could oppose but a scant force of 900 men. Once more American, French and Italian sailors were landed from warships summoned to the capital, to protect the lives of the foreigners within the city. After a brief resistance, the Woss y Gil Government capitulated, and on November 24th, the revolutionaries entered the city. As the result of the revolution, the indebtedness of the Republic had been further increased by some $700,000.

3.

The chief of the revolution, General Carlos F. Morales Languasco, had long been identified as a prominent Jimenista. A native of Puerto Plata, in his early days he had taken holy orders, and as a priest had taken part in the campaign which had prefaced the election of Jiménez to the Presidency. He had, however, later cast aside his cassock, had married, and had raised a numerous family. A man of greater energy than intelligence, greater ambition than conscience, erratic and impulsive far beyond the

border line of sanity, he had fast gained the entire confidence of his chief, and had been personally responsible for the final disastrous break between Jiménez and Vasquez. So sure was Jiménez of Morales' loyalty to himself, that when the revolution against the Government of Woss y Gil was proclaimed in Puerto Plata, he had, with a group of supporters, immediately sailed there from the United States in order to succeed to the Presidency which the downfall of Woss y Gil would leave vacant.

Ever deficient in political strategy, Jiménez, however, failed to reckon with two considerable factors, the temperament of his lieutenant and the strength of the Horacistas.

The facile triumph of the revolution proved too great a temptation to Morales to resist. In this ambition he readily found supporters among the Horacistas, who had already announced their irrevocable determination to prevent the return of Jiménez to the Presidency. Persuaded at length that he could secure the Presidency himself, Morales sought to placate both parties by appointing to his Provisional Cabinet members of both groups. In a decree issued December 8th, the Provisional President then convoked elections for the following January 16th and 17th, and formally announced his own candidacy for the Presidency, together with that of General Ramón Cáceres for the Vice Presidency, notwithstanding the fact that the candidacies of Don Juan Isidro Jiménez and General Miguel Andrés Pichardo had already been launched. In a further proclamation announcing his acceptance of the support of the Horacista party in the elections, General Morales stated that he himself had announced his candidacy upon the somewhat dubious ground that

"Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, my old friend, who has ever been the leader of the cause for which I have made so many sacrifices, will always find loyalty in me; and because I believe that General Horacio Vasquez, today living in retirement in a foreign country, but succeeded in the direction of his party by General Ramón Cáceres, candidate for the Vice-Presidency, will likewise find in me a strong guarantee of his interests."

At once a new revolution broke out. Not only was the Republic divided into zones controlled by Horacistas and Jimenistas, but also into zones controlled by neither, since in the Provinces of Azua and Barahona another Provisional Government was installed, having General Luis Pelletier as President and Don Carlos Alberto Mota as Vice President, which was addicted to the candidacies of neither Jiménez nor Morales. By December 25th, the Morales Government retained possession solely of the capital and of the town of Moca.

Little by little, however, the Morales Government began to gain ground after it had declared a blockade of all the ports of the Republic. The two gunboats in its possession enabled it to move troops from port to port with rapidity, and thereby to obtain possession of the customs houses. By the middle of January, 1904, Morales' forces had retaken San Francisco de Macorís, Santiago, Puerto Plata, Samaná, and Seybo, and the situation of the Government was rendered more favourable by the desertion in large numbers of the revolutionary troops in the southern Provinces, since the Provisional Government installed in Azua had no funds with which to pay them, and by the defeat of the insurgent forces commanded by General Navarro, who had attempted to besiege the capital.

Moreover, the general public had to some extent become

prejudiced against Jiménez through the refusal of the latter to carry out his prior agreement to resort to elections as a means of determining whether or not his candidacy would obtain greater popular support than that of Morales. This point was emphasized in a public letter addressed to Jiménez by General Cáceres, then besieged in Moca, in which the former was arraigned as being responsible for the civil war through his refusal to agree to a compromise:

"All efforts were useless because although we accepted as President one of your closest friends, a man capable of giving us definite guaranties, the sordid interest which has always governed your political actions, as well in Santo Domingo as in Haiti, proved to be an insuperable obstacle which neither the public welfare nor the high purpose of those of us who desire to save our country were able to overcome. When you commenced the revolution you left us no other path than that of the defense of the Government and of public order. You are the sole individual responsible for all the misfortunes which may occur as a consequence of this disastrous and treasonable war. . . . You have wished it so, and so it will be; and in this way the country once and for all will either support you and your satellites, partisans of disorder, conspiracies, robbery of the public treasury, or ourselves . . . the only ones who truly desire the welfare of this unfortunate land . . . Our paths are thus well defined. So far, so good; and I will likewise state to you that I am well aware that I am condemned to death by you and your friends; you may therefore likewise be advised that so are you by my friends and by myself in person . . . R. CÁCERES." [1]

A commentary upon the ideals and methods of a certain fraction of Jiménez's followers may be found in a letter

[1] *El Diario*, Santiago, January 8, 1904.

addressed to his chief by General Desiderio Arias, the revolutionary chieftain of Monte Cristi:

"When we obtain Puerto Plata again, special consideration must be shown to nobody and such foreigners as . . . should be kicked out of the country so that they never come back, without paying any attention to the Consuls or to the Americans . . . Order Andrés [Navarro] to use his cannons more actively against the Capital and to keep his courage up; tell him that affairs require, in fact demand, today more than ever, a very decided and firm attitude . . . Cannon shots from all sides of the City are what is needed because that terrifies the enemy and makes the Consuls and the families oblige them to give in . . . Offer Puerto Plata to be pillaged by the troops when you are going to attack it and see how contentedly and greedily they go about it. Always your friend, ARIAS." [1]

Before the middle of March, owing to the energetic campaign undertaken by Morales and to the increasing popularity of his Administration, the entire country was under the control of the National Government with the exception of the port of Monte Cristi, the last stronghold of the Jimenistas, where Jiménez himself had taken refuge after the approach of the forces of the Government had forced him to flee from Santiago. By a decree issued on April 23rd, elections were convoked for the latter part of May, since the outbreak of the revolution had forced the postponement of the elections originally decreed for the month of January. By the end of May, the insurgents in Monte Cristi were obliged to give in to the Government, and on June 3rd and June 10th, Generals Desiderio Arias and Demetrio Rodriguez, commanding the last remnants

[1] General Desiderio Arias to Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, January 18, 1904, later published in the *Listin Diario* of Santo Domingo.

of the revolutionary troops, capitulated to General Céspedes, representative of the Morales Government, upon the understanding that General Arias was to be recognized as Governor of Monte Cristi, with the obligation to maintain peace and order within the confines of the Province, and to collect all revolutionary arms in order that they might be turned over to the Government. The agreement, of course, amounted to little more than the recognition by the Government of a revolutionary area within the Republic.

This sterile compromise, resulting from the mediation of Commander Dillingham of the U.S.S. *Detroit*, who had been despatched to Dominican waters to safeguard the lives and properties of foreigners on the north coast of the Republic, left Monte Cristi virtually independent. It resulted inevitably in distrust on both sides. The Jimenista chieftains constantly feared their dispossession by the Government, while Morales, on the other hand, was, with reason, certain that the Province would become a base for a renewed insurrection against the Government, whenever the Jimenistas deemed the moment propitious.

Fully aware that the demands of the Republic's foreign creditors would once more be pressed, as soon as the revolution was terminated and he himself had been installed as President, throughout the six months of the duration of the rebellion Morales had consistently sought the intervention of the United States, endeavouring to obtain through such support the means whereby to maintain himself in power.

Immediately after his first entry as Provisional President into the capital, Morales had informed the American Minister that it was his intention to send General Juan Francisco Sánchez as his special agent to Washington to

undertake the negotiation of a treaty with the United States, to provide that the Republic be placed under the protection of the United States for a term of fifty years, the United States to be given control over the fiscal affairs of the Dominican Republic as a guarantee for the payment of annual installments upon the foreign indebtedness of the Republic; to provide for reciprocity between the two countries, and to provide for the lease of Samaná and Manzanillo Bays to the United States.[1] While this appeal, when later made, was rejected on the ground that the United States was unwilling to undertake intervention of so sweeping a character, President Morales persisted in his policy, and had made it generally known by March of 1904 that should his Government dominate the revolution, and should he himself be elected Constitutional President of the Republic, the negotiation of a convention with the United States would become the cardinal policy of his Administration, for the specific purpose of removing the control of the customs houses from political parties, and by that method abolish the major incentive to revolution. This declaration on the part of the President was immediately utilized by the Jimenista party as an appeal to the ever vigorous chauvinism within the Republic. Morales consequently reaped a large measure of opprobrium, and brought upon himself bitter attacks, among them one from so outstanding a patriot as Archbishop Meriño. The opposition became naturally violently anti-American, and so bitter did the feeling among the Jimenistas grow towards the United States, which was believed to be secretly assisting Morales and the Horacista party, that, in the month of February, a body of the revolutionists then encamped near the capital fired upon a launch sent within

[1] Mr. Powell to Secretary Hay, December 17, 1903.

the harbour from the U.S.S. *Yankee*, and killed the launch's engineer. As an act of reprisal, marines were landed from the American war vessels anchored without, and occupied Villa Duarte, whence the revolutionists were dislodged. This act caused a renewed outburst against the Government.

As an outgrowth of the opposition to the Morales Government for its effort to support itself through the assistance of the United States, the Jimenista party attempted to curry favour with other foreign Governments. On February 19th, General Demetrio Rodriguez, a leading Jimenista, addressed a letter to the German Consul General in Santo Domingo stating that Don Juan Isidro Jiménez,

"Proclaimed President by the majority in Dominican territory," [sent through him] "his expression of respect and esteem to His Majesty, the Emperor of the German Empire, and solemnly offers to carry out in the future legally a secret treaty with His Majesty, the German Emperor, to whom the United States of America are commercial enemies . . . preferring the German Government to the United States." [1]

Jiménez likewise turned to Haiti, attempting to induce the Haitian Government to assist him to the Presidency should Morales refuse to break off all negotiations looking towards American protection or annexation. But from neither of these two sources was the Jimenista party enabled to obtain open encouragement, and Jiménez was forced temporarily to adopt an attitude of expectation.

4.

In the national elections held after the suppression of the insurrection, General Morales and General Cáceres

[1] Mr. Powell to Secretary Hay, February 26, 1904.

had been elected President and Vice President, and upon their inauguration in the capital on June 19, 1904, a great demonstration acclaimed them, the city being decorated with arches and with flowers, many houses having the Dominican and American flags interlaced.

On the same date, the President announced his Cabinet appointments. General Cáceres, the Vice President, was appointed Minister of the Interior; General Juan Francisco Sánchez, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Don Pelegrín Castillo, Minister of Justice; Don Manuel Lamarche García, Minister of Fomento; General Epifanio Rodriguez, Minister for War; Don Bernardo Pichardo, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and Don Federico Velasquez, Minister of Hacienda. The Cabinet was thus divided between members of the Horacista party and representatives of those Jimenistas who had supported Morales during the revolution, rather than the nominal leader of their party.

Upon the installation of his Government, President Morales had secured the agreement of the Belgian and French Governments to the postponement until the month of November, 1904, of the payment of the first installments upon the claims of the Belgian and French bondholders, which were secured by the revenues of the customs houses at Santo Domingo and Macorís. The Italian claims were secured by a new protocol pledging one-tenth of all the customs revenues of the Republic to their settlement, in addition to the specific hypothecation of the Samaná customs. Scarcely, however, had the Government obtained for itself this brief respite than the award of the arbitral tribunal, constituted by agreement with the second Provisional Government of General Vasquez to determine the mode of settlement of the claim of the Improvement Company, was announced. The arbitral tribunal, composed of

Judge George Gray of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, John G. Carlisle, and Don Manuel de Jesús Galván, had determined that the amount of $4,500,000, fixed as the sum due the Improvement Company, together with 4 per cent interest per annum, should be paid in monthly installments beginning with the month of September, 1904, the award to be secured by the customs revenues and port dues of all the ports on the northern coast of the Republic. The award had further provided for the appointment of Judge Abbott as the Financial Agent of the United States, who was authorized, in the event of the failure of the Government to make the payments due each month, to take possession of the customs house at Puerto Plata and undertake the collection of all revenues at that port, and in the event that such sums should still prove insufficient for the payment of the amounts due under the award, to undertake as well the collection of all customs duties in the other northern ports of the Republic with the same rights and privileges as were accorded him in Puerto Plata.

As soon as the award was announced, the European creditors of the Republic protested vigorously, both to the Dominican and to the United States Governments, against its execution, on the ground that their rights were clearly infringed by the terms of the award, since by various protocols entered into by the Governments intervening since the second Vasquez Administration several foreign claims had been secured by the same customs revenues which were now hypothecated for the satisfaction of the claims of the Improvement Company.

Upon the failure of the Dominican Government to pay the installments due under the award in the month of September, 1904, Judge Abbott, the Financial Agent of the

American Government, was placed in possession of the customs house at Puerto Plata by order of President Morales, who recognized the validity of the arbitral award notwithstanding the opposition of the Dominican Congress.

From the customs revenues of Puerto Plata the Government had previously been enabled to meet the expenses of the Administration not only of that province, but of the provinces of Santiago and Moca as well, constituting practically the entire Cibao. Consequently, with this source of income now cut off, the President was forced to seek additional revenues for expenditures which must imperatively be met should his Government desire to maintain itself. Owing to the manipulation by the authorities of Monte Cristi of the customs collections at that port, the revenues at the other northern ports were constantly diminishing, since importers found it less onerous to satisfy the desire for graft of the officials at Monte Cristi than to pay the legitimate duties elsewhere. Therefore, the sole remaining source of supply was the revenues of the ports of Macorís and the capital, already far insufficient to meet the demands placed upon them.

As soon as Morales, of necessity, commenced to expend a portion of the revenues of these two latter ports to meet urgent expenses in the Cibao, the Belgian and French Governments once more, and legitimately, protested that the security pledged to their nationals was being dissipated.

It was plain that were the Dominican Government to continue this procedure, the patience of these Powers would be exhausted, and that the European Governments whose rights were thus disregarded would seize the customs houses which they claimed and administer them to their own satisfaction.

While the President was even willing to surrender additional customs houses to the Improvement Company in return for a sure monthly payment of $30,000, this scheme was so vigorously combated by his Minister of Hacienda, Señor Velasquez, that he was obliged perforce to abandon it.

The position of the Government was as precarious through internal dissension as it was through danger of intervention from abroad. The demands of General Cáceres and the Horacistas had by now forced Morales to identify himself with the Horacistas. The influence of General Cáceres was becoming swiftly all-compelling, and the President himself was well aware that his own retention of office was now dependent solely upon his acquiescence in the orders of the Horacista leaders, since he had gradually forfeited the support of almost all the remaining members of the Jimenista party who had continued loyal to him. Fearful lest he be forcibly removed from the Presidency by General Cáceres, and confronted with an inevitable impending crisis in the foreign relations of his Government which he well knew his Administration could not withstand, Morales determined to make a final effort to save himself by throwing himself into the arms of the United States.

5.

In the United States there had become noticeable since the termination of the Spanish War a marked change in the self-appreciation of the American people. From its century-long comparative isolation, the United States had suddenly emerged a world power. The annexation of Hawaii in 1898, and the transfer of the former Spanish colonies of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, had tended to

create in an important body of public opinion the belief that the true rôle of the United States among the other Powers was that of a republican empire. The nascent feeling of self-importance thrilled an agreeable response to the mawkish admonition to "carry the white man's burden." Public sentiment was prepared to accept an extension of responsibility over-seas. In this new development, many of the finer distinctions of right and justice vanished. Public pride was as much appealed to by the manner in which Colombia had been despoiled, as it was by the unlimited benefit conferred upon the republics of the American continent and the world at large in the actual construction by the United States of the Panama Canal.

The phase was an evanescent one. It had its rapid culmination, and its equally swift decline. It so happened that the period of its greatest vigour fell within the years of the Administration of that most stimulating of American Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt.

The necessity of defining the extent of the responsibilities incumbent upon the United States, as a great power, in the maintenance of that policy of self-protection known as the Monroe Doctrine, had long been considered by President Roosevelt. So early as the year 1896, the possibility of grave dangers arising from the unilateral nature of that policy had been impressed upon him in a letter addressed to him by James Bryce, after the warning of President Cleveland had caused Lord Salisbury to accept arbitration of the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. Bryce wrote:

"As to the Monroe Doctrine, I have never been able to see how it applies at all to such a case as this: If the United States are going to assume a protectorate over all Central

and South America, and see that these so-called Republics behave like civilized States, that is another matter. Then other countries will know whom they have to deal with. But the United States have not done so—and certainly that is not the Monroe Doctrine." [1]

The impracticability of continuing indefinitely to warn off the European Powers from taking effective measures to obtain redress for their just claims or legitimate grievances from the less stable of the American Republics seemed evident. The continued interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in that manner would lead almost inevitably to war involving the United States with one or more of the European Powers, since certain of the republics of the American continent were so assured of the protection afforded them by the opportune interposition of the United States that they had flagrantly violated international equity in their dealings with European Governments. It was well within the bounds of possibility that the other European Powers, and Germany in particular, would not continue forever to manifest the spirit of patience and conciliation demonstrated by Great Britain in the Venezuela incident.

The appeal now addressed to the United States by the President of the Dominican Republic for assistance in extricating his Government from the difficulties involving it with European Powers came at an opportune moment. Not only did it afford an opportunity for President Roosevelt to announce the determination of the United States Government to adopt that broader interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which he considered both equitable and advantageous, and in accord with the spirit of the times,

[1] Rt. Hon. James Bryce to Theodore Roosevelt, January 1, 1896, James Bryce by H. A. L. Fisher.

but it likewise made it possible for him, by so doing, to place a very positive check upon the ambition of Germany to find scope for colonial expansion within the Western Hemisphere.

In Asia, in Africa and in the Southern Pacific, Germany had within a few brief years built up a colonial empire. She had openly opposed the cession of Spain's former colonies, which she herself had coveted, to the United States, and her opposition to the construction of the Panama Canal by the United States was notorious. During the early years of the century it seemed that the principal obstacle in the way of the satisfaction of her greed for additional colonies was the increasing influence of the United States. Forced to recede in 1902 from her intention to obtain a foothold in Venezuela, by Roosevelt's resolute ultimatum that a German occupation of Venezuela would be opposed by the strength of the American Navy, Germany later thought to avenge this humiliation by blocking the Danish ratification of the treaty providing for the sale of the Danish West Indies to the United States. German intrigue against the United States consequently was rife in Latin America, and nowhere more than in the Caribbean, for the purpose of offsetting the growth of American influence, and preventing the expansion of American commerce.

At the very moment that Morales sought American intervention, Germany, impressed by the possibilities latent within the offers made to her representatives in Santo Domingo and in Haiti by the agents of Jiménez, had under favourable consideration the project to purchase the Spanish, Belgian and Italian claims against the Dominican Government, and secure control of the Republic by occupying the customs houses as guarantees for

the eventual repayment of the claims which she had taken over.

President Roosevelt determined to act, and, as always, to act swiftly. The justification for the nature of the assistance he intended to proffer the Dominican Government was based upon the corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which he later announced officially in a message to the United States Senate:

"The conditions in the Republic of Santo Domingo have been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been many disturbances and revolutions and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of these debts were properly contracted and are held by those who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are without question improper or exorbitant, constituting claims which should never be paid in full and perhaps only to the extent of a very small portion of their nominal value.

"Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved because of the non-payment of debts due their citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic itself any guarantee of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory, outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the custom houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking possession of a certain amount of territory.

"It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the Doctrine. It cannot be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbours and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an

excuse for such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo or exercise any other control over the Island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the Government to meet the necessary expenses of running it and part of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other Powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any other steps.

"An aggrieved nation can, without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade or bombardment, or the seizure of the custom houses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in fact a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European Power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these Republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually afford the only way in which the Power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States. . . . The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the people of the

Island, as well as the security of American interests, and they are intimately associated with the interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction. . . ." [1]

At once the following instruction was cabled to the American Minister in Santo Domingo by Secretary Hay on December 30, 1904:

"You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly but earnestly, and in a perfectly friendly spirit, regarding the disquieting situation which is developing owing to the pressure of other Governments having arbitral awards in their favor and who regard our award as conflicting with their rights. Already one European Government strongly intimates that it may resort to occupation of some Dominican customs ports to secure its own payment. There appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be disposed to request the United States to take charge of the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government and the several claimants. We have grounds to think that such an arrangement would satisfy the other powers, besides serving as a practical guarantee of the peace of Santo Domingo from external influence or internal disturbances."

6.

In the negotiations which ensued, Morales readily admitted his fear that the European creditors would no longer delay exacting payment and would seize the customs

[1] Message from the President of the United States to the Senate, February 15, 1905.

houses, but before it was possible for him to accede to the proposal of the United States, it became necessary for him, owing to the political situation, to secure the unanimous approval of the members of his Cabinet. This at first was not practicable, since the Minister of Hacienda, the dominating figure in the Cabinet, and the personal representative within the Government of the Vice President, General Cáceres, favoured the plan of a joint collection of customs revenues by American and Dominican officials rather than the establishment of an American Receivership. Believing any delay to be dangerous, President Roosevelt despatched an additional representative to Santo Domingo for the purpose of accelerating negotiations. Commander Dillingham, who was selected for this duty, had already, through the experience in the Republic gained during the course of the revolution of the preceding year, obtained a considerable knowledge of men and of affairs in Santo Domingo. It had, in fact, been to him that the first suggestion had been made by President Morales that the administration of the customs houses in the Dominican Republic be undertaken by the United States. Commander Dillingham was instructed to communicate to the Dominican President the willingness of the United States Government to assume this obligation, with the proviso that in such event 40 per cent of the import duties would be remitted to the Dominican Government for its own uses, and the remaining 60 per cent would be devoted to the payment of the interest and amortization charges upon the acknowledged indebtedness of the Republic, and to the payment of recognized claims. Such an assumption of responsibility by the United States, he was further to advise the President, must necessarily entail the agreement on the part of President Morales to make no change in the

existing tariff or taxation laws without the advice and consent of the United States, and to undertake such revision upon the formal request of the Government of the United States.

Upon the arrival of Commander Dillingham in Santo Domingo, agitation within the Republic became vehement. It was generally believed that the negotiations comprehended either the annexation of the Republic or the cession of Samaná, and the press commenced a vigorous campaign against the Executive. The project as elaborated by the American Government was communicated to the Dominican officials, and proved acceptable in its general terms to the Cabinet when Señor Velasquez modified his earlier insistence upon the joint collection scheme. An obstacle was, however, found in the phrasing of the preamble of the draft, which, while specifically providing in its original form against the intervention of European Powers in the Republic, did not, in the minds of certain of the Dominican Cabinet Ministers, safeguard the Republic from the possibility of American intervention. The insistence of the Dominican Ministers that the preamble contain the phrase, "The Government of the United States of America . . . agreeing to respect the complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic," met with the immediate acquiescence of the American Government. The communication of the desire for this amendment on the part of the Dominican Government to President Roosevelt elicited the following response, contained in a note to the Assistant Secretary of State from the President's Secretary:

"Referring to the enclosed cablegram, the President says, 'Of course, to put in anything the Dominicans want

about our not annexing the Island—the stronger the better.'" [1]

Finally on January 21st, the protocol providing for the collection by representatives of the United States of all the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, and for the assumption by the former Government of the duty of remitting 45% of such revenues to the Dominican Government for its expenses, and of disbursing the remainder in the discharge of the recognized obligations of the Dominican Government, was signed. To quiet popular apprehension, the contents of the protocol were immediately made known by President Morales, and while the agreement entered into was hotly debated, the threats of revolution to which the earlier apprehensions of the populace had given rise were dispelled. Later modified in a few particulars because of the desire of President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State to remove possible objections to it on the part of the United States Senate, a new version was signed, on February 7th, which was transmitted to the United States Senate by the President on February 15, 1905, with the following vigorous recommendation:

"This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine."

Owing, however, to the refusal of the United States Senate to take action upon the agreement so submitted to it, during the extra session of March, 1905, the stability of the Dominican Government was once more jeopard-

[1] Mr. William Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President, to Mr. F. B. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State, February 6, 1905.

ized, since not only was it generally feared that the negotiations resulting in the signing of the protocol would prove fruitless, or that the ratification of the instrument would at least be indefinitely postponed, but any delay made it impossible for the Government to obtain sufficient revenues with which to meet its imperative daily expenses. By an arrangement, temporary in its character, agreed to by both the Governments involved, the good offices of a Puerto Rican banker in Santo Domingo, Don Santiago Michelena, were resorted to, as the result of which Señor Michelena acted as a temporary intermediary for the United States, collecting the customs revenues, transmitting monthly $75,000 to the Dominican Government, and holding the surplus in trust for that Government until such time as the agreement with the United States might go into effect.

President Roosevelt was, however, unwilling to wait upon the Senate. Appreciating fully, as he indicated in the following instructions which he issued to the Acting Secretary of State, that, should the Government of the United States postpone taking action, changes might occur in the situation in the Dominican Republic which would later render useless the consummation of the proposed agreement or bring complications into its enforcement, President Roosevelt authorized the immediate enactment of a *modus vivendi* by which, under the direction of a nominee of the President of the United States, all revenues from both the northern and southern ports in the Dominican Republic would be collected; 45% of this total to be delivered to the Dominican Government for its current expenses, and the remaining 55% to be retained upon deposit, to be later distributed among the creditors of the Dominican Government should the agreement be ratified

by the United States Senate, and should the treaty be rejected by the Senate, to be returned thereafter to the Dominican Government:

"This action is rendered necessary by the peculiar circumstances in the case. The treaty now before the Senate was concluded at Santo Domingo's earnest request, repeatedly pressed upon us, and was submitted to the Senate because of my judgment it was our duty to our less fortunate neighbor to respond to her call for aid inasmuch as we were the only Power who could give this aid and inasmuch as her need for it was very great. The treaty is now before the Senate and has been favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is pending and final action will undoubtedly be taken when Congress convenes next Fall. Meanwhile, Santo Domingo has requested that the action above outlined be taken—that is, she desires in this way to maintain the *statu quo*, so that if the treaty is ratified it can be executed.

"With this purpose in view, I direct that the proposed arrangement be approved. It will terminate as soon as the Senate has acted one way or the other." [1]

In view of the fact that the Italian, Spanish and American creditors of the Dominican Government, with the exception of the Improvement Company, had accepted the proposed customs agreement between the two Governments unconditionally, and the Belgian and French Governments had tendered a provisional acceptance, the prompt action taken by the American Executive in enacting the *modus vivendi* unquestionably saved the situation. The news of the adjournment of the United States Senate without taking action upon the proposed agreement had at first been exaggerated in Santo Domingo into the report

[1] President Roosevelt to the Acting Secretary of State, March 28, 1905.

that the agreement had been rejected, and the danger of revolution by the Jiménez adherents in the Province of Monte Cristi was imminent. This danger was minimized by the steps immediately taken to enforce the *modus vivendi,* and with the arrival of President Roosevelt's nominee, Colonel George R. Colton, who had distinguished himself in the Philippines Customs Service, the reorganization of the Dominican Customs Service under an American Receivership was promptly undertaken in accordance with the terms of a decree prepared by Señor Velasquez and promulgated by President Morales under date of March 31st.

With the entrance upon his duties of Colonel Colton, the question was at once raised by the Dominican Government as to the inherent right of Colonel Colton under the temporary plan to appoint and to remove his subordinates. Realizing how vitally important the question of patronage involved was to the Morales Government by reason of its precarious tenure, the American Collector determined upon a policy of making no changes in the Customs Service other than those indispensable to insure the honest collection of the import revenues, although he at once insisted upon the cancellation of the preferential contracts under which the more important importers had been permitted to evade payment of the customs duties.

Through the efficacious assistance lent by the United States Government, the Dominican Republic was saved from inevitable disaster. With a total foreign indebtedness amounting to nearly $20,000,000, and with an interior debt admitted to total a nominal value of $9,500,000, as afterwards estimated by Professor Jacob H. Hollander, sent by President Roosevelt as special Commissioner to report upon the financial problems of the Dominican

Government, the Dominican Government was nevertheless now relieved from the danger of intervention or of armed occupation by the European Powers, as a means of enforcing the collection of their claims. The *modus vivendi,* moreover, satisfied a majority of those foreign creditors in that it offered the assurance that their claims would eventually be paid. Equally important to the Morales Administration, the *modus vivendi* presented the only method by which the Dominican Government could obtain sufficient funds with which to exist and to maintain order, and by removing the customs houses from the direct control of the National Government and placing the collection of the customs revenues under a receivership, the greatest incentive to revolution had likewise been eliminated.

At once, the beneficial effects of the *modus vivendi* were made apparent; not only for the major reasons above outlined, but by the striking increase in the revenues of the Government through the introduction of honest and efficient business methods in the customs houses.

At first the signing of the protocol had given rise to an outbreak of savage hostility against the Administration, and the inauguration of the *modus vivendi* had met with general disapproval. But little by little public opinion veered about, and eventually most of the principal leaders of the Horacista party admitted their agreement with the opinions which President Morales had expressed in his yearly message to Congress on February 27, 1905:

"The protocol is the result of necessity and means the reaching of an agreement which may place the country in a position to solve the problem of its debt. In submitting it to your high approbation, I am confident that your

patriotism . . . will gather inspiration from the reality of existing circumstances. The only kind of patriotism which is useful is that which shows results in works of practical utility."

7.

This practical utility was soon generally conceded except by those whose rabid partisanship rendered them blind to the essential requirements of the Republic.

Had Morales manifested the same statesmanship in dealing with the internal political affairs of the Republic that he had exhibited in confronting the international problems of his country, the success of his own Administration would have been assured. Unfortunately, such was not the case. Repeated efforts at revolution occurred throughout the spring and summer of 1905, although their chances of success were diminished by the embargo placed by the United States Government upon the exportation of arms and ammunition to the Dominican Republic, and by the occasional visits to Dominican ports of American warships to guard against any interference with the collection of the customs revenues by the American Receivership.

The amicable relations which had at first existed between the President and the Vice President, General Cáceres, gradually developed into an open estrangement, due in no small part to the intrigues of Don Leonte Vasquez, who had been appointed to the Cabinet. The consistent effort of Don Leonte Vasquez was to obtain the appointment by the President of a purely Horacista government, eliminating all those with whom Morales had originally been identified. A crisis was provoked in the autumn of 1905.

General Guayubín (Cirilo de los Santos), a brave negro

leader, who had been of considerable assistance to President Morales during the revolution which had succeeded the installation of his Provisional Government, had been originally appointed Governor of La Vega, but had been forced to resign in the preceding month of May and had been supplanted by another supporter of the President. His complaints at length moved General Cáceres to action. While General Cáceres' popularity, prestige, and reputation for fair and unselfish dealing were unquestioned, as was his patrotism, he was excessively loyal to his friends and followers. Accompanied by his closest friend within the Cabinet, the Minister of Hacienda, Señor Velasquez, General Cáceres proceeded to the capital and demanded that the President dismiss all members of his Cabinet who were not members of the Horacista party, and likewise replace General Guayubín in the position from which he had been removed. While at first he refused to comply with the demands made, the President later was forced to give in, and announced his intention of satisfying the Horacista party. Satisfied with the initial success of their project, the leaders of the Horacistas were later perturbed, and were forced to doubt whether they had in fact reduced the President to a state of complete submission, inasmuch as Morales again manifested a spirit of independence by voting a split ticket in the municipal elections, in which the Horacista party triumphed throughout the Republic except, as was to be anticipated, in the Province of Monte Cristi.

With the growing distrust between the President and the leaders of the Horacista party, the tranquillity which had existed for a few months within the Republic was once more disturbed by an attempt at revolution in San Pedro de Macorís and by sporadic outbreaks in the Cibao,

largely due to the continuance of a press campaign against the ratification by the Dominican Congress of the pending convention with the United States. Public agitation within the capital came to a head early in December, when the President demanded the resignation of the Comandante de Armas in the capital, whom he believed involved in a conspiracy. As soon as the President's action became known, the Minister for War, General Luis Tejera, the son of Don Emiliano Tejera, who had likewise become a member of the Cabinet upon his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs after the dismissal of General Sánchez, concentrated the troops in the capital within their barracks. Gathering together a group of forty or fifty of the more vehement of his officers, the Minister for War forced his way into the Government Palace where the President was conferring with the American Minister, General Cáceres, and Señor Velasquez, and demanded the reappointment of the Comandante de Armas. General Cáceres, deputed by the President as his representative to parley with Tejera, was informed brazenly by the latter that he had completed his plans to assassinate Morales, and in his conspiracy counted upon the support of the Vice President. Upon the indignant refusal of General Cáceres to take any part in such a plot, General Tejera, learning that all the other members of the Cabinet were determined to support the President in the sudden emergency, was forced to abandon his intentions and to resign his office. There resulted a momentary reconciliation between the President and the members of the Horacista party which was officially announced on December 13th.

The situation had, however, gone too far to be supported longer by a man of the ambitious and unbalanced temperament of Morales. He had failed to create any party

of his own, and realizing that he could never dominate the Horacista party, he determined to seek support once more from the Jimenistas.

The immediate cause of the final definite break between Morales and his Cabinet was the insistent refusal of Don Fermín Pérez to resign his position as Governor of Puerto Plata. Appointed to the latter post, after the President had removed him from his Cabinet upon the demand of General Cáceres, General Pérez refused to comply with the President's new request that he resign the Governorship in Puerto Plata, where it was alleged by the Horacistas he was endangering their interests. It is probable that the position taken by Pérez in this case was due to the conspiracy directed against his own Government into which the President had now entered. Reaching a secret agreement with the Jimenista leaders installed in Monte Cristi, Morales resolved by a bold stroke to overthrow his own Administration and rely for support in the revolution which would ensue upon his former political associates.

8.

On Christmas night, giving no evidence of his intentions to anyone within the capital, after spending some hours in apparently friendly conversation with his Cabinet Ministers, Don Emiliano Tejera and Don Federico Velasquez, President Morales walked alone from the city to a point some two miles distant, where he was met by thirty of his associates in the conspiracy. The party thereupon rode to the Haina River which they reached late at night. Joined there by two Jimenista chieftains who had been able to raise a few followers, the President attempted to launch a revolution. At the same time, General Desiderio Arias, the Governor of Monte Cristi, announcing that

the "rebels" of the Horacista party within the capital had prevented the President from exercising his Constitutional functions, proclaimed a revolution in support of the President.

The astonishment of the Cabinet upon ascertaining the President's flight was naturally extreme. Announcing that the President had secretly abandoned the capital, leaving the Government without an Executive head, the Cabinet at once summoned General Cáceres to take control of the Government as Vice President. Troops were promptly despatched by the Cabinet, pending the arrival of General Cáceres, to surround the forces which had rallied to the support of the President, while instructions were issued to the authorities in Santiago to proceed rapidly against the revolutionaries of Monte Cristi.

The plight in which the President now found himself was deplorable. Not only did the revolution which he had attempted to launch fail utterly, upon the refusal of the populace in the southern Provinces to rally to his support, but as the result of a fall in which he had broken his leg, he was unable to travel from the vicinity of the capital, and was dragged about from one place of concealment to another by his companions in the endeavour to elude the pursuing forces of the Government. On January 3rd, the American Minister received a letter written by the President from his place of hiding:

"The miserable circumstances in which I find myself impose upon me the painful necessity of making an appeal to the inexhaustible kindness of your heart. Today more than ever I need your powerful aid to save my life and my reputation, menaced by senseless rage. I do not want power. I renounce everything. But I desire to be permitted to live abroad beside my children—the two little ones.

Provided that you can obtain from my adversaries guarantees for me and those who accompany me, I will present myself in your Legation in order to embark for a foreign country in a warship of the United States . . . I am completely sick of political life and if by your valued coöperation I obtain the happiness of returning to the peaceful tranquillity of my own home, I can assure you that never again will I take part in the political affairs of my country.

MORALES L."

At once, the American Minister, Mr. Dawson, sought and obtained guaranties from the Cabinet of Morales' personal security. At nine o'clock on the night of January 11, 1906, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, who had gone out from the city to find him, located the President at a distance of some seven miles from the capital. From there he conducted him to the American Legation where, on January 12th, the President signed the following formal resignation, addressed to the President of the National Congress:

"By virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, I communicate through you to the high Body over which you preside, that I resign the Presidency of the Republic with which the votes of my fellow-citizens honored me."

On the following day, stretched out upon a litter in an open carriage, Morales was driven from the American Legation through the streets of the capital, where a great crowd had gathered silently to enjoy his humiliation, to embark upon the United States warship *Dubuque,* which conveyed the former President to Puerto Rico.

9.

After an absence of more than a year and a half in Cuba, General Horacio Vasquez had returned to his old

home in Moca after the installation of the Provisional Government of Morales. He had suffered a complete breakdown in his health, and with the firm determination to take no further active part in the political struggles in his country, he had attempted to abstain from any intervention in the events which had led up to the final break between General Cáceres and President Morales. By force of circumstances, however, General Vasquez had been compelled to take part in the campaign which ensued upon the resignation of Morales, when the attempt was made by the revolutionists of Monte Cristi to capture Santiago and Puerto Plata. It was in no small part due to the efforts of General Vasquez in this campaign that the Jimenistas were defeated both in Monte Cristi and at Puerto Plata, where one of their foremost leaders, General Demetrio Rodriguez, was killed, and that the Province of Samaná was pacified upon the surrender there of General Barba.

When the revolution had been crushed, and General Cáceres had succeeded to the Presidency, the question was at once raised whether General Cáceres would remain in office, or would by his resignation permit the historic leader of the Horacista party to return once more to the Presidency. The general belief among the members of the Horacista party that General Cáceres would insist upon his cousin's return to office was confirmed by the announcement made by General Cáceres to his Cabinet on February 9, 1906, that he had determined to resign immediately and that General Vasquez had consented to be a candidate for the vacancy so created.

A smaller group within the Horacista party was, however, insistent that General Cáceres remain in office, and in order to prevent any serious unrest within the Republic,

which such dissensions would necessarily tend to create, General Vasquez refused to consent to become a candidate for the Presidency, and likewise decided immediately to resign his position as the Government's Delegate in the Cibao, an office which he had accepted during the brief course of the revolution. Upon the insistence of General Cáceres that he continue in the latter office for a while, General Vasquez, through his personal influence, was enabled to prevent the outbreak of an insurrection which might have assumed formidable proportions, by intervening in a dispute which had been engendered between the President and General Cabrera, first appointed Governor of Moca and later transferred as Governor of Samaná. After these difficulties had been smoothed over, General Vasquez insisted upon the immediate acceptance of his resignation as Delegate of the Government in the Cibao. Returning to his home, he determined to devote himself to the recuperation of his personal fortune, which he had been forced for many years to neglect.

Immediately thereafter he was visited by General Cáceres. Announcing his firm determination to resign the Presidency, General Cáceres stated that General Vasquez was the chief of the party, and that it was essential in the interests of the country that General Vasquez succeed him in the Presidency, since this opinion was held by the great majority of the most prominent leaders of the Horacista party. After strong arguments had been adduced by General Cáceres and by his own closest political friends, General Vasquez agreed to reconsider the question for a period of two weeks.

During the course of this time, General Cáceres sent to him General Guayubín to notify General Vasquez once more that he himself had reached an irrevocable decision

to resign the Presidency, since in his opinion General Vasquez was the one man capable of filling the office. After the fullest consideration, believing from all the evidence which reached him that the great majority of the Horacista leaders desired him to assume the Presidency, General Vasquez sent word to General Cáceres that he would accept the nomination for the Presidency should General Cáceres resign the office. Hardly, however, had this decision been reached, when General Vasquez received a telegram from Don Emiliano Tejera and Don Federico Velasquez urging him to withdraw his decision and to insist that General Cáceres continue in the Presidency. It became immediately apparent to the leader of the party that General Cáceres, influenced by the members of his Cabinet, was once more wavering in his decision to resign the Presidency, and in his reply to the telegram addressed to him by Cáceres' two Ministers, General Vasquez stated that he had consistently urged General Cáceres to continue in the Presidency, and that should General Cáceres continue as President, he would support him, or should he in the future run for the Presidency, he himself would be the first to vote for him.

The decision now taken by General Vasquez was final, and although the Governors of the Cibao united to protest and to urge General Vasquez to become a candidate, the latter rejected all further overtures. Thereupon General Cáceres, on February 20, 1906, announced his intention to continue in office as President of the Republic, as the successor under the Constitution of President Morales.

CHAPTER XI

THE TRIUMPH OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REVERSION TO ANARCHY

1.

UPON the inauguration of Ramón Cáceres, the helm of affairs had been seized by a man who was destined to bestow upon the Dominican Republic five years of peaceful, stable and orderly government, and for the first time in the history of the nation, an Administration not only responsive to the needs of the people but also capable of satisfying them.

A few years younger than his cousin and chief, General Horacio Vasquez, Ramón Cáceres had been born some forty years before near Moca where he had passed his earliest years on the plantations owned by his family. Of vigorous and hardy frame, with a ruddy, jovial face reflecting his sanguine temperament, the attraction of his personality was such that he compelled all those with whom he came in contact. The qualities of leadership were innate in him. All that was finest in him thrilled ever to the roll of drums and the shrill of the bugle. Had it not been by reason of the fact that he had been overshadowed by the abilities and the great reputation of the leader of his party, General Vasquez, Cáceres would unquestionably have been installed in the Presidency after the downfall of Heureaux.

The devotion which he was able to inspire among his followers was remarkable. Even now, many years after his tragic death, those who were most closely identified with him cherish the recollection of their association with him as one of the proudest memories of their lives. No less loyal was Cáceres himself to his friends. While he lacked

the qualities of statesmanship, owing to his rudimentary preparation and even more to his indolence in mastering questions which failed to interest him, he possessed both vision and rare good sense. A practical politician, he understood his people, their needs, their desires, and their reactions. Utterly fearless, with a reputation recognized throughout the country as an audacious and capable military leader, he was unquestionably as well fitted as any man within the Republic to take hold of the reins of administration at that time. A man of action and in no sense a student, he recognized his own limitations. For this reason, as well as because of the lack of the power of application, he shirked the task of determining the technical problems of administration, and gladly relinquished the burden to his advisers.

Fortunately for General Cáceres, he found at hand in his closest friend and ablest lieutenant, whose loyalty to himself had been a prime factor in bringing him to the Presidency, exactly that executive ability and technical knowledge without which his Administration must inevitably have failed. From Don Federico Velasquez y Hernández, who continued in Cáceres' new Cabinet as Minister of Hacienda, the President obtained ever an unfaltering support. A year younger than the President, Señor Velasquez presented a striking contrast to General Cáceres in almost every particular.

Having come to the capital from the Cibao at an early age to obtain an education, he had been fortunate in coming directly under the influence of the great pedagogue, Eugenio Hostos. Accepting the position as professor in the primary school of the capital known as "La Trinitaria," at the age of twenty-one, Velasquez undertook at the same time the direction of the periodical *El*

Magisterio. Like a few others of the younger men of ability of his generation, his sympathies were early ranged against the Dictator, and he participated in the conspiracy against Heureaux which had been initiated by General Marchena. While on a mission connected with the execution of this plot he had been apprehended by agents of the Dictator and had suffered the penalty of two months' solitary confinement in the notorious "Cuarto de Colón" in the prison of Fort Ozama. Upon his release, rejecting the opportunities afforded him of becoming affiliated with the partisans of the Dictatorship, he had fled to Puerto Rico, where he had become the private secretary of General Vasquez and had taken a prominent part in the plans of the "Junta Revolucionaria de Jóvenes." His close connection with the chief of the Horacista party had continued for many years afterwards until his strenuous opposition to the contracts entered into by President Jiménez with the Improvement Company had rendered his official association with General Vasquez, then the Vice President, no longer tenable. From that time on, due to the confidence placed in him by General Cáceres, as well as to his own remarkable abilities, he had played an increasingly important part in the ranks of the Horacista party, and after holding positions of minor importance, when the party of which he was a member returned to power after the triumph of the Morales revolution against Woss y Gil, through the insistence of its leaders, he had been appointed Minister of Hacienda in the Morales Cabinet.

His qualities of mind and of temperament formed an exact complement to those of Cáceres. Lacking the military prestige, the magnetic personality, the jovial approach, with the resultant great popularity among all

kinds and classes which distinguished Cáceres, Velasquez possessed indomitable perseverance, a well-trained, well-disciplined mentality, a passion for politics, unlimited personal ambition, and an untiring capacity for application. Where Cáceres was pliant, Velasquez was rigid; where Cáceres was conciliatory, Velasquez was aggressive; where Cáceres was too easily imposed upon by his friends, Velasquez was unduly suspicious. The qualities of the former made him an idol among his adherents; the qualities of the latter tended to make the possessor of them unpopular; but the popularity of the former was gained frequently by the satisfaction of the few at the eventual expense of the many, while the antipathies created by the character of the latter were often incurred because of his unfaltering determination to pursue the true interests of the country as he conceived them. Cáceres had many other able advisers, outstanding among them Don Emiliano Tejera, one of the least self-seeking of Dominican patriots and one of the most capable, but the accomplishments of the Cáceres Administration must in the last analysis be attributed equally to Cáceres and to Velasquez. Without the popularity, the military ability, and the personal prestige of Cáceres, Velasquez could have accomplished nothing; without the great executive capacity of his Minister, Cáceres would have been unable to bequeath to posterity his Government's long record of achievement. To these two men must be accredited the remarkable attainments of an Administration far superior to any which the Republic had yet known.

2.

Immediately after the announcement of his determination to continue in the Presidency, General Cáceres

addressed a message to the Congress outlining the policy which his Administration intended to pursue. He recommended a general revision of the laws relating to the administration of the governmental departments; advised that prompt steps be taken to encourage immigration and to further public education, and urged the adoption of certain amendments to the Constitution.

Turning his attention then to that question which loomed largest—the proposed collection by the United States of the customs revenues of the Republic, and the assumption by that Government of the responsibility for discharging the indebtedness of the Dominican Republic—the President made his own position immediately clear. Emphasizing the fact that for the first time in its history the Dominican Government, since the operation of the *modus vivendi,* had been running without a deficit, he added,

"Order has now succeeded chaos. During the last year our receipts have covered the appropriations made by the budget law, and on December 31, 1905, the deposit in the National City Bank of New York amounted to $815,000 gold—a sum destined for the payment of the interest and amortization of our debts."

Convinced of the benefits which the ratification of the Convention would insure, Cáceres continued:

"The Convention signed February 7, 1905, is now submitted to the vote of this House and of the Senate of the United States. You know its antecedents. You can intelligently consider its consequences, and following the dictates of your patriotism determine upon its ratification or rejection. It has not been the will of the Executive that has

brought us to the necessity of making this agreement, but an accumulation of circumstances which have arisen from the errors of all. As regards this matter we are confronted by necessity; we are in the position of having to make sacrifices for the payment of our debts and the preservation of our independence."

The opposition to the Convention was no longer limited, General Cáceres had found, to the Jimenista party. Within his own party, the feeling was very strong that with the creation of a purely Horacista Government, the President should not be debarred from granting the coveted control of the customs to the loyal members of his party. The strength of this objection was at first temporarily relieved by the visit to the capital in the early spring of 1906 of General Horacio Vasquez. Convinced by the arguments advanced by the President, by Don Federico Velasquez, and by Don Emiliano Tejera, of the practical advantages which would inure to the Republic by the ratification of the Convention, General Vasquez expressed his accord with the policy which the Administration was pursuing, but the stubborn opposition of his brother, Don Leonte Vasquez, who had been appointed Minister of Fomento in the Cáceres Cabinet, encouraged the opponents of the Convention, and ended by threatening to create a definite break within the party.[1]

The spirit of dissension, stimulated and fostered at every opportunity by Don Leonte Vasquez, found a ready response within the Congress and selected as the target for its attack the person of Don Federico Velasquez. While originally opposed to the negotiation of the Convention in the form in which it was signed, and insistent

[1] Mr. Dawson to Secretary Root, April 2, 1906.

that the collection of the customs should be jointly undertaken by both Dominican and American officials, Velasquez had reached the conclusion that in the ratification of the Convention lay the safety of the nation. In this opinion he was warmly supported not only by the President but by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Emiliano Tejera, as well, whose realization of the situation was graphically portrayed in a letter which he wrote when the opposition had grown even stronger:

"What will happen if Congress does not accept the treaty? You know as well as I; it would mean the triumph of the speculators of former years; permanent civil war; the impossibility of paying off domestic or foreign creditors because all our resources will be expended in civil war; the discredit and the final downfall of the few good men in the country; the ruin of the Nation in every sense of the word." [1]

The group within the Horacista party favouring the ratification of the Convention was ably led by Velasquez, and while the faction of opposition headed by Don Leonte Vasquez was eventually successful in persuading General Horacio Vasquez to modify his earlier approbation of the Convention, the latter refused to make his change of opinion public in order not to embarrass the Administration, and the task of directing the opposition devolved upon his brother. So acute did public feeling rapidly become that in May of 1906 a resolution of impeachment was presented in the Congress against Señor Velasquez based upon the trumped-up charge that he had expended sums not authorized by the Congress. Upon the immediate

[1] Don Emiliano Tejera to Mr. Dawson, American Minister to the Dominican Republic, February 7, 1907.

presentation by the Minister of Hacienda of a detailed statement of all of his expenditures, which were shown clearly to be legitimate, the President was able through his influence to cause the resolution to be defeated; but the presentation of the resolution proved to be only the first step in a systematic campaign waged within the Horacista party to discredit the Minister of Hacienda and to force the President to agree to his removal.

3.

During the preceding months, President Roosevelt had been unable to obtain assurances that the United States Senate would adopt the policy which he had so strongly recommended, and agree to the proposed Convention with the Dominican Republic. So determined had the opposition within the Senate become, and so much prominence had been given the charge brought by Senator Tillman of South Carolina that the execution of the *modus vivendi* had been unconstitutional and outside the prerogatives of the Executive, that it was feared by the President that the Convention could not be ratified in its original form. President Roosevelt, more than ever determined to carry out his policy, came to the conclusion that it would prove an easier task to obtain the Senate's approval of the Convention should the Dominican Government itself undertake the task of adjusting the settlement of its debt directly with its creditors, leaving to the United States the sole responsibility of collecting the Dominican customs revenues, and of paying the indebtedness of the Republic therefrom in accordance with the terms of the adjustments which might be arrived at by the Dominican Government.

Consequently, in the month of June, Señor Velasquez,

as the Republic's financial representative, visited the United States to consult the American Secretary of State and the President's Special Commissioner, Professor Hollander, regarding the terms of the proposed adjustment. During his absence from the Republic, the Minister of Hacienda negotiated two contingent agreements—one with the banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company of New York for the issue of a loan of $20,000,000 of fifty-year 5% bonds of the Republic, and the second an agreement with the Morton Trust Company of New York to act as fiscal agent and depositary of the Republic. He then undertook, upon his return to Santo Domingo, the task, provocative, naturally enough, of increased hostility against the Minister, of adjusting, by a process of radical scaling down, the claims held in the Dominican Republic against the Government. At the same time, Professor Hollander proceeded to Europe, and there succeeded in reaching an agreement with the French and Belgian bondholders as the result of which the latter assented to a similar process in the settlement of the obligations of the Republic held by them. After many months of protracted negotiations and tedious struggle, the Minister of Hacienda and Professor Hollander perfected an offer of settlement to those creditors of the Republic who held recognized debts or claims to adjust these, at rates varying from 10% to 90% of their face value. The nominal total of the debts and claims recognized by the Republic amounted to $31,833,510, while the total of the adjustments offered by the Republic amounted to approximately but 50% of the face value of such obligations. While the proposals advanced by the Dominican Government were bitterly combated, not only by the Republic's domestic creditors but by its for-

eign creditors as well, a sufficient number of the creditors had signified their agreement before the end of the year 1906, to make possible the success of the project, and to warrant the negotiation of a new Convention along the lines determined by President Roosevelt.

The new Convention containing these modifications was at length signed in Santo Domingo on February 8, 1907, and almost immediately ratified by the United States Senate on February 25th, in the following form:

"Whereas during disturbed political conditions in the Dominican Republic debts and claims have been created, some by regular and some by revolutionary governments, many of doubtful validity in whole or in part, and amounting in all to over $30,000,000, nominal or face value;

"And whereas the same conditions have prevented the peaceable and continuous collection and application of national revenues for payment of interest or principal of such debts or for liquidation and settlement of such claims; and the said debts and claims continually increase by accretion of interest and are a grievous burden upon the people of the Dominican Republic and a barrier to their improvement and prosperity;

"And whereas the Dominican Government has now effected a conditional adjustment and settlement of said debts and claims under which all its foreign creditors have agreed to accept about $12,407,000 for debts and claims amounting to about $21,184,000 of nominal or face value, and the holders of internal debts or claims of about $2,028,258 nominal or face value have agreed to accept about $645,827 therefor, and the remaining holders of internal debts or claims on the same basis as the assents already given will receive about $2,400,000 therefor, which sum the Dominican Government has fixed and de-

termined as the amount which it will pay to such remaining internal debt holders; making the total payments under such adjustment and settlement, including interest, as adjusted and claims not yet liquidated, amount to not more than about $17,000,000;

"And whereas a part of such plan of settlement is the issue and sale of bonds of the Dominican Republic to the amount of $20,000,000, bearing five per cent interest, payable in fifty years, and redeemable after ten years at 102½, and requiring payment of at least one per cent per annum for amortization, the proceeds of said bonds, together with such funds as are now deposited for the benefit of creditors from customs revenues of the Dominican Republic heretofore received, after payment of the expenses of such adjustment, to be applied first to the payment of said debts and claims as adjusted, and, second, out of the balance remaining to the retirement and extinction of certain concessions and harbour monopolies which are a burden and hindrance to the commerce of the country, and, third, the entire balance still remaining to the construction of certain railroads and bridges and other public improvements necessary to the industrial development of the country;

"And whereas the whole of said plan is conditioned and dependent upon the assistance of the United States in the collection of customs revenues of the Dominican Republic and the application thereof so far as necessary to the interest upon and the amortization and redemption of said bonds, and the Dominican Republic has requested the United States to give and the United States is willing to give such assistance:

"The Dominican Government, represented by its minister of State for foreign relations, Emiliano Tejera, and its minister of state for finance and commerce Federico Velasquez H., and the United States Government, repre-

sented by Thomas C. Dawson, minister resident and consul-general of the United States to the Dominican Republic, have agreed:

"1. That the President of the United States shall appoint a general receiver of Dominican customs, who, with such assistant receivers and other employees of the receivership as shall be appointed by the President of the United States in his discretion, shall collect all the customs duties accruing at the several customs houses of the Dominican Republic until the payment or retirement of any and all bonds issued by the Dominican Government in accordance with the plan and under the limitations as to terms and amounts hereinbefore recited; and said general receiver shall apply the sums as collected, as follows:

"First, to paying the expenses of the receivership; second, to the payment of interest upon said bonds; third, to the payment of the annual sums provided for amortization of said bonds, including interest upon all bonds held in sinking fund; fourth, to the purchase and cancellation or the retirement and cancellation, pursuant to the terms thereof, of any of said bonds as may be directed by the Dominican Government; fifth, the remainder to be paid to the Dominican Government.

"The method of distributing the current collections of revenue in order to accomplish the application thereof as hereinbefore provided shall be as follows:

"The expenses of the receivership shall be paid by the receiver as they arise. The allowances to the general receiver and his assistants for the expense of collecting the revenues shall not exceed five per cent unless by agreement between the two Governments.

"On the first day of each calendar month the sum of $100,000 shall be paid over by the receiver to the fiscal agent of the loan, and the remaining collection of the last preceding month shall be paid over to the Dominican Gov-

ernment, or applied to the sinking fund for the purchase or redemption of bonds, as the Dominican Government shall direct.

"PROVIDED, That in case the customs revenues collected by the general receiver shall in any year exceed the sum of $3,000,000, one-half of the surplus above such sum of $3,000,000 shall be applied to the sinking fund for the redemption of bonds.

"II. The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment of all customs duties to the general receiver and his assistants and will give to them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to the extent of its powers. The Government of the United States will give to the general receiver and his assistants such protection as it may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.

"III. Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rates of duties have been for each of such two years in excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.

"IV. The accounts of the general receiver shall be rendered monthly to the contaduria general of the Dominican Republic and to the State Department of the United States and shall be subject to examination and verification by the

appropriate officers of the Dominican and the United States Governments.

"V. This agreement shall take effect after its approval by the Senate of the United States and the Congress of the Dominican Republic.

"Done in four originals, two being in the English language, and two in the Spanish, and the representatives of the high contracting parties signing them in the city of Santo Domingo this 8th day of February in the year of our Lord 1907.

THOMAS C. DAWSON
EMILIANO TEJERA
FEDERICO VELASQUEZ H."

So bitter, however, had the opposition to the Convention now become within the Dominican Republic that for a while even the dauntless supporters of President Cáceres' policy felt that the battle of procuring its ratification by the Dominican Congress was well-nigh hopeless. The opposition within the Horacista party which at first had been based largely on personal grounds was now able to count upon the great number of disgruntled creditors of the Republic, as well as upon the Jimenista opposition, and became vociferous in its protests against the Convention, not only upon the ground that the investment infringed the sovereignty of the Republic, but likewise upon the ground that the policy of the Administration was one of repudiation. The great majority of the Provincial Governors announced their open opposition to the Convention and to the contingent loan; many of the Cabinet Ministers identified themselves with this opposition; and when the Congress convened on February 27, 1907, the Administration was sure of only nine of the sixteen votes necessary to secure ratification.

In accordance with the advice tendered him by General Vasquez, who was unwilling that the intrigues of his brother, Don Leonte Vasquez, should cause a still wider split within the party, General Cáceres, to obtain the latter's removal from the scene, appointed Don Leonte Vasquez Consul in Hamburg. With the departure of the latter, the President's task was simplified, and due in great measure to the persuasive methods adopted by Don Emiliano Tejera in his dealings with the members of the Congress, the Convention was at length ratified, on May 3rd, by a vote of seventeen out of twenty-four, not, however, without so-called "clarifying amendments," which read as follows:

"(a) As to article 1: It is understood that the employees mentioned in that article do not in any case include those who are to be appointed by the Dominican Executive Power in the custom-houses of the Republic in accordance with the our existing laws. (b) As to article 2: The protection of the receiver-general and his assistants by the American Government shall only take place in case the Dominican Government should find it impossible to extend it. (c) As to the second part of article 3: It is understood that the urgent and requisite tariff reform may be carried out immediately, in accordance with the tenor of the text, since the Dominican Executive Power can demonstrate that during the two years preceding the current one customs receipts have exceeded $2,000,000. (d) Add to article 5 . . . 'and after ratification by the high contracting parties.'"

It was determined by the American Secretary of State that these amendments should be considered merely as in the nature of an interpretation of the Convention by the

legislative body of the Dominican Government, in order to avoid the necessity of submitting the Convention once more to the United States Senate. Consequently, Secretary Root expressed himself on May 24, 1907, in a note addressed to the Dominican Minister in Washington, as in accord with the interpretation placed upon the convention by the Dominican Congress and outlined clearly his viewpoint in the following language:

"I note that the President of the Congress says in his communication of May 4th that the explanations introduced in the resolution approving said convention alter in no respect the text of the convention and only serve to clear up the doubts that might occur in its interpretation.

"The explanations seem to be in the nature of statements of what the Dominican Congress understands that the operation of the treaty will be. If I understand them correctly, they entirely agree with the views entertained by the Government of the United States. In order to avoid any possibility that I may misunderstand the somewhat general language of the first explanation relating to Article I of the treaty, I will observe that the understanding of the Government of the United States is that the vesting in the President of the United States, under that article, of the power to appoint a general receiver, assistant receivers, and other employees of the receivership will not exclude or prevent the appointment of any other officers or employees by the Dominican executive authority; but such other officers or employees would not be authorized to take part in the collection of the customs revenues or other duties of the receivership except as they render assistance to the general receiver with his approval.

"It thus appears that both Governments will construe the treaty in the sense of the explanations included in the congressional resolution, and the object of the explana-

tions seems to be accomplished. Your Government will, I am sure, understand that it is not only unnecessary but impossible for the President of the United States to make those explanations any part of the treaty, which he is obliged to ratify, if at all, as it was approved by the Senate of the United States, and that without the consent of the Senate he cannot make any further or other treaty with regard to these explanations. If ratifications are to be exchanged it must therefore suffice that the various explanations which have been made have developed entire harmony of opinion between the two Governments regarding the meaning and effect of the treaty, and the ratifications should be of the treaty itself without including therein or appending thereto any additions or explanations. This would appear to be the course necessary to give effect to the intent of your Congress to alter in no respect the text of the convention."

Upon the ratification of the Convention, the Minister of Hacienda and his associate, Professor Hollander, who continued his connection with the Dominican Republic temporarily, as an employee of that Government, after the issuance of the loan already contracted for, completed the adjustment of the Republic's prior obligations, under which the creditors of the nation were paid the amounts provided for in the original plan, the creditors receiving 20% of such amounts in cash, drawn from the cash fund accumulated under the *modus vivendi*, and 80% in bonds of the new issue acceptable at 98½% of their nominal value. The outstanding features of the final adjustment of the Dominican debt were the payment of the French and Belgian bonds and the major portion of the other Dominican bonds at 50% of their par value; the payment of the claim of the Improvement Company

at 90% of the amount originally agreed upon; and the payment of the remaining obligations and claims at rates varying from 10% to 40%.

As a result of the persistence displayed by the Dominican Government, and the unflinching support rendered it by President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, the desperate situation in which the Republic had found itself two years before had been completely relieved, and the obligations of the nation had been discharged at a figure very materially less than that which had been anticipated. In addition, with the payment of the claim of the Improvement Company, the Central Dominican Railway, built by the Company during the Heureaux Administration, was now turned over to the Government, and the exasperating and burdensome private concessions covering the majority of the ports and port works throughout the Republic were now cancelled by the payment to their owners of an indemnity from the proceeds of the new bond issue.

Thus relieved of the burdens which had caused the failure of preceding Administrations, the Cáceres Government was enabled to devote itself to the pacification of the country and to the execution of projects for the development of the resources of the Republic.

It was not to be expected that the operation of the Receivership created by the Convention could be initiated without some divergences of opinion as to the rights and duties of the Receiver, notwithstanding the good-will made manifest both by the Dominican Government and by the American officials in the Receivership. Immediately after the ratification of the Convention, Mr. William E. Pulliam, who, like his predecessor under the *modus vivendi*, had distinguished himself by his marked ability

in the Philippine Customs Service, had been appointed Receiver General, and Mr. J. H. Edwards as his Deputy. A disagreement promptly arose as to the powers vested in the Receiver General by the Convention in respect to the appointment of his subordinates in the Customs Service, particularly in the appointment of "interventores," the customs officials whose duties consisted in the classification and appraisal of merchandise. Since this question involved once more the patronage which previously had been at the disposal of the Dominican Government, the question was aired with considerable feeling in the Dominican Congress. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Emiliano Tejera, at once upheld the Dominican contention by asserting that all customs employees should be appointed by the Dominican Government and be responsible to the Minister of Finance; that the duty of the Receivership was merely to receive customs payments, the amounts of which should be fixed in each individual case by "interventores" not under the control of the Receivership, and that after the duties so fixed by the "interventores" had been received by the Receiver General, the sole duty of the latter was to forward the sums collected to their destination in accordance with his obligations as fixed by the provisions of the Convention. The contention of the Receiver General, on the other hand, consisted in the assertion that the right of appointment and dismissal of all customs employees must necessarily be vested in him, since the Convention entailed the obligation on the part of the United States Government, of which he was for this purpose the representative, to receive and administer all the customs revenues of the Republic; and that were the control over his subordinates not to be vested in him, it would necessarily be impossible for the Receiver Gen-

eral to assure himself, and to guarantee to his Government, that all the customs revenues which should be collected had actually been received. So acrimonious did the dispute finally become that several members of the Cabinet threatened to make the issue a pretext for their resignation.

The Minister of Hacienda and the Receiver General were consequently invited to Washington by Secretary Root, who, in several conferences with them, reached the following conclusions, summarized in a note subsequently addressed to the Acting Secretary of State by Professor Hollander, who had attended the conferences:

"The most important result of the conference . . . was the agreement that at this particular juncture it is not of paramount concern to determine, as a matter of strict treaty construction and of abstract legal right, upon whom the appointment of the 'interventores' devolves. There need be no formal waiver of any right claimed by either Government, but it is manifestly of much greater importance that energies be concentrated upon the particular problems at hand than dissipated in theoretical contention.

"The only important thing for both Governments is that the Customs Service of the Dominican Republic be efficiently conducted, which means that all duties imposed pursuant to law should be paid by the persons liable, to the extent imposed, and that when so imposed they should be collected promptly and fully from the persons liable therefor. It is of vital importance that this be done and the United States, in consequence of the recent Convention, stands committed to see that it is done.

"The matter therefore resolves itself into a question of ways and means for the most efficient conduct of the Dominican Customs Service. It is a universally admitted principle of customs administration that efficient service is

only possible when the person in charge has the fullest control over the personnel of the service. Mr. Pulliam's work cannot be done as it should be done if any part of his equipment is selected upon grounds other than personal efficiency, or is not subject at all times to his absolute instruction and control even to the extent of prompt removal for a breach of discipline, or other adequate causes.

"It is to the obvious interest of Santo Domingo to conform to this common sense business-like arrangement, and even though possessing the right—which for the moment we may assume—to name 'interventores,' to exercise this right only through the agency of Mr. Pulliam; or certainly not to designate any person except after consultation with Mr. Pulliam as to his fitness and efficiency. It is very certain that Mr. Pulliam will recognize the particular conditions under which the Republic must work, and will be anxious to do anything to simplify the problems of the Republic in the matter of assignments and patronage.

"In fact, the whole matter should reduce itself to two sensible parties in interest working to a common end." [1]

The conciliatory and practical solution so indicated by Secretary Root was followed in after years without further protest or dispute, save during the Victoria régime.

4.

The new order resulting from the enactment of the Convention, with the reëstablishment of the nation's credit, was reflected immediately in a wave of prosperity which swept over the country. Commercial and industrial conditions became more satisfactory than they had

[1] Professor Jacob H. Hollander to the Acting Secretary of State, December 20, 1907.

ever been, and the improvement was at once shown by a material increase in the volume of trade. The yearly revenues of 1907 amounted in their total to a figure approaching $4,000,000, which presented a striking contrast to the low figures of the preceding years.

Fortified by this proof of the benefits of the policy which he had adopted, President Cáceres devoted his immediate attention to the reorganization of the political administration of the Republic. The way was prepared for this reform by the drafting of amendments to the Constitution, which he induced the Dominican Congress, in the autumn of 1907, to present for their subsequent ratification by a Constitutional Convention which assembled in the City of Santiago. It was the intention of the Cáceres Administration, by undertaking this new revision of the Constitution of the Republic, so often before amended to serve individual ambitions, and so completely disregarded by succeeding Governments, to establish upon a firm foundation that public faith in orderly procedure in government which had been the chief requisite of the Dominican nation since the days of its first independence. The task was undertaken in the spirit in which the President and his Cabinet had conceived it. By the new Constitution, the Republic was divided for purposes of administration into twelve Provinces, under Provincial Governors directly responsible to the National Executive. The "ayuntamientos," the municipal governments, the strongest bulwark of democracy in the Dominican political system, were retained as bodies representative so nearly as might be possible of the inhabitants of each locality. The Presidential term was increased to a period of six years, and, impressed by the political disputes which

had been engendered so often during the preceding decade between the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the Republic, the Constitutional Convention abolished the Vice Presidency and arranged for the replacement of the President in the event of his death, resignation or disability, by the provision that his successor should be elected by the National Congress, to take office as a Provisional President, obligated within a limited period to hold general elections in which a Constitutional President might be elected. The indirect system of elections was, however, retained, the electorate voting for a college of electors, to whom the election of the President was entrusted.

Animated by no partisan bias, the Constitutional Convention in abolishing the Vice Presidency was convinced that in so doing a material menace to orderly government had been removed. In the end, however, the remedy proposed proved far more prejudicial than the evil which it was desired to suppress, since the system now constituted provided for a provisional interregnum subsequent to the removal, for whatever cause, of the President, and made it possible, by permitting such an hiatus, for the generation of conflicts which should readily have been anticipated, and which in practice proved to be of fatal consequence to the Republic.

Under the new Constitution, the college of electors was elected in popular elections held on the first and second days of May, 1908. The Electoral College, in turn, on May 30th, re-elected President Cáceres, and at the same time elected the Senators and Deputies in the two Legislative Bodies now created. On July 1st, General Cáceres was inaugurated for the term ending in 1914.

5.

Enabled to point with just satisfaction to the great achievements for which his Government was already responsible, the President in his inaugural address made evident his intention of devoting himself to the improvement of conditions within the Republic. Steps had already been taken to better the still deficient administration of justice, as well as that of public education; particular stress was laid upon the need of encouraging agriculture and fostering immigration, the improvement and extension of roads, and the construction of systems of irrigation, and of other much needed public works. Warning the Congress that in the opinion of his Administration the haphazard granting of concessions to foreigners was contrary to the public interest, the President announced his intention of adopting the policy long favoured by Don Federico Velasquez—the construction of public works by the Government itself.

Soon after, the Government created a Bureau of Public Works, which was placed under the supervision of an American engineer, and obtained, with the assent of the Government of the United States as provided by the Convention of 1907, the sum of approximately $500,000 with which to undertake the construction of such works of public utility as were immediately necessary. Under the system adopted at that time, the Chief Engineer submitted to the Government in connection with each project undertaken a detailed budget showing the amount of the expenditures involved.

The Cáceres Administration consistently pursued the policy of the Government ownership of public utilities, inclusive of all port works. Granted the limited funds at

its disposal, the accomplishments of the Administration were in fact remarkable. Sanitary conditions within the principal cities were greatly improved, and in the capital and the larger cities of the Republic evidences of progress were at once made manifest; the principal streets were rolled, sidewalks and gutters were constructed, and a start was made to build the much needed highways to connect the capital with the cities of the south, of the east, and of the Cibao. The impoverishment of the public treasury by Heureaux, and the chaotic years which had ensued since his overthrow, had made it impossible for the various administrations which had succeeded that of the Dictator to undertake the task of making communication practicable within the Republic. At the time that the Administration of General Cáceres was first installed, a highroad in the modern sense of the word was unknown in the Dominican Republic. The only roads which existed were trails connecting the principal towns, suitable only for equestrians, and in the rainy season the difficulties of communication were so great that it was frequently impossible to make the journey from the capital to Santiago, the chief city of the Cibao, in less than three days. It was consequently the practice of the majority of those residents of the Cibao who had occasion to come to the capital to proceed by railroad to Puerto Plata, and from there to make the trip by sea around the eastern extremity of the Island to Santo Domingo city. Not only was this almost incredible hindrance to rapid communication an insuperable obstacle to the commercial development of the interior of the Republic, but it tended largely to separate and to keep apart the residents of each section as distinct entities, and had ever been a contributing cause of insurrection as well as a reason for the lack of fellow-

feeling which existed in the Provinces of the south and east for the inhabitants of the Cibao, with whom no personal contact had ever been established. National feeling, in fact, was subordinated to local prejudice.

It was for the purpose of preventing a continuance of these conditions, which would inevitably arrest the growth of the nation and render a permanent pacification of the Republic well-nigh impossible, that Cáceres, upon the advice of his Minister of Hacienda, determined to further, with all the rapidity which the resources at his disposal made possible, the construction of arterial highroads within the Republic. The highroad by which it was intended to link the capital with Azua was completed within a brief period as far as the town of San Cristóbal; and the northern highroad, destined to connect the capital with the cities of the Cibao, was completed during these years so far as Los Alcarrizos. The roads thus constructed under the supervision of an American Chief Engineer were high grade roads intended to withstand the heavy traffic which it was believed would shortly develop.

6.

Engrossed in the carrying out of the progressive program adopted by his Administration, General Cáceres had nevertheless, during the earlier years of his Government, to devote a considerable portion of his attention and his energy to the suppression of insurrection in various parts of the Republic. In the first months of his Administration, the intrigues of his predecessor in the Presidency had kept the revolution in Monte Cristi constantly smouldering. Repeated negotiations for the surrender of the rebels proved fruitless, and by the autumn of the year 1906,

the situation had reached a point where the Government force, unable to capture the insurrectionists or to negotiate their surrender, was obliged to content itself with the retention of the town of Monte Cristi itself. Aware of the constant drain upon the resources of the Government which the persistence of the rebellion occasioned, General Cáceres proceeded himself to Monte Cristi with a large force and proclaimed martial law. With the assent of the Haitian Government, troops under the command of General Camacho marched through Haitian territory and succeeded in recapturing the frontier town of Dajabón, and cleared the route from that town to Monte Cristi. By the end of October, peace was at length restored, and the leaders of the revolution, among them General Mauricio Jiménez and Generals Pichardo and Rivas, were forced to leave the Republic.

The outbreak of popular hostility caused by the pending ratification of the convention with the United States created subsequently a new pretext for insurrection, but the situation was tided over through the vigour of the Government, which successively put down with ease all attempts at rebellion. The amnesty which, on the day following the commencement of his second term of office, Cáceres granted all political exiles, with permission for them to return to the Republic, made it, however, easier for the ringleaders in the various conspiracies against the Government. Among them, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez was active in Puerto Rico, and another ex-President, General Carlos Morales, was equally active, after he had availed himself of the amnesty proffered and had returned to the Republic from his exile in St. Thomas. In November of 1909, the conspiracy conceived by General Morales, who

had later gone, with General Zenón Toribio and another bitter opponent of the convention, Don Francisco Espaillat de la Mota, to Jamaica, came to a head. But the filibustering expedition which they had planned proved to be destined to frustration, since the vessel upon which the revolutionists had embarked was driven out of its course by a hurricane to the Haitian Coast, where the chief conspirators were arrested by the Haitian authorities and deported to Turks Island.

Such sporadic attempts at rebellion gave the Government, however, which now considered itself firmly established, no grave cause for alarm. The organization of the armed forces of the Republic, which were now for the first time in the history of the nation decently fed and clothed, and promptly paid, made it difficult for any rebellion to meet with success, in particular since the President's personal popularity throughout the country was so great that a rebellion could scarcely hope for more than purely local response. It was against the person of the Secretary of Hacienda, Don Federico Velasquez, that popular hostility continued to be directed. It had been hoped by a large element of the Horacista party, jealous of Velasquez's influence over the President, indignant at the stand which the former had taken in the adjustment of the claims which so many of them had held, and antagonized by the manner in which the Minister steadfastly refused to brook opposition to his own projects where they affected the welfare of the nation as he conceived it, that the President might be induced to refrain from reappointing Señor Velasquez to the new Cabinet which General Cáceres formed at the commencement of his second term. But no arguments could persuade the President to deprive himself of the support of his

Minister. In the Cabinet appointed in 1908, Velasquez retained his portfolio as Minister of Hacienda and was appointed likewise *ad interim* to the post of Minister of Fomento and Communications, while at the same time a distinguished lawyer, Don José Maria Cabral y Baez, was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs; Don Miguel A. Román, Minister of the Interior; Don Manuel Lamarche García, Minister of Justice and Public Instruction; Don Emilio Tejera Bonetti, Minister of Agriculture and Immigration; and General Jesús Maria Céspedes, Minister of War.

The intrigues against the Minister of Hacienda increased as his influence with the President grew. Eventually all public questions were referred to him by General Cáceres, and the members of the majority in Congress were accustomed to consult with Señor Velasquez before they voted in order to ascertain the wishes of the Administration. Señor Velasquez had, in short, become supreme within the Government, and his influence with the President was decisive. Due to this fact, the year of 1909 saw the outbreak of a number of attempts at revolution within the country. General Céspedes, who had resigned from his post as Minister for War because of his inability to withstand the influence of the Minister of Hacienda with the President, unable to foster public discontent to the extent which he desired, left the country, while the Government was called upon to suppress in Monte Cristi, San Francisco de Macorís, and Santiago, outbreaks which such an evidence of dissension within the Government had encouraged. While all of these outbreaks were directly attributable to the dissatisfaction of several leaders with the policy of integrity, retrenchment and progress insisted upon by Don Federico Velasquez, the President, retaining

his implicit confidence in the latter, refused to waver in his loyalty to his Minister.

The growing hostility to the outstanding member of the Cáceres Cabinet occasioned, however, unfortunately for the President, in the summer of 1909, a problem far graver than any which he had previously confronted. Some two years previously, General Horacio Vasquez, at the urgent instance of the President, and influenced very greatly by the insistence of Don Emiliano Tejera, had accepted the position as General Supervisor for the Government of the construction of the Moca-Santiago Railroad, a continuation of the Central Dominican Railroad. The work had progressed smoothly and with rapidity, under the direction of the Government's Supervisor, when General Vasquez ascertained that the Government was involved in connection therewith in a transaction constituting, in fact, an attempt to speculate in the lands seized by the National Government by right of eminent domain for the construction of the road. Upon receipt of the protests addressed to the Government by General Vasquez in the matter, the Minister of Hacienda retorted by the issuance of orders which General Vasquez considered offensive to himself, and ascertaining that Señor Velasquez was supported by the President in the position which he had assumed, General Vasquez felt it obligatory to resign his position and to sever all relations with the Government.

Events which had transpired earlier in the year had caused a break in his relations with the brother of the President, and it became increasingly evident to him that his own partisans as well as the partisans of the President were exerting their efforts to create a complete break between the President and himself. To avoid such

a rupture General Vasquez determined to leave the Republic, and in midsummer of the year 1909 he went to Europe. Returning from France to the United States, he there received information concerning the course of the Cáceres Administration which caused him to reach the determination of addressing a private letter to the President urging him to modify his policy in those particulars which he deemed prejudicial to the interests of the nation, and to maintain the standards which his own Administrations had set up. This letter, which its writer had not intended to make public, was stolen from the mails and promptly published widely throughout the Republic. As soon as he was advised that his letter had been made public, General Vasquez assumed full responsibility therefor, and in a cable to the *Listin Diario* of the capital, sent on February 27, 1910, urged

"the press and citizens of the country to support the rectifications which he had suggested to President Cáceres as the only honest and certain means of pacification."

The more salient features of his published letter were as follows:

"The successive calls to arms which have disturbed the country since the last reform of our political constitution and your own re-election, and the adoption for the settlement of our finances of the so-called 'adjustment plan,' which has caused so much injustice, and has raised so many adversaries against the Government, even amongst the most passive classes of the Dominican people, constitute proofs that our national politics require a profound and dispassionate study, particularly under present circumstances, and of the crying need for the speedy and patriotic

mending of our errors; the path which the Government has taken is leading it to the most decided unpopularity.

"It is a well-known fact that you do not lack the gift of repression, which some applaud calling it fortitude or firmness, but which all others reprove, classifying it with contempt. I know that you will not be prevented through any kind of vacillation from using the rash means of pacification by repressive methods which a false spirit of vengeance caused many of your adventurous predecessors to use. The majority of your advisors have confidence in these measures and seem to prefer them in order to obtain profit and power.

"But all this is in severe contrast to the historical figure of the hero of the 26th of July . . . The most alarming feature of existing conditions, lies in the discontent of the peaceful classes, demonstrating an as yet embryonic but persistent and powerful popular feeling. To attempt to conquer this with blood and fire would be equivalent to challenging all society to a duel to the death, while extinguishing it by a wise change of policy would be equivalent decidedly to obtaining a glorious reconciliation between official interests, which must be entirely impersonal to be legitimate, and popular sentiment, which should be respectfully consulted, even when not in accord with the personal criterion of the rulers.

"These are the rectifications which I permit myself to suggest to you, Mr. President, and which it is necessary you should effect at once; inasmuch as it is imperative that public confidence in the Government be re-established and re-illumine the constitution which makes property rights inviolable, and in order to avoid disastrous international controversies, there should be undertaken the rectification of the adjustment plan, the stipulations of which cannot be legally carried out except in the case of those creditors whose claims form a portion of the public debt, who have

accepted or will accept its terms voluntarily . . . It is also necessary that without delay official action be taken so that all Dominicans who have been arbitrarily imprisoned, confined in other cities, or exiled, may return to their homes, no matter to what political party the victim may belong. I advise this reparation so that you may concede it not as an act of favor but to repair a grave injury done illegally. . . . We note with childish pride that our Constitution concedes us an essentially civil government, but we see nevertheless, with the sadness of disheartened men, that such a formula of government has been disregarded, set aside, or even contravened by official practises. This state of affairs is unpardonable. Nothing can justify it. All the more when I know that you do not lack prominent officials, and that the country has an abundance of high minded citizens in all political parties and outside them, to carry out effectively the civil administration which the law has created.

"But the advent of such an era will not be possible until every branch of the public administration acts with absolute independence, in other words, when there is no public servant who on account of favoritism is allowed to monopolize the general administration of all public affairs. I exhort you to reflect, Mr. President, hoping that your natural desire for civic greatness will permit you to heed my words with the same fraternal feeling with which in them I make evident my fervent desire for the salvation of our country and the true restoration of its democratic institutions."

To General Cáceres, the publication of this communication implied necessarily a complete break between himself and the man to whom he had been closest in his life. The rectifications suggested by General Vasquez implied primarily the dismissal of Señor Velasquez, with whose

policy the President himself was in full accord. Rumours that General Vasquez intended at once to foment a revolution against his Government were rife, and as a last attempt to conciliate his cousin, the President despatched General Casimiro de Moya to New York, but the attempt failed utterly in its purpose. As soon as this break in the relations between the two most prominent members of the Horacista party became known, there immediately rallied around General Vasquez in New York a group of the most inveterate opponents of the Government, among them Don Enrique Henriquez, Don Santiago Guzmán Espaillat, General Zenón Toribio, and Don Francisco Espaillat de la Mota.

But while General Vasquez determined to combat the policy which General Cáceres was pursuing through his principal Cabinet Minister, he was, at the same time, utterly opposed to the trend which the conspiracy of the leading revolutionaries had now taken. Learning in the summer of 1910 from communications received from Cuba that an attempt to assassinate President Cáceres had only been forestalled by the publication of his own letter, General Vasquez communicated the information so received to General de Moya when he arrived in New York as the President's emissary. He broke off, at the same time, all relations with the leading revolutionists in New York, turning over to them the sums which had been collected for the launching of a revolution and which had been placed under his control. A few months later, General Luis Tejera, the most envenomed antagonist of the President, reached New York and advised General Vasquez that a conspiracy had been formed to capture President Cáceres upon the pier in Santo Domingo upon some occasion when the President might be embarking or

disembarking from one of the Government vessels. Upon the indignant refusal of General Vasquez to share in a plot which might readily result in the death of his cousin, Tejera solemnly asserted that he was equally averse to the President's assassination.

Desirous, however, of maintaining himself entirely aloof from any conspiracy of this character, General Vasquez left New York in the spring of 1911 for St. Thomas, where he continued in a firm refusal to coöperate any further in the conspiracies directed against the President.

At the same time, other opponents of the Administration were busy. On February 13, 1911, General Carlos Morales visited the State Department in Washington to advise it that, supported by seventy adherents, he was resolved to terminate the alleged abuses existing in the Dominican Republic by a resort to armed revolution. Although informed by the Department of State that the American Government would exert every effort to preserve peace, Morales continued his preparations, and embarking for Puerto Rico, where Don Juan Isidro Jiménez was then living, he conceived the plan of purchasing a sailing vessel which would meet him and his fellow-conspirators at Inagua to make an attempt to capture Puerto Plata. As soon as the judicial authorities in Puerto Rico were apprised of this intended breach of the laws of the United States, Morales was arrested, together with his fellow-conspirators, among them General Zenón Toribio and General Mauricio Jiménez; and from the papers belonging to Morales which were seized at the time it was made evident that General Desiderio Arias, Don Eugenio Deschamps, and General Luis Tejera were all involved in the plot.

Throughout the summer of 1911, reports were con-

stantly received by the President that the opponents of his Government, unable to cause his downfall by resort to revolution, had determined to remove him through assassination. The President, sanguine as ever, felt not only sure of the stability of his Government, in that it had now grown too strong to be overthrown, but likewise was convinced that his own popularity with the public was too great to permit such an attempt to be made. Cáceres overlooked, however, the fact that in the person of General Luis Tejera, the son of his own Minister, Don Emiliano, he had created a bitter and vindictive personal enemy. General Cáceres had not only rebuffed him when Luis Tejera had sought his support in assassinating President Morales, but had also subsequently, upon becoming President himself, completely disregarded the demand of Tejera for the appointment of Colonel Aníbal Roldán as Comandante de Armas in the capital, through which Tejera had hoped to strengthen his hold over the National Guard, and had instead appointed Colonel Alfredo Victoria to that position. Tejera, whose unstable mind veered upon the borderline of insanity, could not overlook this deliberate shattering of his ambitions, which had grown into the fixed delusion that upon the death or removal of Cáceres he himself might readily become President of the Republic.

Gathering together a group of vicious young malcontents within the capital, Tejera at first determined, as he had advised General Horacio Vasquez, to capture the person of the President and force from him his resignation. Later he determined to grasp any means of removing General Cáceres from the scene. In his conspiracy he was chiefly abetted by his group of boon companions in Santo Domingo, while Don Enrique Henriquez, the chief of the

revolutionary band in New York, was kept in close touch with developments through constant communications from Tejera.

7.

The afternoon of November 19th was sultry and overcast. The heat was unusually oppressive and more reminiscent of the summer months than the beginning of the winter season. The President, as was his custom, determined a little before five o'clock, to go out for his evening drive. Disregarding with disdain as women's fancies the rumours which had reached him, confident as always of his popularity and of the good luck which had attended his course for so many years, he was attended only by the head of his staff, Colonel Chipi Pérez. You can see him as he lolls back on the seat of his victoria. The years of office which had passed over his head had not left many changes. His stalwart body had lost perhaps a little of the muscular quality which distinguished it in the earlier years. The high color, which had always been noticeable, had coarsened a little as the result of the sedentary life of the years in the Presidency and of the good living to which he had always been inclined, but all the old personal magnetism was there and the exceptional quality of a commanding personality. As the carriage rolled along the Calle Separación, the President greeted each passer-by. There was no formality in the intercourse between the Chief of State and his fellow-citizens. As the carriage swung into the Avenida Independencia at a quick trot, it passed Don Francisco Peynado and Don Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos riding into the city for an evening promenade along the Malecón. The President was greeted with the cry, "You are a fine President, driving without an escort!" "Abur vagabundos"

is all that they could hear of his jesting reply; the rest was lost in the noise of the wheels and the horses' hoofs.

Turning at San Jerónimo, the carriage had nearly reached the Peynado quinta on its way back to the city, when Colonel Pérez saw beyond, a few hundred yards down the road, a country wagon drawn up upon the right, and on the left, placed obliquely, was a small car, the occupants of which, numbering seven, were standing on the roadside where they had been joined by another group. The thought flashed into Pérez's mind that the moment so long rumoured had arrived, but the fear in which he stood of his chief and his unwillingness to incur the taunt of cowardice kept him silent. The coachman, thinking the group would disperse in time to permit the President's carriage to proceed between the two obstacles encumbering the roadway, did not rein in his horses until they were almost upon the men now strung out across the road. Suddenly the lowering quiet of the evening was rent with the cry "Alto!" and simultaneously the firing commenced. Colonel Pérez, his hand upon his revolver, leapt from the victoria, and returning the first round, wounding one of the conspirators, ran for protection behind one of the trees lining the highway, assuming presumably that the President followed the same course. The moment had passed, however, when Ramón Cáceres could ever again return the fire of an enemy's attack. The coachman, who had leapt from the box at the first shot to protect his master, supported the hesitating steps of the President as he stepped to the road. The assassins, now that their purpose had been accomplished, seemed undecided what course to pursue, and made no attempt to stop the dying man. At the entrance of the Peynado quinta the coachman persuaded the President to turn in. When they reached the

high steps leading into the house, the President attempted to walk up, but his strength was ebbing fast and he turned to one side. The mother of Don Francisco Peynado, who had heard the shots, came down to assist him on the other side, and so he was helped the last few yards to the carriage house which stood to one side of the residence. There he sank to the ground. The wife of Señor Peynado, who at the first sound of the shots had left to place her children in concealment, ran to the house to get some stimulant for the President. Upon her return to the spot where he was stretched, she was confronted by a group of the assassins apparently determined to make sure that their work had been accomplished. But they slunk off without penetrating to where the President was lying. The efforts of the two women were then devoted to moving the almost unconscious man to the American Legation next door, in the belief that should there be any chance of life the President would there at least be safe from further attacks. To this end, the body was placed upon a carpet, and a servant with a machete cut a passage through the fence which separated the two properties. As the President's body was moved one of the women bent over him. She heard the words, "My mother." By the time the body was borne within the Legation the life of Ramón Cáceres was extinct.

The news spread like wildfire. The Sunday crowds on the Malecón were made aware of the assassination by a countryman riding into the town on a foaming horse on his way to the Fortress. "They have killed 'Món.' " Soon doctors, members of the Cabinet, legal authorities, were hastening to the spot where Cáceres lay, and the Avenida Independencia was black with crowds. After nightfall, the body of the dead President was borne down the length of the dusty road, past the cemetery, over the pavements of

GENERAL RAMÓN CÁCERES

the streets through which he had driven a few hours before, into the entrance of the Fortress, almost opposite the Presidential Palace where his wife and his small children were waiting.

In the meantime, while the body was being prepared for burial, the order had been given by Colonel Alfredo Victoria, the Commander of the Guardia Nacional, to pursue the assassins. Word had been received from countrymen along the road that the automobile in which a number of the conspirators had driven out had been seen driving furiously in the direction of Haina. A car was commandeered and officers of the Guardia proceeded in pursuit in the car and on horseback. At midnight a noise was heard without the entrance of the Fortress and the cry was raised, "They have found one of the assassins." It was Luis Tejera, whose skull had been fractured when the automobile in which he and his companions had been driving had been overturned into the Haina River. At the ferry-landing, Tejera had been abandoned by his companions, who were by that time seized with panic at the thought of the revenge which would overtake them, and here he was found an hour later when the pursuing officers of the Guardia arrived. So he was dragged back, half unconscious. As soon as the broken man was brought within the Fortress, the order was given by Colonel Victoria for his immediate execution, and without trial, without the opportunity to see his parents, without a priest, he was shot down in the central court of the Fortress, his body riddled with bullets from more than one revolver.

It was a strange coincidence that Ramón Cáceres, by whose hand had perished the man responsible for so great a share of the Republic's misfortunes, should himself fall a victim to an assassin's bullet at the moment when, because

of his success in restoring peace to his ravaged country and in laying the foundations of democratic and progressive government, he had merited the lasting gratitude of his fellow-citizens as one of those outstanding patriots in Dominican history who had served their country well.

Never was a political crime less justified than was the murder of Cáceres. To it may be attributed directly the anarchy and attrition of the years which followed, and all the various contributing causes which eventually brought about the military occupation of the Republic by the United States.

His murderers, except for Luis Tejera who had paid the ultimate penalty, after securing their safety temporarily by taking refuge on the Haitian border during the months of the Victoria Administration, were declared by the courts the beneficiaries of the general amnesty granted political offenders by the Dominican Congress in the following December. Thus restored to the enjoyment of liberty and to the exercise of their civil rights, the band of assassins suffered solely that inevitable retribution contained in the damning words: "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; he that is filthy, let him be filthy still."

8.

The execution of Tejera necessarily put an end to the illusory scheme whereby the members of the conspiracy of which he had been the head had hoped to obtain control of the Government after Cáceres' death. Had it not been for the complete domination of the armed forces within the capital by Colonel Alfredo Victoria, Señor Velasquez might have succeeded in forcing his election as Provisional President by the Congress; but Colonel Victoria, utterly opposed to the continuation of Velasquez in power, and

supported in this by the majority of the Horacista party, determined definitely to quench the formerly all-powerful Minister's ambitions. So strong did Colonel Victoria rapidly become that ten days after the death of Cáceres, Velasquez, to preserve his own life, was forced to take refuge in the Haitian Legation, and thence secretly to leave the country.

Unable, by reason of the fact that he himself had not yet reached the constitutional age, to secure the Presidency himself, Colonel Victoria at first attempted to persuade Don Manuel Cáceres, the late President's brother, to accept election to the Presidency. Failing in this, he determined to force the Congress to elect his own uncle, Don Eladio Victoria, a former member of the Cáceres Cabinet and at the time Senator from Santiago, Provisional President. Don Eladio Victoria, while a man generally esteemed and of excellent antecedents, lacked entirely the forceful personality of his nephew, and Colonel Victoria was sure that by this maneuver he could retain within his own grasp the practical control of the Administration. The plan was successfully carried out; not only was Don Eladio Victoria elected Provisional President for a term of two months by the Congress, but he was likewise, in the general elections held shortly thereafter, elected Constitutional President of the Republic.

The entire country now relapsed with incredible rapidity into a state of complete anarchy. Within a few months were swept away the achievements of the preceding five years. In Moca, Salcedo, and La Vega, important leaders of the Horacista party rose in arms. In the east, the conspiracy of the Jimenista leaders, which had for so long proved fruitless, at length met with temporary success in the landing on the shores of the Province of Seybo of a filibustering expedition commanded by the ex-President,

General Morales, and General Mauricio Jiménez, but the initial gains of the revolution which they had proclaimed were soon checked, since the Government promptly crushed the rebellion and captured the commanders of the expedition, imprisoning them in the capital. In the frontier Provinces, revolutions were proclaimed by General Zenón Toribio and General Desiderio Arias, who pursued there, as ever, a system of guerrilla warfare through which they succeeded in establishing a reign of terror which the Government was powerless to remedy.

In St. Thomas, General Vasquez, who had there received word of the assassination of President Cáceres, had announced to his friends his unwillingness to grasp any political advantages which might be created by the death of the man who had been his closest associate through so many years. This decision he conveyed to his fellow-citizens in an open letter which was published in the press of the capital in December:

"The country knows the circumstances which caused me to write the letter of January 1, 1910. Disappointed in the hope that the suggestions contained in that letter might be heeded, it was natural that I should adopt the attitude already known to my countrymen.

"Today, an unforeseen event has changed the nature of my task. I refer to the death of General Ramón Cáceres, to whom I was bound by ties of blood and friendship and whose personality was united with mine in history . . . When I knew of the death of General Cáceres I sent the following cablegram to the Executive . . . 'I desire to contribute towards peace. I shall support the results of free elections . . .' The seeming calm which . . . prevails in the country in the midst of the natural agitation of the moment confirms me in the belief that the time has

come to lay the foundations which are to serve as the basis of the restoration of our civil government . . . Pledged as I am to the securing of such liberty, in which I do not doubt I am supported by the country, no obstacle will be sufficiently strong to modify my determination . . . I must indicate as particularly urgent the reform of the electoral law, as well as the necessity for shortening the presidential term and for abolishing re-election of a President, and most important, when public sentiment becomes unanimous, to introduce in our Constitution such amendments as will tend to decentralize the national administration and to broaden the powers of the people . . . As for myself, from that position in which circumstances have placed me, I shall not hesitate to further the moral peace of the Dominican family by attempting to obtain the benefits to be procured by the installation of a truly democratic administration, and as a simple citizen, inspired by the desire to further the progress of the Nation, I shall coöperate in whatever may tend to dignify and ennoble our country." [1]

Alienated from General Vasquez throughout the foregoing years by the opposition of the latter to his increasing influence and power, Don Federico Velasquez nevertheless determined at this moment to sink the differences which had existed between his former leader and himself, and joined General Vasquez at St. Thomas, where these outstanding figures in the Horacista party determined to take joint action in the crisis which was evidently impending in the fortunes of the Republic.

In a letter which Velasquez had published in Haiti shortly after his flight from Santo Domingo, explaining the motives of his flight, he had made known, as had General Vasquez, the course he intended to pursue:

[1] *Listin Diario*, December 9, 1911.

"So far as I am concerned, I can say that I have always done my best, and I wish all true and loyal friends of General Cáceres, as well as all my fellow-countrymen, to understand that I shall continue in the path of duty even more firmly resolved today than yesterday . . . I consider myself as bound to the country and to that companion who fell, the victim of criminal hands, in a dark hour; and I know how to fulfill my obligations. My departure from the Republic does not keep me from this, one of the most sacred obligations which I have contracted in my public life. My heart is where my duty is, there where lies the work I started with so much eagerness and where with a full heart I gave all my energies and all my ambitions for the good of my country."

On January 20, 1912, the two leaders jointly cabled the Dominican Government from St. Thomas, urging upon it the maintenance of peace and the guaranty of fair elections. When it became evident that all hope of fair elections and of democratic government had been swept aside by the election as Constitutional President of Don Eladio Victoria, with the evident implication that the government so constituted would become merely a mask for the dictatorship which Colonel Alfredo Victoria was desirous of installing, both General Vasquez and Señor Velasquez came to the conclusion that the sole hope of the country lay in their supporting any insurrection which seemed likely to gather sufficient strength to overthrow the Victoria Government. Since the Government had already been able to dominate the various revolutionary attempts which had been made in the eastern and northern Provinces, the two leaders determined to join forces with the insurrectionists who were then active along the Haitian frontier. It was well known that to these activities

the Government of Haiti, then presided over by President Lecompte, as well as the virtual ruler of Cape Haitian, General Charles Zamor, were lending their secret but effective support. Velasquez departed first to attempt to reach Cape Haitian, but was prevented from landing in Haiti by the Haitian Government, which feared an open break with the Dominican Government. General Ricardo Limardo, General Vasquez's personal representative, had already succeeded, however, in reaching Port-au-Prince, and upon learning of the failure of Velasquez to enter Haitian territory and of his forced departure for Jamaica, General Vasquez determined to make the attempt to join General Limardo at Port-au-Prince and thence join forces with the revolutionary leaders in the Dominican frontier Provinces.

Proceeding by way of Puerto Rico, upon arrival at Port-au-Prince, General Vasquez was officially refused permission by the Haitian authorities to disembark. The situation seemed disastrous. General Limardo, already apprised of his arrival, was awaiting him in the Haitian capital, and all arrangements were pending until General Vasquez might himself be enabled to assume direction of the revolution. His failure to disembark would have implied the inevitable frustration of all the plans which he had laid. Fortunately, however, at the last moment, one of the officers of the steamer lent him his assistance, and as the vessel was moving slowly out of the harbour, General Vasquez was helped to descend from a portion of the deck which was turned away from the crowds upon the pier, by a rope ladder, into a small rowboat which made for the quay, where he remained in concealment until the evening. After nightfall, he reached the shore and communicated with General Limardo. So sure was the

Dominican Minister in Port-au-Prince that General Vasquez had been forced to leave Haitian jurisdiction and had sailed, that he cabled his Government that General Vasquez had proceeded to Cuba.

It was soon made evident that the opposition of the Haitian Government to General Vasquez's disembarkation had been caused solely by its desire to avoid well grounded protests from the Victoria Government, as well as remonstrances from the United States, which was sternly urging the Haitian President to refrain from countenancing revolutionary activities against the Victoria Government. President Lecompte, as soon as he was informed of General Vasquez's presence in the Haitian capital, arranged for his safe concealment upon the steamer *Marina,* then in port, and upon the following day summoned the Dominican leader to a secret interview in the Palace, in the course of which he promised the latter not only to facilitate his journey to Cape Haitian, but likewise to grant him ammunition and supplies in the impending revolution. Sent to Gonaives upon the Haitian warship *Pétion,* General Vasquez and his companions traveled thence overland to the Cape, where they were received by General Zamor with the news that the needed arms and ammunition had already been placed at their disposal upon the frontier, and with the urgent request from the Haitian President, transmitted through the Governor of the Cape, that the Dominican revolutionists speedily cross into Dominican territory and thus prevent the assistance lent them by the Haitian Government from becoming known to the suspicious authorities of the United States.

As soon as he reached the frontier, General Vasquez realized that the revolution could gain headway only with great difficulty. No supreme leader of the revolution had

been recognized, and the jealousy existing between the respective leaders of the local insurrections was so great that no effective operations could under such circumstances be undertaken.

General Vasquez determined at first to send the revolutionary forces which he had assembled upon the frontier to Moca, to make their way across the mountain ranges in order to avoid encounters with the Government troops until they were established within the town of Moca itself. He himself pushed on with Generals Limardo and Bencosme towards Puerto Plata, where he hoped with the assistance of the troops loyal to him within that Province to capture the provincial capital. This plan was necessarily abandoned, however, upon receipt of the news that two of the leading revolutionary generals upon whose aid General Vasquez had depended had failed him. This initial mishap was but the first in a series of misfortunes which eventually caused the enthusiasm of the revolutionists following the fortunes of General Vasquez to vanish. In the first encounter, in which the troops despatched towards Moca were engaged, the Government troops were victorious. General Limardo, who had been sent to Haiti to obtain additional funds, was captured by Government forces in Puñal. In three later encounters which General Vasquez's troops had with the Government armies, the former obtained the advantage, but only at the sacrifice of the scanty stores of ammunition which they had at their disposal. Most serious of all, President Lecompte of Haiti, whose assistance had proved invaluable to General Vasquez in the conduct of the revolution, had been killed when the Government Palace in Port-au-Prince had been completely destroyed by the explosion of a large quantity of powder which had been stored in it.

Forced to the determination of abandoning his campaign, at least temporarily, General Vasquez at length made his way to the Haitian frontier, accompanied only by a group of five men, notwithstanding the efforts of a large force sent by the Government to capture him.

In Dajabón, General Vasquez received word that General Arias had established himself near by and that many of the younger leaders of the Cibao who had taken refuge along the frontier had joined the revolutionary forces which Arias commanded. In an interview which General Vasquez granted General Arias, the latter stated that before he would consent to support General Vasquez in his campaign, he required an understanding satisfactory to himself regarding the appointments to be made to the future Government should the revolution prove successful. The prime requisite of General Arias was the agreement of General Vasquez to the appointment of General Luis Felipe Vidal as Minister of the Interior in such a Government. General Vasquez, however, refused to reach an agreement upon such a condition, stating that he would support no Government of which General Vidal formed a part, since the latter had been involved in the murder of General Cáceres and was a fugitive from justice. Shortly thereafter, his own position strengthened by the arrival of a contingent of the revolutionary troops of his personal following, he was advised by a group of the younger and abler leaders of the revolution in the Cibao, among them Don Juan Baltle, General Rafael Tolentino, General Rafael Estrella Ureña, and Don Rafael Espaillat, that General Arias desired to renew negotiations, and had manifested his willingness to support a future government composed of these leaders upon the understanding that neither General Vasquez nor himself should take office in it, but should

limit their activities to the command of the military forces of that Government. The proposal was likewise based upon the election of Señor Espaillat as President, in whose capacity and integrity General Vasquez had entire confidence, and under such conditions the proposed appointment of General Arias as a general of the proposed Government appeared to be the lesser in a necessary choice of evils. No sooner, however, had General Vasquez accepted the plan so proposed than General Arias withdrew his own consent to it, and in further negotiations which General Vasquez continued in order to attempt to unite the leaders of the revolution, plan after plan suggested by him was rejected by Arias.

After interminable discussions, General Vasquez had reached the conclusion that it was futile to continue negotiations any longer, when Arias advanced the following proposal: informing General Vasquez that General Charles Zamor, the *de facto* chief of northern Haiti, was near the frontier, he proposed that General Vasquez and himself agree to submit to the determination of the Haitian chieftain the feasibility of the appointment of General Luis Felipe Vidal as Minister of the Interior in a Government of which General Vasquez should be the chief. General Vasquez at once advised General Arias that this astonishing proposal to submit to the determination of a Haitian chieftain the selection of the members of a Dominican Cabinet was entirely unacceptable, but later, placing above all the necessity of uniting the leaders of the revolution against the Victoria Government, he consented to obtain the opinion of General Zamor upon this point. When the latter upheld the position taken by General Vasquez regarding the appointment of General Vidal, General Arias once more refused to comply with his

engagements, and General Vasquez, appreciating the futility of continuing discussions, broke off all negotiations with General Arias, and left the frontier with a body of troops for Mao.

After a sharp engagement at that point with the Government forces, General Vasquez continued his march towards Puerto Plata to assist the revolutionary troops which were besieging the city, then occupied by a Government detachment under the command of General Rubirosa.

9.

In the meanwhile, the situation of the Government during the course of the revolution had daily become more difficult. Commencing with no real popular support other than that which had temporarily resulted from the gratification of a few politicians of both parties, President Victoria found that even that support was rapidly withdrawn. While Don Juan Isidro Jiménez had at first assumed an attitude of "watchful expectation," as expressed in a letter written by him in February of 1912—

"We must be patient until after the elections, and in the meanwhile do nothing to contribute to the carrying out of the plans of Horacio, Velasquez and others,"

with the inauguration of Don Eladio Victoria as Constitutional President, he had become actively engaged in directing the opposition of his partisans against the Victoria Government. Within a brief period the Government was forced to contend with the open opposition of all factions. Had it not been for the well armed and well disciplined Guardia Nacional inherited from the Cáceres Administration, the Government would undoubtedly have fallen in a

few weeks. When the funds remaining in the treasury were spent, unable to continue operations against the revolutionists with the ordinary revenues of the Government, President Victoria had been forced to resort to the issuance of promissory notes, to the making of local loans, and to the payment of salaries with pledges in order to obtain ready cash. Within ten months' time, the Victoria Government had exhausted the surplus accumulated by President Cáceres, and had increased the public debt by an amount totalling $1,500,000, unauthorized by the United States Government, openly infringing in this manner the clear intent of the provisions of the Convention of 1907.

All guarantees of life and property were flagrantly disregarded, and the imprisonment of non-combatants on the mere suspicion of revolutionary complicity was daily becoming more frequent. There appeared to be no hope of an early abatement of a condition of frank anarchy.

In its attitude towards Latin America in general, and towards the smaller Republics of the Caribbean and of Central America in particular, the policy of the United States had changed brusquely with the succession in 1909 to the Roosevelt Administration of that of President Taft. The change so soon discernible was due very largely to the different concepts held by Secretary Root and by Secretary Knox of what constituted true national advantage.

Secretary Root, during the latter years of the Roosevelt Administration, by maintaining that the Republics of the American continent were the equals of the United States in sovereignty, whatever their relative material strength might be, and by scrupulously respecting the susceptibilities of the Latin American Republics in all official dealings, had not only won a just influence and regard for

his Government, but had also done much towards dispelling the suspicions of the imperialistic designs of the United States which had been rampant in Latin America since the Spanish War and since the Panama incident. The liberation of Cuba, the practical assistance rendered the Dominican Republic without extorting material compensation in return therefor, the helpful and altruistic disposition demonstrated by the United States Government in the Central-American Conference held at Washington in 1908, and the patent sincerity of the declarations made by Secretary Root on behalf of his Government in his notable address at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, had all tended to create a friendly feeling of trust and respect towards the United States on the part of her southern neighbours.

With the advent of Secretary Knox, however, the situation changed completely. Secretary Knox believed primarily in commercializing the foreign policy of the United States. With all his great ability and recognized brilliance, he remained a lawyer rather than a statesman. He failed to comprehend Latin American psychology, and by reason of that failure, did not appreciate the fact that by arousing suspicions of the ultimate intent of his own Government, and by injuring the national pride of all the Latin American Governments in disregarding the sovereign rights of some of them, so great a prejudice was created against the United States that American commercial expansion was retarded, and the very opportunities he sought for American foreign commerce were definitely circumscribed. The foreign policy of the United States was determined by the immediate requirements of a limited privileged class in the United States, rather than by a true appreciation of the ultimate national interest.

In the policy adopted towards the Dominican Republic the above held true. In place of the courteous, helpful, considerate spirit manifested both by President Roosevelt and by Secretary Root in the negotiation of the Convention of 1907 in accordance, so far as might be possible, with the true interests of the Dominican people and without undertaking to intervene in their internal affairs, there was now assumed by the Department of State an attitude of omniscience in all that concerned the solution of the domestic problems of the Republic. A policy to still internal discord in the Dominican Republic was formulated, based solely upon the recommendations of the agents of the United States Government, which ignored the advice which would readily have been tendered by a great number of competent Dominicans of prominence in public life, had the Department of State shown any sign of desiring such coöperation. This solution, once determined, was dictated. The rôle assumed by the United States Government was one which could only legitimately and legally have been assumed in dealing with a protectorate—but the basis for the action taken was declared to be solely the responsibility assumed by the United States under the Convention of 1907.

The attention of the United States Government during the summer of 1912 had repeatedly been called to the fact that owing to the revolutionary disturbances along the frontier, the officials of the Receivership were unable to collect the customs duties at the interior customs houses, and that in several instances funds legitimately appertaining to the Receivership had been commandeered by revolutionary troops. The newly appointed American Minister, Mr. William W. Russell, had advised the American Government of the gravity of the situation, and at length

recommended that, owing to the evident inability of the Dominican Government to maintain law and order and to protect the customs houses, the United States Government should promptly take steps to occupy the customs houses to insure temporarily the proper collection of customs. This recommendation was based upon the treaty right of the United States Government to assure itself that the Receivership General was afforded ample protection in collecting the Dominican customs duties. But the further recommendations of the Minister went far beyond these legitimate lines:

"Only complete control by our Government would permanently insure order and justice, but any degree of control would be beneficial; indeed, without our effective control, one administration here would be as good as another. Once having landed men for protection of the customhouses, in accordance with our rights under the convention, we might be able to dictate a policy beneficial to the country. The main evils to be remedied are: the absolute subservience of the courts; forced recruiting for the army; wholesale imprisonment without trial; peculation of public funds." [1]

10.

It was upon these recommendations, plainly foreign to the treaty rights of the United States, and in complete disregard of the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic, that the Secretary of State determined to act.

On September 24th, General Frank McIntyre, of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, and Mr. W. T. Doyle, Chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department, were appointed Special Commis-

[1] Mr. W. W. Russell, American Minister, to Secretary Knox, September 19, 1912.

sioners to investigate the situation existing in the Dominican Republic, to proceed there upon the U.S.S. *Prairie*, escorted by a force of 750 marines. Upon the same date, the Dominican Government was officially informed that inasmuch as the United States Government felt obligated to assure itself that the Receivership instituted under its auspices was enabled efficiently to carry out its duties, and inasmuch as the mediation of the United States Government had been requested by both Haiti and the Dominican Republic to assist in the settlement of the long-standing boundary dispute, the Government of the United States had, as a consequence, determined, without prejudice to either of the parties in the controversy, to regard the boundary between the two Republics as that indicated upon the maps prepared by the United States War Department until the boundary dispute should be finally determined by resort to arbitration or through some other method.

On October 2nd, President Taft's Commissioners arrived in Santo Domingo. Upon their arrival in the capital, the Commissioners counselled President Victoria on behalf of their Government to remove immediately from office and authority his nephew, General Alfredo Victoria, the Minister for War and Interior; to decree a general amnesty and to offer personal guarantees to all those who submitted to the Government's authority; to release from jail all political prisoners except those involved in the murder of General Cáceres; "to confer and cooperate promptly" with the American Minister and the Receiver General of Customs in such matters as the maintenance of the re-established customs guards along the Haitian frontier and the protection of officials of the Receivership; and finally, to make all other reforms

needful for the protection of the revenues and the "restoration of quiet and content throughout the Republic."

After bitter opposition, President Victoria at length agreed to make certain of the concessions demanded by the American Commissioners, and on October 21st issued a proclamation providing for the enactment of several of the reforms urged upon him, and likewise announced, in accordance with the advice of the Commissioners, his own intention to retire from office on July 1, 1914, the date upon which the term of President Cáceres would have expired. Upon the issuance of this decree, the Dominican President attempted to obtain some "quid pro quo." He urged that the United States Government grant its consent to the flotation by the Dominican Government of a new bond issue intended to cancel the indebtedness which his Government had created; but this request was promptly refused by the American Government except upon condition that the Dominican Government assume the responsibility for the misappropriation of public funds, which included the expenditure for other purposes by President Victoria of a large sum set aside by his predecessor for the construction of public works, and agree to appoint an American Financial Adviser to audit the disbursement of the funds obtained by the proposed new loan, the functions of such Adviser to continue, if necessary, until he had been afforded an opportunity to audit the accounts of all prior receipts and disbursements of the Victoria Government.

The efforts of the Commissioners, in view of such instructions, to improve conditions within the Republic proved hopeless. Not only did the leaders of the revolution appear unwilling to negotiate with the Victoria Govern-

ment upon the basis of the decree which President Victoria had promulgated, but the retirement of Colonel Victoria from the Cabinet had hardly bettered the situation, since the latter made it generally known that his retirement was but temporary.

The revolutionists retained possession of Sánchez and Samaná, and controlled the Santiago-Samaná Railway as far as La Vega. Both Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi were besieged by revolutionary troops, and water and food supplies had been cut off from the residents within the two cities. In the southern Provinces the revolutionary forces commanded by General Vidal were continuing their operations, and the situation appeared to have given rise to a stalemate.

While the Victoria Government had become thoroughly discredited, it still had sufficient force to continue in power within the capital for an indefinite period. The Commissioners, with the approval of Secretary Knox, therefore made it known that should the Victoria Government continue in office until November 20th, the United States Government would advise the Dominican Government officially that in view of its misappropriation of approximately $400,000 obtained under the Convention for the construction of public works, and in view of its having contracted obligations, in violation of the Convention, of so great an amount as to make it impossible for it to replace the funds misappropriated from its ordinary revenues, the United States Government would direct the General Receiver of Dominican Customs to discontinue the payment of any portion of the customs revenues to the Dominican Government; that the Department of State would at the same time announce publicly that any monies advanced to the Dominican Government

would be considered as advanced in violation of the Convention, and that any monies advanced to the revolutionists would be considered as gifts to them and not as obligations subsequently to be recognized by the Dominican Government; and that the revolutionists would officially be notified that should the Government be overthrown by force, the successful parties who might then constitute a government would not be recognized by the United States.

The Commissioners at the same time made known that should the Victoria Government, on the other hand, resign at once and be succeeded by a government constitutionally elected, the Government of the United States would take steps to place such a government in possession of the customs houses then held by the revolutionists, and would further prevent the rebels from operating within a distance of five miles from the seaport customs houses; that such a government would further be assisted financially by a loan procured in the United States, conditioned upon the appointment of a Financial Adviser designated by the United States to supervise the disbursements of such funds. In addition to the knowledge of this ultimatum of the American Government, which soon became widespread, the rumour became current that should, notwithstanding the ultimatum so presented, no improvement in the situation develop, the United States Government would impose a military government upon the Dominican Republic.

This information reached General Vasquez, who had joined forces at the end of October with the revolutionists besieging Puerto Plata, and who was there likewise advised that the American Commissioners had determined to propose to the party leaders within the Republic the

election as President of Monseñor Adolfo A. Nouel, the Archbishop of Santo Domingo.

Grasping the grave possibilities involved in the situation, General Vasquez at once signified his willingness to confer with the Delegates of the United States Government, who proceeded upon the U.S.S. *Prairie*, together with Monseñor Nouel, to Sánchez, where General Vasquez agreed to accept the Archbishop as President and to instruct his followers in the National Congress to vote for him. As soon as the determination of General Vasquez was made known, the revolution subsided, the contending forces in Puerto Plata agreeing upon an armistice to continue until the resignation of President Victoria had legally been accepted by the Congress.

Realizing, although reluctantly, that the execution of the American ultimatum must of necessity cause the eventual downfall of the Government, the Victorias at length determined to select the lesser of two evils. The apparently voluntary resignation of the Government was preferable to its gradual supervision or to the imposition upon the Republic of a government selected by American officials. Consequently on November 26th, President Victoria submitted his resignation to Congress, which at once accepted it. On December 2nd, the Senate and the House of Deputies unanimously elected Monseñor Adolfo A. Nouel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo, as Provisional President for a period of two years.

CHAPTER XII

THE SHADOW OF APPROACHING INTERVENTION

1.

THE solution dictated by the American Commissioners and accepted by the majority of the leaders of the Dominican political parties, which resulted in the election of Monseñor Nouel as President for a period of two years, was at its best merely a palliative. It was in no sense a remedy.

Archbishop Nouel, who was now called upon to emulate his illustrious predecessor, Archbishop Meriño, in assuming the Presidency of the Republic, possessed none of the martial spirit which had made it possible for Meriño to rule with a high hand during the years he had held office. The new President was moreover devoid of the political ambition which at one period dominated Meriño. A man of great personal charm and of the most kindly nature, Archbishop Nouel had endeared himself to all with whom he had come into contact, and possessed a devoted host of friends, notably in the Cibao where he had lived as Vicar of La Vega for many years prior to his succession to the Archbishopric. His prestige was, however, by no means political. It was rather the result of the regard of all classes which he had gained in the course of his pastorate, and while he possessed the affection and esteem of the public in general, he had never been regarded as a leader. Inherently reluctant to undertake the task of directing the Government, he had accepted the responsibility only out of a feeling of patriotic duty, and his election by the Congress was due solely to the belief of the politicians that his election had been indicated by the American Commissioners as the one means of avoiding the

direct intervention of the United States, and as the one method of preventing a continuation of the civil war of the preceding twelve months. The Presidency of Monseñor Nouel can hardly be termed an administration. It was rather a truce between the various political factions, and even so, a truce more generally regarded in the breach than in the observance.

Without any political following of his own, no sooner had Monseñor Nouel expressed his willingness to accept the Presidency than he was beset by demands from all sides for appointment to office. In his first interviews with the political leaders, the new President announced his intention of apportioning his appointments so as to give representation in his Government to all parties. General Vasquez, however, refused to indicate the names of the members of his party whom he desired the Archbishop to appoint to office, declaring that he preferred to leave the President complete freedom in the selection of his advisers. Urged, however, by the Archbishop at least to nominate a candidate for the Governorship of Santiago, General Vasquez at length consented to make this exception and signified his desire to have appointed to that important position Don Manuel Valverde, who, while a member of the Jimenista party, possessed the entire confidence of the leader of the Horacistas. As soon as this nomination was made known, General Desiderio Arias interposed such strenuous objections that the Archbishop weakened in his determination, and appointed to the Governorship a nominee proposed by the latter. The vacillation so early demonstrated by Monseñor Nouel continued throughout the months he held office. Anxious to please all parties, he succeeded in satisfying none. The members of his Cabinet, selected originally equally from

the Horacista party and from the Jimenista party, were continually displaced to make room for new appointees, and representation in the Cabinet was later accorded as well to the faction identified with the political fortunes of Don Federico Velasquez, who had returned to the Republic at the time Monseñor Nouel was elected.

Barely two weeks had passed after his inauguration when the Archbishop, harassed and exhausted by importunities to which he was unaccustomed, determined to resign his office. It was only due to the urgent representations of the American Minister that Monseñor Nouel was persuaded to withdraw the resignation which he had sent to the Congress. During the months following, hardly a week went by that he did not receive a message from the President of the United States or from the American Secretary of State urging him to continue in office. On December 11th, President Taft cabled the Archbishop as follows:

"I am greatly distressed to hear that the duties which you have assumed as Provisional President are proving so irksome. I can hardly doubt that all good elements in the Dominican Republic will join in supporting the Provisional Government and thus discharge their patriotic duty to a Republic in the welfare of which the United States has a vital interest. Meanwhile, I earnestly hope that in the interest of humanity and peace you will continue in the Provisional Presidency for the allotted time and I assure you that your efforts on behalf of the people of Santo Domingo will receive the most sincere and earnest support of this Government."

The American Minister was instructed to make every effort to deter the Archbishop from abandoning his office,

and, should the Archbishop nevertheless persist in his intention, to insist that the American Government be granted at least two or three months' notice prior to the date upon which the resignation would become effective in order that some other plan might be devised to secure the maintenance of peace in the Republic.

Notwithstanding repeated representations, the Archbishop notified the United States Government that it was his intention in any event to resign his office as soon as the Republic had been pacified.

2.

For a brief period the situation was improved when it was known that the Government, with the authorization of the Government of the United States, as provided by the Convention of 1907, had been empowered by the Dominican Congress to issue a loan of $1,500,000 to meet the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the recent revolution, and to liquidate the salaries of the Government employees which had long been in arrears. The outlook was still further brightened by the publication by General Vasquez on December 18th of an open letter announcing his determination to retire from political life, and the decision of both himself and his partisans to permit the Provisional President entire freedom of action. This public declaration of General Vasquez was, however, based upon the condition that the Provisional Government maintain itself free from the domination of any political party and provide the Republic with an administration which would offer equal guaranties to all factions and groups. Such, however, did not prove the case.

As soon as it was known that the Horacista party would abstain from attempting to compel the Provisional Gov-

ernment to favour its interests, certain of the Jimenista leaders, and outstanding among them General Desiderio Arias, determined to bring pressure to bear upon the Provisional President in order to transform the Government into a purely Jimenista party machine. The Horacistas, as the result of the determination of their leader, had been for the most part disarmed and had returned to their homes. The opportunity appeared consequently most favourable to Arias. Collecting a number of troops from the Province of Monte Cristi, and supported by General Mauricio Jiménez, Arias marched to Santiago and subsequently to La Vega, whence he sent Monseñor Nouel the following demands which he insisted be promptly complied with:

1. That the Government appoint to all the official posts in Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, La Vega, and San Pedro de Macorís, nominees proposed by Arias from among his own adherents;
2. That the Government recognize Monte Cristi as a fortified town under the control of a garrison responsive only to Arias;
3. That the Government appoint Arias its Delegate in the Cibao;
4. That two Cabinet portfolios be granted to the individuals whom Arias might indicate and that the Government provide Arias with $50,000 in gold for distribution among his followers;
5. That the Comandante de Armas (the supreme military official) in the capital be named in accordance with the desires expressed by Arias, and that the garrison of the capital be removed to make way for a garrison of troops from Monte Cristi subservient to Arias himself.

The menacing attitude assumed by Arias not only made it impossible for the Provisional Government to function, but likewise impelled the members of the Horacista party, realizing that the President lacked sufficient force to withstand the demands of Arias, to arm themselves once more as a measure of self-protection. The panic of the Horacistas finally reached such proportions that a conspiracy was formed to seize the fort within the capital in order to prevent the Government from complying with the last of the demands made by Arias. As soon as General Vasquez himself was advised of the plot, he informed the Provisional President of it and offered to take command of the Fortress himself in order to maintain order and to prevent disturbances within the city. The Archbishop refused the offer, however, and, availing himself of the use of the U.S.S. *Des Moines* tendered him by the American Legation, journeyed to Monte Cristi, where he interviewed General Arias in an endeavour to procure a modification of the latter's demands. When the result of the interview was known, it was found that the President had acquiesced in practically all that had been sought of him by the Jimenista leader. The mingled dread and disgust of the members of the Horacista party consequently grew out of all bounds.

The sole hope of averting a return to anarchy lay, in fact, in the prompt holding of national elections which would have resulted in the selection of a one-party government, which might have proved strong enough to maintain order.

Monseñor Nouel himself clearly appreciated this necessity, and in the middle of the month of January, 1913, requested the United States Government to lend him its moral support in assuring the immediate holding of free

elections in the Republic. Secretary Knox, however, was confident that he realized the requirements of the situation far better than the responsible chiefs of the Dominican Government. While he assured the Dominican President of the desire of the United States Government to support him in every way possible, he replied that the Government of the United States considered it indispensable that the entire electoral system of the Dominican Republic be reformed prior to the holding of elections, and that it likewise deemed it indispensable that there be first undertaken the revision of a large part of the existing Dominican legislation. He continued to urge the Provisional President to retain office for the full two years of the term to which he had been elected. This attempt to force the Archbishop to continue in office when he himself lacked all desire to do so, and foresaw the peril which such continuance involved, and when he had no political nor military support within the Republic to keep him in office should the ever increasing danger of renewed insurrection be realized, was necessarily fatuous. When the Republic was on the brink of civil war, which the Government was proving itself incompetent to avert and which it was entirely incapable of putting down, neither the interests of the Dominican Republic nor those of the United States were served by insistence that the Provisional Dominican Government undertake the elaboration of complicated legislative reforms, which demanded of necessity the coöperation of all parties, and which, even in a period of peace, would have required much time.

The storm, which had by now been impending for weeks, at length broke. Believing that elections would be held within a reasonable period of time, General Vasquez,

Señor Velasquez, and the veteran General Ignacio Maria González, had held a series of conferences to seek to obtain some agreement among the members of the Horacista party as to the candidates to be supported by that party in the elections. When it was seen, however, that the United States Government opposed the prompt holding of national elections, and that the Provisional Government was unable itself to provide proper guaranties of freedom were such elections held, the conferences terminated without result. Don Federico Velasquez, however, announced his own candidacy for the Presidency.

By now the situation of the Provisional President had grown so intolerable that no amount of persuasion could have induced him to remain in office. General Arias, accompanied by a large number of his ragged troops from Monte Cristi, had come to the capital, where they converted the Archbishop's Palace into a barracks. Those who could not accommodate themselves within the living rooms or bedrooms stretched themselves upon the stairs. Driven to make any concession in order to rid himself of such an incubus, the Archbishop agreed to all the new demands formulated by Arias, and proceeded to remove from office those few officials of the Horacista party who still retained their positions. But General Vasquez, who had before agreed to the innumerable concessions made, hoping that by this means the Provisional President might at length be enabled to obtain a firmer hold, when he learned that the Archbishop was now harried into obeying the new series of Arias's behests, refused to give in any further. He instructed his last remaining representative in the Provisional Cabinet, General Casimiro de Moya, to convey the following message to the Archbishop:

"Advise Monseñor that I will not cede another inch, and that if Monseñor persists in these demands, torrents of blood will flow for which Monseñor himself will be responsible."

Caught between the upper and the nether millstones, the unfortunate Archbishop saw but one solution, and that lay in his immediate resignation of the Presidency. Travelling secretly to Barahona on the ostensible pretext that he needed a change of scene in order to recuperate his health, Monseñor embarked at that port for Europe, sending, however, before his departure, his formal resignation to the Dominican Congress, which the latter officially accepted on March 31st, 1913.

3.

Under the Constitution of 1908, it became the immediate obligation of the Dominican Congress, which was at the time in session, to select the successor of Monseñor Nouel as Provisional President. The ambitions of all the political leaders had been sharpened by their rivalry during the preceding four months. General Vasquez at once consulted his partisans as to the course which they should pursue. His first hope that his own followers and those of Velasquez might be able jointly to agree upon a candidate proved fruitless, since Velasquez insisted upon his own candidacy, which was unacceptable to the partisans of General Vasquez. Don Juan Isidro Jiménez became an active candidate as well. When, after the first voting had taken place, Jiménez became convinced that he himself could not be elected, the former President despatched agents to Don Emiliano Tejera, the representative of General Vasquez, to offer the support of his followers in

the Congress in order to secure the election of General Vasquez as Provisional President, upon condition that the latter consent to grant equal representation in the Government to the Jimenista and Horacista parties. When General Vasquez refused to agree to this condition, Jiménez advised Don Emiliano Tejera personally that he would favour the election of General Vasquez without condition, asserting that he had greater confidence in the chief of the Horacista party than in any of the other candidates whose names had been proposed. General Vasquez, however, persisted in his refusal to become a candidate, and determined to procure the election of General José Bordas Valdez, who was at that time one of his prominent partisans. For two weeks the balloting continued. The agitation within the Republic increased as time went on, and during the period the Congress was voting, three hundred armed men took up their positions in Villa Duarte and two hundred in La Fé, both just without the capital, with the announced intention of marching upon the city should Velasquez be elected. Elected finally, unanimously, by the Senate, General Bordas was still rejected as a candidate by the majority of the House of Deputies. At length, a week later, he was likewise elected by the lower House although by only a bare majority.

On April 14th, General José Bordas Valdez was consequently inaugurated as Provisional President, having been elected by the Congress with the express proviso that his Presidential term should not exceed one year, and that he should convoke within that period general elections to provide for the election of a Constitutional President of the Republic.

Granted the opposition offered by the Jimenistas and by the Velasquistas to the election of General Bordas, it

was not surprising that attempts at insurrection occurred as soon as General Bordas had taken office. On the morning of the day the new President was inaugurated, Don Elias Brache, a member of the Cabinet of President Nouel, accompanied by some fifty men, all armed, embarked upon a Government vessel for San Pedro de Macorís, where they attempted to gain the support of General Zenón Ovando, the Governor of the Province, in an uprising against the Government, and failing in this, continued on the vessel to Monte Cristi to join General Arias, who had seized another Government gunboat, the *Independencia,* and was threatening immediate revolution.

General Arias postponed, however, commencing hostilities in the hope that he might be as successful in intimidating the new Government into acceding to his demands as he had been in terrorizing the Government of Monseñor Nouel. In a proclamation which he launched at once, he attempted to conciliate the new Provisional President with the declaration of his own belief "in the sincerity of General Bordas's ideals," since he had realized "in the last campaign his identification with the lofty purposes of the revolution." He alleged that Bordas must naturally feel disposed to place him in a position where he might "cooperate usefully in the accomplishment of the purposes of that revolution," and consequently demanded:

1. Representation in the Cabinet;
2. The removal of no employees nor Government officials in the Provinces of Santiago, La Vega, San Francisco de Macorís, and Monte Cristi, except with the consent of Arias himself;
3. The retention of Don Federico Henriquez y Carvajal as Minister in Port-au-Prince and the appoint-

ment of Don Abelardo Blandino as Consul-General in that capital;

4. The payment by the Government of Arias's revolutionary claims;
5. The promulgation of a decree identical to that issued by President Nouel appointing garrisons in Monte Cristi and Santiago selected by Arias.

To these demands General Bordas made public a counter proposal in which he announced his intention of securing for General Arias "some of the things he was most interested in," should General Arias assist Don Juan Isidro Jiménez in obtaining the Senatorship from Monte Cristi.

Upon the announcement by General Bordas of his intention of acceding to the greater number of the demands made upon him by General Arias, the Horacista party, naturally, became once more thoroughly disconcerted. This sudden change of heart manifested by the leader whom they had placed in the Presidency proved an impetus to the rapidly growing discontent with the Provisional Government, to which the appointments made by General Bordas to his Cabinet had already given rise. Of the Cabinet Ministers appointed only General Ricardo Limardo could be classified as a thoroughgoing Horacista, since the other Cabinet Ministers were either uncertain in their party allegiance, or were else definitely aligned with the Jimenistas or Velasquistas.

The growing resentment of the Horacistas, latent at first, suddenly flamed into open insurrection with the announced decision of the Government to replace the management in control of the Central Dominican Railway. The control of the road had been vested by Monseñor Nouel in Don Alfredo Ginebra, a distinguished engi-

neer who was a prominent follower of General Vasquez, and the appointments to the hundreds of subordinate positions upon the railroad had naturally fallen among the political supporters of the Horacista party. The sight of the lucrative appointments received by the members of General Vasquez's following proved too much for the partisans of Desiderio Arias, and steps were immediately taken by the latter to compel his supporters in the National Congress to insist that the Government withdraw the management of the railway from Don Alfredo Ginebra in order that Arias's friends might profit thereby. Consequently, in accordance with a resolution of the National Congress, the Bordas Government called for bids, announcing that the management of the railway would be conceded to the bidder of the highest sum over and above the amount of $130,000. Since the only bid made for the concession was that of $130,001, made by Don Mario Fermín Cabral and Don Agustín Malagón, the control of the road was promptly awarded to these partisans of General Arias, although it was well recognized that Arias was in a position to disregard any agreement he might make with the Government for payment. It was plain that President Bordas was disinclined to accept any longer the dictation of the Horacista party, and that he had decided to obtain the support of the groups dominated by Jiménez and by Arias in order to create a political following of his own strong enough to insure his own reëlection as President of the Republic.

As the immediate consequence of the action of the Government in permitting the control of the railway to be taken from the Horacista party, a revolution was proclaimed, on September 1, 1913, in Puerto Plata, by General Céspedes, the Governor of the Province, who declared

himself Provisional President and announced that the Province of Puerto Plata was thereby severed from the control of the Central Government. The revolution was immediately openly supported in San Francisco de Macorís, Santiago, Samaná, Moca, and San Cristóbal. As soon as the insurrection had broken out, General Vasquez sent a telegram from San Francisco de Macorís to President Bordas, urging him to prevent further bloodshed, and stating that there was still time to avoid a general insurrection if the Government would withdraw from the policy upon which it had apparently embarked of antagonizing the Horacista party. An intemperate reply from President Bordas made it evident that there could be no further coöperation between the Government and General Vasquez or his followers, and it likewise became doubly clear that the ambition of General Bordas was set upon forcing his own reëlection to the Presidency.

The outbreak of insurrection in the Dominican Republic proved a bitter shock to the new Secretary of State in Washington, William Jennings Bryan. His first reaction resulted in this instruction sent by him to the American Chargé d'Affaires:

. "Take the first favorable opportunity to communicate to Governor Céspedes—and also to Horacio Vasquez, should he be implicated—the profound displeasure felt by this Government at his pernicious revolutionary activity, for which this Government will not fail to fix the responsibility." [1]

4.

The distinction between President Wilson's original conception of the Latin American policy of the Gov-

[1] Secretary Bryan to the American Chargé d'Affaires in Santo Domingo, September , 1913.

ernment of the United States and that of Secretary Knox was profound. The drawing together of the Republics of the Western Hemisphere remained until the outbreak of the World War the cardinal feature in Wilson's foreign policy. To accomplish this end, the President determined to deal with the Latin American Republics as equal to equal, avoiding injuring any susceptibilities, and maintaining in view a just appreciation of their national pride. The goal which he sought, the increase in the continental influence of his Government, was the same as that for which Secretary Knox had striven, but the nature of the influence which he desired to procure was fundamentally different. Rather than the aggrandizement of the United States through commercial domination and through the penetration of the Latin American Republics by American capital, he sought the increased influence of the United States through an identification of the national interests of the twenty Latin American Republics with the national interests of the United States, and to this end he strove to obtain a new confidence on the part of the Republics to the south in the pacific and unselfish intentions of the United States, together with a regeneration of the early faith of some of them in the equity of the United States Government. As he himself expressed it once:

"What we desire to do, and what we shall do, is to show our neighbors to the south of us that their interests are identical with our interests; that we have no plans or any thoughts of our own exaltation, but have in view only the peace and the prosperity of the people in our hemisphere." [1]

[1] *The New Democracy*, p. 121.

This appreciation of the requisites of American foreign policy President Wilson had demonstrated at the outset of his Administration in dealing with the Mexican problem bequeathed to him by the Taft Administration. Six months later, and only a few weeks after the revolution against the Bordas Government had broken out in Santo Domingo, he took occasion officially to declare the "new Latin American policy" in his memorable address delivered before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile on October 27, 1913. It was in this address that President Wilson officially announced that policy towards the American Republics which, had it been effectively maintained and intelligently carried out, would very rapidly have created a real improvement in the relations between the United States and the other Republics of the continent, which had steadily been growing worse during the four years of the Taft Administration, and would have checked the suspicion and resentment which during the preceding years had assumed formidable proportions.

To mark the termination of the "commercialized" foreign policy of Secretary Knox, President Wilson now declared, the Latin American

"States that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. What these States are going to see, therefore, is an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise, and an assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate. The dignity, the character, the self-possession, the self-respect

of the Latin American States, their achievements in the face of all these divers circumstances, deserve nothing but the admiration and applause of the world. They have had harder bargains driven with them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. Interest has been exacted of them that was not exacted of anybody else, because the risk was said to be greater; and then securities were taken that destroyed the risk—an admirable arrangement for those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be the first to take part in assisting in that emancipation. . . It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interests. It not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your own actions . ."

So much for the flat rejection of the material basis upon which Secretary Knox had established his Latin American policy; but the President further outlined the constructive policy which he desired to follow, the policy of identifying the national interests of the Latin American Republics with those of the United States, in the following words:

"Comprehension must be the soil in which shall grow all the fruits of friendship, and there is a reason and a compulsion lying behind all this which is dearer than anything else to the thoughtful men of America. I mean the development of constitutional liberty in the world."

And finally, the positive pronouncement which reëchoed throughout the Western Hemisphere—

"I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."

In theory the Wilson policy was unexceptionable. Its mere announcement created at once an admirable effect. It necessarily continued to remain theory, however, since the President was not enabled to transform the theory into fact through the lack, during the early years of his Administration, of advisers capable of depicting for him certain practical aspects of the problems existing in the Latin American Republics, of which he had had no opportunity personally to inform himself, as well as through the lack of agents capacitated by experience and understanding for the task of carrying out effectively the doctrine which he preached.

Secretary Bryan, while emotionally responsive to the idealism of the theories enunciated by President Wilson, was incapable of grasping intellectually the manner in which those theories might be transmuted into the daily routine of his Department. It was notorious that the great majority of the diplomatic appointees sent by the Wilson Administration to Latin America possessed no qualification for their task other than that of loyalty to the Democratic party. But nowhere, not even in the appointment of John Lind as the President's personal representative in Mexico, was this ineptitude in the selection of agents to carry out the Wilson policy more lamentably demonstrated than in the appointments made to the Dominican Republic.

Under President Roosevelt and under President Taft as well, the positions in the Dominican Receivership General of Customs had been filled with officials eminently qualified by prior experience and by demonstrated capacity for the work involved. The Receivership General, it had been formally stated, was deemed a trust undertaken on behalf of the Dominican people. The Receiver Gen-

eral and his assistants had invariably been non-political appointees selected by reason of their long experience in some branch of the Customs Service of the United States. The Receiver General who had held office under the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations had however been dismissed by the Wilson Administration and had been replaced by Mr. Walter H. Vick, a political appointee. It was to Mr. Vick that Mr. Bryan inscribed his well-remembered request for information as to the number of subordinate positions in the Receivership General, together with the salaries attached thereto, in order that "deserving Democrats" might be appointed to them. The orderly and efficient administration of the Dominican Customs Service, which had in previous years achieved a noteworthy record, was consequently promptly disrupted, and improved but slightly some time later when Mr. Vick, as the result of a public quarrel with the American Minister, was replaced by another political appointee.

It was, however, in the selection of the new American Minister to the Dominican Republic, in the person of Mr. James Mark Sullivan, that a far graver error had been committed by Secretary Bryan, and one of deplorable consequence both to the Dominican Republic and to the United States. With the exception of Mexico, there was no post in Latin America where there was more urgently needed at that moment an American Diplomatic Representative capacitated by experience, ability, knowledge of local conditions, and a just appreciation of the manner in which the true interests of the Dominican people might be identified with the interests of the American people, than in the Dominican Republic. The President, in order to carry out the policy which he had announced, required at the least a representative capable of understanding that

policy, in order to formulate upon the spot the necessary recommendations to the Department of State. Mr. Sullivan, whose previous career had been limited to varied activities in ward politics, possessed not one of these qualifications.

Appointed American Minister to the Dominican Republic a few days after the outbreak of the revolution of September 1st against the Bordas Government, Mr. Sullivan was instructed to proceed immediately to the Dominican Republic and was provided by Secretary Bryan with the following instructions dated September 9th:

"The President directs me to say, for your instruction, that the influence of this Government will be exerted for the support of lawful authorities in Santo Domingo, and for the discouragement of any and all insurrectionary methods . . We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition . . The test of a republican form of government is to be found in its responsiveness to the will of the people, its just powers being derived from the consent of the governed . . Say to any who may feel aggrieved, or who may be disposed to resort to violations, that the good offices of this Government can be counted upon at all times to assist in the establishment of justice, in the remedying of abuses, and in the promotion of the welfare of the people. We must depend, therefore, upon all the people of Santo Domingo, of whatever party or faction, to join together in securing justice through law and in the election by free and fair ballot of officials whom the people desire. You will make it known to those now in insurrection that this Government will amply afford legitimate means to assist in the restoration of order and in the prevention of further insurrections, holding

itself bound at all times to advise with the Government in behalf of those who feel that they have a grievance."

En route to Santo Domingo, Mr. Sullivan received a further communication from Secretary Bryan, which he was instructed to communicate verbatim to the rebel governor of Puerto Plata, General Céspedes, and to General Horacio Vasquez:

"Firm in its intention to coöperate with the legally constituted government in order that revolutionary activity may cease, the Department of State makes known to the revolutionists and those who foment revolutions the following:

"Under the Convention of 1907, the Dominican Republic cannot increase its debt without the consent of the United States of America, and this Government will not consent that the Dominican Government increase its debts for the purpose of paying the revolutionary expenses and claims. Moreover, this Administration would look with disfavor on any administrative act that would have for its object increase of the taxes, thereby imposing a burden upon the people for the purpose of satisfying revolutionists. And should the revolution succeed, this Government, in view of the President's declaration of policy, would withhold recognition of the *de facto* government, and consequently withhold the portion of the customs collections belonging to Santo Domingo as long as an unrecognized *de facto* government should exist."

These instructions, based wholly upon a conception of government as it exists in the United States, took into account none of the facts of the situation which existed in the Dominican Republic. No heed was paid to the fact, was it even known to Secretary Bryan, that a condition

of anarchy had persisted for a period of nearly two years; nor to the varied motives which had caused the revolution of the Horacista party. And in particular, when it was patent to the most superficial observer of Dominican conditions that with Bordas's appointees in all the Provincial and Municipal offices, thus completely dominating the electoral machinery, only the simulacrum of an election could be held, the advice to the revolutionists to resort to election "by free and fair ballot of officials whom the people desire" was worse than futile.

The statement of what constitutes republican government, contained in Secretary Bryan's instructions of September 9th, might, however, have been regarded as a desirable ultimate goal towards which the efforts of the United States Representative should have been directed so far as the local situation permitted. As might have been expected, however, Mr. Sullivan's first activities made it evident not only that he failed to grasp in the slightest degree the manner in which the American Minister might have proved of practical service in serving as a mediator in furthering the reëstablishment of constitutional procedure in the Dominican Republic, but likewise demonstrated his entire failure even to comprehend the nature of the policy announced by the President of the United States. Upon his arrival, on his way to Santo Domingo, at Monte Cristi, on September 15th, the American Minister delivered an address to the ruined and exhausted inhabitants of that war-ravaged, devastated province:

"This is a rich country; it should be one of the prosperous nations in the West Indies . . But you will no longer be impoverished by revolutions, because the United States Government has determined to make such uprisings

fruitless and profitless in the future . . That there be no life lost in this Province, let your resistance to forcible entry be peaceful . . I am authorized to say to you, people of Monte Cristi, that in the opinion of the United States there is no grievance which now exists or which can exist that justifies resort to arms. The will of the people should prevail in this Republic and . . the people can demand a fair ballot."

Having indicated at once in this manner his diagnosis of the malady from which the Dominican people were suffering, and having pointed out the remedy, Mr. Sullivan proceeded to Puerto Plata, where, in the midst of his interviews with General Vasquez and other leaders of the Horacista party, he found time in his earliest reports to point out to his own Government another remedy for the situation, and advised Secretary Bryan to take serious note of the fact that baseball was becoming popular in the Dominican Republic, and by no means to minimize the importance of this phenomenon, since it would unquestionably prove "a real substitute for the excitement of revolutions."

5.

In his conversation with General Vasquez, the American Minister offered his services as intermediary between General Vasquez and the Government, and agreed to communicate to President Bordas the bases proposed by the former for a peaceful settlement of the revolution, advising General Vasquez in advance that he would see to it that the latter's proposals would be acquiesced in by the Bordas Government. In accordance with this understanding a commission was at once despatched to the capital by General Vasquez to enter into a formal agreement with

the Government along the lines communicated to the American Minister, but upon the arrival in Santo Domingo of Don Domingo Ferreras and Don Leonte Vasquez, the two Commissioners, it was at once made evident to them that Mr. Sullivan had either been unable to induce the Government to accept the proposals or had himself misconstrued them. Negotiations were consequently broken off, with the result that the revolutionary leaders promptly lost faith in the sincerity of the American Minister. Mr. Sullivan, on his part, at once cabled to his Government that the leaders of the revolution had repudiated the terms agreed upon and requested authority "to show these malcontents that the United States means business." Upon the defeat, however, of the revolutionary forces a few days later by the troops sent against them by the Government, the revolution was temporarily crushed, and General Vasquez left the Republic, while General Arias was permitted without opposition to occupy Puerto Plata.

A decree had previously been promulgated by President Bordas calling for the election on December 15th of the members of a constitutional convention summoned to undertake a further revision of the Constitution, and for the election of the municipal authorities in the several communes of the Republic. To Secretary Bryan the moment now appeared opportune to take steps to carry out in his own fashion what he termed the guarantee offered by the Government of the United States to the leaders of the recent revolution, as well as to the Dominican people in general, of a "fair ballot and free elections." It did not appear to occur to the Secretary of State that the declaration of President Wilson as contained in his original instructions to the American Minister, to the effect that the United States Government must depend upon "the peo-

ple of Santo Domingo joining together" "in securing justice through law and in the election by free and fair ballot of officials whom the people desire," did not imply the guarantee by the United States of the validity of Dominican elections. To consider such a declaration as a guarantee by the United States of the freedom of Dominican elections implied necessarily an assumption of responsibility on the part of the United States quite unwarranted by any treaty right, and inherently an infringement of the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic, and thus completely alien to the true intent of President Wilson's repeated official declarations. The recommendations made by the American Minister, however, when requested by Secretary Bryan for his opinion of how the guarantee which he had conceived might be made effective, went far beyond even what Secretary Bryan had originally had in view. Mr. Sullivan recommended—

"A non-interfering scrutiny by open agents appointed by the Department at the principal towns and balloting places, upon whose joint report the Department will decide as to the validity of the constitutional election, the Dominican Government to be informed of our purpose, with the assurance from us that unless the election of December 15th expresses the will of the people as a whole the American Government will take full control of the Presidential election that follows."

Mr. Sullivan likewise requested that American naval vessels be stationed in Dominican waters during the election period.

On December 2nd, Secretary Bryan approved these recommendations of the American Minister, coinciding in the opinion which the latter had also expressed that the

issuance of a proclamation by President Bordas guaranteeing the freedom of the coming elections would be insufficient. Both the Secretary of State and the American Minister were confirmed in this opinion by a conflict which occurred on December 2nd in the capital between Government troops and a gathering of members of the opposition parties engaged in listening to orators declaiming against the Bordas Government, as the result of which several persons were killed and many wounded.

Since it was not plain either to the members of the Dominican Government or to the leaders of the political parties opposed to the Government how American agents could be "non-interfering," when it was stated that it was the intention of the United States Government that these agents be present at the polling booths throughout the Republic, and that the United States would assume the responsibility of determining the validity of the elections in accordance with the reports which its observers might render, as soon as Secretary Bryan's plan was made known it was generally and bitterly opposed. Not only did the President and the members of his Cabinet counter with the statement that they desired no such agents to be despatched to the Dominican Republic, and that should they be despatched they would be accorded no official recognition, but the Government publicly declared likewise that the arrival of such a commission would necessarily imply American supervision, intervention, and control. The Dominican Minister in Washington, Don Francisco J. Peynado, who had represented his country with notable ability in Washington during the two preceding years, at once addressed a protest to Secretary Bryan, declaring bluntly that the proposed step was not only unnecessary and without cause, but likewise a positive

infringement of the sovereignty of the Republic which he represented. Nevertheless, Secretary Bryan adhered to his original intention, and in the elections held there were present in the Dominican Republic not only three official observers despatched from the Department of State, but likewise some thirty additional assistants sent from Puerto Rico.

The step so taken constituted the first evidence of formal intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. The despatch of the Knox Commission, which had brought about the election of Monseñor Nouel as President of the Republic, had evidenced the intention of the American Government to dictate a solution of the disputes which had provoked internal strife in the Dominican Republic in the mistaken belief that the solution so imposed would contribute to the establishment of peace within the country. But, upon that occasion the action of the Commissioners had been limited by their instructions to the offering of advice, and the advice so offered, ultimatum though it was, had been carried out by constitutional methods by the joint action of the political parties. In the course adopted by Secretary Bryan, however, this initial formal infringement of the sovereignty of the Republic was undertaken over the public protest of the Dominican Government, in accordance with no treaty right, and with no justification under any recognized construction of international law. It was a step taken at random, without due consideration, haphazard. It constituted a portion of no clearly conceived and duly elaborated Dominican policy. For no such policy existed. It is doubtful whether Secretary Bryan ever realized that this step could only have legitimately been taken had a protectorate been established over the Dominican

Government. This was the first evidence of the gradually increasing disregard for the sovereign rights inherent in the Dominican people which led inevitably to the military occupation of the Republic three years later.

6.

The action taken by the Government of the United States necessarily weakened the prestige and authority of the Bordas Government. It created a direct incentive to disorder, since the opposition leaders believed that it constituted an evidence of a lack of confidence on the part of the United States in the Constitutional Government of the Republic. This belief soon manifested itself in renewed insurrection. Desiderio Arias became certain that his long hunger for place might now be satisfied, and informed the Department of State through the American Consul in Puerto Plata that should the United States Government grant him a free hand, he would guarantee many years of tranquillity to his country and "save the United States from all the trouble and expense they had had in the Dominican Republic." [1] So encouraged did General Arias become as the result of the chaotic situation which had developed, that upon the refusal of General Bordas to support the former's nomination for the Vice Presidency, should the Constitution once more be amended so as to create that office anew, he determined to press his candidacy for the Presidency itself and was supported in this endeavour by General Alfredo Victoria, General Luis Felipe Vidal, and Don Elias Brache. Repeated efforts thereupon on the part of General Bordas to come to an agreement with General Arias proved unsuccessful, since Arias not only clung to his original demands, but amended them

[1] American Consul at Puerto Plata to Secretary of State, November 13, 1913.

by insisting that he immediately be furnished by the Government with a donation of $300,000. As soon as Secretary Bryan learned of an interview which President Bordas proposed to have with General Arias in order to make a final attempt to prevent the latter from having recourse to open rebellion, he instructed the American Minister to counsel the President that in his interview with Arias "he should assume that Arias was sincerely interested in his country's welfare and should talk to him as one patriotic citizen would talk to another."

During the winter of 1914, the Bordas Government reached the end of its financial resources. It therefore requested authorization from the United States Government under the Convention of 1907 for the issuance of a loan of $1,600,000 to enable it to pay salaries which were long overdue, to meet recognized revolutionary claims, and to cover the cost of maintenance of the armed forces of the Republic, which became increasingly heavy with the constant growth of unrest and disquiet throughout the country. As it was impossible for General Bordas to procure the consent of the Congress to this procedure, since the majority in the House of Deputies was politically hostile to him, and a loan could therefore not legally be obtained, measures recommended by the Department of State were resorted to which created havoc in the finances of the nation. Daily advances were made for a while by the Receiver of Customs, and upon other occasions the Department of State gave its approval to the obtaining of temporary advances from local Dominican banks.

At the same time, the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic was still further impaired by the compliance of the Dominican Government with the insistent demand of the American Minister that formal guaranties be granted

by the Dominican Government covering the trial and punishment of political prisoners, and by the acceptance on January 12, 1914, of the further demand of the American Minister that he himself be authorized to audit the daily expenses of the Dominican Government in order to assure himself that they were in accord with the budget promulgated by the Government.

As soon as this latter demand had been met, Secretary Bryan considered the possibility of attaching a financial expert to the American Legation, in the guise of a commercial attaché, to perform the duties so entailed. A more radical solution of the problem was, however, found in the final determination of the Department of State that a financial adviser to the Dominican Government must be appointed by that Government upon the nomination of the President of the United States, and on March 20th the Bordas Government, determined to maintain itself in power at any cost, informed that it could no longer obtain funds unless it consented to the conditions imposed by the United States Government, agreed officially to accede to this new exaction in a note the text of which is as follows:

"The Government of the Dominican Republic, desirous of preserving its regard for the international obligations of the Republic relative to the demands of national sovereignty, suggests, with the purpose of rendering effective the clauses of the Convention of 1907, that the President of the United States designate a competent financial expert to come to Santo Domingo to aid the proper officials of this Government to settle debts, to devise an adequate system of public accountability and to conserve and put into execution the original agreement of increasing the revenues and to adjust them to the expenses, all

this with the view of assuring order and stability over our finances, and to prevent deficits. In the fulfillment of this task it will be his duty especially to inquire into the validity of any charge or claim which may be presented, to countersign checks, drafts, and orders of payment from the Dominican funds in favor of a third party, to enlighten both Governments with reference to any eventual debt, determine if such debt is or is not in conformity with the Convention of 1907, and to exercise all the powers of a comptroller.

"The financial expert shall be employed in connection with the Receivership by virtue of the terms of the Convention of 1907 but he shall not be subordinate thereto. His salary and expenses shall be paid by the Receivership.

"The duties which are assigned to the financial expert shall be effective over the Receivership, the Department of Public Works, and any department or bureau of public accounts.

"In case of disagreement between the Receivership and the Department of Treasury and Commerce, and when it affects a matter the solution of which does not require the intervention of both Governments, the financial expert shall have authority to use his good offices to compose their differences.

"When notice is received by the Dominican Government that the financial expert has been designated, it will forthwith notify the Receiver General of such designation, who will thereupon be authorized to make monthly payments and arrange for all other expenses out of the five per cent mentioned in Clause One of the Convention of 1907, as determined by the President of the United States and the President of the Dominican Republic."

In this manner the United States Government, within a period of six months, had undertaken to control Do-

minican electoral procedure, to insist upon compliance with its own views regarding Dominican judicial procedure, and to direct the collection and disbursement of the revenues of the Dominican Government. Notwithstanding the momentous policy thus embarked upon by the Government of the United States in accord with the impulses of the Secretary of State and the American Minister in Santo Domingo, the domestic situation within the Republic was infinitely more precarious than it had been previously.

At the end of March, General Bordas, who had announced his own candidacy for the Presidency in the preceding month, came to a final break with General Arias and removed the officials partial to General Arias in the Provinces of Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, Santiago, and the Seybo. General Arias, with his own followers, had determined ostensibly to support the Presidential candidacy of Don Juan Isidro Jiménez. Don Federico Velasquez was pressing his own candidacy, while the leaders of the Horacista party were supporting the candidacy of General Vasquez who was residing in Puerto Rico owing to the refusal of the Government to permit him to return to the Republic.

By the middle of April, the country was once more in the grip of a general insurrection, and General Bordas had taken the field in person against Arias. All semblance of constitutional government had by that time vanished, since no elections for the Presidency had been held, and the term of one year, to which General Bordas had been elected as Provisional President, had expired upon April 13th. General Bordas still clung to office as a *de facto* executive. At this moment when no constitutional government existed in the Dominican Republic, and when

insurrection was daily spreading throughout the country, Mr. Sullivan reported:

"There has been a wonderful improvement in matters governmental here; never before in the history of the country has there been such liberality of government; at a time of the keenest political interest, with excitement at a feverish pitch and with the politicians passionately in earnest, the Government has not made a single arrest and there has not been one execution. . . conditions here . . have resulted from the application of Wilson Latin-American policy." [1]

During the following six weeks, the revolution continued unabated, one side or the other obtaining and holding the advantage for a brief moment. At length, by the beginning of June, the contest narrowed down to the attempt on the part of the Government forces to capture the city of Puerto Plata in which the revolutionists were strongly entrenched. In the course of the siege, the Commanding Officer of the United States war vessels in that port, on the ground that he desired to protect the lives and property of foreigners within the besieged city, notified both the generals of the revolutionary forces within the city and President Bordas, who was personally in command of the besieging forces, that no bombardment of the city would be permitted by the United States naval forces. Upon the disregard by the President of the orders so given, the fire of the U.S.S. *Machias* was turned upon the camp of the Government forces. Formal protest was at once made by General Bordas against the action of the American naval force, which had created a spirit of bitter hostility on the part of Bordas's followers towards the

[1] Mr. James Mark Sullivan to Secretary Bryan, April 17, 1914.

United States, since it not unnaturally was construed by the Dominican public at large as an evidence that the Government of the United States favoured the revolutionary forces.

General elections which General Bordas had at length determined to hold took place early in June, but owing to the open disorder which prevailed throughout the country it had only been possible to make even the appearance of holding elections in five of the twelve provinces. While the *de facto* Government protested that supplementary elections would be held as soon as the revolution had been crushed, it was glaringly apparent that the returns from elections held under such conditions could not be considered legitimate.

7.

Shortly before this, however, the revolution had received a new impulse with the unexpected and secret arrival in the Republic of General Horacio Vasquez. Determined at first not to participate in the revolution, General Vasquez had remained quietly in Puerto Rico near San Juan when the Bordas Government had refused to permit him to return to the Republic. Finally, however, a message from his brother, who had been wounded in an encounter with Government troops, persuaded him to make the effort to return. Knowing that the Dominican Government, through its agents, was closely watching his movements in Puerto Rico, he realized that only secretly could he return to his country. In San Juan General Vasquez obtained a small gasoline launch, and with only one companion set out at dawn one morning for the Dominican shores, hoping to reach Matanzas, where he knew he could find loyal supporters. The first night was

spent on Mona Island, and on the following day, General Vasquez and his companion were put ashore on the coast of the Province of Samaná at a point known as La Terrena. This spot was not only some distance from the place where General Vasquez had intended to land but was also in territory which he knew to be controlled by Bordas's adherents. By chance he procured from a guide whom he had obtained to conduct him to Matanzas, information of value as to the sympathies of the local leaders, and upon his arrival at Matanzas, as soon as he was recognized and his presence had become known, the population arose as one man to join the insurrection in his behalf. Not only did General Vasquez, with the troops which soon rallied about him, succeed in fighting his way through the besieging lines around Puerto Plata to go to the assistance of the revolutionists within that city, but he likewise undertook to hearten the spirits of the revolutionists in Moca and in La Vega by proceeding there in person to organize their resistance against the Government.

General Vasquez also formed a revolutionary Junta in Puerto Plata composed of representatives of all the factions and parties opposed to the Bordas Government, and in a personal interview at Guayubín with Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, reached a direct agreement for the joint participation of the two parties which they represented in the struggle to overthrow the Bordas Government.

On July 29th, when plans had been completed by all the revolutionary leaders for a final concerted attack upon the troops commanded by General Bordas, which would doubtless have proved successful, the leaders of the revolution and the members of the Bordas Government were advised that the President of the United States intended shortly to propose a plan "for the restoration of peace and

establishment of order in Santo Domingo," and demanded that hostilities be suspended until his proposals could be made known to the leaders on both sides. On August 6th, a general armistice was signed in Puerto Plata, to last during a period of fifteen days.

On July 23rd, in a letter addressed by President Wilson to Secretary Bryan, the former had stated that he had "the feeling that a way is opening up for an adjustment in Santo Domingo." It was evident that the efforts of Secretary Bryan and of Mr. Sullivan had only resulted in confusion worse confounded. The destruction within the Republic of private property had been very great. For lack of shipping facilities the crops had not been marketed. Customs receipts were diminishing each month. The civil list had not been paid for almost a year, and the General Receiver of Customs had been instructed by the American Financial Adviser appointed under the agreement entered into by Secretary Bryan with the Bordas Government, to advance the Government no further funds on the ground that, since General Bordas was no longer constitutionally President, he should not receive funds destined for the Dominican Government from the customs receipts. The confidence of the Dominican Republic in its own authorities had been completely destroyed. Rights which could not be alienated under the Dominican Constitution had been accorded the Government of the United States by the mere sanction of the Dominican Executive without legislative warrant. It was admitted that no constitutional authorities and no authorities-elect existed in the Dominican Republic, since the returns from the elections which General Bordas had purported to hold were so incomplete and so patently fraudulent that they could not be recognized as legitimate. Consequently, the electoral

colleges elected in those elections, which would unquestionably have proclaimed General Bordas President, could not be resorted to as a means of procuring the desired solution. Constitutional government, which President Wilson had announced his intention of upholding, had ceased.

President Wilson consequently took the matter into his own hands, drafting the following project for a solution of the Dominican problem, appointing the former Governor of New Jersey, Franklin Fort, and Charles Smith, an attorney of New Hampshire, as his Commissioners to make this plan known to the political leaders in the Dominican Republic, and entrusting to these Commissioners its execution:

"The Government of the United States desires nothing for itself from the Dominican Republic and no concessions or advantages for its citizens which are not accorded citizens of other countries. It desires only to prove its sincere and disinterested friendship for the republic and its people and to fulfill its responsibilities as the friend to whom in such crises as the present all the world looks to guide Santo Domingo out of its difficulties.

"It, therefore, makes the following earnest representations not only to the existing de facto Government of the Dominican Republic, but also to all who are in any way responsible for the present posture of affairs there:

"I. It warns everyone concerned that it is absolutely imperative that the present hostilities should cease and that all who are concerned in them should disperse to their several homes, disbanding the existing armed forces and returning to the peaceful occupations upon which the welfare of the people of the republic depends. This is necessary, and necessary at once. Nothing can be successfully accomplished until this is done.

"II. It is also necessary that there should be an immediate reconstitution of political authority in the republic. To this end the Government of the United States very solemnly advises all concerned with the public affairs of the republic to adopt the following plan:

"(1) Let all those who have any pretensions to be chosen President of the Republic and who can make any sufficient show of exercising a recognized leadership and having an acknowledged following agree upon some responsible and representative man to act as Provisional President of the Republic, it being understood that Mr. Bordas will relinquish his present position and authority. If these candidates can agree in this matter, the Government of the United States will recognize and support the man of their choice as Provisional President. If they cannot agree, the Government of the United States will itself name a Provisional President, sustain him in the assumption of office, and support him in the exercise of his temporary authority. The Provisional President will not be a candidate for President.

"(2) At the earliest feasible date after the establishment and recognition of the Provisional Government thus established, let elections for a regular President and Congress be held under the authority and direction of the Provisional President, who will, it must of course be understood, exercise during his tenure of office the full powers of President of the Republic; but let it be understood that the Government of the United States will send representatives of its own choosing to observe the election throughout the republic and that it will expect those observers not only to be accorded a courteous welcome but also to be accorded the freest opportunities to observe the circumstances and processes of the election.

"(3) Let it be understood that if the United States Government is satisfied that these elections have been free

and fair and carried out under conditions which enable the people of the Republic to express their real choice, it will recognize the President and Congress thus chosen as the legitimate and constitutional Government of the Republic and will support them in the exercise of their functions and authority in every way it can. If it should not be satisfied that elections of the right kind have been held, let it be understood that another election will he held at which the mistakes observed will be corrected.

"III. A regular and constitutional government having thus been set up, the Government of the United States would feel at liberty thereafter to insist that revolutionary movements cease and that all subsequent changes in the Government of the Republic be effected by the peaceful processes provided in the Dominican Constitution. By no other course can the Government of the United States fulfill its treaty obligations with Santo Domingo or its tacitly conceded obligations as the nearest friend of Santo Domingo in her relations with the rest of the world."

8.

The project of President Wilson, reaffirming as it did the right of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic already stipulated by Secretary Bryan during the preceding months, was premised upon far more general grounds than had ever previously been asserted by the Government of the United States. This basis was stated by President Wilson in the third article of his plan. President Wilson implied that the Government of the United States possessed the right to assure itself of the continuance of orderly constitutional government in the Dominican Republic, and would "feel at liberty" to prevent all changes in the Government of the Dominican Republic other than those by the "peaceful processes pro-

vided in the Dominican Constitution." The right was based, according to the President, not only upon the treaty obligations of the United States but also upon "its tacitly conceded obligations as the nearest friend of Santo Domingo in her relations with the rest of the world." The new relationship was clearly assumed, and the establishment of a quasi-protectorate by the United States over the Dominican Republic was unmistakably asserted.

It is difficult to reconcile the step now taken by President Wilson with his statement in the Mobile speech less than a year before in referring to the Latin American Republics:

"We must prove ourselves their friends and champions, upon terms of equality and honor . . We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our interest or not."

It can only be assumed that having asserted that the United States would never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest, the President believed that the action which he was now taking was an act of friendship which could not be misconstrued by the rest of the continent, and that the assumption of practical suzerainty would be regarded as a temporary measure intended by the President to bring closer that goal upon which his mind dwelt, "the development of constitutional liberty in the world." There presumably entered into the question, likewise, a more personal element. Temperamentally unable to concede failure, President Wilson could not conceive that the idealistic policy which he had announced towards the Latin American nations should prove so barren of results in the Dominican Republic. He ignored, apparently, the fact that, had he possessed the coöperation of a

Secretary of State cognizant of the actual condition and requirements of the Dominican Republic, and of an American Minister in Santo Domingo capable of a correct appreciation of the legitimate methods of utilizing the influence of the United States in assisting the Dominicans themselves to correct the deplorable conditions which continued there, his original policy might have been productive of great benefits. As it was, President Wilson appeared to believe that the consistent deterioration in the condition of the Republic was due solely to the malevolence of the Dominican political leaders and to their unwillingness to avail themselves of the instruction which he was willing to provide.

While, therefore, his plan as published purported to be in the nature of an exhortation, it was nevertheless accompanied by an instruction issued to his Commissioners to present it to the leaders of the political parties in the Dominican Republic as an ultimatum. The Commissioners were advised that "No opportunity for argument should be given to any person or faction. It is desired that you present the plan and see that it is complied with." [1]

On August 15th, the Commissioners appointed by President Wilson, accompanied by the American Minister, who had been recalled to the United States for conference prior to the appointment of the Commission, arrived in Santo Domingo and left immediately for Puerto Plata.

Before their arrival in the latter city, General Vasquez, accompanied solely by General Cipriano Bencosme, had gone to La Altagracia, where General Bordas had established his headquarters in the midst of his own troops, to discuss the bases of a proposed agreement between the

[1] Secretary Bryan to Commissioner Fort, August 13, 1914.

DON FEDERICO VELASQUEZ Y HERNANDEZ

Government and the leaders of the revolution. The negotiations so undertaken were on the point of completion when word was received that the American Commissioners had reached Puerto Plata and had requested interviews with General Bordas and with the principal leaders of the revolutionary parties. In the conferences which ensued in Puerto Plata, General Vasquez and the other leaders of the revolution, with the exception of General Arias, agreed to conform with the requirements contained in the Wilson plan. While General Bordas at first likewise expressed his willingness to resign the *de facto* Presidency and to take part in the selection of a Provisional President, he later withdrew his consent and on August 23rd it appeared as if the plan could not be carried out in its entirety. General Vasquez and Don Juan Isidro Jiménez had already proceeded to Santo Domingo with the members of the American Commission, and these leaders were joined in the capital by Don Federico Velasquez and General Luis Felipe Vidal, who had been invited to participate in the selection of a Provisional President by the American Commissioners, notwithstanding the fact that the party of which the latter was the recognized leader was purely a local faction in the Province of Azua, and in no sense national. Two days later, General Bordas, who had once more changed in his attitude, arrived in Santo Domingo and transmitted his proclamation of resignation to the American Commissioners to be issued at a time to be selected by the latter.

On August 26th, the meetings of the Commission entrusted with the selection of the Provisional President demanded by the President of the United States commenced. In the deliberations there took part General Bordas, Don Manuel de Jesús Bidó, representing Don Juan

Isidro Jiménez, General Horacio Vasquez, Don Federico Velasquez, and General Luis Felipe Vidal. The report had been spread by the American Commissioners that should the selection of the Provisional President not be made with the unanimous consent of all the party leaders represented in the conference, President Wilson would insist upon the alternative in his plan, namely, the selection by himself of the Provisional President of the Dominican Republic. Consequently the political leaders determined to accept a candidate who might be unacceptable to themselves rather than be forced to the alternative of the selection of a Dominican Provisional President by the President of the United States.

At the outset, General Bordas proposed the selection of Don Genaro Pérez, but upon the refusal of certain of the other political chieftains to agree to this proposal, he proposed the selection of General Vasquez. Don Juan Isidro Jiménez proposed the name of Don Eliseo Grullón, while General Vasquez proposed Don Jacinto de Castro. It was soon evident that none of these candidates would be acceptable to all the members of the conference. Thereupon, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, through his representative, proposed the name of Dr. Ramón Baez. This proposal was at first vigorously combated both by General Vasquez and by Don Federico Velasquez, but when it was later seen that no other candidate had a better chance of satisfying all those present, the objections of these two leaders were withdrawn and Dr. Baez was declared the unanimous choice of the conference. On August 27th, after the resignation of General Bordas had been made public, Dr. Baez was inaugurated as Provisional President and was promptly officially recognized as such by the Government of the United States.

Since General Arias manifested no intention of recognizing Dr. Baez as President and appeared to contemplate a continuation of his revolutionary activities in the northern Provinces, the American Commissioners were instructed by Secretary Bryan to deliver an ultimatum to Arias giving him a limited period within which to make his allegiance to the Provisional President, and should that ultimatum be disregarded, to obtain a formal request from the Provisional President that American marines coöperate with the Dominican customs guards for the arrest of General Arias upon the ground of his complicity in smuggling operations in Monte Cristi. Upon the suggestion of the Commissioners this instruction was, however, modified and President Baez was afforded an opportunity to negotiate directly with General Arias for the submission of the latter.

Immediately after his inauguration, President Baez entered into an official agreement with the American Commissioners providing that national elections for a Constitutional President and Congress should be held six weeks later, and that at those elections observers appointed by the United States should be present at all the voting booths and should be afforded the fullest opportunity to observe the casting, and the counting of the votes.

CHAPTER XIII

MILITARY INTERVENTION BY THE UNITED STATES

1.

THE new Provisional President, Dr. Ramón Baez, was a son of the Dictator, General Buenaventura Baez. He had been educated in France and had obtained after his return to the Republic a distinguished reputation as a physician and as a professor in the University of Santo Domingo. While he had not figured prominently in political life, his political sympathies were with the Jimenista party, and during the first weeks of his brief term of office it was apparent that his interest in the electoral campaign was inclined towards the candidacy of Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, which had been announced shortly after the installation of the Provisional President. Don Federico Velasquez had likewise once more announced his own candidacy, while the Horacista party was supporting, as usual, the candidacy of General Vasquez. General Vidal had announced himself as the Presidential condidate of the Legalista party, but it was evident that his ambitions must necessarily be limited to obtaining the Congressional representation of the Province of Azua in the two Houses of Congress. Shortly after the campaign commenced, Velasquez withdrew his own candidacy for the Presidency in order to support Jiménez. The contest therefore narrowed down to a clear-cut struggle along the old-time lines between the Horacista and the Jiménista parties.

While the pacification of the country as the result of the armistice agreed upon in August had been rapidly carried on under the Provisional Government, and had been fairly general in the southern and eastern Provinces, the situation was less satisfactory in the Cibao. The nego-

tiations between President Baez and General Arias had resulted in a merely nominal agreement, and the admonitions addressed by American naval officers to General Arias's representatives in accordance with the instruction of Secretary Bryan proved equally negligible in their results. The earlier appointments of provincial officials in the Cibao which had been made by Dr. Baez almost entirely from among the partisans of Jiménez, were objected to upon that ground not only by the members of the Horacista party but likewise by Arias. Early in October an outbreak in Santiago appeared to be imminent, since Don Genaro Pérez, appointed Governor of Santiago, was unable to assert his authority, as the fort of San Luis in Santiago continued to be occupied by a large body of armed troops commanded by General Jorge, the representative of General Arias. It was only when an agreement was entered into between Don Juan Isidro Jiménez and General Arias whereby the latter agreed to support Jiménez's candidacy for the Presidency in return for the promise of his own appointment to the Cabinet and patronage for his followers, should Jiménez be elected, that the immediate danger of further rebellion on the part of Arias was definitely removed.

The elections were finally held on October 25th, and continued for two additional days. By the first of November, as the returns slowly came in, it was apparent that Jiménez had been elected by a small majority, owing partly to the fact that in supplementary elections which were held in Santiago as the result of the annulment by the courts of the results of the elections earlier held there, only the Jimenistas went to the polls, since the members of the Horacista party protested that owing to the flagrant partiality of the electoral authorities they were

without valid protection. The total vote cast was finally computed to be 40,076 for Jiménez, while the total number of votes cast for General Vasquez and for General Vidal amounted to 39,632. Jiménez had carried seven out of the twelve Provinces, and in the electoral college, composed of 632 electors, had obtained 337.

Believing that the results of the elections should be annulled by the courts on the ground that the distribution of electors was not in accord with the population, and that fraud had been perpetrated upon a large scale, notwithstanding the presence at the polls of American observers, the members of the Horacista party at first determined to prevent their representatives in the newly elected Congress from attending the Congressional sessions, in order, by thus preventing the formation of a quorum, to postpone the inauguration of Jiménez as President until the Supreme Court of the Republic had passed upon the election contests.

It was likewise evident, and it was so reported to Secretary Bryan, that the Provisional President himself was not averse to the postponement of the inauguration of his successor. While openly favourable at the outset of his term to the candidacy of Jiménez, Dr. Baez was dissatisfied with the manner in which after his election Don Juan Isidro Jiménez had manifested his appreciation of his partiality. During the last days of his term, Dr. Baez, in fact, became so reluctant to turn over the Government to the newly elected Chief Executive that he began to manifest the most extravagant sympathy for the Horacista party and its leader. General Vasquez, notwithstanding his sincere conviction that he had been unfairly defeated in the general elections, was resolutely opposed to any interference with the orderly procedure fixed by the Constitution for

the inauguration of President Jiménez. He not only refused to patronize any suggestions for revolt, but likewise instructed his followers in the Congress to form the quorum necessary to permit the inauguration of President Jiménez before the National Assembly composed of the two Houses, as soon as the Supreme Court had rendered a decision favourable to Jiménez in the election contests. On December 5, 1914, Don Juan Isidro Jiménez was again inaugurated President of the Dominican Republic.

2.

President Jiménez had thus attained the end for which he had striven during the twelve years which had elapsed since he had been forced to relinquish the Presidency. The years which had intervened had dealt harshly with him. He had aged very perceptibly, and never notable for force of character or power of determination, it was unquestioned that the President would be controlled by his advisers. The question of prime importance to the public was which group among his advisers would obtain the upper hand. Owing to the agreements which he had made during the campaign he was obligated both to Don Federico Velasquez, whose support had undoubtedly determined his election, and to General Arias, without whose assistance he would not have obtained the Presidential electors from the Provinces of Monte Cristi and Santiago. In the formation of his Cabinet, therefore, in accordance with the agreements previously made, President Jiménez appointed General Arias his Minister for War, and the latter's chief representative, Don Elias Brache, Minister of the Interior. Don Federico Velasquez was appointed Minister of Fomento, and the other Cabinet portfolios were entrusted to Don Bernardo Pichardo, Don Jacinto Pey-

nado, Don Jaime Mota, and Don Armando Pérez Perdomo, all members of the Jimenista party, with the exception of Don Bernardo Pichardo, a supporter of Velasquez. Before the first month had passed, it became evident that the conflicting interests within the Cabinet were so deeply rooted that it would have required a far more forceful personality than that of President Jiménez to dominate them. To his consternation, President Jiménez likewise ascertained that it was impossible for him to obtain a majority in the Congress for the measures which he proposed unless he agreed to submit to the dictation of General Arias, since many of the supposedly Jimenista Deputies and Senators from the northern Provinces were in reality pledged to support General Arias and not the President of the Republic.

The first serious difficulty occurred in the month of February following the President's inauguration. This was directly due to the attempt of Secretary Bryan to continue the policy which he had initiated during the Bordas Government, later enlarged in its scope by President Wilson, of vesting the ultimate decision regarding the domestic policies of the Dominican Government in the hands of representatives of the United States. Prior to the inauguration of President Jiménez, Secretary Bryan had obtained confidential commitments from both Jiménez and Velasquez that the Government of which they would form a part would undertake to retain the American Financial Adviser appointed during the Bordas Administration. A little more than a week after President Jiménez's inauguration, Secretary Bryan undertook to have these commitments realized. President Jiménez was informed that he was expected by the Department of State to accord official recognition to Mr. Charles M.

Johnston, Mr. Bryan's appointee, as "Comptroller of the Finances of the Dominican Republic," whose duties should be

"to provide a budget for the Dominican Republic based upon his knowledge of income and probable expenditures, this budget to be rigidly adhered to; to approve and countersign any payments made by the Dominican Government, it being understood that no payments be valid unless countersigned by the Comptroller."

The President was likewise required to issue a decree placing the collection of internal revenue under the Receivership, and to amend the contract under which an American engineer had been employed by the preceding Administration as Director of Public Works in such a manner as to provide that the said Director might be removed from office only with the authorization of the American Department of State, and should be given full authority of appointment and dismissal over all of his subordinates. In addition to these requirements, the suggestion was made that the assistance of the United States Government be obtained in organizing a constabulary within the Dominican Republic to replace the Dominican army.

When the President attempted to obtain the approval of the Dominican Congress to the proposed measures, he met not only with the opposition of the Horacista Senators and Deputies but likewise with that of the group of Arias's friends. General Arias himself threatened to resign upon the ostensible ground that the Government was too ready to obey the dictates of the United States, but it was generally recognized that his discontent was due to the fact that the President was unable to increase the subsidy which he had already commenced to pay him and was

unwilling to carry out all of Arias's desires with regard to governmental appointments.

Simultaneous with these first outward evidences of impending conflict within the Cabinet was the first threat of armed insurrection against the Government, which occurred towards the end of January when Governor Quirico Feliú, of Puerto Plata, refused to obey the instructions issued to him by the President and demanded compensation for his services in the revolution against the Bordas Government. Confusing the issue involved, Secretary Bryan promptly cabled to the American Minister to advise the Minister for War and General Vasquez, the latter apparently upon the ground that he must be implicated in the insurrection threatened by General Feliú, that should they embarrass the Jiménez Government they would be held personally responsible to the United States. In his instructions, the Secretary of State continued:

"This Government means what it said when it sent a commission there with a proposal looking to permanent peace and it will live up to the promises it has made. . . The changes advised (i.e. the reforms demanded) are the reforms necessary for the honest and efficient administration of the Government and the early and proper development of the country. There should be no unnecessary delay, therefore, in putting them into operation . . A naval force will be sent whenever necessary."

While the threatened insurrection in Puerto Plata was peacefully settled by an agreement reached between President Jiménez and the disgruntled provincial officeholders, it was not settled without the practical intervention of the United States, since the presence in the port of Puerto Plata of the U.S.S. *Castine* with a large body of Ameri-

can marines undoubtedly hastened the conclusion of the agreement reached. Although he urged at this time that the Dominican Government officially request the United States for the assistance of the armed forces of the American Government in maintaining peace within the Republic, the Secretary of State refused to authorize the General Receiver of Customs to advance the sums needed by the Government to meet the extraordinary expenses incurred by the necessity of maintaining a large body of Dominican troops in readiness in the Cibao provinces, inasmuch as he believed that the Government would be more ready to press for the sanction by the Dominican Congress of the demands of the Department of State should it be clearly shown that no financial concessions might be expected from the Receivership unless those requirements were acceded to by the Congress. When President Jiménez at length requested formally that the approval of Congress be given to the major requirement of the United States, namely, the employment of the American Financial Adviser in accordance with the conditions exacted by Secretary Bryan, the resolution carrying the necessary authorization was defeated by a large majority.

President Jiménez was at once confronted with a serious dilemma in that the action of the Congress prevented him from continuing the employment of the American Financial Adviser, while on the other hand he feared to dismiss the latter and thus incur the disfavour of the American Government. When, in the early part of April, President Jiménez was informed that the opposition majority in the Congress was preparing to follow the example set in 1902, and was preparing to adopt a resolution impeaching him on the ground that he continued to retain Mr. Johnston in office, he appealed to the Department of State, and

notified Secretary Bryan that he intended to despatch immediately to Washington a commission headed by his Minister of Fomento, Don Federico Velasquez, who was to be accompanied by Don Jacinto Peynado, the Minister of Justice, as well as by Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, to discuss with the Secretary of State "certain questions of the utmost importance to the interests of the Nation," believing that the despatch of this mission would offer an opportunity for the United States Government "to give to America an imminent confirmation of the respect which the interests and rights of the Dominican Republic merit." Secretary Bryan had, however, passed the stage when he considered that the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic were other than a matter for the sole determination of the Department of State. Ignoring completely the right of impeachment vested in the Dominican Congress by the Dominican Constitution, he cabled at once, as soon as he was advised of the possibility of the impeachment proceedings, that the United States Government would not

"permit any attack to be made upon President Jiménez for acting in good faith towards the United States . . President Jiménez . . is entitled to and will receive from this Government any assistance that will be necessary to compel respect for his Administration. This support will be given whether the attacks made upon him are direct or indirect, open or in secret." [1]

Encouraged by the report from Mr. Sullivan that this pronouncement had immediately improved the situation, Secretary Bryan prepared to discuss with the members of

[1] Secretary Bryan to the American Minister in Santo Domingo, April 9, 1915.

the Dominican Delegation the various questions which they desired to treat with the United States.

3.

The first question taken up was one which had already proved a source of contention between the Dominican Government and the Government of the United States, namely, the measure of control to be exerted by the Receiver General of Dominican Customs over the appointment or dismissal of the subordinate officials in the Receivership. This question could hardly be said to have reached a satisfactory solution in these conferences, since the Dominican Commissioners, bearing in mind the considerations advanced by Secretary Root, maintained that the right of appointment or dismissal of these employees was vested solely in the President of the Dominican Republic, while the Department of State in a memorandum dated June 8, 1915, replied that this control was ultimately vested by the provisions of the Convention of 1907 in the President of the United States and might therefore be deputed by him to his representative, the General Receiver of Dominican Customs. No more satisfactory agreement was reached when the Dominican Commissioners protested strongly against the continuation of the Financial Adviser to the Dominican Republic, on the ground that his duties and rights as fixed by Secretary Bryan were in open and evident conflict with various provisions of the Dominican Constitution, and in violation of Dominican laws, while his continuance in office would be in flagrant disregard of the disapproval recently registered by the Dominican Congress. After consideration of these objections Secretary Bryan informed the Dominican envoys that President Wilson had determined to avoid any

question as to the legality or propriety of the appointment of Mr. Johnston as Financial Adviser to the Dominican Government, by enlarging the scope of the duties of the American Receiver General so as to include certain functions which had most assuredly never been foreseen when the Receivership was created. These additional functions were now listed in a further memorandum sent by the Secretary of State to the Dominican Commissioners under date of June 8, 1915, as follows:

"(a) To advise the proper Dominican officials in the settlement of all outstanding indebtedness of the Republic;

"(b) To make to the Dominican Government recomdations looking to the improvement of the system of public accountability;

"(c) To make to the Dominican Government suggestions of equitable means of increasing the public revenues and of so adjusting the public disbursements thereto that deficits may be avoided;

"(d) To inquire into the validity of any and all claims presented against the Dominican Government;

"(e) To request information from time to time from the Dominican Department of Hacienda as to the public accounts of the Dominican Government and to advise that Government of errors and discrepancies therein and to make recommendations looking to their adjustment."

The same Mr. Charles Johnston, whose earlier title had been "Comptroller of the Finances of the Dominican Government," was now to be considered an official of the Receivership General, and in this new guise was to undertake these responsibilities.

As soon as President Jiménez was advised of the purpose of the Department of State, he cabled directly to President Wilson informing him that he deemed it inopportune that Mr. Johnston should hold any office in the Dominican Republic. To this formal protest, the sole response was the statement on the part of the Department of State that should the Dominican Government prefer any allegations of misconduct against Mr. Johnston the American Government would act in accordance with the conclusions which it might form after studying such allegations.

4.

At this time, Secretary Bryan, with a final "God bless you!" from President Wilson, resigned his office. Mr. Walter Vick, the original appointee of President Wilson to the Dominican Receivership General had been replaced by another political appointee, and Mr. James Mark Sullivan, whose conduct had been officially investigated by Senator Phelan of California, at the request of President Wilson, as the result of numerous charges preferred against him, had been permitted to retire. The policy of the United States Government, however, notwithstanding these varied changes in personnel underwent no modification.

During the spring of the year 1915, local rebellions broke out throughout the Dominican Republic. An insurrection headed by General Zenón Ovando in the Province of San Pedro de Macoris was later followed by further efforts at rebellion in Puerto Plata, and by the beginning of July a general revolution was imminent. By instruction of Secretary Lansing, the American Chargé d'Affaires on July 21st publicly admonished the leaders of the revolution. He stated positively that President Jiménez would receive from the United States all assistance necessary in

order to compel respect for his Administration, and added that in the event that the American Government deemed it necessary to land troops in order to enforce order, those leaders who were or who might be engaged in encouraging disorder would be held personally responsible by the United States. This admonition was promptly answered in an open message sent the American Representative by General Horacio Vasquez. The latter declared:

"I believe that the peace of the country can be firmly established not by troops but through good and respected institutions. The menaces and the conduct of Minister Sullivan in supporting the unjustifiable administration of Bordas contributed no little towards one of our most disastrous governments. Moreover, I do not believe that President Wilson has the right, under any pretext, to infringe the sovereignty of an independent people. So far as my desire for peace is concerned, it is consistently firm, as I have already expressed in my public telegram to Senator de Castro, but I consider as indispensable both respect for public liberties and for the law on the part of the Government in order to attain the ends which we so much desire."

Coincident with this public warning to the leaders of the parties hostile to the Government, the Government itself was secretly reprimanded by the Department of State on the ground that it had expended considerable sums appropriated for other purposes in maintaining armed forces in the field, and that such diversion of funds was contrary to the terms of the Convention. President Jiménez was informed that the Department of State would be very slow "to accept political conditions as reasons for future advances to cover these diversions."

So charged had the political atmosphere in the Republic become by midsummer of 1915, that President Jiménez, upon whom the constant burdens which he had been called to assume had weighed heavily, suffered a physical and mental breakdown. The constant dread of assassination which was ever present in his mind led him first to conceal himself in the residence of his son and later to seek repose in his old home in Monte Cristi. The one bright spot appeared to be the result of the interviews held with General Horacio Vasquez by the President's Ministers, Don Federico Velasquez and Don Jaime Mota, in which they received positive assurances from General Vasquez that he neither approved the efforts at insurrection undertaken in Puerto Plata by General Feliú nor had any intention himself of disturbing the peace. In accordance with these assurances, the principal leaders of the Horacista party had been called by General Vasquez to a conference at his home, and had there been ordered by their leader to countenance no attempts at revolution. In the autumn the situation momentarily improved with the surrender of the revolutionaries in Puerto Plata, and with the later agreement reached by the Government with the principal revolutionary leaders in San Pedro de Macorís, who agreed to lay down their arms in return for the distribution among them of road-building contracts and appointments to various local offices.

5.

The continued disquiet within the Republic had, however, led Secretary Lansing to seize the opportunity afforded by the appointment in September, 1915, of a new American Minister, Mr. William W. Russell, who had previously held that position during the Administra-

tion of President Taft, not only to reaffirm the policy gradually moulded by Secretary Bryan with the at least tacit approval of President Wilson, but likewise to undertake to obtain for the United States an even greater measure of control. In the detailed instructions handed the new American Minister on September 17th, he was instructed to draw the immediate attention of the Dominican Government to the fact that in the opinion of the United States, the Dominican Government had been guilty of a consistent violation of its contractual obligation not to increase its public debt without the prior authorization of the Government of the United States as provided in the third article of the Convention of 1907. It was declared that the amount of the public indebtedness so contracted by the Dominican Government without the consent of the United States amounted to at least $7,000,000, and that should this procedure continue, the objects for which the Convention had been created and enacted would necessarily be defeated. The American Minister was advised that the United States Government had now determined that further violations of the obligations assumed by the Dominican Government must cease.

In accordance with these instructions, the American Minister, on November 19th, presented a formal note to the Dominican Government, informing it that the Government of the United States, for the reasons above mentioned, had determined that the Convention of 1907 gave it the following rights:

"A. To compel the observance of Article III by insisting upon the immediate appointment of a financial adviser to the Dominican Republic, who shall be appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic, upon desig-

nation of the President of the United States, and who shall be attached to the Ministry of Finance to give effect to whose proposals and labors the Minister will lend all efficient aid. The financial adviser shall render effective the clauses of the Convention of 1907 by aiding the proper officials of the Dominican Government in the adjudication and settlement of all its outstanding indebtedness; devise and inaugurate an adequate system of public accountability; investigate proper means of increasing the public revenues and of so adjusting the public disbursements thereto that deficits may be avoided; inquire into the validity of any and all claims which may be presented against the Dominican Government; countersign all checks, drafts, warrants or orders for the payment of Dominican funds to third parties; enlighten both Governments with reference to any eventual debt and to determine if such debt is or is not in conformity with the Convention of 1907; compose whatever differences may arise between the receivership and the Department of Treasury and Commerce, in which matters not requiring the intervention of both Governments are involved; assist the proper officials of the Dominican Government in the preparation of the annual budget and to aid them in correlating the governmental expenditures thereto; recommend improved methods of obtaining and applying the revenues and make such other recommendations to the minister of finance as may be deemed necesssary for the welfare of the Dominican Republic; provided, that the authority of the general receiver as described in Article I, to collect and apply the customs revenues shall in no way be affected by this interpretation.

"B. To provide for the free course of the customs and prevent factional strife and disturbances by the creation of a constabulary, which the Dominican Government obligates itself, for the preservation of domestic peace,

security of individual rights and the full observance of the provisions of the convention, to create without delay and maintain. This constabulary shall be organized and commanded by an American to be appointed, as 'Director of Constabulary,' by the President of the Dominican Republic, upon nomination of the President of the United States. In like manner there shall be appointed to the constabulary such other American officers as the director of constabulary shall consider requisite; also there shall be appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic, on the nomination of the director of constabulary such Dominican officers as, in the judgment of the director of constabulary, may be desirable from the standpoint of efficiency. The Dominican Government shall clothe these officers with the proper and necessary authority and uphold them in the performance of their functions. The Dominican Government shall authorize for the constabulary such commissioned officers, and enlisted men (non-commissioned officers and privates) as the director of constabulary may deem necessary for the proper preservation of peace and order, within the Republic, and shall ratify and promulgate such regulations as to pay of personnel, enlistment, appointment and reduction of non-commissioned officers, discharge, discipline, etc., as the director of constabulary may recommend; provided that the President of the United States shall decide any question of regulation affecting the organization upon which the Dominican Government and the director of constabulary may fail to agree, and shall by agreement with the Dominican Republic fix the salary of the director of constabulary.

"The constabulary thus provided for, shall, under the direction of the Dominican Government, have supervision and control of the arms and ammunition, military supplies and traffic therein, throughout the country.

"In regard to the financial adviser I will say to Your Excellency that my Government would prefer to have this office so established that it would not be in danger of being abolished by future administrations, but, in view of past experiences with the post of financial adviser, is willing to have his rights and duties vested in the receivership, provided that said receivership is properly authorized to exercise full budgetary control, and is given all the powers herein set forth in section 'A'.

"In insisting upon the establishment of the constabulary Your Excellency can not fail to see that its organization will afford ample protection to the constituted authorities at a minimum of cost, and will be subject to the control of the central Government, thus placing it beyond the domination of provincial administrators; and the maintenance of this constabulary will be less onerous and far more effective than the present system of the army and customs guard, and guardia republicana."

In reply to this demand a communication was transmitted to the American Minister under date of December 8th, which had been drafted not only after consultation with all the members of the President's Cabinet but likewise after consultation with representatives of the opposition parties, in which the Dominican Government declared its refusal to consent to either of the two requirements advanced by the Government of the United States, in the following language:

"For the reason that it is not likely to bring about the end desired, the Government does not acquiesce in the suggestion of Your Excellency to secure the reëstablishment of the office of the financial expert, eliminated by agreement between the two Governments after the Washington Government heard the statements of the Dominican

commission. The financial expert serves no useful purpose because, even though his work should be advantageous for the one side, on the other side it would constitute a permanent element of intranquillity and annoyance for the Dominican people who have unanimously expressed themselves as opposed to such an official. To reëstablish this office, therefore, would be cause for stirring up an absolutely dangerous public sentiment. And as the purpose of the American Government is sincerely to assist the Dominican Government in the fulfillment of its duties, that aid should assume a form devoid of all danger, of everything which might wound a national sentiment jealous of its sovereignty. The intelligent aid of the American Government to the Dominican Government, in the matter of finances, ought not to be along lines outside of those prescribed by the provisions of Article III of the convention, all of which was cleared up by the negotiations of the Dominican Commission.

"In regard to the transformation of the public forces into a civil guard organized and commanded by American officials designated by your Government and appointed by the Dominican Government, there is the same objection as in the matter of the financial expert. That which is sought for is not a peace obligated by force, which is always precarious, but a moral peace, resulting from tranquillity of mind and a cessation of warlike acts, and a desire for financial welfare.

"And the establishment of a police as proposed, interpreted by the Dominican people as an abdication of the national sovereignty, far from being a pacificating element would be, on the contrary, an inextinguishable germ of trouble, of protest, and of violent attacks—all of which would bring about a situation much more lamentable than the present.

"The question is not one of those to be settled by the

increase or the abolition of the armed forces of the Republic. The most important side of the matter is the economic side, and with the rëestablishment of the producing vitality of the country, social and political phenomena which are at present a source of alarm both to natives and foreigners will be easily and advantageously modified.

"This is the constant aim of the Government, and the foreign aid which it may need and which on several occasions the American Government has offered and which will be accepted with thanks, must be of that character which does not wound the susceptibilities of the Dominican people, as everything which disturbs peace of mind must, perforce, act contrary to the whole social life of the Dominican Republic."

Public opinion was unanimous that the American demands must be rejected. It was generally recognized that the moment was crucial; as General Vasquez stated, in a well-conceived public letter addressed to the President urging upon him certain measures of reform in order to "cut the evil at the root":

"We are passing through one of those dark hours which occur in the life of peoples when it seems as if everything has been lost; but in contrast to the despair and the discouragement of the feebler spirits there is as ever opposed the determination and the faith of those who never lose their confidence in the efficacy of principle and in the worth of duty in action as a means of transforming a state of social chaos into one of order, liberty and justice."

The position in which President Jiménez found himself, unstable as it had been upon the day when he took

office, had now become infinitely more precarious. Armed opposition to his Government threatened to break out any day in every Province of the Republic; the continued presence of General Arias in his Cabinet made it impossible for Jiménez to control his own Administration, notwithstanding the loyal support given him by Don Federico Velasquez and several other able officials. It was well recognized that the purpose of General Arias was by constant pressure and consistent intrigue to force President Jiménez to resign his office, and then by an agreement with the members of the opposition party in the Congress to procure his own election as Provisional President of the Republic. The sole hope of salvation for the President lay in his maintaining his position for a length of time sufficient to enable him to check by force, if necessary, the efforts of those within his own Government to obtain his removal, and in order to accomplish this it was necessary for his Administration to procure sufficient funds either through a loan or by temporary advances. Neither of the two latter solutions was feasible, however, without the consent of the Government of the United States, and the recent communication of the American Minister had made it evident both that the United States would no longer tolerate an increase in the public debt of the Republic without its prior approval, and also that it would refuse to authorize either a loan or a temporary advance to tide the Government over in its difficulties, unless the Dominican Government consented to an interpretation of the Convention of 1907 which public opinion in the Dominican Republic unanimously considered violative of the Dominican Constitution and an infringement of the sovereignty of the nation.

Under such conditions, it was evident no Administra-

tion could long retain office. A direct appeal of Jiménez to President Wilson that the exigencies of his position be considered, and that a modification of the policy announced by the Department of State be authorized, proved productive merely of the following reply:

"The White House, January 15, 1916.

. . "I have noted with great satisfaction the generous appreciation of the disinterested friendship of the Government and people of the United States, and of their earnest purpose to do all that they properly can to aid Dominicans in the establishment of their Government that will provide peace, individual guaranties, and opportunity for development, without which no true prosperity can come to the Dominican people.

"Your Excellency may count upon my friendly advice and continued support in any wise reforms which may be devised and carried out with a view to secure peace and prosperity in your country.

"With best wishes for the prosperity of the Dominican Republic and for your personal welfare, I am, Your Excellency's good friend,

"Woodrow Wilson."

This reply to his appeal, well-intentioned as it undoubtedly was, must have appeared to Jiménez as the proffer of a stone when he had asked for bread. The "friendly advice" which President Wilson assured him he would always be willing to lend, was to the eyes of the Dominican President based upon an entirely erroneous conception of the true requirements of his country, but the situation had by now reached a point where almost any temporary remedy would have been futile. As soon as it was generally recognized that the Dominican Government would receive no

financial assistance without acceding to the demands made by the American Government, which it not only had rejected but which it likewise could not agree to without the consent of the Dominican Congress—which it was well known would not be forthcoming,—the opposition to President Jiménez's Government became open and determined.

In the Congress, the followers of General Arias and the adherents of General Vidal were preparing again to move the President's impeachment. In San Pedro de Macorís, in the Seybo, and in Barahona, insurrection was spreading, and while President Jiménez was officially informed by Secretary Lansing that the United States Government would, if requested by him, furnish the forces necessary to suppress insurrection and to maintain order, President Jiménez refused to make the request involved, believing that if he did so he would not only increase the hostility of the opposition to him but would likewise risk the danger of an indefinite occupation of the Republic by the military forces of the United States.

6.

The long-expected crisis occurred on April 14th. President Jiménez, notwithstanding his inherent reluctance to reach definite decisions, at length determined, upon the advice of Señor Velasquez, to attempt to lessen the constantly increasing influence of General Arias. Ordering General Cesáreo Jiménez, the chief of the National Guard, and General Mauricio Jiménez, the commander of the Fortress in the capital, both leading partisans of General Arias, to Cambelén, a country-place a few miles without the capital where the President was then residing, President Jiménez ordered their immediate arrest on the ground

that they were disloyal to himself, and had been guilty of venality in their official transactions. Immediately thereafter, the President sent for General Arias to come himself to Cambelén to an interview. General Arias, learning of the arrest of his followers and believing that the summons portended the President's decision to order his own arrest, proceeded immediately to the Fortress, and learning there that instructions had been sent by the President to refuse him entrance, forced his way through the guards at the point of a revolver, took command of the Fortress, and announced his refusal to obey the instructions of the President of the Republic. While Arias at this time asserted that he was not in rebellion against the President, and had taken this step solely to preserve order and as a means of self-protection, his subsequent acts constituted even more flagrant evidence of rebellion against the authority of the Chief Executive. It was also evident that his authority and not that of the President would be obeyed by the major portion of the armed forces of the Government.

For some ten days the situation continued without material change. President Jiménez, ill and discouraged, and temperamentally unable to meet the demands of the situation, was only dissuaded from resigning immediately by the efforts of the American Minister and by the arguments of those members of his Cabinet who remained loyal to him.

On May 1st, the long-threatened resolution of impeachment was passed by the Congress. President Jiménez was impeached by the House of Deputies "for violations of the Constitution and laws," and two days later his impeachment was approved by the Dominican Senate. The control of General Arias within the capital was absolute and the President, unable to enter the city, was forced to remain

at Cambelén surrounded by a small body of troops still loyal to him. Required by the Senate to appear before it to reply to the resolutions of impeachment, the President was induced by his advisers to refuse to comply with this demand on the ground that the proceedings were illegal, inasmuch as a quorum had only been obtained in the lower House through the intimidation exercised by General Arias, who had surrounded with his armed forces the building in which the Deputies assembled. Simultaneously, the President issued a proclamation to the people in which he charged General Arias with treason and issued an order dismissing him from the Cabinet and his leading supporters from the positions which they occupied.

The President, thereupon, gathering together what forces he could muster, advanced a few miles towards the capital and established himself at the suburb of San Jerónimo, whence he sent envoys to demand the immediate surrender of the capital by the revolutionary troops. Secretary Lansing at once instructed the American Minister to notify all factions that the President would be supported by the Government of the United States, and in complying with this instruction the American Minister insisted that President Jiménez request the assistance of the forces of American marines, which had arrived in considerable numbers on the U.S.S. *Prairie* and on the U.S.S. *Castine*, in order to capture the city. President Jiménez, according to the official reports of the American Minister, at first was willing to request this assistance. Subsequently, however, his position was modified to requesting that a sufficient amount of rifles and ammunition be loaned by the American military authorities to replenish the supplies in the possession of his troops which were practically exhausted. This request was, however, denied, the

DON JUAN ISIDRO JIMÉNEZ

American Minister insisting that the President confine himself to asking for the armed support of the American forces.

As soon as fighting had broken out between the two contending parties, American marines were landed, nominally for the protection of the American Legation, the Receivership General, and the foreigners within the capital who had been massed together in the Haitian Legation. Additional American warships were at once despatched to Puerto Plata, Macorís and Sánchez. Recognizing his inability to capture the capital without the assistance of the American forces, constantly being landed in increasing numbers, for which he refused to ask, the President determined at last to resign. The influence of the members of his family was strongly exerted towards this end, and President Jiménez had neither the inclination nor the will to overcome the crisis in which he was inextricably involved. On the 7th of May, in a proclamation addressed to the nation, he announced his resignation:

"In my proclamation to my fellow-citizens of two days since, I solemnly declared that I held the sorrowful conviction that an armed encounter between my forces, those who are upholding the Constitution, and those which occupy the rebel stronghold of the Capital of Santo Domingo would inevitably bring as a result the humiliation of a North American intervention.

"In effect, the American Commission which came entrusted by its Government with the support of that legitimately constituted government which perishes today under the black wave of the most futile disloyalty, expressed formally its determination of supporting me by force and of opening a way for the Constitutional Government through the walls of the Capital.

"The spirit of the rebels was deaf to the urgent requirements of true and authentic patriotism, not to that patriotism which declaims its hypocritical phrases through the streets and plazas to mask shady political projects, but to that patriotism which prefers a sacrifice to the dishonor of that power which controls the clear serenity of conscience, and since the authors of the coup d'état of the 14th of April were disposed to destroy the Nation rather than renounce their febrile lust for power, the President of the Republic was forced to select one of two alternatives: either to return to the Presidential Mansion among ruins to enjoy a power regained for him by foreign bullets, or his own immolation.

"I have not vacillated a single instant, and with the whole country at my side excepting that treasonable portion of the army which occupies Santo Domingo and Puerto Plata, with more than 1500 men besieging the rebel stronghold who are both valiant and filled with martial enthusiasm, I descend the steps of the Capitol, and with my conscience serene with the conviction of duty accomplished, feeling in the twilight that the sun shines upon my gray hairs, I withdraw to the serenity of a tranquil home."

7.

As soon as the President's resignation was known within the capital the Congress refused to accept it. The ground for this refusal was stated to be the fact that it had been addressed to the nation and not, according to constitutional procedure, to the Congress itself, and the Congress resorted to the empty gesture of asserting the Presidency to be vacant. Several hundreds of United States marines had by now been stationed just without the Dominican capital and announcement had been made by the officers commanding them that "any hostile act against the Ameri-

can forces will determine a grave response from the said troops." The President of the Senate, Don Mario Fermín Cabral, and Don Luis Bernal, President of the House of Deputies, addressed the following cable to President Wilson:

"The transport *Prairie* has arrived with troops, but the Dominican people have confidence that these troops will not be used by any means to interfere with the free action of our institutions. The Legislative Power of this country is responsive to the needs of the whole country and claims full responsibility for its institutions and laws."

Notwithstanding this and similar protests, the number of the United States marines landed was still further increased on May 13th with the arrival of Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton on the U.S.S. *Dolphin*.

On May 7th, the American Minister was granted by Secretary Lansing full liberty to determine whatever action should be taken and, in particular, the disposition to be made of the American marines which by now controlled access to the capital from the north and west. The American Minister, in accordance with this authority, decided to force recognition in the Republic of the Council of Ministers—composed of those members of the Cabinet who had remained loyal to Jiménez—which, according to the Constitution, held the supreme Executive power until a new President should be elected; and as the first step towards this end determined to dislodge by force the troops commanded by Arias from the capital. On May 13th, Admiral Caperton delivered an ultimatum to General Arias signed both by the American Minister and himself in which General Arias was informed that "in view of the publicly announced policy of the United States of

America to support, by force if necessary, the present constituted authority of the Republic," should the rebel forces within the capital not surrender and turn over their arms and ammunition to the United States forces by six o'clock upon the morning of May 15th, the American troops would occupy the city and forcibly disarm the revolutionists.

The night after this ultimatum was received, General Arias abandoned the capital, taking with him his troops and a number of prisoners released from the prisons in Santo Domingo, together with such arms and ammunition as they could carry, and proceeded across the Ozama River towards the interior of the Republic. The morning following, the American troops quietly entered the capital, where a military occupation was instituted which was made known to the citizens by Admiral Caperton in the following proclamation:

"1. Owing to the conditions that have existed in and around this City in consequence of the fact that rebels in arms have taken possession of the City, excluding therefrom the Constitutional officials of the Government, and after all means to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the situation had been exhausted, it became necessary to have the City occupied by forces of the United States of America.

"2. Notice is hereby given to the citizens of Santo Domingo that the forces of the United States of America have assumed control of this City.

"3. All the inhabitants are requested to stay in the City and coöperate with me and my representatives in protecting life and property and maintaining order.

"4. All public officials are asked to remain at their posts and coöperate with me," etc.

Notwithst[illegible]at even among his warmest supporte[illegible]n greatly discredited by the pusillar[illegible] which he had fled, without striking [illegible] shot, at a moment when the forces un[illegible]thin the capital were greatly superior j[illegible]e forces of American marines, which [illegible]e outside not more than six or seven [illegible]ollowers in the Congress were still deter[illegible]ce his election as President of the Republic. [illegible]ess remained in session, and while it was uncer[illegible]ther a quorum could be obtained, owing to the [illegible]ined opposition of the members of the Horacista [illegible]y to proceedings which might result in the election of [illegible]ias as President, the chances appeared favourable that Arias would in the end be elected. The American Minister, still permitted entire latitude by Secretary Lansing in determining the course to be pursued, at this most crucial moment determined to postpone the election by the Congress of a Provisional President until he could be assured that some candidate other than Arias would be elected, and, in especial, one disposed to adopt the measures demanded by the United States Government providing for the administrative control of the United States over the Dominican Republic. The American Minister informed Secretary Lansing that in view of the presence in the Republic of American military forces the position of the United States was favourable "for ultimately obtaining the permanent reforms under negotiation since last October." [1]

The leaders of all parties in the Congress refused, however, to agree to the pressing intimations made by the American Minister that the election of a Provisional

[1] Mr. W. W. Russell, American Minister, to Secretary Lansing, May 7, 1916.

President be postponed. The followers of Arias were finally willing, though, to agree to the election of a compromise candidate favourable to their chief, in order to obtain the quorum within the House of Deputies which the members of the Horacista party were not disposed to provide should the attempt still be continued to elect Arias himself. On May 17th, the House of Deputies passed the third reading of a resolution providing for the election as Provisional President of Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, President of the Supreme Court, a candidate known to be favourably regarded by General Arias, whose selection was acquiesced in, although reluctantly, by General Vasquez. On May 23rd, notwithstanding the continued protest of the American Minister, the Senate passed the first reading confirming this resolution of the House of Deputies. Throughout this period, General Arias with his troops had remained approximately twelve miles from the capital pending the result of the final decision of the two Chambers of the Congress. When it became evident that no election would be immediately forthcoming, General Arias proceeded north to Santiago, where armed engagements between the revolutionists and the forces loyal to the Government continued to take place.

In pursuit of the policy upon which they had determined, the American Minister and Admiral Caperton had come to the conclusion that Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal should not be elected President by the Congress. The cause of this decision was the fact that in an interview which the two had had with Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, the latter had refused to enter into any pre-election commitment to grant to the United States Government the powers which its representatives were demanding. On June 2nd, the American Minister cabled to

the Department of State that the Senate would probably proceed to confirm the election of Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal unless his election were prevented by the American forces through the arrest of the Senators pledged to this election. The Minister requested instructions as to whether this course should be adopted, and, failing this, whether an election should be permitted were Arias and his supporters, as well as Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, to be eliminated as candidates. He recommended that the American forces, which had already occupied Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata, proceed inland to occupy Santiago, on the ground that that city was a stronghold of General Arias; and that, without waiting for the establishment of a Constitutional Government in the Republic, the Government of the United States should at once proceed to appoint a financial comptroller of the Dominican Government.

In reply to these recommendations, the American Minister was informed by Mr. Polk, at the time Acting Secretary of State, that the arrest of Dominican Senators by the American forces should not be undertaken, but that the United States Government would under no circumstances countenance the election of General Arias or of any one of his supporters, or even of Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, in view of the latter's refusal to acquiesce in the demands of the Department of State. Any candidate for the Presidency before he was approved by the American Minister was to provide assurance that he would enact the measures demanded by the United States Government, and was to be advised that the United States Government had determined to retain its forces within the Dominican territory until the "reforms" demanded by the American Government had been satisfactorily negotiated.

8.

In the meantime, the Council of Ministers, dominated by Velasquez, had determined to force the issue, and on the night of June 4th arrested seven Senators and one Deputy on the pretext that they had openly opposed the legitimate Government. While popular protest against this proceeding was so strong that the Council of Ministers soon released the prisoners, the action taken presumably hastened the determination of Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal to withdraw his candidacy, which he did in a public statement protesting energetically against the interference undertaken by the representatives of the United States Government in Dominican political affairs. On June 14th, the Senate, after a third reading, approved the election as Provisional President of Don Jacinto de Castro, who was at that time the most prominent follower of General Vasquez in the Horacista party. This action on the part of the Senate resulted in a deadlock which it was realized might continue indefinitely, since it was well known that the House of Deputies would not confirm the election of any member of the Horacista party.

While this deadlock continued, the American forces under the command of Admiral Caperton had undertaken a progressive occupation of the Republic. Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata had been occupied after armed opposition on the part of the inhabitants. The 4th Regiment of United States Marines, proceeding overland to Santiago from Monte Cristi, succeeded in reaching the city of Santiago on July 6th, only, however, after encountering stubborn resistance along the road of their march. Three American privates had been killed, thirteen had been wounded, and two of the officers in command had like-

wise been wounded. Upon the occupation of Santiago, General Arias surrendered to the Governor of that city. The American Minister and Admiral Caperton decided, however, to proceed further with the occupation of the Republic. A new proclamation was addressed to the Dominican people by the Admiral announcing his intention of occupying the important inland cities of Moca and La Vega as well. He stated that this action was undertaken inasmuch as the forces of the United States had entered the Dominican Republic "for the purpose of supporting the constituted authorities and to put a stop to revolutions and to consequent disorders detrimental to the ordered progress and prosperity of the country," and inasmuch as cities were "in the possession of, or menaced by, a considerable force of revolutionists against the constituted Government." This further declaration was likewise made:

"It is not the intention of the United States Government to acquire by conquest any territory in the Dominican Republic nor to attack its sovereignty, but our troops will remain here until all revolutionary movements have been stamped out and until such reforms as are deemed necessary to insure the future welfare of the country have been initiated and are in effective operation."

The Congress, whose sessions expired by constitutional limitation on July 26th, determined at last to end the deadlock. The party leaders after prolonged negotiation, putting to one side all factional feeling rather than permit the indefinite control of the Council of Ministers to continue after the termination of the sessions of Congress, proceeded with common accord to elect Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, the brother of Dr. Federico Hen-

riquez y Carvajal, Provisional President for a period of five months.

In a telegram signed by General Vasquez, Don Federico Velasquez, Don Jaime Mota, General Vidal, and Don Elias Brache, in representation of all the political groups then existing within the Republic, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal was advised of his election and urged to proceed immediately to the Republic. The long postponement in the election of a Provisional President, due to the demand of the American representatives, and to their insistence that no candidate be selected until he had manifested his willingness to agree to the requirements of the Government of the United States, thus proved utterly futile, since the very absence of the President-elect from the Republic made it impossible to attempt to gain his acquiescence in the demands formulated. Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, since the days of his association with President Jiménez in the latter's first Government, had, unlike his brother, Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, remained entirely aloof from Dominican party politics. Although his sympathies continued with the Jimenista party, he had had no connection with the recent developments under the last Jiménez Government, and had in fact been absent from the Dominican Republic for the greater portion of the preceding twelve years. At the time he was summoned to the Provisional Presidency he was living in Santiago de Cuba, where he had long since established his residence. It would have therefore been manifestly impossible for the American Minister to obtain any pre-election promises from Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal even had the Minister been advised before his election of the determination to select him as a candidate.

Confronted, therefore, with an accomplished fact, in

that Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal proceeded immediately to Santo Domingo after his election and was promptly inaugurated on July 31st, the American Minister was in a quandary as to what course to pursue. He determined, with the approval of the Department of State, to adopt the policy of withholding recognition from the newly elected Provisional President until it could be definitely ascertained whether the latter would meet the demands of the United States Government.

Necessarily, the question of recognition by the United States was of the most vital importance to the Dominican Government. The withholding of recognition, it could not be ignored, implied that that portion of the customs revenues collected by the American Receiver General and due the Dominican Government for budgetary expenses, would be withheld by order of the United States. Such action, it would have been assumed, could only have been taken were the United States Government to withhold recognition of a Dominican Government on the ground that it was not the constitutional nor the legitimate Government of the Dominican Republic. In the present instance, however, there was no apparent reason to believe that Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal was not the Constitutional Executive of the nation, inasmuch as he had been elected by a constitutionally elected Congress in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The American Minister raised the question, however, that while Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal had been elected by the Congress in Constitutional session, he had taken the oath of office before the Congress after its ordinary session had terminated. The Provisional President was consequently promptly informed that his Government would not be recognized by the United States until he acquiesced in the interpretation of

the Convention of 1907 laid down by the Government of the United States, by which control of Dominican finances, control of a Dominican constabulary, and the other additional measures of control contained in the American Minister's note to the Dominican Government of the preceding autumn, would be vested in the Government of the United States.

During the two months preceding the election of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, the Government of the United States had clearly made rapid strides towards accomplishing its ends. The American Minister, on June 5th, had officially informed the Council of Ministers of the determination of his Government to enforce its interpretation of the third article of the Customs Convention, and of its decision to proceed immediately to establish its control over all the finances of the Dominican Government, and that he had consequently instructed the Receiver General to undertake temporarily the duties so involved. Notwithstanding the formal protest of all the members of the Council of Ministers, the American Minister, on June 16th, further notified the Government that the Receivership General had upon the latter date assumed the responsibility of collecting all the revenues of the Dominican Republic, internal revenues as well as customs, and had likewise commenced to act as the disbursing agency for the Dominican Government. When it was seen that further protests were useless, the Secretary of Hacienda resigned.

When the American Minister ascertained that the new Provisional President manifested no disposition to concede meekly the demands of the American Government, the General Receiver of Customs was directed to suspend at once all disbursements of Dominican funds. As a result

the entire machinery of the Dominican Government was immediately paralyzed, and Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal was at once brought to realize that should he refuse to adopt the measures proposed, his continuance in office would necessarily be limited. That the concept held by the American Minister of the powers to be procured by the United States Government was even broader than that which the Department of State itself had gradually evolved, becomes evident from the report sent on August 18th by the American Minister to his Government of the action which he had taken and of the reasons which had caused it:

"I have advised General Receiver to suspend at once all disbursements of Dominican funds until a complete understanding is reached in regard to interpretation of certain articles of the Convention or until this Government is amicable. I deem this measure necessary in order to show seriousness of our intention. . . As we are to insist on our interpretation of the Convention as to control and constabulary, it is advisable to formulate all other reforms we consider necessary other than those outlined in your instruction of September 17, 1915, as well as some proposal in regard to Samaná Bay, and it is also absolutely essential to the progress of the Republic that some safe land title law be enacted."

9.

In the difficult path which stretched before him, the Provisional President was at least able to count upon the advice and support of some capable Cabinet Ministers. His brother, Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, was appointed by the President Minister of the Interior; Don Eladio Sánchez, a representative of the Velasquista party, and General Miguel Mascaró, a member of the Legalista

party, were entrusted respectively with the Portfolios of Agriculture and War. The remaining three Cabinet appointments were more notable. Don José Maria Cabral y Baez, a member of the Horacista party, an exceptionally able lawyer of Santiago, was the sole member of the new Cabinet who had previously held Cabinet office. Don Eliseo Espaillat, likewise a resident of Santiago, was a grandson of President Espaillat and possessed many of the qualities which had distinguished that noted Dominican patriot. To the Department of Hacienda, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal appointed Don Francisco J. Peynado, generally recognized as one of the most prominent citizens of the Republic and as an outstanding jurist, whose services as Minister in Washington had gained for him the regard and esteem of many prominent Americans and had likewise given him an unusual insight into and comprehension of American policy. The Cabinet represented all parties, and the members of it, during their brief tenure of office, were at all times unanimous in the determinations which were reached by the Government. The gravity of the situation was recognized by them all, and political advantage and factional disputes were disregarded.

The major problem which confronted the President in the demands which were daily being more strenuously pressed by the United States Government was by no means, however, the sole difficulty with which he had to contend. The act passed by the Dominican Congress by which Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal had been elected Provisional President of the Republic had contained the following two significant provisions:

"Article II. If the Constitutional Convention convoked by a decree of equal date should not have

completed its reforms to the Constitution within a period of five months, the Provisional President of the Republic is obligated upon the expiration of that period, counting from the date upon which he takes the Constitutional oath of office, to convoke the primary assemblies in order that these, at the end of thirty days, proceed to the election of new electoral colleges in order that these latter, having perfected their own election, may proceed upon the completion of an equal period to the election of a President of the Republic. In the event that the reforms to the Constitution should have been completed within the period of five months referred to, the Provisional President shall take action in all which concerns the electoral processes in accordance with the dictates of the said reforms and in accord with the final dispositions of the National Congress; or, if the new Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Convention should preserve the system of electoral colleges, the Provisional President shall convoke the primary assemblies in order to elect the electoral colleges within the period of thirty days immediately following the promulgation or the completion of the said Constitution.

"Article III. The acceptance by the individual entrusted with the Executive Power of the announcement of his candidacy for the definitive Presidency or for the Vice Presidency should the latter office be instituted, shall incapacitate him to continue in the exercise of his functions and such an acceptance on his part shall be considered as an irrevocable resignation which the National Assembly have full right to accept. If the contingency foreseen in this article should occur after the new Con-

stitution has been adopted, action upon such resignation shall be taken in the form which that Constitution may determine."

The obligations of the Provisional President were therefore clearly defined and explicit. Inasmuch as the terms of a portion of the Senators and a portion of the Deputies expired in the following autumn, it was necessary, therefore, for the elections referred to in the act above quoted to take place in sufficient time to permit the election of successors to these Senators and Deputies. It was at once evident that notwithstanding the accord maintained within the Cabinet by the representatives of the different political groups, such accord did not exist within the Constitutional Convention when it assembled. Although the presence of sixteen delegates was necessary to insure a quorum, only twelve members met, and day after day an adjournment was taken failing the quorum necessary to do business. The situation was still further complicated by the fact that the electoral colleges in several Provinces, unwilling to wait longer for the reform of the Constitution by the Constitutional Convention, and refusing to delay matters until a decree convoking elections had been promulgated by the Provisional President, met of their own volition and returned to Congress those supporters of General Arias whose terms expired December 1st. It was plain, therefore, that after November 30th, the legitimacy of any action taken by a Congress composed of the hold-over members and of the members elected in this fashion by the electoral colleges would be at once contested on the ground that the election of the latter had not been legal.

During the earlier weeks of his term of office, however, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal was forced to devote himself

almost exclusively to the attempt to compromise the requirements laid down by the Government of the United States. In this effort he availed himself of the able counsel of his Minister of Hacienda, Señor Peynado, who soon made himself conspicuous as the preponderant force within the Cabinet. In his first interview with the American Minister, when the latter was pressing upon him complete and immediate compliance with the demands of the United States Government, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal declared

"You may say to your Government that with the help of the United States I intend to establish a government of order that will guarantee the peace and prosperity of the country."

While the President and his Cabinet in view of the crucial situation were willing to meet the Government of the United States more than half way, they were nevertheless positive that popular opinion in the Republic would not sanction complete acquiescence, nor were they willing themselves to accept the conditions imposed, which in their own opinion constituted an irreparable violation of the nation's sovereignty. The American Minister now demanded official recognition by the Government of the authority of the Receiver General to collect and disburse all the funds of the Republic; that the national army be disbanded and a Dominican Constabulary be created in accordance with the plans drawn up by the Department of State; and finally, that the negotiation of a treaty be undertaken within a period of thirty days which should assure to the United States in contractual form all the powers, rights, and privileges which had previously and repeatedly been requested. These requirements, it was

stated by the Provisional Government, were clearly contrary to the Dominican Constitution.

Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the situation, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal expressed his willingness to meet the American demands in so far as he felt himself able to do so under the provisions of the Constitution. On August 25th, and again on September 14th, the Provisional President suggested compromises. Neither was acceptable to the Department of State, which instructed the American Minister to refuse to discuss any half measures. Finally, on September 30th, Secretary Lansing instructed the Minister to propose to the Provisional President that the following decrees drafted in the Department of State be promulgated as expressing concretely the measures demanded by the Government of the United States. The first of the decrees so suggested referred to the creation of a rural guard:

"*Article I.* For purposes of preserving the domestic peace, for the security of individual rights in the Dominican Republic, and for the better observance of the Convention of 1907 between the United States and the Dominican Republic, the rural guard of Santo Domingo shall constitute the sole military and police force of the Republic. It shall be placed under the control, and subject to the direction of the President of the Republic.

"*Article II.* Upon request of the President of the Republic, the President of the United States will submit to him for appointment the names of an American officer to command the rural guard and of an adequate number of American officers to aid such commandant in the organization and command of the guard.

"*Article III.* Such officers and enlisted men and such regulations as to pay, personnel, enlistment, appointment, discipline, etc., as the commandant may recommend shall

be duly authorized, ratified and promulgated by the Government of the Republic. Should an agreement fail to be reached regarding any question of the regulations provided in this article, such question shall be submitted to the President of the United States for decision.

"*Article IV.* The rural guard shall have the supervision and control of arms, ammunition, military supplies and traffic therein throughout the Republic.

"*Article V.* The reorganization of the rural guard as hereinbefore provided shall be commenced within one month of the promulgation of this decree."

The latter of the two decrees was merely a reassertion of the principal demands of the United States covering control of Dominican finances:

"*Article I.* The collection of internal revenues and revenues accruing to the Government from all other sources shall be placed under the General Receiver of Customs under the regulation at present in force governing the collection of customs duties.

"*Article II.* No payment from the revenues belonging to the Dominican Government shall be made by the General Receiver of Customs except by order of the Dominican Government in conformity with the budget law or other law of the Dominican Government."

All compromise of these requirements continued to be rejected by the American representatives, and the Provisional Government was informed officially by Secretary Lansing that it would not receive the recognition of the United States "unless financial control and establishment of the constabulary" were definitely assured and were made binding in the future.

10.

As the month of September progressed, conditions were still further complicated by incidents which were inevitable in view of the anomalous situation created by the presence within the Republic of large bodies of American troops which had undertaken, with no definite concerted plan, gradually to assume police functions. General Arias and his companion, General Mauricio Jiménez, had been arrested in Santiago by direction of the Procurator General of the Republic on the charge of robbing the public treasury. But in other instances which occurred with increasing frequency, arrests of Dominican citizens were made by armed patrols of the United States forces. In the attempt to arrest Ramón Batista in Villa Duarte, just across the Ozama River from Santo Domingo, the activities of the armed patrol resulted in an encounter in which two officers of the marines and various privates were killed and several Dominicans perished, among them several women and innocent bystanders. On October 26th, a marine patrol in the capital itself, alarmed by some shots fired in the air by a drunken roisterer, shot and killed several Dominicans in a café. Similar occurrences took place in other cities of the Republic. The efforts of the American officers to impose a censorship upon the Dominican press increased the constantly growing feeling of hostility, and the insolence and overbearing manner of a few officers in their dealings with Dominicans, including such prominent officials as governors of provinces, judges, and other civil authorities, provoked the utmost resentment. It is hardly surprising under the circumstances that by the end of October, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Cabral y Baez, advised the American Minister that the former gen-

eral feeling of friendliness towards Americans had changed to one of universal hostility among the Dominicans.

In the first days of November, the American Minister was suddenly recalled to Washington to communicate to the Secretary of State his recommendations as to the policy to be pursued. Knowing that the Minister had already informed his Government that in his opinion no Constitutional Congress would exist after the 30th of November for the reasons already detailed, the Provisional President made a final attempt to ward off the increasing dangers which he foresaw. With the agreement of the chiefs of all the political parties that it was imperative to forestall the possibility of American intervention in the Dominican Government itself, President Henriquez y Carvajal issued a decree on November 14th, convoking the electoral colleges to assemble upon the following December 3rd, to elect successors to the Senators and Deputies whose terms expired before the latter date. The moment had, however, already passed when remedial measures of that character were practicable.

While the decision of Secretary Lansing was pending as to the course he should recommend to President Wilson, the Dominican Minister in Washington, Señor Pérez Perdomo, was instructed by Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal to make a final urgent plea that some solution be adopted which would not imply the complete obliteration of Dominican sovereignty. Four points were emphasized in the communication so made: that the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic was entitled to receive recognition of the Government of the United States; that the withholding of payments of salaries for four months had resulted in a situation which affected all activities and had

resulted in the destitution of many Dominicans, and that the withholding of such funds by the Government of the United States was contrary to the provisions of the Convention of 1907; that the action so taken had been additionally unjust in that American employees of the Dominican Government had been paid while salaries had only been withheld from Dominican employees; finally, that notwithstanding the difficulties which had continuously confronted the Provisional Government it had always been ready to discuss upon reasonable terms with the Government of the United States an acceptable solution of the situation.

Small heed, however, was paid either to this communication or to protests received from other sources. The Secretary of State had determined that the only solution effective in result would be the radical solution contained in a military occupation of the Republic by the United States. In a communication addressed to President Wilson on November 22, 1916, Secretary Lansing enclosed a memorandum detailing the situation in the Dominican Republic, and declared that in his opinion the situation was fast approaching a crisis. Secretary Lansing stated to the President:

"We ought to determine immediately a course of action, as otherwise revolution and economic disaster are imminent."

Emphasizing, as a prime reason for the action which it was proposed to take, the fact that President Henriquez y Carvajal had issued a decree convoking the electoral colleges for the purpose of electing Senators and Deputies, it was stated in the Department's memorandum that the majority of the Senators and Deputies so elected would be

supporters of General Arias, thus giving Arias complete governmental control, even in the event of the election of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal as Constitutional President of the Republic. "This new phase of the situation" the memorandum continued,

"coupled with the fact that the Provisional Government will not meet the views of the United States in regard to the establishment of financial control and the constabulary, brings the Government of the United States face to face with a serious problem.

"The withholding of the funds by the United States Government on account of the fact that recognition has not been granted to Henriquez has brought an economic crisis in the country which is daily growing worse and for which this Government would not wish to be placed in such a position that it would be held responsible. . . It is thought that the only solution of the difficulty would be the declaration of martial law and placing of Santo Domingo under military occupation, basing this on the interpretation which the United States has given to the Dominican Convention of 1907 and also upon the present unsettled conditions in the Republic . . Captain Knapp . . is understood to have arrived today in Santo Domingo and it is believed that no time should be lost in instructing him to put into effect the proclamation declaring military control and to commence immediately the disbursement of funds under martial law."

With Secretary Lansing's communication to the President there was likewise enclosed a copy of the proclamation which it was proposed Captain Knapp should be authorized to issue. The proclamation contained the following clause:

"For malfeasance in office or for other proper and sufficient cause the military Government will remove any Dominican judge or other court official and will appoint his successor in office."

The immense upheaval which had resulted from the outbreak of the World War, the constantly increasing evidence that the United States might not be permitted to remain aloof, and the activities of his own electoral campaign, had made it increasingly difficult during the preceding year for President Wilson to devote much attention to the Dominican situation. The successive steps which had been taken during the summer months, while duly reported to him, had doubtless not impressed themselves upon him in their full gravity, since his mind had by now become engrossed with the European problem. On November 26, 1916, the President replied to Secretary Lansing's communication in the following terms:

"My dear Mr. Secretary:

"It is with the deepest reluctance that I approve and authorize the course here proposed, but I am convinced that it is the least of the evils in sight in this very perplexing situation. I therefore authorize you to issue the necessary instructions in the premises.

"I have stricken out the sentence in the proposed proclamation which authorized the commanding officer to remove judges and others in certain circumstances. It may be necessary to resort to such extreme measures, but I do not deem it wise to put so arbitrary an announcement in the proclamation itself."

"Faithfully yours,

"Woodrow Wilson."

On November 29th, Captain Knapp, from his flagship, the U.S.S. *Olympia*, in the port of Santo Domingo, issued the following proclamation as approved by President Wilson, which officially disregarded the existence of a Dominican Government established, in accordance with the Dominican Constitution, by the Dominican people, in the exercise of the rights inherent in them as a sovereign nation, a nation which had maintained its liberty and independence against every menace and against overwhelming odds during the preceding seventy-two years:

"Whereas, a treaty was concluded between the United States of America and the Republic of Santo Domingo on February 8, 1907, Article III of which reads:

> 'Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the basis of exportations and importations of the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that which it is desired to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rates of duties have been for each of such two years in excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold'; and

"Whereas, the Government of Santo Domingo has violated the said Article III on more than one occasion; and

"Whereas, the Government of Santo Domingo has from time to time explained such violation by the necessity of

incurring expenses incident to the repression of revolution; and

"Whereas, the United States Government, with great forbearance and with a friendly desire to enable Santo Domingo to maintain domestic tranquillity and observe the terms of the aforesaid treaty, has urged upon the Government of Santo Domingo certain necessary measures which that Government has been unwilling or unable to adopt; and

"Whereas, in consequence domestic tranquillity has been disturbed and is not now established, nor is the future observance of the treaty by the Government of Santo Domingo assured; and

"Whereas, the Government of the United States is determined that the time has come to take measures to insure the observance of the provisions of the aforesaid treaty by the Republic of Santo Domingo and to maintain the domestic tranquillity in the said Republic of Santo Domingo necessary thereto;

"Now, therefore, I, H. S. Knapp, Captain, United States Navy, commanding the Cruiser Force of the United States Atlantic Fleet, and the armed forces of the United States stationed in various places within the territory of the Republic of Santo Domingo, acting under the authority and by the direction of the Government of the United States, declare and announce to all concerned that the Republic of Santo Domingo is hereby placed in a state of Military Occupation by the forces under my command, and is made subject to Military Government and to the exercise of military law applicable to such occupation.

"This military occupation is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of Santo Domingo, but on the contrary, is designed to give aid to that country in returning to a

condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid, and the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations.

"Dominican statutes, therefore, will continue in effect in so far as they do not conflict with the objects of the Occupation or necessary regulations established thereunder, and their lawful administration will continue in the hands of such duly authorized Dominican officials as may be necessary, all under the oversight and control of the United States Forces exercising Military Government.

"The ordinary administration of justice, both in civil and criminal matters, through the regularly constituted Dominican courts will not be interfered with by the Military Government herein established; but cases to which a member of the United States Forces in Occupation is a party, or in which are involved contempt or defiance of the authority of the Military Government, will be tried by tribunals set up by the Military Government.

"All revenue accruing to the Dominican Government, including revenues hitherto accrued and unpaid—whether from customs duties under the terms of the Treaty concluded on February 8, 1907, the Receivership established by which remains in effect, or from internal revenue—shall be paid to the Military Government herein established, which will, in trust for the Republic of Santo Domingo, hold such revenue and will make all the proper legal disbursements therefrom necessary for the administration of the Dominican Government, and for the purposes of the Occupation.

"I call upon the citizens of, and residents and sojourners in, Santo Domingo to coöperate with the Forces of the United States in Occupation to the end that the purposes thereof may promptly be attained, and that the country may be restored to domestic order and tranquillity and to the prosperity that can be attained only under such conditions.

"The Forces of the United States in Occupation will act in accordance with military law, governing their conduct with due respect for the personal and property rights of citizens of, and residents and sojourners in, Santo Domingo, upholding Dominican laws in so far as they do not conflict with the purposes for which the Occupation is undertaken.

"H. S. KNAPP,
"Captain United States Navy, Commander
Cruiser Force, United States Atlantic Fleet.
"U.S.S. *Olympia,* Flagship,
"Santo Domingo City, R. D.
"November 29, 1916."

Five days later, the Dominican Minister in Washington, Don Armando Pérez Perdomo, filed his protest against the Occupation, framing it in words which are well worthy of remembrance:

. . . "A state of war which alone could have justified such a proceeding on the part of the Government of the United States toward the Dominican Republic has never existed between the two Nations.

"And therefore by acting as it has with the Dominican Republic, Your Excellency's Government plainly violated in the first place the fundamental principles of public international law which laid down as an invariable rule of public order for the nations the reciprocal respect of the sovereignty of each and every one of the other states of the civilized world, and in the second place, the principles which guide the doctrine of Pan-Americanism which hallow the inviolability of American nationalities; principles which may be said to have found their highest virtues in the many official declarations of the learned President of the United States."

CHAPTER XIV

A MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1.

IN the proclamation of occupation of November 29, 1916, the declaration was officially made by Captain Knapp that the Dominican Republic was placed "in a state of military occupation by the forces under my command and is made subject to military government and to the exercise of military law applicable to such occupation." No specific announcement was included in the proclamation that Dominicans holding office in the Executive or Legislative branches of the National Government would be removed from their positions, and no further action in that sense was at first taken beyond the prohibition contained in the first executive order issued by Captain Knapp on December 4th that Dominican citizens were ineligible to hold the Portfolios of the Interior and of War and Marine in the Dominican Cabinet. These two Cabinet positions were immediately entrusted to officers of the Marine Corps. Within a few days, however, the remaining members of the Henriquez y Carvajal Cabinet, refusing to serve in an American Military Government, were replaced by officers of either the American Navy or the United States Marine Corps. The Provisional President left Santo Domingo for Cuba on December 9th.

The extraordinary anomaly was thus presented in a brief ten days of the creation of a Government of the Dominican Republic, headed by an officer of the American Navy, with a cabinet composed of officers of the United States Navy or Marine Corps, none of whom had any knowledge or experience of Dominican affairs or problems, and the

great majority of whom could not even speak the language of the country. The fiction was maintained by the Department of State that this Government "was carrying on the Government for the Dominican Republic." To such a length was this pretense later pursued, that the Military Government, in assuming the functions of a legitimate Government, even sent and received diplomatic representatives. In one amusing instance, when the President of the United States was withholding recognition from a recently established Central American Government, the Military Governor of the Dominican Republic, ignorant of the fact, addressed a communication to the Chief of the Government in question, expressing his desire to enter into official relations with his "Great and Good Friend." This recognition, so cordially extended by the American Admiral, had later to be hastily withdrawn in response to urgent orders from Washington.

Payment of the salaries due the subordinate employees of the Dominican Government was made by the Military Government at once, but the overdue salaries of the Cabinet Ministers who had served under Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal were not paid, upon the ground that these officials had participated in a Government unrecognized by the United States. The Provisional President likewise had his salary refused him upon the same grounds, notwithstanding the request made of the Military Government by the Archbishop of Santo Domingo that the sums due Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal be advanced owing to the latter's financial embarrassments.

The Military Government at first conceded that those members of the Dominican Congress comprising the two-thirds elected during the Jiménez administration, who still had either two or four years to serve, held office legally,

declaring, however, that those who claimed their seats as the result of elections held during the Henriquez y Carvajal Provisional Government were not legally members of the Congress, since their election had taken place at a time when the Government which had convoked those elections had not been recognized by the United States. By a later executive order dated January 2, 1917, the Military Governor declared that no sessions of the Dominican Congress would be held until elections were had to fill the vacancies existing; that consequently the Senators and Deputies whose terms had not expired were suspended from office, and that until a full Congress were called into session the emoluments of such functionaries should cease.

Within six weeks after the date of the Occupation, therefore, the Government of the Dominican Republic had been transformed into a purely Military Government, responsible solely to the Government of the United States, and all Dominican officials, other than those pertaining to the judiciary, and such minor employees as continued to be employed in the executive departments, had either been suspended from office, removed by order of the Military Governor, or had resigned of their own volition.

The American Minister, who had been in Washington at the time the Military Occupation was proclaimed, was ordered to return to his post in Santo Domingo. By instruction of Secretary Lansing, the Minister was advised that the position of the Legation "should be practically the same as before the proclamation of military government," and he was likewise informed that "it should be understood that it is the civil representative of the American Government in Santo Domingo and will advise on all points with the Military Government, which is carrying

on the Government for the Republic." [1] In the first despatches sent by the Minister after his return to Santo Domingo the Department of State was informed that he was impressed with the manner in which the Dominican people had accepted the new order. According to him, "Disappointed petty politicians are the only people dissatisfied." His recommendations as to the plan of procedure are worthy of quotation at some length, inasmuch as the policy determined upon by Secretary Lansing was necessarily influenced to a considerable degree by these recommendations. Mr. Russell stated:

"I am convinced that the present Military Government or a *de facto* government with an American Governor supported by the military should go right ahead for a year at least, working out complete reforms necessary with the voluntary aid of patriotic Dominicans. At the end of this time, if it has been shown that the country is in a position to have a *de facto* government presided over by a junta of the best native element, then this could be done, and, after a period of control for this junta, the country should be ready for elections, then proceed with elections for President. There is nothing to fear from this program above outlined for it is what the country needs and expects . . . Censorship of the press has produced excellent effect and should be continued for a while at least." [2]

In a further series of recommendations addressed to the Department approximately a month later, the Minister reported:

". . . conditions here are growing better daily. The people have accepted the Military Government with remark-

[1] Secretary Lansing to Minister Russell, December 20, 1916.
[2] Minister Russell to Secretary Lansing, December 14, 1916.

ably good grace, and throughout the Republic a feeling of security obtains not experienced for some time . . The reforms to be instituted are many, and constant and careful study of the problem is necessary. The Military Government will have to continue for a considerable time before the country will be in a position for a *de facto* government of its own." [1]

As the months passed by and the United States entered the World War, the interest displayed in the status of the Dominican Republic by the Department of State was greatly lessened. The attention of the American Government was concentrated almost exclusively upon the struggle in Europe. Consequently, as time went on, the Department of State modified very materially its original insistence that questions of policy be submitted to it for its approval before action was taken by the military authorities, and, with but nominal supervision from Washington, the Military Governor reigned supreme.

2.

Under these circumstances, it was fortunate that the choice for Military Governor in Santo Domingo had fallen upon Captain, later Rear-Admiral, Harry S. Knapp. Admiral Knapp, who possessed a record of most distinguished service in the United States Navy, united several essential qualifications for the difficult task entrusted to him. The policy which had determined the occupation was a matter with which, he realized, he was not primarily concerned. Like many other American Naval officers who had been entrusted with the execution of projects determined upon by Presidents of the United

[1] Minister Russell to Secretary Lansing, January 5, 1917.

States or the Department of State, he considered himself merely an instrument to carry out the orders given him, and to carry them out to the best of his ability, regardless of whether or not he coincided in the wisdom of the policy which had determined them. Admiral Knapp possessed an essentially judicial mind. He early reached the conclusion that while respect for the Military Government must be enforced, were it to function at all, the Occupation should at the same time avoid, so far as possible, not only unnecessary harshness, but likewise needless offense to Dominican feeling, in order to obtain Dominican coöperation with the Military Government in its administrative program. As Admiral Knapp informed the Archbishop of Santo Domingo in an interview which took place soon after the establishment of the Military Government, his attitude was that of a friend, desirous of assisting the Dominicans, who intended to conduct the Military Government with as great respect for Dominican susceptibilities as might be possible, although the accomplishment of this purpose would necessarily rest largely upon the attitude of the Dominican people themselves. In the opinion of Admiral Knapp, since the Occupation had been undertaken, so long as it continued the Military Government should seek to accomplish so much as might be possible for the benefit of the Dominican people, without running counter to local prejudice, and without rendering impossible, through unnecessary harshness, an ultimate regeneration of friendly feeling between the Dominican and American peoples.

The prime requisite, as Admiral Knapp saw it, was the definite pacification of the Republic. Once this had been accomplished, the attention of the Military Governor might be turned to the adjustment of the financial condition of the Dominican Government, which it will be

recalled had been steadily deteriorating since the days of the administration of President Cáceres; and later towards the continuation of the public works program which had been largely paralyzed since the same date; to the promotion of education; to the foundation of a much needed Department of Sanitation; and to the stimulation of agriculture upon which, in his opinion, the future material prosperity of the Republic depended.

With characteristic energy, the Military Governor devoted himself immediately to the accomplishment of the first general objective.

3.

Since the initial resistance encountered by the Forces of Occupation in the summer of 1916, a state of tranquillity had become general in the northern and southern Provinces, as well as in the provinces adjacent to the capital. It is true that slight disturbances occurred in San Francisco de Macorís, Salcedo, and Azua, but these disturbances were but trifling in character and were rapidly quelled by the American authorities. The conditions obtaining in the eastern Province of San Pedro de Macorís, where many of the more important sugar plantations are located, and more particularly in the neighbouring province of the Seybo, were, however, distinct.

The orders issued by the Military Government for the confiscation of arms and ammunition, and for the disarmament of all save those who had obtained special permits, had been carried out satisfactorily and with despatch except in the two latter Provinces. Here, due in part to the suppression by the Military Government of the system which had previously prevailed whereby local chieftains had been bribed to maintain order, a species of banditry

had arisen with which the military authorities found it increasingly difficult to contend. These eastern districts, while potentially among the most fertile of the Republic, are sparsely settled. Over a great portion of the uncultivated part of Seybo Province there spreads a thick growth of forest and brush in which the "gavilleros," as the bandits were colloquially termed, found it easy to take refuge, with the constantly increasing numbers of their followers, after their raiding forays, and thus to elude the detachments of marines sent in their pursuit. The marines and their commanding officers, unfamiliar with the country, unable to speak Spanish, unable to elicit from the inhabitants of the Province any information which would make it possible for them to learn the whereabouts of the marauders, confronted a condition of affairs with which it was difficult for them to cope. As time went on and conditions deteriorated rather than improved, the tempers of both officers and men became exacerbated. This is the sole explanation which can be found for the fact that whereas the Military Government adopted in general throughout the rest of the Republic a policy of conciliation which at first proved notably successful, in the Provinces of San Pedro de Macorís and of the Seybo the reverse should have been the case. It must also be recalled that with the entrance of the United States into the World War the United States Marines were the first American troops to be despatched to France. All available officers were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic to serve in Europe, and the resulting vacancies in the lower ranks were filled with non-commissioned officers, unaccustomed, and in many instances unfitted, to undertake commands of this nature.

It is perhaps inevitable, granted the establishment of

martial law and the military occupation of a country of which the inhabitants are alien to the occupying troops in language, origin, and customs, that friction should ensue, misunderstanding result, and in isolated instances cruelties be perpetrated. But it was certainly unavoidable in an experiment such as the Dominican Occupation, when many of the American officers had received their commissions solely through emergency, and where the inhabitants of the occupied country constituted a virile race, accustomed to liberty and, except in the larger cities, unused to more than nominal restraint.

Such scattered cases of injustice or maltreatment of civilians as took place in the northern, central and southern Provinces of the Dominican Republic, were diminished in their effect by the general recognition of the sincerity with which Admiral Knapp and the majority of the higher ranking officers in the capital, and among these notably Brigadier General Rufus H. Lane, desired to carry out a policy of friendly conciliation in dealing with the inhabitants of the Republic. It was in the two eastern Provinces, which were difficult of access to the Military Governor himself, that a policy of harsh intimidation was pursued which completely destroyed all hope of winning the confidence of the inhabitants of those Provinces, and which resulted not only in thwarting the achievement of the main objectives sought by the Military Governor, but also in stimulating and accelerating the very disturbances which the Military Government had determined to put down. It is as the result of the policy pursued in the eastern Provinces that the great majority of the atrocities charged against the Forces of Occupation occurred, and that for a period of more than two years the inhabitants of the Seybo and of a portion of the Province of the San

Pedro de Macorís suffered a reign of terror due alike to the operations of the American forces and to the frequent raids of the "gavillero" chieftains.

Of the multitude of accusations preferred against the conduct of the American marines in the eastern Dominican Provinces, it may be presumed that many were unfounded and many exaggerated, and that many were eventually presented by professional agitators or by individuals who had, rightly or wrongly, conceived some grudge against particular officers of the Forces of Occupation. It may on the other hand be surmised with equal justice that many of the charges originally brought, which were dismissed as "not proven" by the courts-martial to which they were presented, were thus determined owing to the reluctance of competent witnesses to testify, through fear that their testimony might bring upon them the enmity of the officers and marines established in their districts. While it is therefore difficult to reach any definite conclusion as to the actual extent and number of the more flagrant outrages perpetrated, it is a fact that a policy of repression was carried out by the Forces of Occupation over a protracted period in the eastern Provinces of the Dominican Republic which was inherently unwise, which reacted primarily upon peaceful civilians, and as the result of which many atrocities were undoubtedly committed.

That the nature of such acts may be recognized, the following instances may be quoted, presented, in the form of testimony, to the Select Committee of the United States Senate under the chairmanship of Senator Medill McCormick, of Illinois, which proceeded to Santo Domingo in 1921, pursuant to a Senate resolution, to obtain information as to the manner in which the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic had been conducted. The

accuracy of a portion of this testimony is challenged in the record of the proceedings of the Boards of Investigation appointed by the Military Government to consider the charges involved, as may be seen from the summary of the proceedings included in the Appendix. Among the Dominicans themselves however, including those of the highest standing and repute, these instances are regarded as only a few of many established beyond doubt, and since the cases quoted are incorporated in the printed hearings of the Senate Committee, they may therefore be considered worthy of consideration:

Statement of Dr. Alejandro Coradín,
of Hato Mayor.

Dr. Coradín:

"On the 22nd of June, 1917, I saw an old man dragged, tied to the tail of a horse—an old man by the name of José Maria Rincón—by an officer by the name of ——— . . This man was tortured in such a manner because he carried a prescription to a drug store in which sulphur and lard were mentioned. This was for some skin disease, and the doctors of the forces stated that it was for dressing wounds, and that was sufficient reason to have what I have just stated done to him. After that he was shot, and after being shot he was hanged from a tree."

Senator McCormick:

"Did you see him shot?"

Dr. Coradín:

"I saw it and I saw him hanging from a tree."

. . . . . .

Dr. Coradín:

"On the 24th of August, 1918, Cipriano Alarcón was killed by Captain ———. All that I state here I saw. Mr. Alarcón was seated at his door; and Cap-

tain ——— and Major ———, under the orders of Colonel ———, had concentrated all the peasants in town. There were about 2,000 persons in the public square when a shot was heard and Mr. Alarcón, who was under the influence of liquor, appeared to have made some remarks that offended Captain ——— . . Captain ——— took him by the left arm and took him to a corner of the house, drew his revolver, and shot him in the left ear. I saw this because I live in front of the house. The Captain sent for the Chief of Police and me in order that I might render my services as a doctor in the case, to which I replied that I could not as the man was in a dying state."

Statement of Pedro Hernandez Rivera of Hato Mayor.

Mr. Hernandez Rivera:

"I was taken prisoner by the Forces of Occupation under the command of Captain ——— who was in charge of that district. A rope was put around my neck, my hands tied, and I was taken to the country about four or five kilometers from town on foot and had to keep up with a horse trotting . . and when in the country I was tied by the feet, placed on my back with my face to the sun, and with a funnel water was poured into my mouth from a demijohn. I was in that state for about three or four days. . . About three or four days after, I was released as there was nothing against me."

Senator McCormick:

"There was no charge made against you?"

Mr. Hernandez Rivera:

"I was confounded or mistaken for a man by the name of Pedro Rivera."

Statement of Jesús M. Vasquez, Chief of Municipal Police in Hato Mayor from 1915 to 1919.

Mr. Vasquez:

"On the 14th of April, 1918, Captain ——— and eight marines came out and took Agapito José prisoner. After having taken him prisoner they took him out of town tied. Three days after, they returned to town with him . . They went to the camp at twenty minutes past eight that night, a group of six marines went out with him, with Major ——— and Captain ——— armed with carbines and rifles, and at about fifteen meters from the camp in the center of the town a volley was fired at Agapito who was killed instantly. The Major ——— took a dagger and driving it in his throat slashed him down to the abdomen, from the neck to the abdomen. Major ——— called me immediately to take away the body and I and two policemen took it away and went to bury it wrapped in a blanket. He told me that he had killed that man."

Senator Pomerene:

"Can you give the names of any other witnesses to this killing?"

Mr. Vasquez:

"Yes; Regla Mota . . " and "Felipe Meris Pacheco." [1]

It should be stated in connection with the citation of these cases, that long prior to the presentation of this testimony to the Senate Committee, the arrest of the officer responsible for many of the most revolting acts of barbarism charged against the Forces of Occupation in the eastern Dominican Provinces had been ordered by the

[1] Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, United States Senate, Pursuant to S. Res. 112, Part 3, pp. 1117-1141.

Military Governor, and that the officer in question had committed suicide before his trial. So far as it was able, the Military Government punished with the utmost severity all officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates, proved to its own satisfaction to have been guilty of offenses against Dominican citizens. It is, however, very plain that no matter how stern may have been the retribution exacted by the Military Government from subordinates guilty of crimes of this character, the retribution so exacted could not obliterate the memory of the acts committed. A feeling of bitter hostility among the inhabitants of the Seybo and of San Pedro de Macorís was engendered against the Military Government, and against the people of the United States, which will undoubtedly continue for many years.

4.

Coincident with the task of pacification and disarmament, the Military Government at once undertook to pave the way for the future maintenance of order by a Dominican force, and commenced the organization of a Guardia Nacional, or National Constabulary. While no great difficulty was encountered in recruiting the number of privates required, it was found almost impossible, from the outset, to persuade Dominicans of the necessary education and standing in the community to serve as officers in this force under the Military Government. The Guardia Nacional, or Policía Nacional Dominicana, as it was later called, was consequently officered from the outset by American officers, although a few Dominican officers were from time to time obtained, and after a period of training were commissioned lieutenants in the Guardia.

During the first months of the Occupation, the Military Governor devoted considerable effort to improve the status of the Dominican treasury. So successful was he in his endeavour that, notwithstanding the material inroads occasioned by the determination of the Military Government, immediately after its establishment, to resume payments in general, the Military Government was administered not only within the national income, but considerable savings were effected which it was determined should be devoted to education, sanitation and public works.

In accordance with his determination to utilize so far as might be possible Dominican counsel in carrying out projects for the betterment of the conditions of life of the Dominican people, Admiral Knapp had early appointed a committee of Dominican citizens under the chairmanship of Monseñor Nouel to frame a report embodying their recommendations as to the immediate steps to be taken in improving the existing system of public education. These recommendations, when they were finally received by the Military Governor, played a determining part in the educational reforms decreed. At the same time, agricultural experts were obtained to travel through the farming regions to encourage the Dominican farmers to raise more varied crops, and experts were likewise engaged to formulate plans for the establishment of a system of sanitary control. Public works projects were immediately undertaken, and a system of audit and control of public expenditures, not only in the Public Works Department, where it was most needed, but in all the Governmental bureaus and agencies, was inaugurated.

While proceeding to carry out this general reconstruction program with as much efficiency and despatch as local conditions and the state of the Dominican treasury made

possible, Admiral Knapp undertook at the same time to dispose of three major problems which he considered of urgent importance. The first was the liquidation of the outstanding claims against the Dominican Government; the second was a much needed survey of the country to establish the legitimacy of land titles; and the third, the establishment of a Dominican Civil Service covering the Executive departments of the Government. The last mentioned object was partly attained by the establishment in the autumn of 1917 of civil service rules covering certain categories of governmental employees. These employees were later reclassified and brought under the direct control of a Civil Service Commission.

To solve the problem created by the fact that the total volume of claims and other alleged obligations of the Dominican Government existing at the time the Military Government was established amounted to approximately $12,000,000, of which total it was well known a large percentage consisted either of fraudulent claims or unproven obligations, by Executive decrees dated June 26 and July 9, 1917, a Dominican Claims Commission was appointed, to have complete and final jurisdiction as a Dominican Governmental agency in adjudicating claims against the Dominican Government. It was provided that the decisions of this Commission should not be subject to review or appeal before any other Dominican authority. The Commission so appointed was composed of Mr. J. H. Edwards, Lt. Col. Bootes of the United States Marine Corps, two Dominican citizens of distinction and recognized standing, Don Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha and Don Emilio Joubert, and Don Martín Travieso, a Puerto Rican lawyer of prominence. The findings of the Commission, which continued in session for a

number of years, resulted in scaling down the floating indebtedness of the Dominican Republic from the figure of $12,000,000 at which this indebtedness had originally been appraised, to an amount of approximately $3,500,000, which was discharged from the proceeds of a bond issue of $5,000,000 five per cent twenty-year bonds which the Military Government was authorized in 1918 by the Government of the United States to issue on behalf of the Dominican Republic.

The land survey considered so essential by the first Military Governor, and the subsequent adjustment and recording of land titles, involved formidable difficulties. Inasmuch as the Dominican Republic was composed of territory originally pertaining to the Spanish Crown as a Crown Colony, the original titles to land within the Republic had consisted of grants issued in the name of the Spanish monarch. Such grants had been drawn in the most general fashion, had been inaccurate as regards distinguishing marks, and no efficient system of transfer or recording had ever been adopted. Under the successive occupations of Dominican territory by France and Haiti, as well as under the last Spanish Occupation, previous records had been frequently destroyed or set aside, and a chaotic situation had resulted. The Dominican Congress had passed legislation upon two occasions requiring the registration of titles to rural lands, but such enactments had in practice been disregarded. A further complication had ensued from the communal lands system prevailing in the case of the inheritance by a number of heirs of an undivided tract. In such cases a money value was customarily set upon the entire tract, each heir being granted a title representing his share in money of the total value of the property, such titles being known as "acciones" or

"peso titles." The sale of such titles without specification of the physical portion of the property thus sold increased the general confusion. Appreciating the necessity to the Republic of clarifying the situation which thus existed, Executive Orders were finally decreed by the Military Governor which provided for the establishment of a Land Court. This court succeeded during the period of Occupation in recording the titles to a considerable portion of the real property of the Republic.

5.

The first year of the Military Occupation resulted in the accomplishment of much constructive work. During the years that followed this record was only more or less maintained, but in so far as the promotion of the material welfare of the Dominican people was concerned, the Military Government functioned along the lines of a modern progressive administration.

The most notable benefits were perhaps obtained in the two spheres of public instruction and of public works construction.

Prior to the Occupation, primary education had been exclusively confined to the larger towns. Few rural schools existed. It was estimated that not more than 18,000 pupils were receiving primary instruction and that of these the average attendance did not amount to more than 40 per cent. Normal schools existed, but the educational advantages offered in them were inferior. To correct this condition, which resulted from the lack of efficient administration on the part of the National Government, from the fact that politics entered into the appointment of instructors and educational inspectors, and from the fact that the disturbed condition of the country frequently

prevented attendance of the pupils in the schools, as well as from the fact that the public instruction budget was consistently in arrears, the Military Government undertook, in accordance with the recommendations of the Dominican Committee appointed by Admiral Knapp, to formulate a series of decrees based upon the requirements of the country. The legislation so promulgated resulted in the creation of a well administered system of public education, directly controlled and supervised by an Executive Department of the National Government. By the employment of funds accumulated by the Government new school buildings were obtained, and the staff of instructors, now materially increased, was promptly paid. Satisfactory normal and vocational schools were likewise founded, and in the largest cities large buildings were constructed to meet the new requirements. Within two years, the number of pupils attending schools amounted to little less than 100,000. At the same time, new methods of instruction were adopted with gratifying results. Believing that the reduction of the high percentage of illiteracy should be its primary purpose in undertaking to reform the public instruction system in the Dominican Republic, the policy of the Military Government was constructive and carried out with notable success.

The same tribute may be rendered to the success of the Military Government in the execution of the public works program which it had immediately laid down. This program, which was a modification, believed to be more adapted to the immediate necessities of the country, of the program first conceived by the Cáceres Government, and later enlarged by the American Director of Public Works appointed by the Victoria Government upon the recommendation of Secretary Bryan, comprised as its

cardinal feature the construction of arterial highroads to connect the important cities of the Republic. As has already been expressed in a preceding chapter, the lack of communication between the several sections of the Republic had not only rendered it impossible to develop the agricultural resources of the country in the interior Provinces, which are by far the richest, but had also been chiefly responsible for the ease with which revolutionary movements had been enabled repeatedly to gain headway. The Military Government consequently, as funds became available, undertook the construction of permanent high-grade roads between the principal cities of the Republic. Before the Occupation had terminated, the main highroad connecting the port of Monte Cristi on the north with the city of Santo Domingo on the south, linking Santiago, Moca, La Vega, and Bonao as well, had been completed, and a considerable portion of the two remaining highroads of major importance—that connecting Seybo Province with the capital by way of San Pedro de Macorís, and that connecting Comendador upon the Haitian frontier with the capital by way of San Juan, Azua, and Baní—had likewise been completed. Inasmuch as the important towns of Puerto Plata and Sánchez were already in communication with Santiago and La Vega, respectively, by railroad, the construction of highroads to these cities, like that of other subsidiary roads, was postponed.

Improvements were made in the telephone and telegraph systems, and harbour improvements in the more important ports of the Republic were also undertaken. While it has been claimed that the road construction during the first years of the Military Government was in certain instances unnecessarily costly, and consequently resulted in a greater expenditure of Dominican funds than

was absolutely essential, it is undoubtedly true that no greater material benefit could have been conferred upon the Dominican people, after disarmament, than the construction by the Military Government of these highroads. Their completion rendered the development of the latent resources of the Republic immediately practicable, and their utility was promptly acknowledged by an overwhelming majority of the Dominican people.

Similar efficient service was rendered by the Military Government in the field of sanitation after a new Executive Department had been established under which the national control of public health was placed. The segregation of lepers in a well-kept modern leprosarium was provided for, and special facilities were created for the treatment of certain classes of diseases, but the attention of the Government was directed more particularly to the enforcement of sanitary regulations affecting the welfare of the community at large, and the improved conditions resulting from the enactment of these regulations were soon noticeable.

In the field of agricultural development, little was accomplished. Two agricultural experimental stations were established by the Military Government, but after a considerable sum had been expended on the more important of these, located near the capital, it was ascertained that the soil and climatic conditions obtaining in that locality were not such as to render the experiments there carried out of general utility. Also, the major portion of the agricultural demonstrators employed proved unfitted for their task, and it must be admitted that with the best intentions the Military Government accomplished but little in this sphere.

6.

During the first year of the Military Occupation, with the exception of those officers directly responsible for the conditions which existed in the eastern Provinces, the Military Governor was loyally assisted in his policy of conciliation and constructive accomplishment by a corps of disinterested and able officers. Admiral Knapp was, however, succeeded in 1918 as Military Governor by Rear-Admiral Thomas Snowden, and the difference in the personalities of the two officers was soon made noticeable by a marked change in the attitude of the Dominican people towards the Occupation. During the first year of the Occupation, notwithstanding the inevitable errors of judgment and appreciation on the part of the military authorities, there existed on the whole a spirit of tolerance towards the officials of the Military Government and an evidence of a desire for coöperation on the part of many prominent Dominicans in bettering the material conditions of the Republic. This feeling was now replaced by one of increasing irritation which broke into smouldering hostility.

Admiral Snowden, while an officer both well-intentioned and of high principle, lacked the forceful personality and the judicial temperament of his predecessor. Reluctant to make decisions himself, he was commonly believed to be guided entirely by the advice of his subordinates, who were by no means always in accord among themselves. The impression which the ensuing policy of vacillation created among the Dominican people may be gauged by the fact that the new Military Governor was commonly referred to as "Don Juan Isidro" Snowden, the belief being general that his personality was comparable to that of President Jiménez. The prejudices and desires of the Dominican

people began to be disregarded. Whereas Admiral Knapp had consistently pursued the policy, so far as he felt able to do so, of consulting certain eminent Dominicans in whom he had soon learned to repose confidence, Admiral Snowden depended entirely upon the officers who had replaced the original members of Admiral Knapp's Cabinet. Since these new officials, almost without exception, possessed so little knowledge of the Spanish language that they were even unable to read the Dominican newspapers, except those portions translated for their benefit by their interpreters, and studiously refrained from associating with Dominicans, it was inevitable that a wall of misapprehension and misunderstanding should soon have been created between the American officials in the Military Government and the Dominican people in general.

As time had passed and the attention of the Department of State had been withdrawn from the Dominican situation, the questions of general policy formerly determined by that Department had been relegated for decision to the Navy Department in Washington. Naturally enough, the Secretary of the Navy, engrossed in the conduct of the war, had not the time to devote to the careful study of conditions in the Dominican Republic. Furthermore, the Navy Department lacked facilities in the nature of an appropriate bureau or division by which the head of the Department might have been assisted in such study. The result soon was that, beyond a nominal supervision, the Military Governor of the Dominican Republic, with his Cabinet, constituted a dictatorship whose actions there was none to criticize. The censorship of the press in the Dominican Republic had become so rigid that the slightest criticism of measures adopted by the Military Government was stringently punished, and comparative freedom of

speech had long since become a thing of the past. The Military Governor and his assistants became, in fact, so sure of their complete control of the situation in the Dominican Republic, that they were convinced that the Military Government would continue for a long period of years. In the expression of this belief, entirely without official authorization from the United States Government, Admiral Snowden, upon the occasion of the formal opening of the agricultural experimental station near Santo Domingo, declared that the Military Government in the Dominican Republic would continue "until the generation of Dominicans then in the cradle had reached adult age."

This declaration, soon made known throughout the Republic, acted perhaps as a salutary irritant to the leaders of Dominican thought. While these leaders had always assumed that the Occupation would not be permanent, they had gained the belief that its duration would be of short extent. They had failed to appreciate the fact that so long as no authoritative protest against the continuation of the Occupation was addressed to the competent officials of the Government of the United States, the Government, believing that a lack of protest denoted presumable contentment on the part of the Dominican people, was not likely to take action to modify the conditions which prevailed.

7.

It is true that from the outset of the Occupation the deposed Provisional President of the Dominican Republic, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, had in the press available to him opposed the continuation of the Occupation, but the attitude of the principal political leaders in the Domini-

can Republic was at first rather that expressed in the following letter addressed on April 19, 1917, by Don Emilio Joubert, first Vice President of the National Committee of the Horacista party, to the members of the Provincial and Municipal committees of the party:

"We have no just reasons to consider the American intervention as a covert and artful conquest and so has it been understood by the leader of the party, whose patriotism no one may doubt. He, not only by his remonstrance but by his example, has shown that he wishes that the period of unfruitful civil warfare be ended and that efforts be made to hasten the termination of the present abnormal occupation by coöperating to suppress the obstacles which prolong it. Therefore, his efforts are directed towards convincing his friends and followers of the utility of accomplishing the disarmament of private citizens . . Under these circumstances the duty of the National Committee of the party is to assume with frankness the responsibilities of the moment."

When the pacification of the Republic had, however, been accomplished, and the indefinite duration of the Military Government was announced by the Military Governor, the feeling on the part of the political leaders underwent a complete transformation. Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, who had obtained a considerable fund in Cuba wherewith to pay the expenses of his mission, had gone to Paris at the outset of the Peace Conference to attempt to bring before the Conference the political status of the Dominican Republic. He was, however, advised by members of the American Mission to the Conference that no questions affecting the status of the Dominican Republic would be taken up in Paris, and was requested to address his views to the Department of State in Washington. In

the conferences which resulted between Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal and officials of the Department of State in Washington in the autumn of 1919, the former Dominican President suggested as a preliminary step in the modification of the absolute control of the Military Government, the abolition of the Provost Courts and the reëstablishment of the jurisdiction of the Dominican judiciary, and, in order to pave the way for a larger share of participation by Dominicans in the administration of their government, the creation of a "Junta Consultiva," or Advisory Board of Dominican citizens, to prepare organic laws for the Dominican Republic, comprising electoral legislation, reorganization of the Provinces and Municipalities, regulation of the budget, and the definition of the functions of the different branches of the Government.

Upon learning that the Department of State had undertaken to obtain the views of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, the Military Governor, Admiral Snowden, urged the Department to refrain from further conversations with the former President, since in his opinion they would give rise to "considerable agitation with danger of sporadic disorder." In accordance with these views, an official of Admiral Snowden's Cabinet despatched to Washington, formally requested the Department of State to announce officially that the United States Government must of necessity conduct the Dominican Government "until such time as the people of the Dominican Republic have developed the character and ability to govern themselves, handle their finances properly, and maintain a permanently stable government." The Department of State was urged to declare "that a minimum period of twenty years" would be necessary for this purpose.

The nature of this advice gave the Department of State

cause for reflection. The termination of the war and the approaching return to peace conditions made it possible for the Secretary of State to undertake once more a detailed consideration of the situation which had developed in the Dominican Republic as the result of the Occupation. The following statement left with the Department by Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal prior to his departure from Washington was in itself an added reason:

"The situation in which the Dominican people are placed, unjust from every point of view of right, intolerable in practice, unnecessary to every end that may be desired, illogical in all its consequences, and in absolute conflict with all principles and morals of international policy which are advocated in these days, cannot and must not be prolonged. The interest of the American Government in rectifying that situation must be as great as the desire of the Dominican people themselves."

Furthermore, it was being constantly brought home to the attention of Secretary Lansing that the continued Occupation of the Dominican Republic was giving rise to increasing apprehension among the Republics of Latin America. Protests both informal and official, emanating from Latin American Governments, prominent publicists in South America, and from associations throughout the continent, were being addressed continually through the summer and autumn of 1919 to President Wilson, urging the termination of the Occupation and the reëstablishment of a Dominican Government. Samuel Gompers, the President of the American Federation of Labour, was foremost among many prominent citizens in the United States who advocated this policy. In a letter addressed to President Wilson on November 29, 1919, Mr. Gompers

declared that the conditions which were alleged to exist in the Dominican Republic did not conform to the principles of modern civilization. He urged their immediate rectification.

In consideration of the growing hostility within the Republic to the Military Government, and of the publicity being given to the questions involved, the Department of State determined once more to assume the direction of affairs itself. Consequently, ignoring the recommendations of the Military Governor, Admiral Snowden was instructed to appoint a "Junta Consultiva" of prominent Dominican citizens, similar in character to that suggested by Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, in order that the Military Governor might have at his disposal in the administration of Dominican Affairs the recommendations of representatives of the Dominican people.

8.

In the members of the Committee selected by the Department of State for appointment, no more truly representative nor able Dominicans could have been named. The Committee as finally constituted on November 3, 1919, was composed of the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Monseñor Nouel, Don Jacinto de Castro, Don Francisco J. Peynado, and Don Federico Velasquez. By instruction of the Department of State, a vacancy had been left upon this Committee in order that it might be filled by Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, should he care to accept the position offered him. The former President refused, however, to undertake the duties involved, and the Committee thus composed of only four members proceeded rapidly with the work before it.

By November 12th, the Committee had completed a

ortion of its findings. In a memorandum addressed to
ie Military Governor, it was recommended first that the
ectoral law then in force be replaced by a new act guar-
nteeing more fully the liberty of the electorate; second,
iat the act providing for the organization of the
ommunes be amended so that the "ayuntamientos," or
unicipal governments, would acquire that measure of
dependence from the control of the National Govern-
ent guaranteed them by the Constitution of 1908; third,
iat the act of conscription be replaced by a new act
evised to compel the military authorities to conform with
xed rules and regulations; fourth, that the act providing
r the organization of the Provincial Governments be
odified so that the Government of each Province should
e elected by popular suffrage; fifth, that the act establish-
g the organization of the Hacienda Department, and
oviding for the collection and disbursement of internal
venues, be amended so as to provide for a more effective
stem of audit and control; sixth, that steps be taken to
ovide for the ultimate amendment of the Dominican
onstitution so that it should conform with the suggested
gislation, and so that it should make provision for a more
ficacious manner of providing a substitute for the Presi-
ent of the Republic should the latter be removed by
eath, disability, resignation, or impeachment.

The members of the Committee also recommended at
e same time that the Military Government suspend the
ecrees providing for the censorship of the press, and
omulgate new decrees placing the responsibility upon
ch publisher for the articles appearing in his publica-
ons. The Committee finally recommended that the juris-
ction of the Provost Courts be limited so that these might
the future have jurisdiction solely over purely military

cases. On December 3rd, an additional memorandum was addressed to the Military Governor strongly urging him not to contract on behalf of the Republic a new foreign loan of $5,000,000, as it was then known he intended to do, and recommending that the public works which it was proposed should be completed with the proceeds of the new loan, be carried out with funds accumulated as the result of certain indicated economies. In a brief memorandum dated December 16th, the Committee finally sent the Military Governor two projects of executive orders providing for the regulation of the press and the restriction of the powers of the Provost Courts, in accordance with the views of the members of the Committee.

The rising tide of opposition to the Military Government on the part of the Dominican public in general had resulted in the delivery in public meetings of addresses which it was claimed by the officials of the Military Government were subversive, and contrary to the censorship regulations which had been promulgated. The appointment of the Junta Consultiva had created widespread discussion, and articles had appeared in the press in the nature of attacks both upon the members of the Junta for accepting their appointment, and upon the Military Government for appointing them. The Military Governor unwisely chose this moment, when the Department of State had determined to obtain the participation of competent Dominicans in the administration of the Dominican Government, to promulgate on December 22nd a new censorship regulation restricting even more severely than in the past the right of free speech and the rights of the press. Convinced by this policy, of which their first notification was the promulgation of the decree, that the Military Governor intended completely to disregard all their recom-

mendations as to the need of greater liberty of speech and of the press, and persuaded that the Military Governor desired to render any public discussion of their recommendations impossible, the members of the Junta Consultiva promptly resigned on January 9, 1920, and determinedly refused to withdraw their resignations.

Had not this first attempt on the part of the Department of State to provide for coöperation between the authorities of the United States and representative Dominicans in taking the steps preliminary to the reëstablishment of an independent Dominican Government been thus abruptly checked by the Military Government, the further difficulties and obstacles of the ensuing two years might readily have been avoided, and the termination of the Occupation would undoubtedly have taken place long before it finally did. The responsibility must, however, be laid as much upon the Department of State as upon the Navy Department and the Military Government in the Dominican Republic. For a period of two years, the Department of State had apparently withdrawn from all supervision over the conduct of affairs in the Dominican Republic. The Navy Department, in view of this, had permitted the Military Governors to acquire an increasingly large measure of authority in determining Dominican problems. No general policy had ever been formulated by the Department of State, much less had any policy ever been announced, and the Military Governor had, not unnaturally, grown to feel that his powers were absolute.

It was now sharply brought home to the Department of State that the whole Latin American policy of the United States Government was affected by the continuance of the

Dominican Occupation. In March, 1920, a society known as the Unión Nacional Dominicana was formed in the Dominican Republic, which proclaimed as its objective the immediate return of the Dominican Republic to its former condition of independence, and announced its refusal to concur in any international agreement with the United States which could prejudice any of the inherent rights of sovereignty of the Republic. The aged Don Emiliano Tejera was elected the president of the association, and Don Antonio Hoepelman its secretary. This organization soon acquired a preponderating influence in the Dominican Republic, and succeeded, through public contributions, in obtaining a considerable fund to be expended in propaganda against the continuation of the Military Occupation in the Latin American Republics, both through the publication of articles in the Latin American press, and through the despatch to Central and South America of delegates to make widely known the conditions which existed in the Dominican Republic.

The Unión Nacional likewise announced its strenuous opposition to any further attempts at coöperation with the Military Government, and succeeded in preventing the despatch of a mission to Washington, a solution which had been proposed by some of the more conciliatory of the prominent Dominicans within the Republic. The efforts, therefore, of the Department of State to obtain the constitution of a new Junta Consultiva to carry on the work abandoned as the result of the resignation of the original members, were seriously handicapped by the activity of the Unión Nacional Dominicana, and were scarcely advanced by the stubborn opposition to this proposal on the part of the Military Governor.

CARRETERA DUARTE

The Central Highway Constructed by the American Military Government

9.

As the weeks passed, an increasing measure of interest was being manifested throughout Latin America in the Dominican situation. On August 18, 1920, the Colombian Congress passed a series of congratulatory resolutions on the occasion of the anniversary of the rebellion of the Dominican people against Spain, as a means of expressing its sympathy for the Dominican Republic. The action of the Military Governor the following November in imprisoning a Venezuelan citizen for having published an article containing photographs showing alleged injuries inflicted upon Dominican citizens by American marines, intensified the growing bitterness of feeling in Latin America, since the report of this action was widely published. While the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, as soon as he was advised of the action of the Military Governor, promptly rescinded the orders issued, and instructed Admiral Snowden to issue immediately executive orders relaxing the rigid censorship regulations, the effect of the act of the Military Governor was not diminished. By instruction of their Governments, the Brazilian Ambassador and the Uruguayan Minister in Washington formally expressed to Secretary Colby, who had now replaced Secretary Lansing as Secretary of State, their hope that the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic might soon be terminated. While the other Governments of Latin America refrained from making official representations in the matter, the press of Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador, as well as that of the Central American Republics, commenced a determined campaign against the policy undertaken by the United States in occupying the Dominican Republic.

At this very moment Secretary Colby had determined to make an official visit to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. Interested as he was in improving the relations between the Republics of Latin America and the United States, he was brought readily to appreciate the fact that apprehensions concerning the true intent of the Government of the United States had arisen since the earlier years of the Wilson Administration. It was apparent that the suspicion which had been aroused was primarily due to the policy into which the United States had drifted in its relations with the Dominican Republic. He likewise saw clearly that the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, in the determination of which he had himself had no participation, had no valid reason for continuing. The President, stricken by the refusal of the American people to adopt the Covenant upon which his soul was set, and unable for many months because of his grave illness to maintain more than a perfunctory contact with the world outside the White House, was ignorant of the turn which events had taken in the Dominican Republic. When the consideration of the question was urged upon him by his Secretary of State, he at once authorized the latter to take the steps necessary to formulate a policy of immediate withdrawal.

On December 24, 1920, the Military Governor of Santo Domingo was instructed immediately to issue the following proclamation:

"WHEREAS, the friendly purposes of the United States in the employment, pursuant to rights derived from the Treaty of 1907, of its military forces within the Dominican Republic for the restoration of public order and the protection of life and property have been substantially achieved, and

"WHEREAS, it has always been the desire and intention of the Government of the United States to withdraw its aid as soon as it could do so consistently with the said purposes and as soon as the improved conditions in Santo Domingo to which the United States has sought to contribute should give promise of permanence,

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Thomas Snowden, Rear-Admiral, U.S.N., Military Governor of the Dominican Republic, acting under the authority and by direction of the Government of the United States, declare and announce to all concerned that the Government of the United States believes the time has arrived when it may, with a due sense of its responsibility to the people of the Dominican Republic, inaugurate the simple processes of its rapid withdrawal from the responsibilities assumed in connection with Dominican affairs.

"Announcement is therefore made that a Commission of representative Dominican citizens will be appointed, the personnel of which will shortly be announced, to which it is my purpose to attach a Technical Adviser. This Commission will be entrusted with the formation of amendments to the Constitution and a general revision of the laws of the Republic, including the drafting of a new Election Law. Such amendments to the Constitution and such laws, or such revision of existing laws, as may be recommended by the Commission, upon approval by the Military Government in occupation, will be submitted to a Constitutional Convention and to the National Congress of the Dominican Republic, respectively."

At the same time that this proclamation was made public, the American Minister and the Military Governor were instructed to invite the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Monseñor Nouel, Don Francisco J. Peynado, Don Federico Velasquez, and Don Jacinto de Castro, the members

of the original Junta Consultiva, to become members of the Commission to be constituted under the terms of the proclamation. Instructions also were sent to the effect that similar invitations be extended to the President of the Supreme Court, Don Rafael Justino Castillo; Don Eliseo Espaillat, a member of the Cabinet of the Henriquez y Carvajal Government; Don Enrique Jiménez, a prominent member of the Jimenista party; and to Don Mario Fermín Cabral, who had been President of the Senate in its last sessions. The Department of State announced its desire to have an American Technical Adviser appointed to the Commission to serve in a purely advisory capacity, and to act primarily as a go-between between the officials of the Military Government and the members of the Dominican Commission. Judge Otto Schoenrich was at first selected for this post in view of his peculiar knowledge of the Dominican Republic, and his freedom from any prior association with the Military Government. When Judge Schoenrich's inability to accept this position was ascertained, Judge Ostrand, an American member of the Dominican Land Court, was appointed as Adviser.

10.

No sooner had the proclamation been published in Santo Domingo, and no sooner had it become known that the five Dominican citizens first mentioned had accepted the positions proffered them, than a general public protest arose from every quarter of the Dominican Republic. The efforts of the Unión Nacional Dominicana were exerted towards obtaining a universal refusal from all Dominicans to coöperate, under any guise, with American officials, in preparing the way for the evacuation of the Republic. The cry, "Evacuation, pure and simple," was raised. The

assertion was made by the propagandists that should the attitude of the Dominican public remain sufficiently firm, the United States Government would be forced to terminate the Military Government and withdraw its armed forces from Dominican territory without previous agreement of any kind.

To such agitators it apparently was not clear that as the result of the four years of the Military Occupation facts existed which could not be disregarded. Laws in the form of decrees had been passed, contracts and concessions had been granted, and obligations on behalf of the Republic had been assumed, under which rights had been acquired which would necessarily be voided unless measures were taken to safeguard their validity. Even more important, however, than any of these considerations was the fact that a termination of the Military Government, and an immediate evacuation of the American Military forces, would have left the Republic without executive or legislative bodies, without an organized military force with which order might be maintained, and in short, would have resulted in a chaotic situation far more serious in its possibilities than any revolution which the Dominican Republic had previously undergone. The phenomenon was one explicable, however, in that public hostility towards the Military Government had become so great, owing to the antagonistic policy pursued by the Military Government, that any form of coöperation with it by Dominicans was regarded by all but the more far-seeing as in the nature of a treasonable act.

Treason, in fact, was the charge hurled against the citizens who had expressed their willingness to serve upon the projected Commission. Their position was rendered still more difficult owing to the fact that the reservations

which they had made in accepting the office tendered them—that all projected legislation and proposed amendments to the Constitution be approved by the Commission before transmission by the Military Government to any Congress or Constitutional Convention, and that the Technical Adviser should not act as a member of the Commission but solely in an advisory capacity—had been abruptly rejected by the Military Governor. Upon receipt of Admiral Snowden's refusal to consent to these eminently logical conditions, the five members who had accepted office promptly resigned.

When the Department of State was advised of this sequel to its endeavours to take the first steps towards preparing the ground for a termination of the Military Occupation, the Military Governor was informed that his action had been taken without due authority, and that the members of the Commission should at once be notified that the reservations which they had made were entirely acceptable to the Department of State as being thoroughly in harmony with the true intent of the proclamation which had been published. Consequently, after considerable negotiation, the resignations were withdrawn, and the Commission, modified in its membership by the appointment of Don Manuel Gonzalez Marero, an Associate Justice of the Dominican Supreme Court, and Don Pedro A. Pérez, a Deputy in the last Dominican Congress, in the place of two of the members originally selected, organized for business, with Judge Ostrand as the Commission's Technical Adviser, on May 16, 1921.

In the meantime, public opposition in the Dominican Republic had by no means died down. Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal and a group of his supporters were insistent that the sole equitable solution lay in the immediate restoration

of the Provisional Government which had been deposed in 1916, and the subsequent evacuation of the American military forces. A portion of the members of the Unión Nacional Dominicana adopted this point of view, which, in fact, was widely preached throughout the Republics of South America by a mission composed of Dr. Federico Henriquez y Carvajal and Don Max Henriquez Ureña who were engaged in a tour of Latin America protesting against the Occupation. In a communication addressed by the former Provisional President, Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, to the Department of State, he declared that his opposition to the proposed plan of evacuation was based primarily upon the fact that the plan provided for the election of Dominican officials and the carrying out of legislative and constitutional reforms under the American Military Government, whereas, he claimed, such steps should only be taken under the Provisional Government of which he had formerly been the head.

To the more practical leaders of Dominican thought, however, the insurmountable obstacles to this solution were apparent. The term for which Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal had been elected had long since expired, and no Congress existed by which a successor to him could be chosen. All possibility of resurrecting a Constitutional Government from the wreck of the past had consequently vanished.

It was evident to those leaders, as practical men, that the restoration of a Dominican Government responsive in fact to the desires of the Dominican people, could only be obtained through an accord with the Government of the United States. To this end they awaited the inauguration of the incoming Administration in the United States of President Harding, fully realizing that upon the determination of his policy their own hopes depended.

CHAPTER XV

THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA

1.

THE Dominican question had played a considerable rôle in the American Presidential campaign of 1920. In a campaign in which the League of Nations controversy had figured as the predominating issue, it was not unnatural that the foreign policy of the Wilson Administration should be vigorously attacked in all its phases by the spokesmen of the Republican party. Furthermore, the unsatisfactory relations which still continued between the Government of Mexico and that of the United States constituted an apt target for attack, and aided in drawing attention towards the Latin American policy of the Administration, as a result of which the situation in the Dominican Republic and in the Republic of Haiti was frequently reviewed in considerable detail. Before this time the fundamental questions involved in the establishment of an American Military Government in the Dominican Republic had been very nearly ignored by the American people in general. It was only during the brief period prior to the Presidential campaign that the public had its attention drawn to the conditions which had for four years prevailed in Santo Domingo.

The Department of State, which, as has already been shown, had to all intents relinquished supervision of the policy of the Military Government between the years 1917 and 1920, had refrained from providing the public with any information regarding the course of developments in that country. While the Navy Department at infrequent intervals gave to the press formal summaries of the semiannual reports of the Military Governors,

hese official statements excited no particular attention. As a result, therefore, the attacks made upon a policy, or ack of policy, which had permitted the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic to be consummated, gained unusual emphasis as involving matters of omplete novelty to the great majority of the American oters.

The Republican candidate, Senator Harding, referred o this phase of the foreign policy of President Wilson in nany of his addresses. In a speech delivered on August 8, 1920, at Marion, Ohio, Senator Harding emphatically leclared:

> . . . "I will not . . . misuse the power of the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little Republics of the Western Hemisphere, such as in the last few years have not only made enemies of those who should be our friends but have rightfully discredited our country as their trusted neighbor."

Upon the election of Senator Harding, therefore, by an overwhelming majority, the conviction became general among those Dominicans not identified with the group in the Dominican Republic opposed to all and every form of understanding with the United States, that, immediately after the inauguration of Senator Harding as President of the United States, steps would promptly be taken to terminate the Military Government in the Dominican Republic and to reinstate the Dominican people in the full and unimpaired enjoyment of their rights as a sovereign and independent nation.

2.

In accordance with this belief, upon the date of his inauguration, cables were sent President Harding from all sections of the Dominican Republic urging upon him the immediate restoration of their freedom to the Dominican people. He was likewise the recipient of a communication from the former Provisional President, Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal, reiterating the arguments which he had already repeatedly pressed upon the attention of the Department of State.

To the new Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, the Dominican problem possessed a peculiar appeal.

Mr. Hughes was convinced, as had been the majority of his predecessors in the Department of State, of the necessity of preserving the Monroe Doctrine unimpaired, as a fundamental part of the established national policy of the United States. He believed that the maintenance of the Republics of the Western Hemisphere free from the danger of encroachment upon their independence or of partition of their territory by non-continental powers, was a cardinal feature in the American doctrine of self-protection. While he frequently emphasized the fact that "the Monroe doctrine as a particular declaration in no way exhausts American right or policy; the United States has rights and obligations which that Doctrine does not define," and made it plain that "in the unsettled condition of certain countries in the region of the Caribbean it has been necessary to assert these rights and obligations as well as the limited principles of the Monroe Doctrine," it was in the methods of obtaining these desired ends that Secretary Hughes differed radically from certain of those who

had preceded him as Secretary of State.[1] "Our interest," as he once phrased it, "does not lie in controlling foreign peoples; that would be a policy of mischief and disaster. Our interest is in having prosperous, peaceful, and law-abiding neighbors with whom we can coöperate to mutual advantage." Such coöperation did not imply continuous meddling in the internal affairs of the nearer Latin American Republics; it did not envisage dictation as to the form and constitution of their Governments, nor the attempt to control their legislation; nor could it ever have entailed, save as a temporary measure owing to the need of protecting foreign life and property, armed intervention, and, much less, military occupation.

His conception of the attitude which the Government of the United States should adopt towards the nearer Republics of the hemisphere was embodied in the declaration which Mr. Hughes addressed to the delegates attending the Central-American Conference of 1922-23:

"The Government of the United States has no ambition to gratify at your expense, no policy which runs counter to your national aspirations, and no purpose save to promote the interests of peace and to assist you, in such manner as you may welcome, to solve your problems to your own proper advantage. The interest of the United States is found in the peace of this hemisphere and in the conservation of your interests."

It was in that spirit that he strove to formulate the measures which should lead to the evacuation of the military forces of the United States from the Dominican

[1] "Observations on the Monroe Doctrine," an Address by Hon. Charles E. Hughes, delivered before the American Bar Association, August 30, 1923.

Republic, and to the solution thereby of a question which, he saw very clearly, had been perhaps more directly responsible than any other for the impairment of the relations of confidence and mutual good-will which had at one time existed between the United States and the other American Republics, relations which Secretary Hughes was determined to reëstablish as a conspicuous feature of the foreign policy of the new Administration.

During the first weeks after he became Secretary of State his attention was, however, fully occupied with the adjustment, through the tender of the good offices of the United States Government, of the controversy which had long existed between the Governments of Costa Rica and Panama over the unsettled boundary between those two Republics and which had suddenly flamed into the outbreak of actual hostilities. The ratification of a treaty between Colombia and the United States to make possible a resumption of those friendly relations between the two countries which had earlier distinguished their intercourse was likewise a pressing requirement. Two months had not elapsed, however, before Secretary Hughes commenced the determination of the first steps to be taken in the restoration of their liberty and independence to the Dominican people.

As an initial move, a new Military Governor was appointed in the person of Rear-Admiral Samuel S. Robison, a distinguished officer who, it was believed, would coöperate more effectively with the Department of State in the measures precedent to the evacuation of the Dominican Republic than had his predecessor. On June 14, 1921, the following proclamation was issued to the Dominican people by instruction of the Secretary of State:

PROCLAMATION.

"WHEREAS, by Proclamation of the Military Governor Santo Domingo, dated December 23, 1920, it was announced to the people of the Dominican Republic that he Government of the United States desired to inaugurate he simple processes of its rapid withdrawal from the sponsibilities assumed in connection with Dominican fairs; and

"WHEREAS, it is necessary that a duly constituted overnment of the Dominican Republic exist before this ithdrawal of the United States may become effective, in rder that the functions of government may be resumed y it in an orderly manner,

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Samuel S. Robison, Military overnor of Santo Domingo, acting under the authority nd by direction of the Government of the United tates, declare and announce to all concerned, that the overnment of the United States proposes to withdraw s military forces from the Dominican Republic in acordance with the steps set forth herein. It is the desire of he Government of the United States to assure itself efore its withdrawal is accomplished that the independence and territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic, he maintenance of public order, and the security of life nd property, will be adequately safeguarded, and to turn ver the administration of the Dominican Republic to a sponsible Dominican Government duly established in ccordance with the existing Constitution and laws. To his end, it calls upon the Dominican people to lend to it heir helpful coöperation with the hope that the withrawal of the military forces of the United States may be ompleted, if such coöperation is extended in the manner

hereinafter provided, within a period of eight months. The Executive power vested by the Dominican Constitution in the President of the Republic shall be exercised by the Military Governor of Santo Domingo until a duly proclaimed President of the Republic shall have taken office and until a Convention of Evacuation shall have been signed by the President and confirmed by the Dominican Congress.

"Within one month from the date of this Proclamation the Military Governor will convene the primary assemblies to assemble thirty days after the date of the Decree of Convocation in conformity with Articles 82 and 83 of the Constitution. These assemblies shall proceed to elect the electors as prescribed by Article 84 of the Constitution. In order that these elections may be held without disorder and in order that the will of the Dominican people may be freely expressed, these elections will be held under the supervision of the authorities designated by the Military Governor.

"The electoral colleges thus elected by the primary assemblies shall, in accordance with Article 85 of the Constitution, proceed to elect Senators, Deputies, and alternates for the latter, and to prepare lists for the Justices of the Supreme Court, of the Appellate Courts, and the Tribunals and Courts of the First Instance, as prescribed by Article 85 of the Constitution.

"The Military Governor, performing the functions of Chief Executive, will then appoint, in accordance with Article 53 of the Constitution, certain Dominican citizens as representatives of the Republic to negotiate a Convention of Evacuation. In order that the enjoyment of individual rights may be insured, and in order that the peace and prosperity of the Republic may be conserved, the said

onvention of Evacuation shall contain the following rovisions:

"1. Ratification of all of the acts of the Military Government;

"2. Validation of the final loan of $2,500,000, which is the minimum loan required in order to complete the public works which are now in actual course of construction, and which can be completed during the period required for withdrawal of the Military Occupation and are deemed essential to the success of the new Government of the Republic and to the well-being of the Dominican people;

"3. Extension of the duties of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs, appointed under the Convention of 1907, to apply to the said loan;

"4. Extension of the powers of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs to the collection and disbursement of such portion of the internal revenues of the Republic as may prove to be necessary, should the customs revenues at any time be insufficient to meet the service of the foreign debt of the Republic;

"5. The obligation on the part of the Dominican Government, in order to preserve peace, to afford adequate protection to life and property, and to secure the proper discharge of all obligations of the Dominican Republic, to maintain an efficient Guardia Nacional, urban and rural, composed of native Dominicans. To this end, it shall also be agreed in said Convention that the President of the Dominican Republic shall at once request the President of the United States to send a Military Mission to the Dominican Republic, charged with the duty of

> securing the competent organization of such Guardia Nacional; the Guardia Nacional to be officered by such Dominican Officers as may be competent to undertake such service, and, for such time as may be found necessary to effect the desired organization, with American Officers appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic upon the nomination of the President of the the United States. The expenses of said Mission will be paid by the Dominican Republic, and the said Mission will be invested by the Executive of the Dominican Republic with proper and adequate authority to accomplish the purpose above stated.

"The Military Governor will thereupon convene the Dominican Congress in extraordinary session to confirm the Convention of Evacuation referred to above.

"The Military Governor will then assemble the electoral colleges for the purpose of electing a President of the Dominican Republic in accordance with Article 85 of the Constitution, and simultaneously, officials other than the Senators and Deputies elected at the first convocation of the electoral colleges, will be installed in office.

"The Dominican President so elected will then take office in accordance with Article 51 of the Constitution, at the same time signing the Convention of Evacuation as confirmed by the Dominican Congress.

"Upon this ratification of the Convention of Evacuation, assuming that through the coöperation of the people of the Dominican Republic a condition of peace and good order obtains, the Military Governor will transfer to the duly elected President of the Republic all of his powers and the Military Government will cease; and thereupon, the forces of the United States will be at once withdrawn.

"The further assistance of the Advisory Commission ppointed under the Proclamation of December 23, 1920, eing no longer required, it is hereby dissolved, with the xpression of the grateful appreciation of the Government f the United States of the self-sacrificing services of the atriotic citizens of the Dominican Republic of whom it as been composed."

. . . . . .

3.

Whereas the proclamation of 1920 had contained no rogram of evacuation, the proclamation now issued con- ined a detailed plan making known each step which ould be taken towards terminating the Military Govern- ent in Santo Domingo, and towards providing for the tablishment by the Dominican people of their own Con- itutional Government before the withdrawal of the rces of the United States had been effected.

In the program so proposed, three essential necessities d been taken into account; first, the observance, so far might be possible in view of the anomalous situation hich the Occupation had created, of constitutional pro- dure as established by the Dominican Constitution of 908; second, the safeguarding of such rights as had been gitimately acquired during the course of the Occupa- on; and third, the maintenance of order subsequent to e withdrawal of the American Forces of Occupation, ntil such time as the succeeding Dominican Government d become sufficiently firmly established itself to exert e full measure of necessary control.

To a great part of the Dominican people, however, the blication of the terms of this proclamation came as a tter disappointment. Studiously taught by the leading

agitators of the Nacionalista group, comprising the more vociferous portion of the directors of the Unión Nacional Dominicana, that the adoption of an attitude of non-coöperation would result in the withdrawal of the American military forces from the Republic without prior agreement, and without the previous establishment of any constituted Dominican authority, they were now inclined to believe that some hidden danger, some threat to their independence, must necessarily lurk in every phrase of the plan of evacuation proposed by the American Government. So responsive were the public and the press to the propaganda of the Nacionalista agitators, that even the more practical and the more disinterested of the political and intellectual leaders in the Dominican Republic were half convinced that the acceptance of the so-called Harding Plan would result in an infringement of the sovereignty of the Republic.

The chief objections raised against the project centered about the proposed election of a Dominican President and a Dominican Congress while an American Military Government still existed in Santo Domingo; and about those articles of the proposed Convention of Evacuation which provided for the ratification of the acts of the Military Government; the extension of the powers of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs to include the collection and disbursement of such portion of the internal revenues as might be required should the customs revenues prove insufficient to meet the service of the Republic's foreign debt; and the despatch of an American Military Mission to undertake the organization of a Dominican National Constabulary.

Had public opinion in the Dominican Republic at the time not been so readily responsive to the appeal of leading

itators, and had public sentiment not been so consistently
tagonized during the preceding two years by the dic-
torial policy adopted by the Military Government, the
ue intent of these portions of the program of evacuation
ight have been seen in a clearer light.

It might, under such different conditions, have been
cognized that since, as a matter of practical necessity,
e military forces of the United States could not be
ithdrawn until some government had been constituted
which the functions of administration could be en-
usted, such a government could only be organized as
e result of elections held while the Military Government
ll continued.

The failure of the United States to obtain the consti-
tional ratification by a duly constituted Dominican
overnment of all the acts of the Military Government
hich had conferred rights upon third persons, would
ve created a chaotic condition of affairs which would
ve reacted primarily upon the Dominican people them-
ves. Decrees, possessing the force of legislation, had been
acted by the Military Government in accordance with
hich rights had been acquired by individuals, monies
d been received and expended, and properties had passed
om hand to hand. The non-validation of the decrees by
hich these acts had been sanctioned, would have resulted
injury to numberless innocent individuals. Furthermore,
e Military Government, on behalf of the Dominican
epublic, had obtained funds, by the issuance of loans,
th which public works had been constructed, property
d been acquired for the Dominican Government, and
ims against the Republic had been paid, and without
e validation so demanded the bonds issued in return for
ch loans would necessarily have become valueless.

The economic crisis resulting from the fall after the World War in the price of sugar, which had nearly ruined Cuba, had resulted also in a period of marked financial depression in the Dominican Republic. The proposal for the extension of the powers of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs to include the collection and disbursement of such portion as might be required of the internal revenues of the Republic, had been made solely to offer additional security to the holders of the obligations of the Dominican Republic, in the event that the customs revenues might not prove sufficient to meet the service of the Republic's foreign debt during the duration of the crisis. It was clearly stated that no desire existed to extend the General Receiver's powers should the customs revenues remain sufficient to discharge such obligations.

The proposed military mission, which might have seemed the least offensive of the proposals made, caused, however, more agitation than any other feature of the proclamation. It was regarded as a trick through which the Military Occupation might be continued, or as an attempt to revive in a new form Secretary Bryan's effort to vest control of the Dominican Constabulary in the President of the United States. It was not understood that the proposal was made solely owing to the desire of the American Government to assure itself that the Dominican Government which succeeded the Military Government might be enabled to maintain itself during the unsettled period which it was believed might temporarily ensue after the withdrawal of the Forces of Occupation. It was deemed necessary that the new Dominican Government be enabled to avail itself of the support of a competently organized, well-armed, and well-disciplined constabulary force.

The establishment of such a body had been considered
y Admiral Knapp to be an important duty of the Military
overnment as a measure helpful to future Dominican
dministrations. So long as he continued Military Gov-
rnor he had devoted his preferential attention to the
reation of such a force, notwithstanding the difficulty
hich he encountered in obtaining a competent body of
ominican officers. His successor in the Military Gov-
rnment, however, had permitted the project very largely
o lapse. A national constabulary existed as the result of
dmiral Knapp's endeavours, but no further efforts had
een made to train Dominicans as officers. It was officered
most entirely by American officers of the Marine Corps,
nd had become generally regarded as merely a branch,
nd a subservient branch, of the American Forces of
ccupation. Consequently, since it was evident that this
onstabulary could not function without officers, and that
fficers could not be appointed from among Dominican
vilians until these latter had gone through at least a brief
reliminary period of intensive training, it was considered
sential, as a means of self-preservation for the future
ominican Government, that the organization of training
amps for Dominican officers be undertaken by competent
structors until the time had come when properly quali-
ed Dominican officers could replace the American officers
ho must necessarily continue temporarily in command
f the Dominican Policía Nacional.

4.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding an official explanation by
e Department of State of the true intent of these pro-
sions in the proposed plan of evacuation which had
ven rise to such intense opposition, the Dominican people

almost unanimously made known their determined refusal to accept the proposals of the American Government. In the city of Santo Domingo, a procession of some 3,000 people marched to the Military Governor's residence to voice their disapproval of the proclamation. A preliminary meeting of the members of the "Junta Consultiva" and of other prominent political leaders called by the Military Governor on July 6th, at which the proposals were read to them, resulted in the immediate declaration on their behalf by Dr. José Maria Cabral that the plan was unacceptable, and the later statement by the political leaders that they would advise their followers not to take part in any elections held in accordance with the proposed project.

Since it was evident that a new deadlock had arisen, the Military Governor was authorized, on July 27th, to announce that the elections would be postponed, and that the attempt to carry out the various provisions of the program of evacuation would be held in abeyance until such time as it might be evident that the Dominican people were willing to participate in elections and to coöperate in the termination of the Military Government.

The situation in which the Military Governor, Admiral Robison, now found himself was naturally one of peculiar difficulty. The announcement of the intention of the United States Government to commence the immediate withdrawal of the American Forces of Occupation from the Dominican Republic had occasioned a feeling of general expectancy and of general unrest throughout the country, which the ensuing stalemate had increased rather than diminished. Unfitted, naturally enough, by any previous training, to deal with the complex local political situation which had been largely responsible for the

deadlock that had resulted, Admiral Robison limited himself to carrying out the letter of his instructions, and refrained from the discussion with the various political leaders of such modifications of the terms of the program of evacuation as might have met their objections, and as might at the same time have made more plain the true intent of the Department of State. The situation was one which called for a clearer understanding on the part of the Dominican leaders of the desires of the United States Government, and for the modification by that Government of those portions of its proposals which had been designed to safeguard the interests of the Dominican Republic itself, and which might readily have been adjusted to conform more closely to the wishes of the Dominican people without losing any of thir value thereby. With the best intention on both sides, a situation had resulted which might readily have been avoided as the result of frank discussion.

The Military Governor was furthermore handicapped by the increasing gravity of the financial condition of the Dominican Government. The funds saved during the previous prosperous years had been expended, occasionally most unwisely, in various projects undertaken by the preceding Military Governor. It had now become evident that even with the greatest economy in administration either the continuation of the public works program must be suspended, or the routine obligations of the Government must remain unpaid, unless an additional loan could be obtained by the Dominican Government. Owing to its hope, however, that the initial refusal of the Dominican leaders to coöperate in carrying out the program of evacuation which it had announced, would be later modified, and impressed by the general public opposition in the

Dominican Republic to the contracting of further loans on behalf of the Dominican people by the Military Government, the Department of State for some time refused to authorize the issuance of the loan recommended by the Military Governor.

For some six months, the situation continued without change. Finally, in February, 1922, Secretary Hughes reached the decision that a continuation of the unsettled condition prevailing in the Dominican Republic could not be permitted. The Military Government had practically ceased to function, except spasmodically, owing to its financial straits and to the refusal of the Department of State to authorize a new loan. He therefore instructed the American Minister in Santo Domingo and the Military Governor to call together the leaders of the Dominican political parties, and to advise them that unless some assurance were immediately obtained of a satisfactory execution of the program of evacuation, the proclamation of June 14, 1921, would be withdrawn, and the Military Government would be continued until after such time as the most urgent public works had been completed, and an adequate Dominican constabulary, officered by trained Dominican officers, had been established, with the hope that thereafter control of the Republic could be turned over to a properly constituted Dominican Government. The Military Governor was likewise instructed to make it plain to the Dominican leaders attending the meeting that the Department of State had no desire to have the proposed elections supervised by military officials of the United States, but that, on the contrary, it was disposed to have the elections supervised by Dominican citizens selected by the Dominican political leaders. Finally, the political leaders were to be informed that in order to provide for

the proper functioning of the Military Government, the United States Government intended to authorize immediately the flotation of a Dominican loan of $10,000,000, which would provide for the completion of the public works program, whether under the Military Government or under a Dominican Government.

At the conference held in accordance with these instructions, attended by Archbishop Nouel, General Horacio Vasquez, Don Federico Velasquez, Dr. Ramón Baez, Don Enrique Jiménez, Don Francisco J. Peynado, Dr. José Maria Cabral y Baez, Justice Rafael Justino Castillo, Don Tulio Cestero, Don Jacinto de Castro, Judge Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha, General Juan Francisco Sánchez, and Don Manuel de Jesús Lluberes, representative of every political party and faction, no modification of the earlier rejection of the American Government's proposals was obtained. The political leaders present, on the contrary, signed a formal statement refusing to coöperate with the Government of the United States upon the terms proposed. Consequently, on March 16, 1922, the Military Governor was authorized to issue a proclamation announcing that the Military Government would continue for a further period, at least until July 1, 1924.

5.

Within a few weeks, however, the situation assumed a different aspect. Don Federico Velasquez, who, in conversations with General Horacio Vasquez, had ascertained that the viewpoint of the two political parties which they represented was very closely alike as regards the announced policy of the United States, informed the Military Governor, on March 27th, on behalf of the Progresista party, as the Velasquez party had now become known, and on

behalf of the Partido Nacional, the new name bestowed upon the old Horacista party, that as soon as the financial situation of the Dominican Government had been improved through the flotation of the new loan, and the Dominican constabulary had been established upon a sufficiently firm foundation, a proposal would be addressed to the Government of the United States by those two political parties with a view to reaching an accord which would permit the holding of national elections. The first of these requirements was soon met in the issuance by the Military Government, with the approval of the Department of State, of a loan of $6,700,000 in twenty-year 5½ per cent bonds. In an official announcement issued at the time by the Department of State, it was declared that the proceeds of this loan would be used to retire the balance of the small bond issue authorized in 1921; to pay the internal indebtedness of the Republic; to pay the debt of approximately $950,000 contracted by the Military Government for the purchase of tobacco when the tobacco planters of the Republic faced impending ruin due to their inability to market their crop in Europe; to repay the balance of approximately $500,000 of certificates of indebtedness issued by the Military Government in the preceding month of January; to complete the construction of the highroad between Monte Cristi and the capital, and for other urgent public purposes. The new loan was secured, like previous loans, by a lien upon the customs revenues of the Republic. The Department of State seized this opportunity of stating that although it had been evident for some time that this new loan was urgently required, the authorization of its issuance had been withheld in the hope that the early establishment of a Dominican Government might have made the matter one

which could be determined by the Dominican people themselves.

At approximately this time, Don Francisco J. Peynado came to the United States. Convinced as he was of the fact that the failure of the American Government to obtain the coöperation of the Dominican political leaders in carrying out the program of evacuation which it had announced, was not due to the intent of the Government of the United States to obtain a prior agreement or commitment from the Dominican people which would in any way impair the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic, but was rather due to the inability of the officials of the Military Government in Santo Domingo to understand the psychology of the Dominican people, he had come to the conclusion that the negotiation of a satisfactory agreement could be reached only as the result of conferences in Washington and not as the result of further negotiation in Santo Domingo. His personal position as a representative Dominican citizen, free from any political ties in his own country, rendered his task easier.

In the course of several interviews granted him by Secretary Hughes he succeeded in facilitating the reaching of an understanding. He formulated a proposal for a modification of the program of evacuation of the preceding year which was found acceptable in principle. In this new plan the salient feature was the establishment of a Provisional Dominican Government, which would assume certain administrative functions in the Dominican Republic at the same time that the Military Government continued with restricted powers, in order that the supervision of the elections for a Constitutional President of the Republic and for the members of the Dominican Congress might be entrusted to a Dominican Government

rather than to a Military Government composed of American officials. With this basis for discussion, having himself reached the conclusion that a resumption of negotiations in Santo Domingo was futile, Secretary Hughes made it known to the chiefs of the Dominican political parties that they would be welcomed should they come to Washington to reach a final conclusion as to the steps which the United States Government should take in its policy of evacuation in order to gain the coöperation of the Dominican people.

General Horacio Vasquez and Don Federico Velasquez, who, after some consideration, determined to respond to this invitation, arrived in Washington toward the latter part of June. In the conferences which ensued, in which Señor Peynado shared, it was readily ascertained that no fundamental disagreement existed between the Dominican political leaders and the Department of State as to the conditions upon which the American Government felt it necessary to insist as a prerequisite to its withdrawal, and as to the nature of the steps providing for that withdrawal. Consequently, on June 30th, a memorandum comprising the details of the plan elaborated was drawn up, with the approval of the Dominican leaders participating in the conference, and with the subsequent approval of Don Elias Brache, who came to Washington somewhat later as the representative of the Partido Liberal, a fraction of the old Jimenista party.

The plan outlined in this memorandum was published in the following form:

"A Provisional Government, composed of Dominican citizens and selected by representatives of the Dominican people, will be installed to enable the citizens of the Do-

inican Republic to carry out such legislative reforms as ey may desire, and to make such amendments to their onstitution as they may deem appropriate, and to hold eneral elections for the installation of a subsequent ermanent Government without the intervention of the uthorities of the United States.

"The representatives of the Dominican people, who will lect the members of the executive power of the Pro- sional Government, will determine the conditions placed pon the exercise of that Government, and the said repre- ntatives will fill the vacancies that may occur in the Pro- sional Government on account of the death, resignation disability of any of its members.

"The Military Government will delegate to the Pro- sional Government administrative powers to carry out eely the aforesaid purposes.

"Upon the inauguration of the Provisional Government e Executive Departments of the Dominican Republic ill be turned over to the Cabinet Ministers appointed by e Provisional President. The officials now in charge of e Executive Departments of the Military Government ill lend their assistance to the respective Secretaries of tate of the Provisional Government. No payment will e made by the Department of Finance except in accord- nce with the provisions of the budget; but any necessary em of expenditure not provided for in the budget will e appropriated by the Provisional Government in agree- ent with the Military Government.

"Immediately upon the installation of the Provisional overnment the Military Government will deliver to that overnment the National Palace, and, at the same time, e Military forces of the United States in the Dominican epublic will be concentrated in one, two or three places, may be determined by the Military Governor. From that me peace and order will be maintained by the Dominican

National police under the orders of the Provisional Government, except in the case of serious disturbances which, in the opinion of the Provisional Government and of the Military Government, cannot be suppressed by the Dominican national police.

"Plenipotentiaries will be designated by the Provisional Government to negotiate a Convention with the United States containing only the following provisions:

" 'Recognition by the Dominican Government of the validity of all the Executive and Departmental Orders promulgated by the Military Government and published in the *Official Gazette* which may have levied taxes, authorized expenditures or established rights on behalf of third persons, and of the contracts which may have been entered into in accordance with those Orders, or with any law of the Republic, and specific recognition by the Dominican Government, in accordance with the foregoing, of the bond issues authorized in 1918, and in 1922.

" 'Agreement between the two Governments that the Convention signed on February 8, 1907, between the United States and the Dominican Republic, shall remain in force so long as any bonds of the issues of 1918 and 1922 shall remain unpaid; and that the duties of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs, appointed in accordance with that Convention, shall be extended to include the collection and application of the revenues pledged for the service of these bond issues, in accordance with the terms of the Executive Orders and of the contracts under which these bonds have been issued.'

"After a National Congress has been elected by general elections, held in accordance with the Constitution, the Convention, above mentioned, will be submitted to it for its approval. Thereupon, after the legislative reforms and the reforms in the Constitution which the Dominican

eople may desire have been carried into effect, if the onvention, above referred to, has been approved by the ational Congress, elections will be held in accordance ith the Constitution for the election of the members of e executive power. Upon the assumption of office by the onstitutional President of the Dominican Republic, the id Convention will be approved by him and the Pro- sional Government will thereupon terminate. Imme- ately thereafter the American Military Forces of Occu- tion will leave the Dominican Republic."

It was announced at the same time, in order that the overnment of the United States might be advised with- t delay whether the agreement reached in Washington et with the approval of the majority of the Dominican eople, that President Harding had appointed Mr. Sumner elles, who had resigned as Chief of the Latin American ivision of the Department of State on March 15, 1922, ommissioner with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and inister Plenipotentiary

o represent him in the Dominican Republic for the rpose of investigating and reporting upon political con- tions in the Dominican Republic, and for the purpose ascertaining the views of the Dominican people with spect to an appropriate agreement with the Government the United States as a result of which the Military rces of the United States might be withdrawn from the ominican Republic."

6.

Prior to the arrival of the American Commissioner in nto Domingo on July 29th, the opposition to the agree- ent reached in Washington had become intense through- t the Republic. The leading orators of the Nacionalista

groups, which still hoped to procure either the reinstatement of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal as Provisional President of the Republic, or the "pure and simple" evacuation of the Republic, fanned the antagonism of the more excitable elements of the population to fever heat. The political leaders who had participated in the conferences in Washington together with Señor Peynado had returned to the Republic during the early part of July, and had at public meetings endeavoured to make plain to their fellow-citizens that the agreement proposed safeguarded the vital interests of the nation and provided at the same time an efficacious method whereby Constitutional Dominican Government might be substituted for the American Military Occupation. While these addresses, as well as the private conversations which the leaders had with their political followers, did much to convince the saner elements of the population of the desirability of acquiescing in the project, the agitation created by the Nacionalista orators and the Nacionalista press continued to be very great. Charges of treason and betrayal of their country were leveled against those who had journeyed to Washington, and public disorder broke out in several parts of the Republic, although this was in no instance of serious proportions.

Popular agitation had, however, been somewhat allayed by the time the American Commissioner arrived in the Dominican Capital, and was still further calmed by his immediate publication of a statement making known the true purpose of his mission.

The Commissioner at once determined, as a matter of expediency, to journey to all the important centers of the Republic, himself to make known, on behalf of his Government, by addresses and by personal conferences, the

ue character of the Convention which the Government the United States proposed to negotiate as a prerequisite its withdrawal, and to elucidate the several steps in the oposed plan of evacuation, concerning which serious ubts had already arisen in the minds of even those ominicans who were not opposed to any and all pro- sals emanating from the Government of the United ates.

In accordance with this decision, the Commissioner sited, in company with one or more of the political aders, Bonao, La Vega, Moca, Santiago, San Francisco Macorís, Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, and subsequently arahona, Azua, San Pedro de Macorís, Sánchez, and maná, where he was afforded the opportunity of explain- g personally the true contents of the plan of evacuation, d of showing the unfounded nature of many of the jections which had been raised thereto, to assemblies of ominicans which varied, in accordance with the size of e communities visited, from between several thousands several hundreds of people.

As a result of the survey so made, the Commissioner as soon enabled to report to Secretary Hughes that the eat majority of the people undoubtedly supported the aders of the chief political parties in approving of the an of evacuation, and that those opposing the plan, while ore vocal than its supporters, nevertheless constituted it a very small percentage of the electorate of the epublic.

As soon as this decision had been reached, steps were ken to proceed immediately with the initiation of the rst stages in the evacuation of the Republic. As an sential preliminary the Commissioner decided that an ecutive board should be created to which should be sub-

mitted all determinations to be reached in carrying out the evacuating program, and as a means of maintaining, throughout the process of evacuation, a constant contact between the real rulers of public opinion in the Dominican Republic and the Department of State. This board, later known generally as the Commission of Representatives, was composed at the outset, in addition to the American Commissioner, of General Horacio Vasquez, the chief of the Partido Nacional; Don Federico Velasquez, the chief of the Partido Progresista; Don Elias Brache, accepted as their representative by the majority of the members of the old Jimenista party; and of Don Francisco J. Peynado as a representative Dominican unaffiliated with any political party. With the consent of these members, the Commission was further increased by the inclusion of the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Monseñor Nouel.

As events subsequently proved, it is highly doubtful whether the plan of evacuation could have been successfully carried out without the intervention of the Commission of Representatives. In the early months, before the Provisional Government had been installed, the grounds of contention between the Dominican leaders and the officials of the Military Government were so numerous, and in many cases so grave, that a deadlock might once more have ensued, as it had in the past, had it not been possible for the views of the Dominican members of the Commission to be transmitted directly to the Secretary of State in Washington, and for the determinations reached by Secretary Hughes to be transmitted to the Dominican leaders solely through the channel of President Harding's representative. Again, the months passed after the Provisional Government had been installed, when the political ambitions of the members of

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the divers parties had once more become sharpened and rivalry had become keen, the presence on the Commission of representatives of all the parties afforded a common meeting ground, and provided a positive assurance to the members of all factions that their desires and their views would be heard.

The sole group not represented upon the Commission was the Nacionalista faction. This, however, was due to the refusal of Dr. Henriquez y Carvajal either to accept a position upon the Commission himself, or to nominate a representative to take part in its deliberations, since he maintained that his position of determined opposition to the plan itself, and to any similar project, would make his participation in the work of the Commission futile.

The utility of the Commission of Representatives as a continuing executive board was demonstrated in a striking manner within ten days after the arrival of the American Commissioner. When the memorandum containing the plan of evacuation had been agreed upon in Washington, the Dominican signatories had received the positive assurance that the only changes which the Government of the United States reserved the right to make in the plan, without obtaining the prior agreement of the Dominican Representatives, were such as might be deemed necessary to protect the rights of third persons not amply safeguarded in the original draft of the proposed Convention. Upon the return of the political leaders to the Dominican Republic, the Dominican people generally had been informed of this assurance. The Military Governor, however, in a letter addressed to the American Commissioner on August 9th, transmitted a series of proposed modifications to the plan of evacuation which he stated he felt it essential should be made, and which he had recommended

by cable to the Navy Department in Washington. Certain of these suggested modifications were believed desirable for the protection of the American Forces of Occupation and for the purpose of avoiding the possibility of friction between the members of the American military establishment and the Dominican people, the necessity of which was readily appreciated by the Dominican representatives. Several others, however, provided for changes in the plan as agreed upon beyond the limits of those requirements, and these changes would unquestionably have been regarded by the Dominican representatives, had they been insisted upon by the Department of State, as constituting a breach of faith on the part of the Government of the United States, and would presumably have resulted in the resignation of the Dominican members from the Commission of Representatives, and in a consequent renewal of the deadlock which had existed throughout the preceding year.

The American Commissioner therefore urged the Department of State to maintain the assurances already given the Dominican leaders, and was promptly authorized by Secretary Hughes to inform the Dominican representatives that the plan as agreed upon in Washington would not be open to further modification except in phraseology, or in such details as were consented to by both the Department of State and the Dominican leaders, and that such engagements as the Military Governor desired to effect for the purely military purposes above mentioned, might be obtained through an exchange of notes between the American Commissioner and the Dominican members of the Commission of Representatives. The determination so reached by the Secretary of State prevented the raising of an issue which would unquestionably have been highly

prejudicial to the satisfactory execution of the plan of evacuation, had it not, in fact, caused its complete breakdown. It made evident, more than ever before, that the intervention of more than one executive department of the United States in carrying out the foreign policy of the United States rendered the achievement of satisfactory results highly improbable.

7.

During August and September, the Commission of Representatives met daily, its sessions continuing morning, afternoon, and evening. Every feature of the plan of evacuation originally conceived in Washington was carefully considered from every point of view, and in those instances where the Dominican representatives and the American Commissioner jointly considered changes in phraseology or in methods of procedure desirable, such changes were made. The proposed Convention of evacuation was amended in such a manner as to provide for greater clarity, and an additional clause was inserted providing for the arbitration of all disputes between the two Governments which might arise from differences in the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention.

Furthermore, the members of the Commission were obliged to undertake the very considerable labour of reviewing all the executive orders issued in the six years of the Military Government, to the end that such orders as had been promulgated by the Military Government and published in the *Official Gazette,* which had levied taxes, authorized expenditures, or established rights on behalf of third persons, as well as the administrative regulations issued, and the contracts which had been entered into in accordance with those orders, or with any law of the

Republic, might be listed by specific reference in the body of the proposed Convention itself.

At length, on September 19th, the definitive version of the plan of evacuation, containing the final draft of the proposed Convention, was signed by the Dominican and American members of the Commission of Representatives, and was published throughout the Republic a few days later in the following form:

1. Announcement by the Military Government that a Provisional Government will be set up for the purpose of promulgating legislation to regulate the holding of elections, and to provide for the reorganization of the provincial and municipal governments, and to enable the Dominican people to make such amendments to the Constitution as they may deem appropriate and hold general elections without the intervention of the Military Government. At the same time, the Military Government will announce that the Provisional Government will assume from the date of its installation, administrative powers to carry out freely the aforesaid purposes; and the said Provisional Government, from that date, will alone be responsible for its acts.

2. The selection of a Provisional President and Cabinet by majority vote of the members of a Commission composed of General Horacio Vasquez, Don Federico Velasquez, Don Elias Brache, Don Francisco Peynado, and of Monseñor Dr. Adolfo Nouel, upon the inclusion of whom the four above named representatives have agreed. The Commission, in determining upon the members of the Provisional Government, will determine the conditions placed upon the exercise of that Government, and the said Commission, by a majority vote, will fill the vacancies that may occur in that Government on account of death, resignation, or disability, of any of its members. Upon the

inauguration of the Provisional Government, the Executive Departments of the Dominican Republic shall be turned over to the members of the Cabinet thus designated. There shall be no change in the personnel of these Departments, except for duly proved cause; the judges and other officials of the Judiciary cannot be removed except for the same reason. Officials in charge of the Executive Departments of the Military Government will lend their assistance to the respective Secretaries of State of the Provisional Government whenever such assistance may be requested. There shall be no payment made by the Department of Finance except in accordance with the budget in force, nor will any payment be made otherwise than as customary. Any necessary item of expenditure not provided for in the budget will be appropriated by the Provisional Government in accord with the Military Governor. Immediately upon the installation of the Provisional Government, the Military Government will deliver to that Government the National Palace, and, at the same time, the Military Forces of the United States in the Dominican Republic will be concentrated at one, two, or three places, as may be determined by the Military Governor. From that date, peace and order will be maintained by the Dominican Government, except in the case of serious disturbances, which in the opinion of the Provisional Government, and of the Military Governor, cannot be suppressed by the Forces of the Dominican Police.

3. The Provisional President will promulgate the legislation above referred to concerning the holding of elections and the reorganization of the Government of the Provinces and Communes.

4. The Provisional President will convene the Primary Assemblies in accordance with the provisions of the new election law and those Assemblies will elect the electors as provided by Article 84 of the present Constitution and the

public functionaries whose election is prescribed in the laws regulating the organization of the Provinces and Communes.

5. The Electoral Colleges so elected by the Primary Assemblies will elect the members of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies and will prepare the lists of the members of the Judiciary to be submitted to the National Senate.

6. The Congress will vote the necessary amendments to the Constitution and will issue the call for the election of the Constitutional Assembly, to which the proposed amendments will be submitted.

7. The Provisional President will designate plenipotentiaries to negotiate a Convention of Ratification reading as follows:

I. The Dominican Government hereby recognizes the validity of all the Executive Orders, promulgated by the Military Government, and published in the *Official Gazette,* which may have levied taxes, authorized expenditures, or established rights on behalf of third persons, and the administrative regulations issued, and contracts which may have been entered into, in accordance with those Orders or with any law of the Republic. These Orders, administrative regulations and contracts are those listed below.

The Dominican Government likewise agrees that those Executive Orders, those resolutions, those administrative regulations, and those contracts shall remain in full force and effect unless and until they are abrogated by those bodies which, in accordance with the Dominican Constitution, can legislate. But, this ratification, in so far as concerns those of the above mentioned Executive Orders, resolutions, administrative regulations, and contracts, which have been modified or abrogated by other Executive orders, resolutions, or administrative regulations of

the Military Government, only refers to the legal effects which they created while they were in force.

The Dominican Government further agrees that neither the subsequent abrogation of those Executive Orders, resolutions, administrative regulations, or contracts, or any other law, Executive Order, or other official act of the Dominican Government, shall affect the validity or security of rights acquired in accordance with those orders, those resolutions, those administrative regulations and those contracts of the Military Government; the controversies which may arise related with those rights acquired will be determined solely by the Dominican Courts, subject, however, in accordance with the generally accepted rules and principles of international law, to the right of diplomatic intervention if those courts should be responsible for cases of notorious injustice or denial of justice. The determination of such cases in which the interests of the United States and the Dominican Republic only are concerned shall, should the two Governments disagree, be by arbitration. In the carrying out of this agreement, in each individual case, the High Contracting Parties, once the necessity of arbitration is determined, shall conclude a special agreement defining clearly the scope of the dispute, the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and the periods to be fixed for the formation of the arbitral tribunal and the several stages of the procedure. It is understood that on the part of the United States, such special agreements will be made by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, and on the part of the Dominican Republic shall be subject to the procedure required by the Constitution and laws thereof.

II. The Dominican Government, in accordance with the Provisions of Article I, specifically recognizes the bond issue of 1918 and the twenty-year five and one-half per

cent Customs Administration Sinking Fund Gold Bond Issue authorized in 1922, as legal, binding, and irrevocable obligations of the Republic, and pledges its full faith and credit to the maintenance of the service of those bond issues. With reference to the stipulation contained in Article 10 of the Executive Order No. 735, in accordance with which the loan of five and one-half per cent authorized in 1922 was issued, which provides:

"That the present customs tariff will not be changed during the life of this loan without previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the Government of the United States:"

the two Governments concerned agree in interpreting this stipulation in the sense that in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention of 1907, a previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States shall be necessary to modify the import duties, it being an indispensable condition before the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognize, that on the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rates of duties have been, for each of such two years, in excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.

III. The Dominican Government and the Government of the United States agree that the Convention signed on February 8, 1907, between the United States and the Dominican Republic, shall remain in force so long as any bonds of the issues of 1918 and 1922 shall remain unpaid, and that the duties of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs appointed in accordance with that Convention

shall be extended to include the application of the revenues pledged for the service of those bond issues in accordance with the terms of the Executive Orders and of the contracts under which the bonds were issued.

IV. This arrangement shall take effect after the approval by the Senate of the United States and the Congress of the Dominican Republic.

This Convention will be referred to the Congress for its approval. The Congress will, in addition, pass the law recognizing independently of the Convention of Ratification the validity of the Executive Orders referred to in the said Convention.

8. The members of the Judicial Power will be elected in accordance with the Constitution.

9. After all the steps specified in the foregoing articles have been taken and after the Convention mentioned in Article 7 has been approved and the law referred to in the same article has gone into effect, the members of the Executive Power will be elected in accordance with the Constitution. Immediately upon taking possession of his office, the President will sign the law ratifying the Executive Orders and the Convention, and the Military Forces of the United States will thereupon leave the territory of the Dominican Republic.

8.

The official publication of the plan of evacuation had a most salutary effect upon public opinion in the Dominican Republic. Owing to the delay in its publication, due to the time entailed by the task of revision, agitators of the Nacionalista group had been studiously spreading the report that the plan contained hidden commitments and secret stipulations not made known by the party leaders to the Dominican people. Its publication in official form

convinced all but the agitators themselves that the plan presented a fit method of terminating the Military Government and of reëstablishing a Constitutional Dominican Government, and in addition thereto, that it safeguarded the sovereignty and independence of the Dominican Republic.

At the last moment, however, two unexpected difficulties arose. The first, due to the wish of the Dominican members of the Commission that no American military officials, nor any troops under their command, be present by any chance at the polling booths on the day when the national elections took place, and to the Military Governor's objection to complying with this desire, was solved by the concession to the Dominican leaders of the engagement they requested.

The second was of a more serious character. Since the duty of selecting the Provisional President of the Republic devolved under the plan of evacuation upon the Dominican members of the Commission of Representatives, the fear had arisen on the part of General Vasquez and of Don Federico Velasquez that since the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Monseñor Nouel, was believed to be inclined in his political sympathies towards the Jimenista party, the representative of that party, Don Elias Brache, together with the Archbishop, would vote for a Jimenista candidate; and should Don Francisco Peynado, appointed to the Commission as representative of the independent voters in the Republic, be likewise inclined towards that party, it was evident in advance that the majority of the members of the Commission would select a Jimenista as Provisional President.

This suspicion was, however, promptly dispelled by the positive declaration on the part of Dr. Peynado that he

had no understanding, formal or informal, with any political party, and that he had at that time no political ambitions, and that in the event that he should later determine to accept a nomination for the Presidency, he would first resign from the Commission. This latter commitment of Dr. Peynado was made in view of the fact that it had been determined to continue the existence of the Commission of Representatives, in the nature of an Executive Council, throughout the duration of the Provisional Government, and until the inauguration of the Constitutional President of the Republic.

As soon as these difficulties had been satisfactorily resolved, the Dominican members of the Commission, meeting in the Palace of the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, proceeded to vote for a Provisional President of the Republic.

The method of selection determined upon was that each member of the Commission should write the name of the candidate proposed by him; that such proposals should then be scrutinized by all the members of the Commission, and that successive ballots should be cast until it could be ascertained whether or not a unanimous vote might be obtained. It had been provided that the selection of the Provisional President might be made by a majority of four out of the five votes, but it was the general feeling, strongly expressed, that in order to avoid, so far as possible, future discord, the selection should be unanimous.

The first candidate to be seriously considered among those proposed was Canon Armando Lamarche Marchena, the vicar of La Vega. Padre Lamarche, perhaps the most distinguished member of the Dominican clergy, and a man of recognized force of character and ability, had, for several years, kept aloof from all active politics, although some

fifteen years earlier he had been a most eloquent member of the House of Deputies. His name proved acceptable to four out of the five members of the Commission, namely, the Archbishop, General Vasquez, Señor Velasquez, and Señor Peynado, but his election was strongly opposed by Señor Elias Brache on the ground that he had previously been identified with the interests of the Horacista party. Consequently, his name was passed over in accordance with the desire of all of the members of the Commission to reach a unanimous agreement. The name of Don Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos was subsequently offered by Don Federico Velasquez, and his name proved acceptable to all the members of the Commission.

At the time of his election, Señor Vicini Burgos was a man about fifty years of age. He had never taken the slightest part in active politics in the Republic. He was the son of an Italian, Giovanni Battista Vicini, who had come to the Dominican Republic as a youth, and who, upon his death, left one of the largest fortunes ever amassed by a resident of the Republic. Since he was born in the Republic, of a Dominican mother, Señor Vicini Burgos was constitutionally eligible for the presidency. He was recognized as possessing great executive ability, which he had demonstrated in the administration of the estate left by his father. Added to these qualifications, moreover, was the fact that his previous aloofness from politics rendered him acceptable to the leading politicians of the country, and, while he was largely unknown to the populace, it was felt that his ability would soon create for him general respect and support. The one objection advanced against him was the fact that it was generally supposed that his sympathies during the preceding months had been inclined towards the stand taken by the Nacionalista leaders, which

might make him unwilling to accept the terms of the plan of evacuation should he be elected to the Provisional Presidency. This objection, however, was soon dissipated in view of Señor Vicini Burgos's acceptance of the plan, and his agreement to assume the office of Provisional President if elected thereto in accordance with the plan, when approached confidentially by two members of the Commission. The election of Señor Vicini Burgos as Provisional President was therefore finally determined.

The Commission immediately thereafter telephoned to the Commandant of the Ozama Fortress and the salute of twenty-one guns fired from the Ozama cannon announced to the people assembled in the public squares of the city that the first step had been taken on the path which led towards the complete restoration of Dominican sovereignty.

On the following day, October 2nd, the Commission agreed unanimously upon the selection as Minister of the Interior and Police, of Señor José del Carmen Ariza, whose name had been proposed by General Vasquez. The selection of Señor Ariza, a resident of Puerto Plata, and a most successful and progressive manufacturer, met with general popular approval by reason of the fact that it was well known that he had no pronounced political sympathies and was, in fact, equally friendly to all the political parties. On the succeeding days, the leaders of the three political parties submitted to the President-elect their recommendations for the constitution of the Provisional Cabinet, in accordance with the agreement previously entered into by them whereby the Provisional President was to select two Ministers from each of the three political parties. The Cabinet as finally constituted was as follows: Secretary of Interior and Police, Don José del Carmen Ariza; Secretary

of Justice and Public Instruction, Don C. Armando Rodriguez; Secretary of Hacienda and Commerce, Don Eladio Sánchez; Secretary of Fomento and Communications, Don Octavio A. Acevedo; Secretary of Foreign Relations, Don Angel Morales; Secretary of Sanitation and Charities, Don Manuel Maria Sanabia; Secretary of Agriculture and Immigration, Don Pedro A. Pérez.

On the morning of October 21st, the Provisional Government was formally installed. The inaugural ceremonies took place in the Senate Chamber. The Provisional President was sworn in by the senior member of the Supreme Court, and after taking the oath of office, delivered his inaugural address to the gathering which had assembled there. Señor Vicini Burgos's address, which was concise and statesmanlike, contained the following noteworthy passages:

"The period which we are confronting is one of national reconstruction. It is one of transition, and I begin it with faith in the prudence and patriotism of the Dominican people; in the efficacy of the plan of evacuation and of the regulations which are to govern the exercise of my official duties; and with complete confidence in the high purpose and spirit of redemption and of justice of which the great American Nation has given so many proofs in its efforts to advance the liberty and independence of the other nations of the world . . . Possessing this optimism I declare that to obtain an independent and sovereign republic I will devote all my strength and all my efforts; always bearing in mind that in relation to internal political questions my conduct will be governed by a decided and unvarying impartiality to all political parties, as much because of my own convictions, as because I believe that my impartiality has been one of the determining conditions of my selection; and furthermore, because it is indi-

cated by the requirements of the country that only through such absolute impartiality and through equal justice in all the branches of the administration can I count upon the faith and general approbation of the entire country. It is necessary that all of us Dominicans, without exception, advance in accordance with our duty, putting to one side for the time being, should it be necessary for the general welfare, the immediate satisfaction of our personal ambitions, lending all of our support to the sole task of the restoration of the Republic and the re-establishment of its institutions."

After the completion of the ceremonies in the Senate Chamber, the Provisional President, with the members of his Cabinet and the members of the Judiciary, took part in the customary Te Deum in the Cathedral and from there proceeded to the Government Palace. The Parque Colón and the streets surrounding the Palace were crowded, and enthusiasm for the Provisional Government was general. In the great reception room on the second floor of the Palace, through the windows of which can be seen the crowded shipping in the harbour, and, beyond, the palms which overshadow the houses of Villa Duarte, the Military Governor had assembled his staff. While the customary speeches were taking place, the crowd from the street below broke through the cordon of police which guarded the main entrance to the Palace and surged up the great stairway, crowding in considerable numbers behind the railing which partitions off one side of the main reception room from the open hallway beyond. In the confusion which ensued, Admiral Robison and his staff withdrew, leaving the Palacio de Gobierno, for the first time since November 29, 1916, in the hands of the Dominican people.

Late in the afternoon of the same day, the Military Governor and his immediate staff left the country unostentatiously, General Harry Lee of the U. S. Marine Corps replacing Admiral Robison as acting Military Governor. While Admiral Robison, in his comparatively brief term of office, had been exceedingly active in advancing, as he saw them, the interests of the country at large, he has been remembered chiefly by the Dominicans for the impetus which he gave to the construction of public highways. His attention was primarily devoted to the activities of the Department of Public Works, which ever had his full sympathy and support, and the notable achievements of the Department of Public Works during the year preceding the installation of the Provisional Government were undoubtedly due to this fact. Admiral Robison himself inspected personally, with considerable frequency, the projects under construction, and in this way visited the greater part of the Municipalities of the Republic. It cannot be said, however, that his administration was sympathetically viewed by the Dominican public at large. The antipathy against the government of his predecessor was naturally inherited to a large extent by his own government, and the agitation for the restoration of Dominican sovereignty which was continuous throughout the year and a half of his administration rendered it unlikely that his many admirable qualities as an administrator should be duly appreciated. It should, however, be recognized that during his term of office the activities of the American officers in charge of the executive departments of the Dominican Government were far more beneficial than in the preceding years of the Military Government. There was no waste of Government money, and no rumours were current concerning the dissipation

of funds in improper or unproductive projects. No contact, however, existed between the members of the Military Government and the Dominican people, with the obvious result that the Military Governor himself was occasionally led astray into adopting measures which were essentially obnoxious to Dominican custom and feeling.

9.

During the first weeks of his Government, the time of the Provisional President was chiefly occupied in familiarizing himself with the details of the national Administration. Habits and practices had grown up during the six years of the Military Occupation alien to the environment to which they had been transplanted. Señor Vicini Burgos, essentially broadminded in his view of government, determined, so far as possible, to continue those innovations of the American Military Government which he believed could persist successfully after a Constitutional Administration came into power.

The difficulty of his task in general was greatly enhanced by the fact that all the political groups were already jockeying for advantage in the appointment of employees to posts not covered by the Civil Service, and by the fact that consequently among all classes of Government employees the fear was persistent that the incumbents might at any moment be removed to make place for political appointees. It was only after an official announcement by the Chief Executive that no changes in appointments would be made except where efficiency required, that the Government employees as a whole settled down to the routine of discharging their customary duties.

The President's chief interest lay in the betterment of conditions in the Department of Hacienda. Here, in fact,

his greatest opportunity for service lay, although, of necessity, the opportunity for improvement was to a very great extent limited by the restrictions imposed in the provisions of the plan of evacuation. The new Secretary of Hacienda, Señor Eladio Sánchez, was in no sense a financial expert, and as his appointment was due to his loyal support of Velasquez in the past, his efforts were primarily directed towards strengthening the political position of Señor Velasquez whenever he felt it possible. He was wholly engrossed in politics, and it was impossible for him to see eye to eye with the President when it came to the purging of the Department of Hacienda of incompetent employees when such employees belonged to the Progresista party. It was not long before rumours arose that there were serious leakages in the collection of internal revenue, and friction between the President and his Secretary of Hacienda continued until a new Secretary was appointed in the person of Don Agustín Acevedo, a most capable lawyer of Santiago.

On a lesser scale the same difficulties arose in the relations between the President and the Secretary of Sanitation, Don Manuel Maria Sanabia. The other members of the Cabinet, however, and notably the Ministers of Fomento and of Foreign Relations, Don Octavio Acevedo and Don Angel Morales, supported the President loyally throughout his term.

The concentration of American forces, as provided by the plan of evacuation, was carried out in accordance both with the letter and spirit of the agreement. The Acting Military Governor, General Lee, who was, within six months after the installation of the Provisional Dominican Government, appointed Military Governor, maintained harmonious relations with the Provisional Government,

and all questions which arose affecting the relations between the Forces of Occupation and the Dominican authorities were readily solved in a friendly manner. The intensive training by American officers of Dominican citizens, now enrolled as cadets of the Policía Nacional Dominicana, in training centers, went on apace under the more than competent direction of Col. Richard M. Cutts, U. S. M. C., and far more satisfactory results were obtained in this direction than even the most optimistic had ventured to hope during the preceding summer.

The most serious incident which arose to threaten the success of the Provisional Administration took place in the month of February, 1923, with the resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Police, Señor José del Carmen Ariza. Señor Ariza, a most high-minded, capable administrator, had authorized the issuance by his Department of numerous permits to carry arms. Such permits were rendered necessary by the terms of the Executive Order issued in 1917 by the then Military Governor, and owing to the general belief that the prime necessity of the country lay in general disarmament, permits to individuals to carry arms had been granted only in exceptional cases and when the authorities were convinced that special reasons warranted such licences. The renascent interest in politics, however, which occasioned from time to time local quarrels and disputes, and which was nowhere keener than in the Province of La Vega, made certain politicians feel that their personal safety was in danger. While Señor Ariza was among those convinced of the desirability of general disarmament, upon certain occasions he had granted permits to individuals to carry arms when the President did not share his feeling that the facts warranted the action taken. It was at no time alleged that the Minister of the

Interior had issued such permits in the interests of one party or of the other, but the President claimed that a precedent was being created by the Minister of the Interior which would be highly prejudicial in the future, and upon calling his Secretary of the Interior to account he was met with the rejoinder that the Chief Executive was overstepping the limits of his powers in interfering in a routine matter of the Ministry of the Interior. The incident, unfortunately, developed into a personal issue between the two officials, and the Provisional President, believing that it was essential that he assert his authority in the premises, called for and received the resignation of Secretary Ariza. The incident was deplorable in that it deprived the Government of the services of an able official, but it was palliated by the decision of the Commission of Representatives to appoint Señor Ariza to fill a vacancy which existed on the Commission, and to appoint Judge Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha as Secretary of the Interior to succeed Señor Ariza.

10.

The political situation had changed considerably during the late autumn of 1922. Señor Peynado had finally been persuaded, against his natural inclination, by two or three of the chief leaders of the old Jimenista party, to announce his candidacy for the Presidency. This necessitated his resignation from the Commission of Representatives as stipulated by his agreement with the members of the Commission prior to the signing of the plan of evacuation. While the political interests of the party of which he was now the candidate were, of course, represented upon the Commission by Don Elias Brache, it would undoubtedly have been preferable for Señor Peynado to continue

upon the Commission as representative of the Jimenista groups in the same manner in which General Vasquez and Señor Velasquez represented the interests of the parties of which they were leaders. A certain measure of misunderstanding could undoubtedly have been avoided in this manner. Close and harmonious relations between the political candidates could thus better have been maintained, and the projects of legislation to be framed by the Commission, and to be promulgated under the plan of evacuation by the Provisional President, might have been more rapidly drafted and agreed upon, had not Señor Peynado alienated himself from the deliberations of the Commission.

With the renewal of the political life of the Republic, the contact, moreover, between the Commission and the Provisional Government became daily less close, and the Executive was not inclined to press for the completion and proclamation of the electoral code and other projects of law when the candidates for the Presidency themselves, who might naturally have been considered the most closely concerned in the matter, devoted but little interest to the question. During the winter of 1923, the Commission met but rarely, since the political members thereof were for the most part traveling from commune to commune throughout the Republic, building up their fences, and presumably making bids for support through promises of future patronage should the results of the elections favour them. The American Government, in fact, by the close of the winter, became considerably concerned at the unexpected delays, particularly when it was called to mind that the first draft of the Electoral Law had been agreed upon six months before by the members of the Commission of Representatives. Finally, however, very largely as

the result of representations from Secretary Hughes, the Provisional President obtained the agreement of the members of the Commission to the proclamation of the new Electoral Law, and the latter, differing only in minor details from the draft tentatively agreed upon the preceding autumn, was promulgated by President Vicini Burgos on March 9, 1923.

Even so, no active steps were taken to carry out the provisions of the Law entailing the immediate registration of voters, a process which required ninety days' time. By midsummer, among all classes a feeling of discouragement began to be general. There was noted an apathy among the political leaders and among the rank and file of the voters, who undoubtedly seemed to show no white-heated desire to free their country from the "occupation of the invader," and the Nacionalista members began to hint that the political leaders and the members of the Provisional Government themselves had been suborned by the American Commissioner in order that it might be announced to the world that the Dominican people had been given the opportunity of freeing themselves from the Military Occupation by means of national elections, but had preferred American Occupation to National Government.

The difficulty in reality lay, however, in the fact that some of the political members of the Commission of Representatives, believing apparently that the elections would take place through some sleight of hand, preferred to spend their time in obtaining political adherents rather than in making practically possible the holding of elections.

The Central Electoral Board, created under the new Election Law, was composed of Justice Alejandro Woss y Gil of the Supreme Court, Judge Fidelio Despradel of the

Court of Appeals of Santiago, and Doctor Horacio Vicioso, Professor of Law in the University of Santo Domingo. The members of the Board, confronted with the task of carrying out the provisions of a detailed, complicated and technical legislative act with which the country had not previously been familiar, had, during the earlier stages of the electoral period, carried out their duties with considerable ability. It was apparent, however, as time wore on and the date for the holding of the national elections was at length set for the autumn of 1923, that the great majority of the members of the Partido Nacional and of the Partido Progresista, whose leaders, General Vasquez and Don Federico Velasquez, had determined to form an alliance between the two parties, with General Vasquez as candidate for the Presidency and Señor Velasquez as candidate for the Vice Presidency, should that office be created anew by amendment of the Constitution, felt that the decisions of the Central Electoral Board were consistently favouring the interests of the Partido de la Coalición Nacional Patriótica, the name under which the political groups supporting the candidacy of Señor Peynado had incorporated themselves as a political party.

This feeling came to a head when the Central Electoral Board, in September, 1923, determined that the local representatives of the Partido Nacional and of the Partido Progresista in the Province of La Vega had not complied with the registration regulations in sufficient time to enable the members of those parties in that Province to vote in the national elections. This decision would necessarily have prevented the candidates of the two allied parties from obtaining any votes in La Vega Province, and, since that Province is one of the three largest in the Republic, this

decision seemed tantamount to determining the elections in favour of Peynado. Bitter feeling was aroused throughout the Republic, and it was only due to the strong measures taken by the Provisional President, and to the insistence of General Vasquez and Señor Velasquez, that actual disturbances of public order did not occur. By the beginning of November, it seemed that the entire electoral machinery had broken down, and that the provisions of the plan of evacuation could not be carried out.

On November 3d, the American Commissioner, who had been absent for six months, returned once more to Santo Domingo with special instructions from the American Secretary of State.

He called, at once, a meeting of the Commission of Representatives, which had not been in session for many weeks owing to the bitter feeling which had developed between its political members. The meeting was held in the American Legation. The atmosphere was electric. General Vasquez and Señor Velasquez sat upon one side of the room—the General, passive and immobile as was his custom whenever he was peculiarly concerned, Señor Velasquez, nervous and highly wrought; on the other side of the room, Señor Brache, hardly able to contain himself; between the two opposing interests, Señor Ariza and the American Commissioner.

Señor Brache commenced the conference, however, in the suavest manner, and made it clear that by reason of a restrictive interpretation given to one of the articles of the Electoral Law the Central Electoral Board had rejected the allied parties' ticket in the Province of La Vega, and that in all probability, should the Board be consistent in its decisions, it would likewise render decisions which would result in the rejection of the tickets of those parties as

well in the Provinces of Barahona, Monte Cristi, and Puerto Plata. As soon as the situation had been outlined in this manner by Señor Brache, Señor Velasquez jumped to his feet and in a manner unusually vehement, even for that high-strung and temperamental politician, stated that should such be the case the allied parties would refuse to permit their representatives on the Municipal and Provincial electoral boards to take part in the election of members of the precinct boards, and that thus without precinct boards, no national elections could be held, and no termination of the American Military Occupation could be expected. It was immediately apparent that this strategy had not occurred to the representative of the Coalition party, and in a voice trembling with emotion, Señor Brache declared that it was painful for him, as a Dominican whose patriotism had never been questioned, to have the Representative of the United States Government hear an important political leader like Señor Velasquez state that he would counsel any measure such as this, which meant disregard for the laws of his own country, and an indefinite postponement of the independence of the Republic.

It was evident that an impasse had been reached, and that the elections could not be held should not each party waive the advantages which it had gained through technicalities in the electoral code, and the suggestion was, in fact, made at once by the American Commissioner that each party agree to waive such strategic advantages as it possessed in order that the slate might be wiped clean, and the best interests of the Dominican Republic be served by making the holding of fair elections possible.

After repeated conferences lasting over a period of many days, it was agreed that the Provisional President

should be authorized to issue a decree postponing the date of the elections; and that additional decrees should be promulgated by the President amending the Electoral Law so that both political parties should be granted an extension of time to rectify any technical mistakes which might have occurred in the drafting of their Provincial tickets; reconstituting the electoral boards in such a manner as to give both parties equal representation thereon throughout the Republic, and thus do away with the advantage gained by the "Alianza," as the allied parties had been termed, after the alliance between the Partido Nacional and the Partido Progresista had been formed subsequent to the promulgation of the Electoral Law; and further granting the Central Electoral Board the right to determine appeals brought by Municipal boards from decisions of the Provincial boards, thus enabling the Central Electoral Board to make its jurisdiction absolute. These concessions, in so far as they affected the interests of the Coalition party, were only agreed upon by the leaders of the Coalition as the result of the insistence of their Presidential candidate, and with the understanding that the President should make a series of new appointments so as to give both parties likewise equal representation among the Governors of Provinces, Síndicos, Fiscales and Judges of the First Instance.

As a matter of fact, the new appointments consequently made among the Judiciary and other authorities throughout the Republic became even more numerous than originally anticipated, and finally included, as well, changes in the Provisional Cabinet. The changes made, however, undoubtedly proved beneficial in the sense that the voters in general now were assured that no party had an undue advantage through the appointment, previous to the in-

stallation of the Provisional Government, of authorities enabled to coerce or influence the electorate.

A change in the Cabinet not included in this agreement, but which resulted from the spirit of conciliation responsible for the agreement, was that which was due to the refusal of the leaders of the Coalition party to agree to the continuance in office of Judge Troncoso de la Concha, appointed to fill the vacancy created the preceding year by the resignation of Señor Ariza as Minister of the Interior and Police. A man of the most admirable qualifications for the position, Judge Troncoso de la Concha had carried out his duties with entire impartiality. It is, however, probable that during his term as Minister of the Interior Judge Troncoso de la Concha had been indiscreet in permitting his unfavourable opinion of certain of the Coalition leaders to be known, and the irritation caused by his reflections had made him highly unpopular with those politicians upon whom his aspersions had been cast.

When it came to providing a successor to Judge Troncoso de la Concha, the Commission of Representatives found itself in a serious quandary. The state of political excitement into which the whole country had been plunged by the progress of the electoral campaign made it, in fact, a difficult thing for the Commission to find any individual of known impartiality who would satisfy both parties. Name after name was proposed and rejected. All ranks of public life were searched without avail. Finally, in a spirit of compromise, but with a notable lack of humour, the Commission determined that a solution be provided in the creation of the additional Cabinet position of Sub-Secretary of the Interior and Police; and by the casting of lots it was finally decided that Señor

Rafael Rincón, whose leanings were believed to be towards the Coalition party, should be named Minister of the Interior and Police, and that Señor Arismendi Robiou, whose relations had been rather with the old Horacista party, should be appointed as Sub-Secretary of that Department. The humour of the situation was heightened by the fact that the two appointees, both natives of the city of La Vega, had for many years been close personal friends, and after their nightly stroll around the park together, which had always been their custom in La Vega, they were nicknamed by the populace of the capital the "heavenly twins." Extravagant as the solution appeared, in practise it worked well, and Señores Rincón and Robiou remained in their posts to the satisfaction of all, so long as the Provisional Government continued in office.

During the days before the solution of the electoral crisis had been found, the Alianza party had attempted to impeach two members of the original Central Electoral Board upon the ground that they were notoriously partial to the interests of the Coalition party. While actual impeachment had been prevented through the refusal of the members of the Coalition party to permit the election of substitutes to the functionaries whose impeachment was demanded, and consequently no determination of the charges brought had been made possible, it was evident to all that the Central Electoral Board as originally constituted, no longer, justly or unjustly, commanded the confidence of the country.

It was clearly realized by the Provisional President and by the members of the Commission of Representatives that it was impossible for the elections to be held unless a Central Electoral Board, the final arbiter in all of the electoral procedure, could be constituted which com-

manded the respect and the confidence of the voters and of the other electoral authorities. In determining the amendments to the Electoral Law undertaken upon the promulgation of the decree of the Provisional President postponing the date of the national elections, it became evident that the most essential amendment lay in the resignation of the members of the original Central Electoral Board and their replacement by admittedly impartial judges. The problem, for a time, appeared difficult of solution, owing to the permeation of the entire populace, including even the members of the Judiciary and the faculty of the University, by the prevalent political fever. It was, however, finally agreed by the members of the Commission of Representatives that the President of the new Central Electoral Board should be Justice Augusto A. Jupiter, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. There was no room for doubt that the Justice had consistently refrained from political activities, and that his character and capacity could not be questioned. It was likewise determined that the choice for the other two members of the Board should fall upon Justice Alcibiades Roca, President of the Court of Appeals of La Vega, and Justice Eudaldo Troncoso de la Concha, a brother of the former Secretary of the Interior and a Justice of the Court of Appeals of Santo Domingo.

When the Provisional President, on December 21st, promulgated the decree containing the necessary amendments to the Electoral Law, the reconstitution of the Central Electoral Board was included therein. The appointments so made caused general satisfaction.

The new Central Electoral Board, immediately upon its constitution, proceeded with its duties in a commendable spirit of despatch. The new electoral period commenced

on January 15, 1924, and with its commencement, the political leaders, who had during the preceding electoral period found it easy to create delays by recourse to technical provisions of the Electoral Code, found their match in the members of the new Central Electoral Board, who determined soon after their inauguration that any decision rendered by the Board should constitute a precedent in the solution of all similar cases in order that delays in the execution of the Code might thus be avoided.

In the early days of February, the leaders of the Coalition party began to realize that the sentiment of the country was turning overwhelmingly in favour of the election of General Vasquez. The popularity of the old-time leader was daily increasing.

He was known from end to end of the country, and his followers of the past thirty years among all kinds and all classes rallied strongly about him. His fine qualities, his ideals, his oft-demonstrated desire for reform, his personal integrity, his unquestioned patriotism, his charm of manner in personal contact, had long rendered him a popular idol. Señor Peynado laboured under several serious disadvantages. As a professional man, ever previously aloof from political contacts, his appeal was primarily to the professional classes who were not strong numerically; the organization of the groups supporting him was deficient, and the Coalition party lacked the financial support which its opponents possessed. Desertions from the ranks of the Coalition party increased day by day, and Señor Peynado considered seriously, in the month of February, announcing his resignation as candidate for the Presidency. This intention his chief henchman prevailed upon him to abandon, but it could not be denied that the campaign was

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prosecuted by the Coalition candidate with a notable lack of enthusiasm.

The conception of a "national" government was discussed some two weeks prior to the elections. A few leaders of the Coalition party were willing to make any sacrifice, and to enter into any combination, which would have prevented General Vasquez from being elected to the Presidency. Señor Velasquez was approached with the suggestion that if General Vasquez could be prevailed upon to resign his candidacy, Señor Peynado would in turn resign his own candidacy, and the strength of both parties could then be thrown to Señor Velasquez. The latter, however, was far too keen a politician to be caught napping, realizing as he did that it would be impossible for him to obtain the wholehearted support of the Partido Nacional in such an event. The solution was then proposed that Señor Vicini Burgos be made a "national" candidate. The attempt was made to persuade General Vasquez that his election would cause widespread dissatisfaction in the country, and that true patriotism demanded that he resign his candidacy and throw his support to some neutral candidate. While General Vasquez was thoroughly prepared to make this sacrifice, the need of it could not be demonstrated. Furthermore, had Señor Peynado not cared more for the interests of his country than for his own political fortunes, he could at this moment have created a very serious situation by resigning his own candidacy. Had this been done, while General Vasquez would have been elected, discontent and unrest would have arisen throughout the country, and the administration of General Vasquez would have at once confronted sullen hostility on the part of all the factions composing the Coalition party. Señor Peynado, however, reached the determina-

tion to go to the polls in the interest of the public welfare.

The days of unrest and indecision prior to the date of the elections produced one benefit, in the decision of both candidates to request the national assemblies of their respective parties to better in some respects their lists of candidates for the Senate and the House of Deputies. It is difficult in any country for a politician who has received for many years the faithful support of local bosses, to ignore the personal services which may have thus been rendered him when the opportunity presents itself to reward such services by the distribution of offices. Both candidates for the Presidency had agreed to accept as Congressional candidates on their party tickets individuals whose personal qualifications demonstrated no valid reason for their election to public office, and at the time when a "national," or coalition, government was uppermost in the minds of both, they came to the conclusion that many changes for the better could be made in the lists of the candidates for the Senate and for the House of Deputies. Such changes, in accordance with the provisions of the electoral code permitting rectification of party tickets, subsequently were made, to the future advantage of the Republic.

11.

The day of the elections, March 15th, finally arrived. Voting commenced at sunrise and continued until sundown. Greater order had never been observed in the Republic. It is a literal fact that no disturbance of the public peace took place, except in a very few minor instances in the Province of La Vega, where party feeling ran very high. In the great majority of the polling booths, voting

erminated early in the afternoon, and as the result of rrangements made by the Central Electoral Board and he Provisional Government by which the computation f returns was expedited, it was evident by seven o'clock n the evening of that day that the candidates of the Alianza had been elected by an overwhelming vote. A day ater, when the election returns were definitely known, it vas found that the total number of votes cast was in the eighbourhood of 110,000, almost fifty per cent in excess f the votes cast in any previous election. The Alianza arty elected 25 out of 31 members of the House of Deputies, and 10 out of 12 members of the National enate, one of the two members of the Coalition party in he Upper House obtaining his election through the cast-ng of lots, owing to a tie vote in the Province from which e was a candidate.

As soon as the result of the elections was officially nnounced, Señor Peynado created a precedent in the Republic by publicly congratulating General Vasquez pon his election, and by promising him his personal sup-ort in the high office to which he had been elected. He kewise made known to the members of his party his ntention to refrain from making any appeal to the Central Electoral Board from the decisions of the lower Boards. The precedent so created by the defeated candidate con-ained an admirable example of patriotism, which, un-ortunately, has not been universal in the history of the American Republics. It did much to allay the disappoint-nent felt over their defeat by the members of the Coalition arty, and augured well for the advance of orderly govern-nent in the Dominican Republic.

During the weeks following the election, the President-lect was besieged by a horde of hungry spoilsmen looking

for a material reward in return for the support which they had given the successful candidate. General Vasquez was moved, however, more by consideration of the interests of the Republic than by the satisfaction of the aspirations of his followers. He made it generally known that it was his desire to have in his Cabinet competent administrators, no matter what their previous party connections had been, and he determined from the outset to include therein at least one member of the Coalition party. Bound as he was by his previous agreement with Vice President-elect Velasquez, entered into when the Alianza party was formed, to assign to the Progresista party one-third of the national Executive appointments, it was difficult for him to satisfy all the leading members of his own party, and a certain spirit of discontent was soon noted among those of his followers who refused to place the interests of the country as a whole above their personal ambitions. It was the original intention of General Vasquez to appoint the following Cabinet: Don Enrique Jiménez, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Don Angel Morales, Minister of the Interior and Police; the Provisional President, Don Juan B. Vicini Burgos, Minister of Hacienda; Don Andrés Pastoriza, Minister of Fomento and Communications; Don Rafael Espaillat, Minister of Agriculture and Immigration; Don Pedro A. Lluberes, Minister of Justice and Public Instruction; Don P. A. Ricart, Minister of Sanitation and Charities. The Cabinet as finally determined upon varied but little from that originally selected. Dr. Angel María Soler, a leading member of the Progresista party, was appointed in the place of Don Enrique Jiménez, and Dr. José Dolores Alfonseca was selected as Minister of Hacienda, owing to the refusal of Señor Vicini Burgos to accept that office, in which the latter's great capacity for

administration would undoubtedly have found large scope.

Early in June of the same year, having received an intimation that his visit to the United States would be welcomed by the American Government, General Vasquez determined to make a brief journey to Washington prior to the date of his inauguration, which had been set for the first week of July. He was inclined to undertake the trip because of his desire to take up directly with the officials of the American Government the long-mooted question of the reform of the 1907 Convention. The President-elect and Secretary Hughes both were in accord that the best interests of the Republic would be served were the Dominican Government afforded greater freedom in revising from time to time the schedules of the Dominican customs tariff than was permitted in the 1907 Convention, and were the Convention to be further amended so as to provide for less onerous conditions as regards the sinking-fund of the Dominican Republic's foreign obligations.

General Vasquez was accompanied on his voyage by Don José del Carmen Ariza, selected as Minister of the Dominican Republic in Washington and by Don Alfredo Ricart Olives, future President of the Ayuntamiento of the capital, and Don Federico Alvarez, future President of the Ayuntamiento of Santiago. Only four days were spent in the capital of the United States, but the period so spent proved highly beneficial in establishing a personal contact, which had never before existed, between a President of the Dominican Republic and the highest officials of the United States Government. An agreement was reached in principle, after some negotiation, for the desired revision of the 1907 Convention, and the Dominican Min-

ister in Washington was charged with the conclusion of a new Convention.

While the visit of General Vasquez to the United States met with criticism on the part of the Nacionalista element, at that time still vociferous, his cordial reception in Washington was undoubtedly a source of satisfaction to the great majority of the Dominican people, and aided in hastening the disappearance of the anti-American spirit which had been so bitter during the latter years of the Military Occupation.

On July 12, 1924, General Vasquez was inaugurated President of the Republic. For the inauguration, a great crowd had gathered, owing to the facility of travel, from all parts of the Republic. Leading men had come to be present at the third restoration of the Republic from Higüey, Seybo, Barahona and Azua, Monte Cristi and Santiago, San Francisco de Macorís, Sánchez and Samaná. Never before had it been possible for a newly inaugurated President to meet at the outset of his Administration with representative citizens from all parts of the country. The oath of office was taken in the hall of the Senate Chamber. Immediately after the inaugural address had been read, the President proceeded with his Cabinet to the customary Te Deum of thanksgiving, at which the Archbishop officiated. The members of the Government then walked, amid the spontaneous acclaim of the crowds gathered in the Parque Colón, to the Government Palace, and as the President entered the Palace to the accompaniment of the Presidential salute from the Fort, the American flag, which had waved at the mouth of the Ozama River for almost eight years, was lowered, and the Dominican flag was raised in its place.

The embarkation of the American Forces of Occupa-

tion, which had commenced in June, continued rapidly during the following weeks, and the last American marine left the Dominican Republic on September 18th. A new era of liberty and independence had commenced.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSIONS

1.

JAMES BRYCE pertinently wrote:

"Effort and suffering do no doubt test and try a community. War, be it civil or foreign, never leaves men the same as it found them, though the common assumption that it makes them either stronger, or wiser in the exercise of their strength, is as false as it is dangerous." [1]

While the insistent civil turmoil of the past eighty years of the independence of the Dominican people has indeed proved in every sense their bane, the continuous threat of foreign aggression, now from one side, again from another, has on the contrary proved their salvation. The fear of the infringement of their independence has in practice proved to be the one great compelling force which at moments of national danger could have fused local jealousies, political rivalries, and selfish ambitions into true patriotism, into the overwhelming determination to preserve the national liberties of the Dominican Republic intact. There has been no Republic of the American continent whose inhabitants have fought more nobly or against greater odds to maintain their freedom than have the Dominican people.

The fundamental cause for the conditions of anarchy, unrest, and civil disturbance which have existed almost continuously from the liberation of the Dominican Republic from Haiti in 1844 until the American Military Occupation in 1916, must be attributed to the years of Haitian domination. During the years when other Latin American Republics were afforded the opportunity of

[1] Bryce, "South America," p. 436.

learning to govern themselves, Santo Domingo was prostrate under the domination of a tyranny which had for its chief object not only the eradication of the Caucasian race but also the obliteration of all the foundations of European culture and civilization upon which the institutions of the American world have been builded.

Consequently, when Duarte and his associates undertook to free their country from Haiti they were confronted with the task not only of constructing the edifice of constitutional government, but likewise with the very laying of the foundations of culture, education, and civilized comprehension upon which such government must rest. When this significant fact is taken into consideration it is hardly a matter for surprise that the Dominican people were at first inclined to respond more readily to the rule of force than to the rule of reason.

Even so, the proportionate progress which they made along the path of self-government during the years which passed between the date of their freedom and the date of the Republic's annexation to Spain was in reality at least as great as that made during the same period by any other Latin American Republic. It is true, of course, that during that epoch, except in name, constitutional government in the Dominican Republic did not exist, and that the rights and obligations of the individual were ignored. It must be remembered, however, that it was during that same period that some of the most despotic governments, some of the most cruel tyrannies, known to the history of the Western Hemisphere existed in those very Republics of America which today are in the vanguard of modern progress. It was during those years that the tyrant Rosas flourished in Buenos Aires. The tyranny of the Lopez family in Paraguay was coincident; and in certain of the other Republics

of South America, as well as in Central America, until the present day despotisms have been the rule, and constitutional governments an exception.

Had it not been for the Spanish Occupation, the probability is that with the death or final downfall of the chief figures in the earlier history of the Dominican Republic a stable constitutional system would have been installed during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The geographic proximity of the Dominican Republic to the northern half of the American continent would doubtless have bound it closely to the United States by commercial ties, with which prosperity would have ensued, and in its wake, education, national development, and peace. The Spanish Occupation, however, again retarded a natural advance. The years of the annexation to Spain were passed in ceaseless struggle. Whatever stability had existed under Santana vanished in the rebellion. When, at length, the Spanish forces were withdrawn, there existed no Constitution, no National Executive, no National Congress, and no Judiciary. The appetites of the leaders who composed the Provisional Government of Santiago were whetted, and the opportunity presented to the Dominican people to establish a representative Government was lost in the mad scramble for power and place which occurred as soon as the last Spanish troops had embarked.

Human nature was doubtless very much the same then as it is now. It is not unnatural that even the most liberal of the Dominicans living at that time, when they suffered in their own persons, in their families, and in their fortunes, from the reign of chaos which resulted, should have forgotten the theory of democracy, and should have preferred security no matter in what form it came. The fact that Buenaventura Baez had, for reasons which may seem

inexplicable now, sufficient prestige to create a Government strong enough to dominate the country was sufficient reason for the great majority of the educated classes in the Republic to have supported Baez until his Government finally became so tyrannical, and he himself so eager to barter the nation's liberties, that anarchy once more seemed preferable.

From that day until modern times only two classes of governments have been known to the Dominican people —the first, known as "strong" governments, of the type imposed by Santana and Heureaux; the other, the "well-intentioned" governments, of the nature attempted by González and Espaillat. The well-intentioned governments were ever of short duration; the strong governments were, by their very nature, more lasting. And during the relatively short periods when well-intentioned governments were in power, so much of the attention of the members of those governments was necessarily engaged in the effort to remain in office that but little thought could be devoted to the improvement of the lot of the average citizen. It was a continuous struggle on the part of the "ins" to retain their power, and on the part of the "outs" to return to power. Under such conditions, the twentieth century dawned in Santo Domingo without even the vestige of a tradition of constitutional government or practice.

When the liberal reaction of 1900 at length occurred, none of the leaders of the reform movement, however well-intentioned they were, had any practical knowledge of orderly procedure in government, nor had their followers any inherent respect for an authority which did not impose itself by force. The freedom of the press granted by Jiménez degenerated into license. The consistent effort of Vasquez to maintain standards of integrity in the national

administration not only failed of appreciation by the rank and file, but was even ridiculed as Utopian and impracticable. Liberality and integrity in administration were regarded as signs of weakness, because no government in the past which had ever been able to maintain itself for any length of time had ever accorded popular liberty, nor had it ever refrained from helping itself from the public treasury in order to procure the way to its own continuance in office.

It is therefore not surprising that the chief menace today to a continuation of orderly democratic government in the Dominican Republic lies in an utter disregard for the sanctity of the Constitution. Constitutional government, in brief, is to the average Dominican but an empty phrase. The Constitution originally proclaimed has been changed innumerable times merely to satisfy the selfish aspirations of the individual or the party in power. It has never been amended or reformed in the interest of the Dominican people as a whole. Instead of being regarded as the sacred charter of the people's liberties, the Constitution has been considered a legitimate source of advantage to the party or to the person in control, and has consequently been modified at frequent intervals without due reflection, and without proper consideration, solely to satisfy the desires or requirements of those enabled thus to advance them.

Until the time arrives when the present system whereby the Dominican Constitution can be amended or replaced merely at the instance of the Dominican Congress, with the subsequent approval of a Constitutional Convention elected *ad hoc,* is abolished, there can exist no positive assurance that the instability of the past will not persist in the future.

The very facility with which the Dominican Constitu-

tion can be amended or set aside encourages this condition. The only hope for a remedy of this fundamental evil lies either in the possibility that with the growth of prosperity, and with the increase in civic education, the Dominican people themselves may refuse to permit the leaders of the political parties to place their own immediate advantage above the interests of the nation, or in the adoption of a system whereby a number of years must elapse before any amendments to the Constitution proposed by the National Congress can be incorporated in the Constitution by the ratification of a Constitutional Assembly.

With a growing sense of confidence in the Constitution as a real source of protection to the individual, the chief incentive to revolution will have been removed. This is the prime necessity. There are, however, other necessities contingent upon this development. Chief among these is the development of a Judiciary in which the citizens of the Republic have complete confidence, and in the devising of a system of electoral procedure which will guarantee to every voter of the Republic the assurance that his vote in the selection of his Government may be freely cast and faithfully computed.

Under the system which has prevailed for many years in the Dominican Republic, whereby the members of the Judiciary are elective officers, selected by the National Congress, there could have been no other result than that the great majority of such officials should have been political partisans after they were seated upon the Bench. Granted such conditions, it must remain a matter for admiration that so many of the Dominican Judges should have remained, notwithstanding their small remuneration, not only incorruptible, but also impartial. The fear has frequently been expressed by prominent Dominicans that

were the Justices of the Supreme Court, and of the Courts of Appeals, to be granted life tenure of office under the Constitution, the difficulty of impeachment would render it improbable that inefficient or untrustworthy members of the judiciary could be readily removed. While this argument undoubtedly is worthy of consideration, the dangers inherent in the difficulty so suggested cannot be considered as of the same importance as the benefits to be procured from a system whereby national confidence in the Judiciary will be ensured. So long as the members of the Supreme Court and of the Courts of Appeals are political candidates, selected by political parties, and placed in office for purely political reasons, there can exist no assurance that the decisions rendered by such officials will actually be impartial and free from partisan tinge. The conciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests would seem to lie, until such time as present standards at least have materially changed, in the election of the members of the Supreme Court and of the Courts of Appeals for a tentative initial term of office, and upon a subsequent election, in their retention in office during the remainder of their lives. The conviction on the part of every citizen that he will find justice administered to him in the Courts to which he has recourse, will be a contributing factor of the greatest value in the enhancement of governmental stability.

In the year 1923, by decree of the Provisional Government of the Republic, an electoral law was promulgated, closely modeled upon the Cuban Electoral Code, which had been elaborated with the utmost care by the Cuban Congress, and which had in its turn been based upon a draft presented at the request of the Cuban Government by Major-General Enoch H. Crowder. The Cuban Elec-

toral Code is an act which provides the most ample guarantees to the electorate, and it is peculiarly adapted to the conditions which obtain in many of the Republics of Latin America. The electoral law promulgated by the Dominican Provisional Government was, however, less complicated in procedure than the Cuban Code and was designed to meet certain special conditions existing at the moment in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican electoral law has again been modified by the Dominican Congress, since the installation of the present Constitutional Government of the Republic, but it retains the chief features of the original law.

The enforcement of this act rests in the last analysis upon the Central Electoral Board, which constitutes not only the Executive Body in the execution of the act, but likewise the final court of appeals in all electoral disputes. Should, at any time, the Dominican Central Electoral Board be composed of citizens other than those of the utmost integrity, capacity, and impartiality, the fundamental purpose of the electoral law will be vitiated; the confidence of the electorate in its power to constitute a government of the Republic by popular ballot will be nullified. It will, therefore, readily be seen that only secondary in importance to the growth of respect for the Constitution, and of confidence in the character of the Judiciary, must be the development of popular assurance that in the final arbiters of electoral disputes there may be found impartiality and justice.

The achievement of the objects above indicated would not, however, be in itself sufficient in this modern world to ensure beyond the shadow of a doubt the maintenance of peace and the continuation of stable government. The enforcement of the laws and the preservation of public

order must necessarily, in the last analysis, still be entrusted to a branch of the administrative structure enabled by the use of force to maintain peace. Until the termination of the American Military Occupation, the Dominican military forces had never merited public confidence, much less popular respect. Generally unpaid, badly clothed, undernourished, and almost invariably undisciplined, the military branch of the Dominican Government was inevitably the means through which, by corruption or by the promise of corruption, revolutions were engineered. It is only in the past four years that a new concept of the functions of the military forces in the Republic has developed. The army of the old days has developed into the Policía Nacional Dominicana, a national constabulary, to which is entrusted the maintenance of local order outside of those cities or towns where municipal police forces are established, as well as the patrol of the boundary between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. At present, the constabulary is a well trained, well organized, well disciplined body, commanded by officers trained for their functions, and in theory, at least, is a corps solely concerned with the execution of the laws and removed from politics. Because of its efficiency the Policía Nacional is a body far more potent than the old army ever was. The elements of danger, therefore, are ever present. Should those who compose this force ever become convinced that their promotion or their well-being depends more upon political favour than upon their own efficiency and their individual excellence, the safety of the Republic itself will be jeopardized. It is only through the settled conviction of the governors of the country that their own interest as well as the safety of the nation lies in the maintenance of this branch of the service completely apart from politics, that

the national security of the Dominican Republic may be assured.

The racial problem is one which has been but briefly dwelt upon. There is, in fact, no problem. The native Indian strain which presumably existed in large proportion in the early days of the colony of Santo Domingo has long since been completely assimilated. It is in fact very rarely that any trait among the Dominicans is perceived reminiscent of the Indian blood which may still flow in their veins. The negro strain, on the contrary, is apparent in almost every portion of the Republic. While the negro race predominates in some of the provinces, notably the provinces along the Haitian frontier and the Province of Samaná, as well as in some districts of the southern coast, in the Cibao Provinces and in the mountain communities remote from the main highways the white race is in the ascendant. But race discrimination in the Dominican Republic is unknown. The question is therefore one which gives no ground for fear lest racial rivalries and jealousies may in the future give cause for unrest.

It is, however, one of the most noteworthy peculiarities of the Dominican people that among all classes and among all shades, there is a universal desire that the black may be obliterated by the white. The stimulation of white immigration has become a general demand. White immigrants from Spain and Italy and from the northern countries of Europe are sought by every province within the Republic, and the present Government is facilitating the immigration of agriculturists and settlers on a large scale. At the same time, a popular demand of similar force exists, that all future immigration into the Republic of members of the coloured race, whether from Haiti or the West Indies, except as contract labourers under temporary

license to work upon the sugar plantations, be rigidly prohibited.

There are, however, two problems confronting the Dominican people which they are called upon to solve to safeguard the future security of the Republic.

The first lies in the necessity of enacting legislation regulating the investment of foreign capital within the Republic in such manner that, while all due guaranties are provided for such foreign investment, the Dominican people will be protected from that unwarranted intervention in national affairs and from that monopolistic control of national resources or of public utilities which foreign capital has so often exercised in the Republics of Latin America.

Until the present time the investment of foreign capital in the Dominican Republic has been limited almost exclusively to that involved in the sugar plantations of the southern coast. While the sugar industry in the Dominican Republic is by far the wealthiest in the country, and is, with a few notable exceptions, largely in foreign hands, it plays no such preponderant rôle as it does in Cuba. Much of the arable land of the Republic is unsuitable for the cultivation of cane, and furthermore, the present Government, with wisdom and vision, has done its utmost to foster the diversification of agricultural products, so that the Dominican Republic may never become, as Cuba has, a one-crop country.

With this one exception, foreign capital has so far played an inconsiderable part in the economic life of the Republic. With the conditions which now obtain it is inevitable that foreign investments should be made in increasing measure in the Dominican Republic. Santo Domingo is a poor country. It requires capital from abroad

for the development of its national resources, and the speedy progress of the country depends to a large extent upon its obtaining it. Fortunately, the situation is such that there is yet time, by the enactment of sound legislation, to provide all foreign capital which may come into the Republic with those legitimate guaranties and safeguards which it may require, and yet, at the same time, assure to the Dominican people themselves the ultimate control of their own resources and utilities.

The other problem now confronting the Dominican people is one which is equally vital in character. The history of the nation has made it evident that political parties, as the term is understood today, have not existed in Santo Domingo. Dominican government has been personal government. During the present century the outstanding political groups have been the Horacista and Jimenista parties, responsive to General Vasquez and to Don Juan Isidro Jiménez, and more recently, the Velasquista party, created by Señor Velasquez. During the American Military Occupation the names of the Horacista and Velasquista parties were changed to the Partido Nacional and the Partido Progresista, and the fractions into which the old Jimenista party had split up after the death of President Jiménez, amalgamated themselves once more into the party known as the Coalición Patriótica, which supported the candidacy of Señor Peynado in the national elections of 1924. While the personal titles of these parties were thus changed, and political platforms were announced, there still existed no real distinction between any of them other than the difference in their leaders. After the inauguration of the Constitutional Government the present President of the Republic, with the patriotic desire of forming a government which would be truly national and which would

be representative of all factions, to a large extent disregarded party lines and appointed both to his Cabinet and to other administrative positions outstanding members of the Coalición Patriótica, as well as of the Partido Progresista, which latter had supported him in the electoral campaign. The intent of the President was laudable, and temporarily served a useful purpose. The continuance of the policy, however, into further extremes, has brought it about, unfortunately, that with the breaking down of party lines that essential in every democracy, a healthy opposition, has disappeared. Such opposition to the present Government as exists is an opposition based on individual dissatisfaction or resentment rather than an opposition based on principle.

The condition is one which cannot be corrected by artificial methods, but the future of the Republic cannot be considered assured until party government, in the modern sense, has been evolved. Until political parties have been formed, with principles and policies, personal government is inevitable, and the succession to the Presidency will be dictated by a few politicians, rather than by the great mass of the plain people, whose interests are the interests of the nation itself.

Under the enlightened and progressive Government which has held office since the termination of the American Military Occupation in the Dominican Republic, the chief efforts of the Administration have been directed towards the stimulation of agricultural expansion, and towards the development of the natural resources of the country. Results within the past three years have been obtained along these lines which would have seemed incredible when the Government first took office. With a similar policy on the part of future governments, and with

GENERAL HORACIO VASQUEZ

President of the Dominican Republic, 1924–

equal constructive accomplishment in the facilitation of primary instruction to the younger generation, and in the opening up of commercial opportunity, there can be no doubt that the Dominican Republic has before it an era of prosperity which will unquestionably tend rapidly to accelerate the march of the nation towards stability, and to assure the future of the Dominican people as an important force in the western world.

2.

The history of the relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic is unique in that in it have been reflected all aspects but one of the constantly shifting Latin American policy of the American Government.

Still a colony of Spain or France, or under the sway of Haiti, during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the Dominican Republic gained no advantages from the policy of wisdom and sanity then evolved and maintained by the early statesmen of the United States. That was a period when Thomas Jefferson, referring to the nations of the Western Hemisphere, bespoke "the importance of their coalescing in an American system of policy." It was then that John Quincy Adams and James Monroe caused the United States, before any other nation of the world, to recognize officially the independence of the struggling American Republics of the south; it was then that the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed; and it was then that Henry Clay demanded the formation of ties of mutual helpfulness, on a basis of equality, between the United States and the other Republics of the Continent.

By the time, however, that the Dominican people had wrested their freedom from Haiti, and had created the independent Dominican Republic, the attitude of the

American Government towards the Republics to the south had undergone a radical change.

In the decades prior to the Civil War, this new policy of the United States resulted in the alienation of the Latin American Republics, through injury to their susceptibilities, through the frank disregard of their independent rights, and through the tacit authorization granted American nationals to commit acts in derogation of the sovereignty of these Republics. This contemptuous disdain of legitimate rights, both individual and national, in Latin America, later reached its climax in the attempt on the part of President Grant to annex the Dominican Republic at the instigation of a group of American speculators, with the connivance of the Dictator Baez. While it may readily be conceded that the President and his Secretary of State were unaware, when the annexation policy was first embarked upon, of the character and true motives of those who had fostered the scheme, and while there can be no doubt that both General Grant and Secretary Fish were without material interest in the project, and believed in all sincerity that the annexation of the Dominican Republic would prove of positive benefit to the United States, it cannot be alleged in their behalf that they had any faith in Baez's protestations that the Dominican people were as one in clamouring for annexation. The history of the annexation to Spain was well known to them; they were fully cognizant of the nature of the farcical plebiscite which had been held by Santana, and of how little such a plebiscite could truly represent popular sentiment; they were equally aware from the reports of one of their own agents that the plebiscite conducted by Baez differed in no way from that held by Santana; and while it is true that a few of the revolutionists opposed to Baez had

been in the past, and might have been in the future, as willing as Baez himself to sell their country, the certainty must have existed in the minds of both the President and his Secretary of State that had the Dominican people themselves been given the opportunity freely to express their opinion, that opinion would have been registered overwhelmingly against annexation to the United States. The whole episode, in fact, could hardly have been more discreditable to the United States, both because of its subversion of national principles, and because of the unsavoury circumstances which surrounded it. The stalwart opposition of those Senators led by Charles Sumner who refused to permit the consummation of the deal, has never received its due mead of gratitude.

During the years which elapsed after the failure of President Grant to procure the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States, the policy of the succeeding Administrations towards the Latin American Republics was purely negative in character. It was not until James G. Blaine became Secretary of State that the policy which he had long meditated crystallized into the definite effort on his part, so long as his influence was paramount in the Republican party, to obtain an identification of the political interests of the Latin American Republics with those of the United States. Secretary Blaine's vision of a federation of American Republics, independent of one another, as they had been from their birth, but mutually helpful, joined by common commercial ties, safeguarding from foreign aggression or interference the republican institutions which they enjoyed, welded into the greatest compact force of the civilized world, was not realized in his life-time, nor has it been realized since. It may be said, however, that Pan-Americanism, as the term is generally

understood, was the creature of his endeavours, and it is due to his initial efforts that the conception of Pan-Americanism has lived.

The realization by the American people, after the Spanish War, that the United States was a world power, fostered the growth of the imperialistic spirit to which reference has already been made. The cession to the United States of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and the annexation of Hawaii, had made of the United States in very fact an empire, with outlying possessions inhabited by alien peoples on other planes of civilization, some of whom it was evident could never be amalgamated in that conglomerate but homogeneous mass of which the American people of today are composed. The rôle of the educator and of the civilizer was thrust upon the United States. Granted the results of the Spanish War, the development of an imperialistic spirit in the United States was inevitable. Appealing as it did to national vanity, it grew, however, out of all proportions. It is startling today to reread the utterances of many of the prominent statesmen of that period and realize thereby to what bounds the imperialistic spirit actually grew. So sane a statesman, so liberal a publicist, as Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, in a speech which he delivered in the United States Senate on January 10, 1901, declared:

"Self-government and internal development have been the dominant features of our second century . . . God has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns . . . He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples . . . This is the definite mission of America . . . Pray God the time may never come when

Mammon and the life of ease will so debase our blood that we will fear to shed it for the flag and its imperial destiny."

Had this missionary spirit been evidenced solely in the attempt to better the condition of the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands now retained by the United States, and in the attempt to assist the people of Puerto Rico to become capable of enjoying the rights of American citizenship, no material damage would presumably have been wrought the foreign relations of the American Government. Unfortunately, the American people became so imbued with the rôle of the evangel, that there soon became apparent an earnest desire not only to reform the conditions of life and government of the peoples inhabiting the insular possessions of the United States, but likewise the conditions of life and government of the independent peoples inhabiting the sovereign Republics of the American hemisphere. All sense of proportion was lost.

The idea rapidly took hold of the public imagination that it was a duty of the American Government to reform and to amend—to clean up, to use the popular phrase—wherever the physical influence of the United States made it possible. Fortunately, the common sense and clarity of vision of President Roosevelt, and the statesmanship of Secretary Root, succeeded to a certain extent in controlling this popular feeling, and consequently the practical results of the public's passion for removing the mote from its brother's eye were less harmful than they otherwise might have been.

It cannot be denied that the manner in which the United States acquired the Panama Canal Zone shook public confidence throughout Latin America in the good faith of

the United States, and was chiefly responsible for generating the widespread belief in the existence of imperialistic designs on the part of the American Government. It is due to this fact that President Roosevelt has been generally regarded in his conduct of relations with Latin America primarily as the wielder of the "big stick," and as the exponent of a policy which ignored the distinction between "mine" and "thine." It is, however, the case that in every other instance affecting the relations between the United States and the other American Republics, the determinations reached by the Roosevelt Administration were not only marked by a scrupulous regard for the sovereignty and independence of other Powers, but likewise demonstrated a noteworthy appreciation of the need to the United States of coöperating with the Latin American Republics on terms of friendly equality, and of lending its assistance, wherever it was desired, in furthering the peace, stability and prosperity of those nations.

Nowhere was this made more clearly evident than in the conduct of the negotiations which resulted in the 1907 Convention with the Dominican Republic. When the apprehension of annexation was widespread, and when President Morales, of his own initiative, suggested the negotiation of a protectorate, President Roosevelt bluntly refused. To use his own picturesque simile:

> "As for annexing the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to." [1]

The powers granted the United States by the Customs Convention of 1907 did not constitute a greater infringement of the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic than

[1] Bishop, Vol. I, p. 431.

hat which had already existed since the time when Presi-
lent Heureaux had alienated the control of Dominican
ustoms from the Dominican Government itself. The
egotiation of the Convention was of practical benefit to
he Dominican Republic in that it established the credit
f the Republic, provided the Dominican Government
vith a sure source of revenue, and removed the danger of
European intervention. It safeguarded the national inter-
sts of the United States by abolishing permanently the
anger of any infringement of the Monroe Doctrine
hrough the resort by European Powers to intervention in
he Dominican Republic under the guise of satisfying the
ust claims of their nationals. While the negotiation of the
Convention, therefore, was in accord with the missionary
pirit of the times, it implied no danger in itself to the
overeignty nor the right of self-government of the Do-
ninican people. The helpful spirit manifested by the
Roosevelt Administration in its dealings with the Repub-
ics of Central America, as evidenced by the Central
American Conference held in Washington in 1908, was
ikewise an outgrowth of the same belief in the nation's
nission, but also contained no element of danger to the
omplete liberty and freedom of these American Repub-
ics.

It was in the following Taft Administration, under the
uidance of Secretary Knox, that there first became
oted that pernicious phase of the Latin American policy
f the United States, which consisted in the attempt to
ntervene in the internal affairs of the Caribbean Re-
ublics in order to force upon the inhabitants of those
ountries governments considered by the Department of
tate in Washington suited to their requirements, regard-
ess of whether or not the people of the nations concerned

had a real voice in their selection. It was not so much that the Department of State considered the governments so imposed readily amenable to American influence, as that they were believed to be desirable for the people whom they governed. It was the fatal, but by no means uncommon, error that the standards of government which might spell accomplishment and success in Pittsburgh or Keokuk, must necessarily be adapted to the requirements and needs, desires and prejudices, of foreign peoples alien in every sense to American traditions, heritage and genius. It was a policy due in great part to a patronizing sense of superiority, which utterly ignored the possibility that another inheritance and other standards might possess their own excellence.

It was inevitable under such conditions that any government in one of those Republics which favoured American commercial expansion must necessarily become identified in the eyes of the Department of State with a government suitable and proper for the people of that Republic. It was only one step farther for the Department of State to attempt directly or indirectly, through diplomatic influence or by force, to maintain or to select the governments in the Caribbean Republics which it believed would favour the interests of the United States. The intervention of Secretary Knox in the Dominican Republic constituted a well defined attempt to impose upon the Dominican people a government selected for them in accordance with what he, and not what they, believed to be their needs. The experiment was naturally disastrous and was responsible in large measure for the unsettled conditions which persisted in the Dominican Republic between the years 1912 and 1916.

In a different sense, the same fundamental root cause

vas the reason for the failure of President Wilson to obtain eneficial results from the salutary idealism which he an- ounced as the guiding motive in his policy towards the atin American Republics. It constituted an extraor- inary paradox that while President Wilson proclaimed ne necessity of winning the confidence of the Latin merican Republics, and of identifying their national nterests with those of the United States, not in order to dvance the commercial interests of the latter, but rather n order to safeguard constitutional liberties throughout ne world, such a step as the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic should have been dictated during his dministration.

There are, however, two reasons for the existence of this aradox. The first, that neither the President nor his ad- isers had any actual knowledge or understanding of the sychology of the Dominican people, of their require- nents, or of the manner in which the influence of the Jnited States might be exerted towards assisting them to overn themselves; the second, that no policy was ever tablished which determined how far the influence of the Jnited States Government might legitimately be exer- ised along those lines. There was no attempt made to reate a practical policy with a view towards a determined nd. As each emergency occurred it was resolved, not as a ep in accordance with a preconceived policy, but merely n the light of immediate circumstances. There was no erspective. Consequently, attempts were continually nade to encroach upon the sovereign rights of the Do- minican people; attempts which President Wilson himself would have been the first to denounce, had he not been orced to consent to them in each instance because of the act that the situation appeared to have grown so far out

of control that the only recourse was further encroachment. Given such premises, complete derogation of the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic was the logical conclusion.

It is very evident that the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916 was a step which was deplored both by President Wilson and by Secretary Lansing. Entirely at variance with the declared policy of the former, it was undoubtedly distasteful to the judicial temperament of the latter, and was a policy only resorted to as an emergency measure, rendered necessary in Secretary Lansing's belief by the course into which the Department of State had drifted since 1909, and by the potential dangers to the United States inherent in the anarchic conditions in a country so close to the territorial waters of the United States, at a moment when the American Government expected soon to find itself involved in the European War.

While both Secretary Lansing and Secretary Colby, after peace had been restored in Europe, appreciated the prejudice caused the relations between the United States and all the Latin American Republics by the continuation of the Military Occupation in the Dominican Republic, and Secretary Colby took the first steps in attempting to terminate the Occupation and to restore the Government of the Dominican Republic to the Dominican people, it was not until Secretary Hughes assumed office that the restoration of Constitutional Government in the Dominican Republic became an important preliminary feature in a constructive policy designed to establish real understanding as well as a community of interest between the United States and the other Republics of the Western Hemisphere.

One of the greatest services which Secretary Hughes

rendered the American people was in his painstaking and authoritative elucidation of what the Monroe Doctrine actually was. It had become the custom during a period of many years for statesmen and orators within the United States to ascribe every phase of the policy of the United States Government towards Latin America as a consequence of the Monroe Doctrine. In the Latin American Republics in the same manner every alleged symptom of imperialism on the part of the United States was attributed to the Monroe Doctrine. While many of those who had had a hand in shaping the policy of the United States had expounded the Monroe Doctrine, and had declared it to be, in the words of President Wilson, "proclaimed by the United States on her own authority," Secretary Hughes brought it home to the American public in a manner more convincing than ever before that the Monroe Doctrine was solely a policy of self-defense, which implied merely that the United States was asserting a national right of self-protection, in the exercise of which right it must have an unhampered discretion. To the peoples of Latin America he at the same time made it plain that the Monroe Doctrine could not by its very nature be a policy of aggression, inasmuch as it could not be interpreted as warranting any infringement by the United States upon the independence and sovereignty of other American States.

But to repeat his own phrase, already quoted:

"The Monroe Doctrine as a particular declaration in no way exhausts American right or policy; the United States has rights and obligations which that Doctrine does not define. And in the unsettled condition of certain countries in the region of the Caribbean it has been necessary to

assert these rights and obligations as well as the limited principles of the Monroe Doctrine."

This clear analysis of the essentials of the Latin American policy of the Government of the United States in the region of the Caribbean, as Secretary Hughes conceived it, could not have been more succinctly stated. The interest of the United States in the preservation of peace and in the maintenance of order in certain of the Republics which lie to the north of the South American continent is not defined by the Monroe Doctrine, except in the limited sense announced by President Roosevelt in his message of 1905 to the United States Senate regarding the Dominican Republic. In the event that there exists in any of those Republics an "impotence resulting in the loosening of the ties of civilized society," of so grave a character as to threaten to make possible the noxious intervention of some non-American Power, the United States Government under the Monroe Doctrine will use its power to remove the cause of that peril. That corollary to the Monroe Doctrine has now unquestionably become a portion of the established policy of the United States.

The other "rights and obligations" referred to by Secretary Hughes are, of course, apparent. The protection of the Panama Canal is a question of vital importance to the Government of the United States. Any chaotic condition in a Republic adjacent to the Canal which actually, not theoretically, threatens the security of the Canal must in itself be cause for action on the part of the United States, purely as a temporary measure of self-protection. The "rights and obligations" of the United States in the Caribbean likewise comprise the safeguarding of its insular possessions and of its leased territory, the protection of its

itizens abroad when the legitimate authorities in the ountries of their sojourn have clearly demonstrated their ncapacity to afford such protection, and the carrying ut of the duties incumbent upon it as the result of its reaty obligations. These "rights and obligations" are pre- ise, and may thus be clearly defined. There is no threat o the sovereignty or independence of any American Re- ublic in their nature. There should be no aggressive aspect o their enforcement.

Conceiving a Latin American policy constructed upon his foundation, Secretary Hughes, during the four years e remained in office, succeeded in establishing beyond oubt that the Monroe Doctrine "does not stand in the ay of Pan American coöperation," but rather that it ffords "the necessary foundation for that coöperation in he independence and security of American States."

It may be confidently asserted that since the acquisition f the Panama Canal Zone by the United States every merican Secretary of State has regarded the preservation f peace and the maintenance of the orderly procedure of overnment in the region of the Caribbean as a matter of eep concern to the United States. The outbreak of hos- lities and the persistence of revolutionary conditions in hat neighbourhood have been motives for well-founded larm. Yet there has been a striking distinction between he policy adopted by Secretaries Root and Hughes and hat adopted by other Secretaries of State towards the epublics which lie between the United States and South merica. The policy of Secretary Root, and even more early that of Secretary Hughes, has been constructive, n the sense that it sought by friendly coöperation with he nations concerned to eliminate the causes for unrest, nd thus prevent the growth of conditions prejudicial to

the interests of the United States. The policy of the others has been purely remedial, in that it sought by the exercise of the power of the United States to cure the disease after it had been contracted.

No example could better demonstrate this distinction than the history of the relations between the Dominican Republic and the United States during the past twenty years. By the negotiation of the 1907 Convention Secretary Root succeeded in removing the chief obstacle to the establishment of stable government in the Dominican Republic. This practical assistance was extended without the slightest attempt on the part of the United States Governmen to determine for the Dominican people the form of their government, or to select the individuals who were to govern them. Morales had been President when the protocol which preceded the Convention was negotiated. But when political opposition to him within his own country became so strong that he was forced to abdicate the Presidency and was succeeded by General Cáceres, there was no attempt made by the Government of the United States to force the Dominican people to retain Morales in the Presidency, nor, once Morales had resigned, to impose upon them any other than Cáceres.

The reversal of this sane policy of coöperation and of abstaining from interference in the purely domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic, as exemplified by Secretary Knox when he forced upon the Dominican people a government not strong enough, unaided, to maintain itself in power, has already been detailed. The result of that reversal, and of the subsequent attempts of Secretary Bryan not only to continue meddling in the internal affairs of the Dominican people, but also to restrict contractually the sovereign rights of the nation, was inevit-

ably the Military Occupation of the Republic by the United States. If the United States undertakes to force an independent people to the status of a protectorate, and by act or by threat prevents that people from exercising the full measure of self-government, the logical end must be the declaration of martial law and military occupation.

It is of interest in this connection to consider briefly what the effects of the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic have in reality been, since it was a Military Occupation illustrative of the character of all military interventions undertaken by the United States.

When Secretary Root dictated the policy to be pursued towards the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands he employed these lapidary words:

> The Government of the Philippine Islands is established "not for our satisfaction nor for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government."

Unfortunately no military occupation or military intervention undertaken by the United States in the Caribbean Republics has conformed to that standard. Usually the peoples of the Republics where intervention has occurred have soon been brought to realize that the measures adopted by the American authorities conformed solely to the customs, habits and prejudices of the intervening power. In the occupation of the Dominican Republic the American Military Government not only failed to consider local customs and prejudices, but was actually igno-

rant of what they were. Under such circumstances, how could an alien administration, operating under martial law, be productive of results of permanent benefit to the country occupied? Improved sanitary conditions, desirable means of communication, and other public works, an increase in educational opportunities, are all results of the Occupation of the Dominican Republic. Can it be maintained that these must necessarily be permanent or lasting improvements, when they did not result from national effort but from alien imposition? Can they be compared in value to the promise of future security to the Dominican people contained in the elaboration of a modern electoral code by their own representatives, and in the holding of free and fair elections by their own Provisional Government in 1924, with the coöperation of the United States Government, but not as a result of its supervision or its dictation?

The American Military Government was administered along progressive lines by men of integrity, but the monies collected from the Dominican taxpayers were not expended in accordance with the desires of these taxpayers, nor was the legislation decreed promulgated in conformity with the wishes of the Dominican people. The very pacification of the country, in a sense the primary purpose of the Occupation, was not a pacification which resulted from a desire for peace; it was a pacification imposed by force of arms, and while a state of peace resulted, it was an artificial peace which did not result from the natural causes which engender peace.

The benefits resulting from the Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic, so far as the national interests of the United States are concerned, have been of infinitesimal importance when compared to the suspicions, fears, and

hatred to which the Occupation gave rise throughout the American continent, and when compared to the lasting hostility towards the American people which the Occupation created in the hearts of a very great number of the Dominican people. So has it been with every military occupation or intervention.

It would seem for these reasons, therefore, that a policy which consists in coöperation with the peoples of the Caribbean Republics in removing the motives and the contributing factors of revolution and anarchy in that region where the United States is vitally concerned in the preservation of peace and order, will be of far greater benefit to the United States, as well as to the Republics concerned, than a policy which will permit the culmination of the causes for revolution and anarchy and then attempt to cure them through the exercise of force.

As Secretary Hughes has said:

"Our interest is in having prosperous, peaceful and law-abiding neighbors with whom we can coöperate to mutual advantage."

The constructive policy towards accomplishing this end is not in standing aloof while the causes of unrest or revolution accumulate, and then, when public disorder has broken out, in effecting a military intervention and in attempting to remedy the situation with the rifles of the American marines. A policy of this character not only does nothing towards removing the causes of disorder, but each time that such a cure is attempted, human life is lost, property is destroyed, and suspicions and jealousies of the ultimate designs of the United States are aroused which remove still further the possibility of accord between the Republics of the continent.

Prosperity is the most powerful antagonist of unrest in the younger Republics of the American continent. In the phrase of Lord Bryce,

"The effect of real prosperity is felt in a growing sense of the value of order and peace."

Yet how rarely has the United States assisted its younger sisters of the continent on the road towards prosperity!

The United States protective tariff has constituted necessarily a material obstacle to the effective development of the natural resources of many of the American Republics. The United States offers a logical market not only to those American Republics which lie near at hand, but likewise to the larger Republics of the South, which have, however, been forced to seek a market in Europe or a market even more remote. While it is true that the United States and certain of the Republics of South America are both common competitors in the world market in the disposal of a few agricultural products, there are many other commodities produced in Latin America which the Latin American Republics are nevertheless unable to sell in the American market because of the restrictions of one kind or another placed upon their importation into the United States. This obstacle is the chief and greatest hindrance to the rapid development of real prosperity in the smaller Republics of the continent, and the removal of this obstacle would do infinitely more to promote the creation of stable government in those Republics where the United States has frequently felt itself called upon to exercise its police power, than all the myriad discourses which have been declaimed by American statesmen emphasizing the benefits conferred upon those nations by the Monroe Doctrine. The effect which restrictions upon imports from

Latin America may have upon the foreign relations and the foreign trade of the United States has rarely been regarded. The tariff and other restrictive measures have been considered solely in the light of internal policy; and account has not been taken of the fact that restrictions enforced often to benefit only an insignificant group of local interests in the United States, may strike at the vital national interests of one of the American Republics, as the result of which not only is the development of that country retarded, but a potential customer for American exports is lost.

It is in the stimulation of commercial ties, in the facilitation of educational advantages to students from the southern Republics, in the limitation of financing to productive purposes, in the proffer of technical and expert assistance when it may be needed, that the United States will obtain the results desired, and not through military occupation, military intervention, or armed supervision of elections.

With the establishment of a permanent constructive policy of this character it may still be admitted that occasion might arise in the region of the Caribbean, when, owing to sudden emergency, or to a pernicious condition of long duration, the vital interests of the United States might be in danger, or the lives and property of American citizens or of other foreigners might be in peril, when the United States might be compelled to undertake armed intervention. In the past it has been, however, remarkable that the Government of the United States has only infrequently attempted in such cases to obtain the coöperation of the other Republics of the continent in sharing jointly with it the task and the responsibility of quelling disorders which constitute a common danger to the peace of all the

Republics of the Western Hemisphere. The fact that the United States has generally undertaken to intervene in independent Republics not only alone, but without even communicating its motives and its intentions to the other Republics of the hemisphere, has been another contributing cause to the suspicions with which its policy has been regarded, and to the charge of imperialistic intent which has so frequently been leveled against it.

If the Government of the United States is called upon to assist in preventing the rise, in the Republics which lie between the United States and the South American continent, of conditions which constitute a menace to the peace of the entire hemisphere, and in complying with this obligation may under certain circumstances find it imperative to resort to armed force, why should it alone shoulder this responsibility? Why should not the other American Republics share in the task of maintaining order in the continent when their own interest is involved? Why should not the United States seek their coöperation, and thus not only render its own task easier, but also avoid the odium which its policy of acting alone has so often in the past incurred?

Secretary Root in the Central American Conference of 1908, in which the five Central American Republics participated and at which both the United States and Mexico were represented, and as the result of which machinery was set up for the peaceful settlement of disputes in Central America, and the growth of orderly procedure in Government was stimulated, gave a practical demonstration of the benefits which coöperation of this character would provide. This demonstration of the value of such coöperation was, however, completely disregarded during the term of his successor in the Department of State.

At the commencement of the Administration of President Wilson, a more general and far reaching effort to procure practical coöperation among all the Republics of the American continent was made. This attempt on the part of President Wilson was, however, based upon the assumption that the domestic policy of the United States known as the "Monroe Doctrine" could be transformed into a common policy in which all the American States might participate. In his effort to transmute this national policy into a continental policy, President Wilson was persuaded thereto by the belief of his adviser, Colonel E. M. House, that such a partnership

"might develop into a league for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Americas and would be of the utmost service in handling situations such as had arisen in Mexico." [1]

The "Pan American Pact" into which this project crystallized provided, however, for a general agreement of participation in a mutual guarantee of "territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government"; for the submission of all disputes to investigation or to arbitration, and for the abstention by each contracting party from fostering, or taking part in, internal disputes within the confines of the territory of any of the other parties to the pact. It became in effect an attempt to transform the policy of self-protection of the United States into a league of American nations. This plan to transmute a national policy into an international pact would presumably have been rejected by the American people had it not been found impossible to obtain the agreement of the great Republics of the South. The pact

[1] Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. I, p. 191.

consequently died abortive, but the desire for a closer continental coöperation which had engendered the negotiations was unquestionably salutary.

A desire to obtain the confidence and the coöperation of the other Republics of the continent was more strikingly demonstrated during the Harding Administration by Secretary Hughes. Convinced as he was that the chief interest of the United States lay in the maintenance of peace and in the growth of prosperity throughout the American continent, it became the consistent endeavour of Secretary Hughes to assist so far as might be possible in procuring the peaceful settlement of that class of disputes which has ever been a potential source of danger, namely, the boundary disputes between the Latin American Republics. In this effort the Government of the United States was singularly successful so long as Mr. Hughes remained Secretary of State.

In similar fashion Mr. Hughes sought to exert the influence of the United States in removing the causes for unrest in the smaller and less prosperous Republics adjacent to the United States. It was in accordance with that purpose that the Central American Conference of 1923 was held in Washington, which achieved results that would have been of the utmost significance had the policy responsible for the holding of the Conference been later persisted in. These results, as Secretary Hughes announced, were not only the establishment of the foundations of political stability, but likewise a concerted attempt to remove the causes for domestic unrest in Central America by providing the means for developing the natural resources of the several Republics and thus enhancing their prosperity. As Secretary Hughes said in addressing the Delegates of the five Republics at the conclusion of the Conference:

"Your first concern has been to establish as securely as possible the foundations of stability . . . You have development, progress and the utmost prosperity within your grasp . . . You have signed agreements which have regard to the specific interests of agriculture and industry; to the exchange of information; to the exigencies of trade and commercial intercourse; to improvement in electoral systems . . . At the beginning of this Conference I stated the relation which the United States sustains to your Republics, and our earnest desire to promote the general interests of peace in this Hemisphere, and to aid you in finding a solution of your own problems to your own proper advantage. We shall rejoice in the vigor of your national life; in the development of your Republics for the benefit of your own peoples; and in the opportunities of friendly and reciprocally beneficial intercourse between neighbors who not only have the advantages of propinquity but of mutual respect and esteem. We desire your peace, your tranquillity, the contentment, just pride, and patriotic satisfactions which will come to each of your Republics from unimpaired integrity."

In its relations with the other Republics of the continent during the past twenty-five years, there has never been a moment when the Government of the United States has been guided by the ambition to procure additional territory at the expense of its neighbours, nor permanently to infringe upon the sovereignty or independence of any American Republic. And yet time and again the confidence of the American Republics in the good faith of the United States has been shaken, and frequently the belief has arisen throughout Latin America that the United States Government in its dealings with the other Republics of the continent has been animated by im-

perialistic ambitions and by the desire to extend its hegemony over the remainder of the hemisphere. At times the policy of the United States has been a sane and salutary policy of coöperation with its continental neighbours, and of helpful assistance without a thought of dictation. At others, it has been exactly the reverse. To a constructive policy of continental coöperation in preventing the motives for unrest there has succeeded a blustering policy of intimidation. The cause for the jealousy, fear, and suspicion with which the United States has recurrently been regarded by the other Republics of the Western world lies clearly in the fact that no consistent policy towards Latin America, in keeping with the true interests of the American people, has ever been permanently established.

Until the moment arrives when the average American appreciates the fact that friendly coöperation and intercourse, both political and commercial, with the other American Republics constitutes the future safeguard and the fundamental advantage of the United States, and until real Pan-Americanism in its broadest meaning becomes a vital thing to the average American citizen, no healthy established continental policy will ever be maintained, and the United States will continue to remain alienated from the other Republics of the Hemisphere.

The American people have evidenced their desire to remain aloof from European entanglements and European disputes. The ambition for colonial expansion which once existed in the United States has undergone a radical modification, and it is probable that the day will eventually come when the United States will have completed its task as a colonial power and will withdraw from the responsibilities which it once assumed in the Pacific.

No nation can live unto itself alone. If the United

States, therefore, is to maintain itself as one of the greatest forces in the world of the future, spiritually and materially, the time is at hand when it must reach the conviction that in the Western Hemisphere lies its strength and its support. In the identification of its interests both political and material, on a basis of absolute equality, with the interests of its sister republics of the continent, and in the rapid removal of the grounds for their distrust, lies its real advantage.

APPENDIX I

TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AND AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic [1]

The United States of America and the Dominican Republic alike animated with the desire of maintaining the cordial relations and good understanding which subsist between them, their respective States and territories, and of augmenting with all the means at their disposal commercial and social intercourse between them, have come to the determination to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a general convention of friendship, navigation and commerce and for the surrender of fugitive criminals and at the same time to make formal recognition on the part of the United States of the independence of the Dominican Republic. For which purpose the President of the United States has conferred full powers on William L. Cazneau, a citizen thereof, and the President of the Dominican Republic on his part has conferred like powers on Juan Nepomuceno Tejera, Minister of State in the Department of Justice, Public Instruction and Foreign Relations, and Juan Luis Franco Bidó, member of the Senate. And the said Plenipotentiaries after an exchange of their full powers found in due form have signed the following articles.

[1] Signed but not ratified.

ARTICLE I

It is agreed by the contracting parties that there shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic and between their respective territories and people without exception of persons and places. If unfortunately a war should occur between the two nations the term of six months after the declaration thereof shall be allowed to the merchants and other citizens and inhabitants respectively on one side and on the other to withdraw themselves with their effects and movables which they shall have the right to carry with them, send away, or sell at their will, without the least obstruction, nor shall their effects, much less their persons, be seized during such term of six months; and also passports which shall be valid for a term necessary, for their return to their own country shall be given to them for their vessels and the effects which they may wish to send away or carry with them, and such passports shall be a safe-conduct against all the insults and prizes which privateers may attempt against their persons and effects. And the money, debts, shares in the public funds or in the bank or any other property, personal or real, belonging to the citizens of the one party in the territories of the other, shall not be confiscated or sequestrated.

ARTICLE II

The citizens of one of the two contracting parties residing or established within the territory of the other, shall be free from personal military duty; but they shall be liable to the pecuniary or material contributions usually

imposed on residents not citizens of the country, but such contributions shall not in any case exceed those required of the citizens thereof.

ARTICLE III

The citizens of the contracting parties shall be permitted to enter, sojourn, domiciliate and reside in all parts whatsoever of the said territories, and to have and occupy warehouses provided they submit to the laws, as well general as special, relative to the rights of residing and traveling. While they conform to the laws and regulations in force, they shall be at liberty to manage their own business subject to the jurisdiction of the country—as well in respect to the consignment and sale of their goods by wholesale or retail, as with respect to loading, unloading and sending off their ships or employing such agents or brokers as they may deem proper, and shall be treated as the citizens of the country in which they reside.

They shall have free access to the tribunals of justice for prosecuting their claims and enforcing their rights of persons and property on the same terms which are granted by the laws and usage of the country to their own citizens, for which purpose they may employ in defense of their interests and rights such advocates, attorneys and other agents as they may think proper and are permitted by the local laws.

ARTICLE IV

The citizens of each of the contracting parties residing in the other shall enjoy the most perfect security of conscience. They shall be subjected to no inconveniences whatever on account of their religious belief. Nor shall they in

any manner be annoyed or disturbed in the exercise of their religious worship in private houses or in the chapels and places which they may select for that purpose, provided that in so doing they observe the respect and decorum due to the laws, usages and customs of the country.

It is likewise agreed that the citizens of either country who may die in the territory of the other country may be interred in it and in the cemeteries which the citizens of each of the two Republics may freely establish and maintain for this purpose, which shall be protected against molestation, as well as the funeral processions going to or returning from the same.

ARTICLE V

The contracting parties hereby agree that whatever kind of produce, manufacture or merchandise of any foreign country, can be lawfully imported into the United States in their own vessels may be imported in the vessels of the Dominican Republic and no higher or other duties upon the tonnage or cargo of the vessels shall be levied or collected, whether the importation be made in a vessel protected by the flag of the United States or in a vessel protected by the flag of the Dominican Republic.

And reciprocally whatever kind of produce, manufacture or merchandise of any foreign country, can be from time to time lawfully imported into the Dominican Republic in her own vessels, may also be imported in vessels of the United States, and no higher tonnage upon the vessels or duties upon the cargo, shall be levied or collected whether the importation be made in a vessel protected by the flag of the Dominican Republic or in a vessel protected by the flag of the United States.

Whatever can be lawfully exported by one party in its own vessels, to any foreign country, may in like manner be exported or re-exported in the vessels of the other, and the same duties, bounties and drawbacks shall be collected and allowed, whether such exportation or re-exportation be made in vessels of the one or the other party. Nor shall higher or other charges of any kind be imposed in the ports of one party on vessels of the other than are or shall be payable in the same ports by its own vessels.

This article is not applicable to the coasting trade and navigation of the contracting powers which are respectively reserved by each exclusively for its own citizens.

ARTICLE VI

Those vessels which are declared by the laws of the Dominican Republic to be Dominican and which carry the papers necessary to establish that fact, shall be considered Dominican by the United States, and reciprocally the same principle shall be applied to the vessels of the United States by the Dominican Republic.

ARTICLE VII

No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importations into the United States of any article the natural product or manufacture of the Dominican Republic, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the Dominican Republic of any article the natural product or manufacture of the United States than are or shall be payable on the like article the natural product or manufacture of any foreign country.

No higher duties and charges shall be imposed in the

United States on the exportation of any article to the Dominican Republic or on the exportation of any article to the United States, than such as are or shall be payable on the exportation of the like article to any other foreign country.

No prohibition shall be imposed on the importation or exportation of any article the natural product or manufacture of the United States or the Dominican Republic from or to the ports of the United States or the Dominican Republic which shall not equally extend to every other foreign country. If, however, either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately become common to the other party, freely where it is freely granted or on yielding the same compensation when the grant is conditional.

ARTICLE VIII

The contracting parties do not recognize the barbarous rights anciently claimed to wrecks of the sea. On the contrary, not only in time of peace, but in time of war (if unfortunately it should arise) vessels belonging to either nation which may be wrecked, stranded or suffer damage on the coasts or in the waters of the other shall receive (unless they carry troops, munitions or other evidence of hostile intention) the same aid and protection for their persons, ships and goods as if they were citizens of the nation in which the accident occurs—being subject like them to pay the costs and dues of salvage which are of usage in such cases.

If the operations of repair shall require that the whole or any part of the cargo be unloaded, they shall pay no duties of custom, charges or fees on the part which they

shall reload and carry away, except such as are payable in the like case by the vessels of the nation in which the unloading is made. It is nevertheless understood that if while the vessel is under repair the cargo shall be landed and kept in a place of deposit destined to receive goods, the duties on which have not been paid, the cargo shall be liable to the charges and fees lawfully due for storage.

ARTICLE IX

The citizens of either of the contracting parties may sail with their ships and merchandise (contraband goods always excepted) from any port whatever of any port or place of those who are or may be enemies of the other, with perfect security and liberty without regard to who may be the owners of the goods on board. And they may equally sail their ships and trade with their merchandise with the same freedom not only directly from the places and ports of the enemy aforementioned without any opposition or disturbance whatever to neutral ports and places, but also from one place belonging to an enemy to another place belonging to an enemy of the other contracting party, whether they be or be not under the jurisdiction of the same power, unless such ports or places shall be effectively blockaded, besieged or invested. And whereas it frequently happens that vessels sail for a port or place belonging to an enemy without knowing that the same is either besieged, blockaded or invested, it is agreed that every vessel so circumstanced may be turned away from such port or place, but she shall not be detained, nor any part of her cargo, if not contraband, be confiscated unless after notice of such blockade or investment she shall attempt to enter,—but she shall be permitted to go to any

other port or place she shall think proper, provided the same be not blockaded, besieged or invested. Nor shall any vessel of either that may have entered into such port or place before the same was actually besieged, blockaded or invested by the other, be restrained from quitting such place with her cargo, nor if found therein after the reduction and surrender of such place shall such vessel or her cargo be liable to confiscation, but they shall be restored to the owners thereof.

ARTICLE X

In order to regulate what shall be deemed contraband of war, there shall be comprised under that denomination gunpowder, saltpeter, petards, match, ball, bombs, grenades, carbines, pikes, halberds, swords, bullets, pistols, holsters, cavalry saddles and furnitures, cannon, mortars, their carriages and beds, and generally all kinds of arms, ammunition of war and instruments fit for the use of troops; all the above articles whenever they are destined to the port of an enemy, are especially declared to be contraband and just objects of confiscation, but the vessel in which they are laden and the residue of the cargo shall be considered free, and not in any manner affected by the prohibition acts whether belonging to the same or a different owner.

ARTICLE XI

It is admitted as a principle that the flag covers the goods, and that everything shall be deemed to be free, exempt and of lawful commerce which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the citizens of either of the contracting parties although the whole lading or any part

thereof should appertain to the enemies of either, contraband goods always excepted. It is also agreed in like manner that the same liberty be extended to persons who are on board a free ship—with this effect,—that although they be enemies to either party, they are not to be taken out of that free ship, unless they are soldiers and in actual service of the enemy.

ARTICLE XII

In the time of war, the merchant ships belonging to the citizens of either of the contracting parties which shall be bound to a port of the enemy of one of the parties, and concerning whose voyage and the articles of her cargo there shall be established just ground of suspicion, shall be obliged to exhibit, as well upon the high seas as in the ports or roads, not only their passports but likewise their certificates showing that their goods are not of the quality of those which are specified to be contraband in the articles of the present convention.

ARTICLE XIII

And that captures on light suspicions may be avoided and injuries thence arising prevented, it is agreed that when one party shall be engaged in war and the other party be neuter, the ships of the neutral party shall be furnished with passports that it may appear thereby that the ships really belong to the citizens of the neutral party; they shall be valid for any number of voyages, but shall be renewed every year, that is if the ship happens to return home in the space of a year. If the ships are laden, they shall be provided not only with passports above mentioned, but also with certificates given by the competent officers

so that it may be known whether they carry any contraband goods. No other papers shall be required—any useage or ordinance of the contrary notwithstanding. And if it shall not appear from the said certificates that there are contraband goods on board, the ships shall be permitted to proceed on their voyage. If it appears from the certificates, that there are contraband goods on board any such ship, and the commander of the same shall offer to deliver them up, the offer shall be accepted,—and the ship be at liberty to pursue its voyage unless the quantity of the contraband goods be greater than can conveniently be received on board the ship of war or privateer, in which case the ship may be carried in to port for the delivery of the same.

If any ship shall not be furnished with such passports or certificates as are above required for the same, such goods may be examined by a proper judge or tribunal,—and if it shall appear from the other documents or proofs admissible by the useage of nations, that the ship belongs to the citizens of the neutral party—it shall not be confiscated, but shall be released with the cargo (contraband goods excepted) and be permitted to proceed on the voyage.

If the master of the ship named in the passport should happen to die, or be removed by any other cause and another put in his place, the ship and cargo shall nevertheless be equally secure and the passport remain in full force.

ARTICLE XIV

In all cases where vessels shall be captured or detained under pretense of carrying to the enemy contraband goods, the captor shall give a receipt for such of the papers of

the vessel as he shall retain,—which receipt shall be annexed to a descriptive list of the said papers: and it shall be unlawful to break up or open the hatches, chests, trunks, caskets, bales, or vessels found on board, or remove the smallest part of the goods, unless the lading be brought on shore in presence of the competent officers, and an inventory be made by them of the said goods. Nor shall it be lawful to sell, exchange, or alienate the same in any manner unless there shall have been lawful process, and the competent judge or judges shall have pronounced against such goods sentence of confiscation.

ARTICLE XV

And that proper care may be taken of the vessel and cargo, and embezzlement prevented, it is agreed that it shall not be lawful to remove the master, commander or supercargo of any captured ship from on board thereof, during the time the ship may be at sea after her capture, or pending the proceedings against her or her cargo, or anything relative thereto. And in all cases where a vessel of the citizens of either party shall be captured, or seized and held for adjudication, her officers, passengers, and crew shall be hospitably treated. They shall not be imprisoned or deprived of any part of their wearing apparel, nor of the possession and use of their money, not exceeding for the Captain, supercargo and mate $500 each, and for the sailors and passengers $100 each.

ARTICLE XVI

It is further agreed that in all cases, the established courts for prize causes, in the country to which the prize may be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of them.

And whenever such tribunal of either of the parties shall pronounce judgment against any vessel, or goods, or property claimed by the citizens of the other party, the sentence or decree shall mention the reasons or motives on which the same shall have been founded, and an authenticated copy of the sentence or decree and of all the proceedings in the case, shall, if demanded, be delivered to the commander or agent of the said vessel without any delay, he paying the legal fees for the same.

ARTICLE XVII

It shall not be lawful for any foreign privateers who have commissions from any prince or state in enmity with either of the contracting parties to fit their ships in the ports of the other nation, to sell their prizes, or in any manner to exchange them; neither shall they be allowed to purchase provisions except such as shall be necessary to their going to the next port of that prince, or state, from which they have received their commissions.

ARTICLE XVIII

No citizen of the Dominican Republic shall apply for or take any commission, or letter of marque for arming any ship to act as privateers against the said United States or any of them or against the property, people or inhabitants of the United States or any of them or against the property of any of the inhabitants of any of them from any prince or state with which the said United States shall be at war, nor shall any citizens or inhabitants of the United States or any of them apply for or take any commission or letter of marque for arming any ship or ships to act as privateers against the Dominican Republic, or

against the persons or property of its citizens or inhabitants or any of them, from any prince or state with which the said Republic shall be at war, and if any person of either nation shall take such commission or letters of marque, he shall be punished according to their respective laws.

ARTICLE XIX

The two contracting parties reciprocally grant to each other the liberty of having each in the ports and other commercial places of the other Consuls, Vice Consuls and Commercial Agents of their own appointment who shall enjoy the same privileges, powers and exemptions as those of the most favored nations. But if any such consuls shall exercise commerce, they shall be subject to the same laws and useages to which private individuals of either nation or subjects or citizens of the most favored nation are subject in the same places in respect to their commercial transactions.

It is also agreed that each of the contracting parties is nevertheless at liberty to except those ports and places in which the admission and residence of consuls, vice consuls, and commercial agents shall not be deemed convenient.

ARTICLE XX

It is understood that whenever either of the two contracting parties shall select for a consular agent to reside in any port or commercial place of the other party, a citizen of this last, such consul or agent shall continue to be regarded notwithstanding his quality of a foreign consul as a citizen of the nation to which he belongs, and consequently shall be subjected to the laws and regulations to

which natives are subjected in the place of residence. This obligation, however, shall in no respect embarrass the exercise of his consular functions or affect the inviolability of the consular archives.

ARTICLE XXI

The said consuls, vice consuls, and commercial agents are authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities for the search, arrest, detention or imprisonment of the deserters from the ships of war and merchant vessels of either country. For this purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals, judges and officers and shall in writing demand said deserters, proving by the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the rolls of the crews, or by other official documents, that such individuals form part of the crews, and this reclamation thus substantiated, the surrender shall not be refused. Such deserters when arrested, shall be placed at the disposal of the said consuls, vice consuls, or commercial agents, and may be confined in the public prisons at the request and cost to those who shall claim them, in order to be detained until the time when they shall be restored to the vessel to which they belonged, or sent back to their own country by a vessel of the same nation, or in other vessel whatsoever. But if not sent back within three months from the date of their arrest, they shall be set at liberty and shall not again be arrested for the same cause. If, however, the deserter should be found to have committed any crime or offense, his surrender may be delayed until the tribunal before which his case should be depending shall have pronounced its sentence and such sentence shall have been carried into execution.

ARTICLE XXII

The citizens of each of the contracting parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other all the power to obtain, occupy, purchase, rent, inherit, dispose of, or bequeath, all the goods and property of whatever class which is now or shall be hereafter allowed by law or treaty to the citizens of the most favored nations, said goods and property being governed in its possession, distribution and succession by the laws of the country in which it is situated, having the same protection and subject only to the same taxes and dues as the inhabitants of the country pay in like cases.

ARTICLE XXIII

The United States of America and the Dominican Republic, on requisition made in their name, through the medium of their respective diplomatic and consular agents, shall deliver up to justice persons who being charged with the crimes enumerated in the following article committed within the jurisdiction of the requiring party, shall seek asylum or shall be found within the territories of the other. Provided, that this shall be done only when the fact of the commission of the crime shall be so established as to justify their apprehension and commitment for trial if this crime had been committed in the country where the persons so accused shall be found.

ARTICLE XXIV

Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this convention who shall be charged with any of the following crimes, to wit: murder (including assassination,

parricide, infanticide and poisoning), attempts to commit murder, rape, counterfeiting or the emission of forged papers, arson, robbery, burglary, embezzlement by public officers or by persons hired or salaried to the detriment of their employers, when these crimes are subject to infamous punishment.

ARTICLE XXV

On the part of each country—the surrender shall be made only by the authority of the Executive thereof. The expenses of detention and delivery incurred in virtue of the preceding articles, shall be at the cost of the party making the demand.

ARTICLE XXVI

The provisions of the foregoing articles relating to the surrender of the fugitive shall not apply to offenses committed before the ratification thereof or to those of a political character.

ARTICLE XXVII

Ships of war—and steam vessels of the United States which may be employed by the Government in carrying the public mails of the United States, shall have free access to the ports of the Dominican Republic, to refit, to refresh, to land passengers and their baggage, and for the transaction of any business pertaining to the public mail service of the United States, and shall be subject in such ports to no other or greater delays, duties, or charges, than are imposed on the vessels of war of the Dominican Republic.

ARTICLE XXVIII

If any of the citizens or inhabitants of the other party shall infringe any article contained in the present treaty, the said citizens or inhabitants shall be personally responsible, and the harmony and good understanding of the two nations shall not be interrupted thereby; and each solemnly pledges itself in no manner to sanction such violation, or protect the offender under pain of rendering itself responsible for the consequences.

Should, unfortunately, any of its conditions be violated in any other manner whatever, it is expressly agreed that neither of the contracting parties shall order or authorize any act of reprisal, nor make war against the other on complaint of injuries resulting therefrom until the party considering itself injured shall first have presented to the other a statement or representation of such injuries or damages fortified by competent proofs and demanded redress, and the same shall have been either refused or unreasonably delayed.

ARTICLE XXIX

The present treaty shall remain in force for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of ratifications and if one year before the expiration of this period neither of these contracting parties shall have announced to the other by an official notification its intention to arrest the operation of the said convention, it shall remain obligatory one year beyond that time, and so on until the expiration of the twelve months which will follow a similar notification whatever is the time at which it may take place.

It is understood and agreed by both parties that even

when the stipulations of commerce, navigation and extradition shall have ceased, the obligations of peace and friendship shall remain in full force and be perpetual with both parties.

ARTICLE XXX

The present treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, navigation and extradition shall be ratified and the ratification exchanged at the City of Santo Domingo within ten months from the date of the signature thereof, or sooner if possible.

In faith whereof, the plenipotentiaries of the contracting parties have signed the present convention and thereto affixed their respective seals.

Done at the City of Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, this fifth day of October in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty four.

William L. Cazneau
J. Nepomuceno Tejera
J. Luis F. Bidó

B

Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, and for the Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic

By the President of the United States of America.

A Proclamation:

Whereas, a General Convention of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, and for the surrender of fugitive crim-

inals, between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries, at the City of Santo Domingo, on the eighth day of February, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, which Convention, being in the English and Spanish languages, is word for word, as follows:

The United States of America and the Dominican Republic, equally animated with the desire of maintaining the cordial relations, and of tightening, if possible, the bonds of friendship between the two countries, as well as to augment, by all the means at their disposal, the commercial intercourse of their respective citizens, have mutually resolved to conclude a general convention of amity, commerce, and navigation, and for the surrender of fugitive criminals. For this purpose they have appointed as their plenitotentiaries, to wit: the President of the United States, John Somers Smith, Commercial Agent of the United States at the city of Santo Domingo, and the President of the Dominican Republic, José Gabriel Garcia, Secretary of State in the Department of Foreign Relations, and Juan Ramón Fiallo, ex-Secretary of the Treasury, who, after a communication of their respective full powers, have agreed to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

It is the intention of the high contracting parties that there shall continue to be a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the Republic of the United States of America and the Dominican Republic, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, without exception of

persons or places. If, unfortunately, the two nations should become involved in war, one with the other, the term of six months after the declaration thereof shall be allowed to the merchants and other citizens and inhabitants, respectively, on each side, during which time they shall be at liberty to withdraw themselves, with their effects and movables, which they shall have the right to carry away, send away, or sell, as they please, without the least obstruction; nor shall their effects, much less their persons, be seized during such term of six months; on the contrary, passports shall be valid for a term necessary for their return, and shall be given to them for their vessels and the effects which they may wish to carry with them or send away, and such passports shall be a safe conduct against the insults and captures which privateers may attempt against their persons and effects, and the money, debts, shares in the public funds, or in banks, or any other property, personal or real, belonging to the citizens of the one party in the territories of the other, shall not be confiscated or sequestrated.

ARTICLE 2

The citizens of each of the high contracting parties, residing or established in the territory of the other, shall be exempt from all compulsory military service by sea or by land, and from all forced loans or military exactions or requisitions; nor shall they be compelled to pay any contributions whatever, higher or other than those that are or may be paid by native citizens.

ARTICLE 3

The citizens of the contracting parties shall be permitted to enter, sojourn, settle, and reside in all parts of said terri-

tories, and such as may wish to engage in business shall have the right to hire and occupy warehouses, provided they submit to the laws, as well general as special, relative to the rights of traveling, residing, or trading. While they conform to the laws and regulations in force, they shall be at liberty to manage themselves their own business, subject to the jurisdiction of either party, as well in respect to the consignment and sale of their goods by wholesale or retail as with respect to the loading, unloading, and sending off their ships. They may also employ such agents or brokers as they may deem proper, and shall in all these cases be treated as the citizens of the country wherein they reside; it being, nevertheless, distinctly understood that they shall be subject to such laws and regulations also in respect to wholesale or retail. They shall have free access to the tribunals of justice, in cases to which they may be a party, on the same terms which are granted by the laws and usage of the country to native citizens; for which purpose they may employ in defence of their interests and rights such advocates, attorneys, and other agents as they may think proper.

ARTICLE 4

The citizens of each of the high contracting parties, residing in the other, shall enjoy the most perfect liberty of conscience. They shall be subjected to no inconveniences whatever on account of their religious belief, nor shall they in any manner be annoyed or disturbed in the exercise of their religious worship in private houses, or in the chapels and places which they may select for that purpose; provided, that in so doing, they observe the decorum due to the laws, usages, and customs of the country. It is likewise agreed that the citizens of the one country dying

in the territory of the other, may be interred either in the ordinary cemeteries or in such others as may be selected for that purpose by their own government, or by their personal friends or representatives, with the consent of the local authorities. All such cemeteries and funeral processions, going to or returning from them, shall be protected from violation or disturbance.

ARTICLE 5

The citizens of each of the high contracting parties, within the jurisdiction of the other, shall have power to dispose of their personal property by sale, donation, testament, or otherwise; and their personal representatives being citizens of the other contracting party, shall succeed to their personal property, whether by testament or *ab intesto*. They may take possession thereof, either by themselves or by others acting for them, at their pleasure, and dispose of the same, paying such duty only as the citizens of the country wherein the said personal property is situated shall be subject to pay in like cases. In the absence of a personal representative, the same care shall be taken of the property as by law would be taken of the property of a native in a similar case, whilst the lawful owner may take measures for securing it. If a question should arise among claimants as to the rightful ownership of the property, the same shall be finally decided by the judicial tribunals of the country in which it is situated.

When on the decease of any person holding real estate within the territory of one party, such real estate would by the law of the land descend on a citizen of the other, were he not disqualified by alienage, the longest term which the laws of the country in which it is situated will permit,

shall be accorded to him to dispose of the same; nor shall he be subjected, in doing so, to higher or other dues than if he were a citizen of the country wherein such real estate is situated.

ARTICLE 6

The high contracting parties hereby agree, that whatever kind of produce, manufactures, or merchandise, of any foreign country can be, from time to time, lawfully imported into the United States in their own vessels, may also be imported in the vessels of the Dominican Republic, and no higher or other duties upon the tonnage or cargo of the vessels shall be levied or collected, whether the importation be made in a vessel under the flag of the United States, or a vessel under the flag of the Dominican Republic. And reciprocally, whatever kind of produce, manufactures, or merchandise of any foreign country can be, from time to time, lawfully imported into the Dominican Republic in her own vessels, may also be imported in vessels of the United States, and no higher or other duties upon the tonnage or cargo of the vessels shall be levied or collected, whether the importation be made in a vessel under the flag of the Dominican Republic, or under the flag of the United States.

Whatever can be lawfully exported or re-exported by one party in its own vessels to any foreign country, may, in like manner be exported or re-exported in the vessels of the other; and the same duties, bounties, and drawbacks shall be collected and allowed, whether such exportation or re-exportation be made in vessels of the one or the other. Nor shall higher or other charges of any kind be imposed in the ports of one party on vessels of the other than are or shall be payable in the same ports by national vessels.

ARTICLE 7

The preceding article is not applicable to the coasting trade of the contracting parties, which is respectively reserved by each exclusively for its own citizens.

But vessels of either country shall be allowed to discharge a part of their cargoes at one port, and proceed to any other port or ports in the territories of the other to discharge the remainder, without paying higher or other port charges or tonnage dues than would be paid by national vessels in such cases, so long as this liberty shall be conceded to any foreign vessels by the laws of both countries.

ARTICLE 8

For the better understanding of the preceding stipulations, it has been agreed that every vessel belonging exclusively to a citizen or citizens of the Dominican Republic, and whose captain is also a citizen of the same, such vessel having also complied with all the other requisites established by law to acquire such national character, though the construction and crew are or may be foreign, shall be considered, for all the objects of this treaty, as a Dominican vessel.

ARTICLE 9

No higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of her fisheries; and no higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the Dominican Republic of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, or their fisheries, than are or shall be payable on

the like articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country, or its fisheries.

No other or higher duties or charges shall be imposed in the United States on the exportation of any article to the Dominican Republic, nor in the Dominican Republic, on the exportation of any article to the United States, than such as are or shall be payable on the exportation of the like article to any other foreign country.

No prohibition shall be imposed on the importation of any article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States or their fisheries, or of the Dominican Republic and her fisheries, from or to the ports of the United States or the Dominican Republic, which shall not equally extend to every other foreign country.

ARTICLE 10

Should one of the high contracting parties hereafter impose discriminating duties upon the products of any other nation, the other party shall be at liberty to determine the manner of establishing the origin of its own products intended to enter the country by which the discriminating duties are imposed.

ARTICLE 11

When any vessel of either party shall be wrecked, stranded, or otherwise damaged on the coasts or within the jurisdiction of the other, their respective citizens shall receive, as well for themselves as for their vessels and effects, the same assistance which would be due to the inhabitants of the country where the accident happened, and they shall be liable to pay the same charges and dues

of salvage as the said inhabitants would be liable to pay in a like case.

If the repairs which a stranded vessel may require shall render it necessary that the whole or any part of her cargo should be unloaded, no duties of custom, charges or fees on such cargo as may be carried away shall be paid, except such as are payable in like case by national vessels. It is understood, nevertheless, that if, while the vessel is under repair, the cargo shall be unladen and kept in a place of deposit destined for the reception of goods, the duties on which have not been paid, the cargo shall be liable to the charges and fees lawfully due to the keepers of such warehouses.

ARTICLE 12

It shall be lawful for the citizens of either country to sail with their ships and merchandise (contraband goods always excepted) from any port whatever, to any port of the enemy of the other, and to sail and trade with their ships and merchandise, with perfect security and liberty, from the countries, ports, and places of those who are enemies of either party, without any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, and to pass not only directly from the places and ports of the enemy aforementioned, to neutral ports and places, but also from one place belonging to an enemy to another place belonging to an enemy, whether they be or be not under the jurisdiction of the same power, unless such ports or places be effectively blockaded, besieged, or invested.

And whereas it frequently happens that vessels sail for a port or place belonging to an enemy without knowing that the same is either besieged, blockaded, or invested, it is agreed that every vessel so circumstanced may be turned

away from such port or place, but she shall not be detained, nor any part of her cargo, if not contraband, be confiscated, unless, after notice of such blockade or investment, she shall again attempt to enter; but she shall be permitted to go to any other port or place she shall think proper; provided the same be not blockaded, besieged, or invested. Nor shall any vessel of either of the parties that may have entered into such port or place before the same was actually besieged, blockaded, or invested by the other, be restrained from quitting such place with her cargo, nor if found therein after the reduction and surrender of such place shall such vessel or her cargo be liable to confiscation, but they shall be restored to the owners thereof.

ARTICLE 13

The liberty of navigation and commerce shall extend to all kinds of merchandise, excepting those only which are distinguished by the name of contraband of war, and under this name shall be comprehended

1. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunderbusses, muskets, fuses, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, swords, sabres, lances, spears, halberds, grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls, and every thing belonging to the use of arms.

2. Bucklers, helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, accoutrements, and clothes made up in military form and for military use.

3. Cavalry belts and horses, with their harness.

4. And generally, all offensive or defensive arms, made of iron, steel, brass, copper, or of any other material prepared and formed to make war by land or at sea.

ARTICLE 14

All other merchandises and things not comprehended in the articles of contraband explicitly enumerated and classified as above, shall be held and considered as free, the subjects of free and lawful commerce, so that they be carried and transported in the freest manner by the citizens of both the contracting parties, even to places belonging to an enemy, excepting only those places which are at the time besieged or blockaded.

ARTICLE 15

The two high contracting parties recognize as permanent and immutable the following principles, to wit:

1. That free ships make free goods; that is to say: that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a power or state at war are free from capture or confiscation when found on board neutral vessels with the exception of articles contraband of war.

2. That the property of neutrals on board of an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation, unless the same be contraband of war.

The like neutrality shall be extended to persons who are on board a neutral ship with this effect, that although they may be enemies of both or either party, they are not to be taken out of that ship, unless they are officers or soldiers, and in the actual service of the enemy. The contracting parties engage to apply these principles to the commerce and navigation of all such powers and states as shall consent to adopt them as permanent and immutable.

ARTICLE 16

In the time of war the merchant ships belonging to the citizens of either of the contracting parties, which shall be bound to a port of the enemy of one of the parties, and concerning whose voyage and the articles of their cargo there shall be just grounds of suspicion, shall be obliged to exhibit as well upon the high seas as in the ports or roads not only their passports but likewise their certificates, showing that their goods are not of the quality of those which are specified to be contraband in the thirteenth article of the present convention.

ARTICLE 17

And that captures on light suspicions may be avoided, and injuries thence arising prevented, it is agreed that when one party shall be engaged in war, and the other party be neutral, the ships of the neutral party shall be furnished with passports, that it may appear thereby that the ships really belong to the citizens of the neutral party; they shall be valid for any number of voyages, but shall be renewed every year; that is, if the ship happens to return home in the space of a year. If the ships are laden they shall be provided, not only with the passports above mentioned, but also with certificates, so that it may be known whether they carry any contraband goods. No other paper shall be required, any usage or ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding. And if it shall not appear from the said certificates that there are contraband goods on board, the ships shall be permitted to proceed on their voyage. If it shall appear from the certificates that there are contraband goods on board any such ship, and the commander

of the same shall offer to deliver them up, the offer shall be accepted, and a receipt for the same shall be given, and the ship shall be at liberty to pursue its voyage unless the quantity of the contraband goods be greater than can conveniently be received on board the ship-of-war or privateer, in which case, as in all other cases of just detention, the ship shall be carried into the nearest safe and convenient port for the delivery of the same.

If any ship shall not be furnished with such passport or certificates as are above required for the same, such case may be examined by a proper judge or tribunal and if it shall appear from other documents or proofs, admissible by the usage of nations, that the ship belongs to the citizens or subjects of the neutral party, it shall not be confiscated, but shall be released with her cargo, (contraband goods excepted,) and be permitted to proceed on her voyage.

If the master of a ship, named in the passport, should happen to die, or be removed by any other cause, and another put in his place, the ship and cargo shall, nevertheless, be equally secure and the passport remain in full force.

ARTICLE 18

In order to prevent all kinds of disorder in the visiting and examination of the vessels and cargoes of both the contracting parties on the high seas, it is hereby agreed that whenever a ship-of-war shall meet with a neutral of the other contracting party, the first shall remain at a convenient distance, and may send its boats, with two or three men only, in order to execute the examination of the papers concerning the ownership and cargo of the vessel, without causing the least extortion, violence, or ill treatment, for which the commanders of the said armed

ships shall be responsible with their persons and property, for which purpose the commanders of all private armed vessels shall, before receiving their commissions, give sufficient security to answer for all damages they may commit; and it is hereby agreed and understood that the neutral party shall in no case be required to go on board the examining vessel for the purpose of exhibiting his papers, or for any other purpose whatever.

ARTICLE 19

It is expressly agreed by the high contracting parties that the stipulations above mentioned, relative to the conduct to be observed on the sea by the cruisers of the belligerent party towards the ships of the neutral party, shall be applicable only to ships sailing without convoy, and when the said ships shall be convoyed, it being the intention of the parties to observe all the regards due to the protection of the flags displayed by public ships, it shall not be lawful to visit them; but the verbal declaration of the commander of the convoy that the ships he convoys belong to the nation whose flag he carries, and that they have no contraband goods on board shall be considered by the respective cruisers as fully sufficient; the two parties reciprocally engaging not to admit under the protection of their convoys, ships which shall have on board contraband goods destined to an enemy.

ARTICLE 20

In all cases where vessels shall be captured or detained, to be carried into port under pretense of carrying to the enemy contraband goods, the captor shall give a receipt for

such of the papers of the vessel as he shall retain, which receipt shall be annexed to a copy of the said papers; and it shall be unlawful to break up or open the hatches, chests, trunks, casks, bales, or vessels found on board, or remove the smallest part of the goods, unless the lading be brought on shore in presence of the competent officers, and an inventory be made by them of the same. Nor shall it be lawful to sell, exchange, or alienate the said articles of contraband in any manner, unless there shall have been lawful process, and the competent judge or judges, shall have pronounced against such goods sentence of confiscation.

ARTICLE 21

And in such time of war, that proper care may be taken of the vessel and cargo, and embezzlement prevented, it is agreed that it shall not be lawful to remove the master, commander, or supercargo of any captured ship from on board thereof, during the time the ship may be at sea after her capture, or pending the proceedings against her, or her cargo, or anything relating thereto; and in all cases where a vessel of the citizens of either party shall be captured or seized and held for adjudication, her officers, passengers, and crew shall be hospitably treated. They shall not be imprisoned or deprived of any part of their wearing apparel, nor of the possession and use of their money, not exceeding for the captain, supercargo, mate, and passengers five hundred dollars each, and for the sailors one hundred dollars each.

ARTICLE 22

It is further agreed that in all cases the established courts for prize causes, in the country to which the prizes may

be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of them. And whenever such tribunal of either of the parties shall pronounce judgment against any vessel or goods, or property claimed by the citizens of the other party, the sentence or decree shall mention the reasons or motives on which the same shall have been founded, and an authenticated copy of the sentence or decree, and of all the proceedings in the case, shall, if demanded, be delivered to the commander or agent of the said vessel without any delay, he paying the legal fees for the same.

ARTICLE 23

When the ships-of-war of the two contracting parties, or those belonging to their citizens, which are armed in war, shall be admitted to enter with their prizes the ports of either of the two parties, the said public or private ships, as well as their prizes, shall not be obliged to pay any duty either to the officers of the place, the judges, or any others; nor shall such prizes, when they come to and enter the ports of either party, be arrested or seized, nor shall the officers of the place make examination concerning the lawfulness of such prizes, but they may hoist sail at any time and depart and carry their prizes to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanders of such ships-of-war shall be obliged to show. It is understood, however, that the privileges conferred by this article shall not extend beyond those allowed by law or by treaty with the most favoured nations.

ARTICLE 24

It shall not be lawful for any foreign privateers who have commissions from any prince or State in enmity with

either nation, to fit their ships in the ports of either, to sell their prizes, or in any manner to exchange them; neither shall they be allowed to purchase provisions, except such as shall be necessary to their going to the next port of that prince or State from which they have received their commissions.

ARTICLE 25

No citizen of the Dominican Republic shall apply for or take any commission or letters of marque for arming any ship or ships to act as privateers against the said United States, or any of them, or against the citizens, people, or inhabitants of the said United States, or any of them, or against the property of any of the inhabitants of any of them, from any prince or State with which the said United States shall be at war; nor shall any citizen or inhabitant of the said United States, or any of them, apply for or take any commission or letters of marque for arming any ship or ships to act as privateers against the citizens or inhabitants of the Dominican Republic, or any of them, or the property of any of them, from any prince or State with which the said Republic shall be at war; and if any person of either nation shall take such commissions of letters of marque, he shall be punished according to their respective laws.

ARTICLE 26

The high contracting parties grant to each other the liberty of having in the ports of the other, consuls or vice consuls of their own appointment, who shall enjoy the same privileges and powers as those of the most favoured nation; but if any of the said consuls or vice consuls shall

carry on trade, they shall be subjected to the same laws and usages to which private individuals of their nation are subjected in the same place.

It is understood that whenever either of the two contracting parties shall select a citizen of the other for a consular agent, to reside in any ports or commercial places of the latter, such consul or agent shall continue to be regarded, notwithstanding his quality of a foreign consul, as a citizen of the nation to which he belongs, and consequently shall be subject to the laws and regulations to which natives are subjected in the place of his residence. This obligation, however, shall in no respect embarrass the exercise of his consular functions or affect the inviolability of the consular archives.

The said consuls and vice consuls shall have the right, as such, to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the masters and crews of the vessel belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless their assistance should be required, or the conduct of the crews or of the captain should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country. It is, however, understood that his species of judgment or arbitration shall not deprive the contending parties of the right they have to resort, on their return, to the judicial authority of their own country.

The said consuls and vice consuls are authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities for the arrest and imprisonment of the deserters from the ships-of-war and merchant vessels of their country. For this purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals, judges, and officers, and shall, in writing, demand such deserters, proving by the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the

muster rolls of the crews, or by any other official documents, that such individuals formed part of the crews; and on this claim being substantiated, the surrender shall not be refused. Such deserters, when arrested, shall be placed at the disposal of the consuls and vice consuls, and may be confined in the public prisons at the request and cost of those who shall claim them, in order to be sent to the vessels to which they belong, or to others of the same country. But if not sent back within three months of the day of their arrest, they shall be set at liberty, and shall not again be arrested for the same cause. However, if the deserter shall be found to have committed any crime or offense, his surrender may be delayed until the tribunal before which his case shall be pending shall have pronounced its sentence, and such sentence shall have been carried into effect.

ARTICLE 27

The United States of America and the Dominican Republic, on requisitions made in their name through the medium of their respective diplomatic and consular agents, shall deliver up to justice persons who, being charged with the crimes enumerated in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of the requiring party, shall seek asylum or shall be found within the territories of the other: Provided, That this shall be done only when the fact of the commission of the crime shall be so established as to justify their apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had been committed in the country where the persons so accused shall be found; in all of which the tribunals of said country shall proceed and decide according to their own laws.

ARTICLE 28

Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this convention, who shall be charged with any of the following crimes, to wit: murder (including assassination, parricide, infanticide, and poisoning;) attempt to commit murder; rape; forgery; the counterfeiting of money; arson; robbery with violence, intimidation, or forcible entry of an inhabited house; piracy; embezzlement by public officers, or by persons hired or salaried, to the detriment of their employers, when these crimes are subject to infamous punishment.

ARTICLE 29

On the part of each country the surrender shall be made only by the authority of the executive thereof. The expenses of detention and delivery effected in virtue of the preceding articles, shall be at the cost of the party making the demand.

ARTICLE 30

The provisions of the foregoing articles relating to the surrender of fugitive criminals, shall not apply to offenses committed before the date hereof, nor to those of a political character.

ARTICLE 31

This convention is concluded for the term of eight years, dating from the exchange of the ratifications; and if one year before the expiration of that period neither of the contracting parties shall have announced, by an official

notification, its intention to the other to arrest the operations of said convention, it shall continue binding for twelve months longer, and so on, from year to year, until the expiration of the twelve months which will follow a similar declaration, whatever the time at which it may take place.

ARTICLE 32

This convention shall be submitted on both sides to the approval and ratification of the respective competent authorities of each of the contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Santo Domingo as soon as circumstances shall admit.

In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the aforegoing articles, in the English and Spanish languages, and they have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate, at the city of Santo Domingo, this eighth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven.

(L.S.) Jno. Somers Smith.
(L.S.) José G. Garcia.
(L.S.) Juan R. Fiallo.

And whereas the said Convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the respective ratifications of the same were exchanged at the city of Santo Domingo on the fifth instant.

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Convention to be made public, to the end that the same, and every clause and article thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fourth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the ninety-second.

(SEAL.)

ANDREW JOHNSON.

By the President:
William H. Seward,
Secretary of State.

C

TREATY CELEBRATED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, FOR THE INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND WITH THE FIRST.[1]

The people of the Dominican Republic having, through their government, expressed their desire to be incorporated into the United States as one of the Territories thereof, in order to provide more effectually for their security and prosperity; and the United States being desirous of meeting the wishes of the people and government of that republic, the high contracting parties have determined to accomplish by treaty an object so important to their mutual and permanent welfare.

For this purpose the President of the United States has given full powers to Mr. Raymond H. Perry, United States commercial agent in the city of Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, and the President of the Dominican Republic has given full powers to Mr. Manuel

[1] Signed but not ratified.

Maria Gautier, secretary of state for foreign affairs of the said Dominican Republic; and the said plenipotentiaries, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:

ARTICLE I

The Dominican Republic, acting subject to the wishes of its people, to be expressed in the shortest possible time, renounces all rights of sovereignty as an independent sovereign nation, and cedes these rights to the United States to be incorporated by them as an integral portion of the Union, subject to the same constitutional provisions as their other Territories. It also cedes to the United States the absolute fee and property in all the custom-houses, fortifications, barracks, ports, harbours, navy and navy yards, magazines, arms, armaments, and accoutrements, archives, and public documents of the said Dominican Republic, of which a schedule is annexed to this treaty; public lands and other property not specified excepted.

ARTICLE II

The citizens of the Dominican Republic shall be incorporated into the United States as citizens thereof, inhabiting one of its Territories, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property as such citizens, and may be admitted into the Union as a State, upon such terms and conditions and at such time as Congress shall provide by law.

ARTICLE III

The public lands and property belonging to the Dominican Republic, not herein specifically ceded to the

United States, are pledged to the payment of all the public debt, liquidated or unliquidated, which shall remain after the payment provided for in this treaty.

ARTICLE IV

The people of the Dominican Republic, shall, in the shortest possible time, express, in a manner conformable to their laws, their will concerning the cession herein provided for; and the United States shall, until such expression shall be had, protect the Dominican Republic against foreign interposition, in order that the national expression may be free.

ARTICLE V

The United States shall pay to the Dominican Republic, for the property hereby ceded, the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars in the gold coin of the United States, such payment not to be made until the Senate of the United States shall have given its advice and consent to the making of this treaty, and an appropriation for the payment shall have been made by Congress, and until delivery of all the property ceded shall be made to the persons authorized to receive the same.

ARTICLE VI

The Dominican Republic engages to apply the amount so paid by the United States, through a commission to be appointed by the present actual Dominican Government, toward the redemption of its public debt, in a manner conformable to the laws of said republic—this commission to be respected and protected by the United States while in the legal performance of its duties; and the said

republic shall hold its public lands as a security for the payment of any part thereof, liquidated or unliquidated, which may remain unpaid after such application, and after the execution hereof to make no grants or concessions of lands or rights in lands and to contract no further debts until Congress shall assume jurisdiction over the Territory and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs thereof. The United States are in no event to be liable for the payment of any part of such debt, or of the interest thereon, or of any obligation of the Dominican Republic.

ARTICLE VII

Until provision shall be made by law for the government, as a Territory of the United States, of the domain hereby ceded, the laws of the Dominican Republic, which are not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall remain in force, and the executive and other public officers of the republic shall retain their offices until Congress shall enact laws for the government of the Territory, and until persons shall be appointed to office pursuant thereto.

ARTICLE VIII

Immediately after the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, the President of the United States shall appoint a commissioner to proceed to the Dominican Republic and receive the transfer of the domains and the property hereby ceded, subject to the foregoing provisions.

ARTICLE IX

The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting parties, it being understood that it must receive the con-

stitutional advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, before it can be ratified on the part of the United States, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Washington within four months from the date thereof, or sooner, if possible.

ARTICLE X

In case of the rejection of this treaty the United States of America shall have the right to acquire the Peninsula and Bay of Samaná at any time prior to the expiration of a period of fifty years by paying to the Dominican Republic the sum of two million dollars in the gold coin of the United States.

ARTICLE XI

It is understood that upon the ratification of this treaty the sum of one hundred and forty-seven thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars and ninety-one cents, paid by the United States to the Dominican Republic on account of the rent of Samaná, shall be deducted from the sum specified in Article V of this treaty.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty, and thereto affixed their respective seals.

Done in duplicate and good faith, in the English and Spanish languages, at the city of Santo Domingo, the twenty-ninth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine.

(SEAL.) RAYMOND H. PERRY.
(SEAL.) MANUEL MARIA GAUTIER.

D

Convention Celebrated Between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic for the Lease of the Bay and Peninsula of Samaná.[1]

For this purpose the President of the United States has invested with full powers Mr. Raymond H. Perry, commercial agent of the United States to the Dominican Republic, and the President of the Dominican Republic has invested with full powers Mr. Manuel Maria Gautier, secretary of state of the Dominican Republic, who, after exchanging their said full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon, concluded, and signed the following articles:

ARTICLE I

The Dominican Republic grants immediate possession and occupation, in the form of a lease, to the United States of America, all the territory comprised in the Peninsula and Bay of Samaná, extending from Cape Samaná or Rezón to the R. Grand Estero, which begins at the mouth of the said Grand Estero on the north, and terminates at the mouth of the Trujillo, at the western end of the bay of Samaná, as appears on the map of the island of Santo Domingo, executed by Sir Robert H. Schomburgk, and published in 1858 by order of his excellency President Buenaventura Baez.

The United States shall possess and occupy the above-described territory during a period of 50 years from this

[1] Signed but not ratified.

date, and the Dominican Republic cedes by this act to the United States the eminent domain of said territory during the above-described term of occupation.

It is understood that the Dominican Republic does not cede its right of free navigation of the waters of said bay.

ARTICLE II

During the above-named term of occupation of the said territory, the United States shall pay, as an annual rent to the Dominican Republic, on the first day of January of each year, in Washington, D. C., or in the city of New York, the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in gold coin of the United States. The Dominican Republic hereby acknowledges to have received the sum of one hundred and forty-seven thousand two hundred and twenty-nine dollars and ninety-one cents on account of the first payment under this convention.

ARTICLE III

In case the United States shall establish a naval and military station, or either, on any part of the tract herein above described, the Dominican Republic shall, on demand of the chief officer in command thereof, arrest and surrender to the United States all deserters from the Army or Navy of the United States found within the said territory of the Dominican Republic, but the expense of such arrest and surrender shall be borne by the United States.

ARTICLE IV

This convention shall be ratified by both parties, it being understood that it cannot be ratified by the United

States until it has received the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States; and the ratification shall take place at Washington, D. C., as soon as possible within four months from the date hereof.

The United States shall protect the Dominican Republic against foreign intervention during the time agreed upon for exchange of the above ratification.

Done in duplicate and good faith in the English and Spanish languages, in the city of Santo Domingo, the twenty-ninth day of the month of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine.

(SEAL.) RAYMOND H. PERRY.
(SEAL.) MANUEL MARIA GAUTIER.

E

CONVENTION FOR COMMERCIAL RECIPROCITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.[1]

The United States of America and the Dominican Republic, equally animated by the desire to strengthen and perpetuate the friendly relations happily existing between them, and especially recognizing that, by reason of the close proximity of the Dominican Republic to the shores of the United States, intimate and beneficial relations of trade have sprung up between the two countries; and, moreover equally sharing the belief that their common interests demand the establishment of such free commercial intercourse between them as shall further encourage and develop trade and good will between their respective

[1] Entered into for the second time by an exchange of notes on June 4, 1891.

peoples, have resolved to enter into a commercial convention to that especial end.

For this purpose the President of the United States has appointed as his plenipotentiary, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State of the United States; and the President of the Dominican Republic Señor de J. Galván, now presiding Judge of the Supreme Court of Justice, who, after exhibition of their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by the Dominican Republic in the present Convention, and as an equivalent therefor, the United States of America hereby agree to admit into the ports of the United States open to commerce as declared ports of entry, all the articles named in the following Schedule "A" free of import duties, and all the articles named in the following Schedule "B" at a reduction of 25 per centum from the rates of customs duties now fixed or which may hereafter be fixed during the continuance in force of this Convention by the customs tariff of the United States with respect to the several articles so enumerated in said Schedule "B": Provided, That the articles named in Schedules "A" and "B" be the growth and manufacture or production of the Dominican Republic: And provided further, That said articles be carried in vessels under the regular documents and flag of one or the other of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE II

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by the United States of America in the present

Convention, and as an equivalent therefor, the Dominican Republic hereby agrees to admit into the ports of the Dominican Republic, open to commerce as declared ports of entry, all the articles named in the following Schedule "C" free of import duties, and all the articles named in the following Schedule "D" at a reduction of 25 per centum from the rates of customs duties now fixed, or which may hereafter be fixed, during the continuance in force of this Convention by the customs tariff of the Dominican Republic with respect to the several articles so enumerated in said Schedule "D": Provided, That the articles named in said Schedules "C" and "D" be the growth and manufacture or production of the United States of America: And provided further, That such articles be carried in vessels under the regular documents and flag of one or the other of the contracting parties.

ARTICLE III

The Governments of the two contracting parties shall respectively have the power to issue such laws, rules, regulations, instructions, and orders as they may deem proper to protect their revenues and prevent fraud, in order to prove that the merchandise included in the above schedules annexed to the first and second articles of this Convention are produced or manufactured in the United States of America or in the Dominican Republic respectively, and are therefore entitled to the special benefits which are granted upon their importation into the declared ports of entry of the respective countries.

The Government of each of the contracting parties shall have, moreover, the power to amend, modify, or amplify, the laws and regulations issued in the exercise of

the power conferred by this article whenever it deems proper, to protect its revenues and prevent fraud.

The contracting parties, however, mutually agree that the proofs of origin contemplated in this article shall be of fact only, and that the carriers of the goods which may be found to contravene the precautionary measures established in virtue hereof shall not be amenable to fine or imprisonment, nor the vessels carrying them to penalty, unless upon proof of an attempt to defraud the revenues.

ARTICLE IV

No export duty or charges shall be imposed in the United States or in the Dominican Republic upon any of the articles proposed to be admitted into the ports of the Dominican Republic or into the ports of the United States under the first and second articles of this Convention, nor shall any of said articles, coming from the United States or from the Dominican Republic and imported into the territory of the other, be subject to internal, excise or consumption dues greater than those which are or may be imposed upon similar articles of national production.

ARTICLE V

Vessels of either of the contracting parties coming directly from any port of one of them with cargo wholly the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States or of the Dominican Republic, as the case may be, or in ballast, shall pay upon entering any port of entry of the other party the same tonnage, clearance and other dues imposed by the federal or general government as are levied upon national vessels engaged in the domestic

coasting trade and coming directly from any port of the same country with cargo or in ballast; and as to municipal or local dues such as pilotage, port, wharf, and hospital charges and the like, they shall pay the same charges as are levied upon national vessels of like point of departure and carrying like cargo. And such vessels of either contracting party, so laden and coming directly from any port or ports of the other country, shall be free to proceed from any one port of entry for foreign commerce to any other like port of entry in the country to which they are bound, unlading cargo duly consigned to such several ports subsequently visited in the course of the same voyage on the same terms as the vessels of that country engaged in the coasting trade thereof: Provided, That nothing in this article shall give the vessels of the United States or of the Dominican Republic the right to take on board in a port of the country of destination cargo destined for another port thereof, such right being exclusively reserved for the domestic coasting trade under the laws of the respective countries.

Inasmuch as neither the United States nor the Dominican Republic at the present time levies tonnage dues upon national vessels engaged in the domestic coasting trade, it is to be understood that nothing in this Convention shall prevent either Government from imposing, if at any time it see fit to do so, a tonnage tax on vessels of national registry engaged in the coasting trade, in which event the vessels favoured under this Convention may be subject to the payment of a like tax. And it is further to be understood that in case either contracting party should hereafter impose such a tonnage tax upon the vessels of its domestic coasting trade, the Government of the other party may impose a countervailing tax.

ARTICLE VI

If any vessel of the United States, proceeding from a port or ports of the United States to the Dominican Republic, shall carry any cargo not the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States, whether the same be shipped in the United States or at any intermediate foreign port, the free treatment stipulated in the preceding Article V shall not be obligatory in respect of said vessel, but said vessel shall be treated, as to tonnage and other shipping dues, and as to the customs duties on such cargo of foreign origin, on the same footing as a vessel of the Dominican Republic coming from the United States laden in like manner; and, conversely, if any vessel of the Dominican Republic, proceeding from a port or ports of the Dominican Republic to the United States, shall carry any cargo not the growth, produce, or manufacture of said Republic, whether the same be shipped in said Republic or at any intermediate port, the free treatment stipulated in the preceding Article V shall not be obligatory in respect of said vessel, but said vessel shall be treated, as to tonnage and other shipping dues and as to the customs duties on such cargo of foreign origin, on the same footing as a vessel of the United States coming from the Dominican Republic laden in like manner; but this article shall not affect any cargo or part of cargo of such vessels being the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States or of the Dominican Republic, and as to such wholly national cargo as they may carry, the privilege of Article I or Article II, as the case may be, shall apply.

ARTICLE VII

Vessels of the United States, with or without cargo, coming from foreign countries and entering the ports of the Dominican Republic, and Dominican vessels, with or without cargo, coming from foreign countries and entering the ports of the United States, whatever may be the place of origin of their cargo or the destination thereof, shall enjoy under all circumstances, on their entry into port, during their stay, and on departing, the same treatment as national vessels and their cargoes coming from the same places and with like cargoes.

ARTICLE VIII

Vessels of the United States or of the Dominican Republic, having entered a port of the United States or of the Dominican Republic voluntarily or in distress, with or without cargo, and sailing from said port without transacting any commercial operation, shall be exempt from tonnage, clearance, navigation, or port dues or charges. In case of entrance in distress, the discharge, reloading, or transshipment caused thereby, the necessary expense for provisioning the crew and the sale of the damaged merchandise, shall not be considered as commercial transaction, when the proper customs official shall have previously authorized it.

ARTICLE IX

No fees named in the tariff or consular fees of the United States or of the Dominican Republic shall be charged or collected by consular officers of either the

United States or the Dominican Republic for official services to the vessels of the United States and the Dominican Republic, or respecting such cargo or parts of cargo, conveyed by said vessels, as may be entitled under this Convention to the privileges of the Schedules "A" and "C" of Articles I and II hereof.

ARTICLE X

Vessels of the United States and of the Dominican Republic, whenever referred to in this Convention, shall be understood to be vessels bona fide owned exclusively by citizens of the United States or of the Dominican Republic, and whose officers are also citizens of the said countries; and no evasion whatever of these requirements for the benefit of other vessels or ship owners shall be recognized.

ARTICLE XI

Each one of the high contracting parties exclusively reserves for its own vessels and citizens the right of fishing in the respective territorial waters; but fish procured by the vessels of one or the other country on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a third power, shall be held to be the product of the country to which the vessel belongs.

ARTICLE XII

Each of the high contracting parties binds itself to extend to the other reciprocally all favours and privileges in regard to customs tariff, commerce, property, and persons which it may have conceded or may concede to a third power, freely if freely granted to such third

power, or for an equivalent consideration if granted to such third power in virtue of a compensating arrangement.

ARTICLE XIII

The stipulations contained in this Convention shall not prevent either of the contracting parties from making such changes in their customs tariffs and navigation dues as their respective interests may require, granting to other nations the same liberty of rights as herein stipulated, either by legislation or by means of treaties with other governments. But in case such changes are made, the party affected by the same may denounce this Convention, even before the term specified in Article XVII, and the present Convention shall be terminated at the end of six months from the day on which such notification may be made.

ARTICLE XIV

The high contracting parties shall be agreed that in the event of any case arising, whether under treaty stipulations between them, or under international law, or through denial or failure of justice, affecting the person or property of a citizen of either in the jurisdiction of the other, which may not be susceptible of adjustment by amicable diplomatic means, the dispute shall be referred to arbitration by a single arbitrator, who shall be a citizen of either country, to be chosen by common consent; and if for any cause the high contracting parties be not able to agree upon a single arbitrator, each party shall choose an arbitrator, and these two, in the further event of their not being able to agree together upon the case submitted to them, shall have power to choose an umpire,

whose decision upon the case submitted shall be final. The result of such arbitration shall be final and conclusive, and shall be carried into effect by the party whom it may concern without any evasion or delay whatsoever.

The expense of the arbitration herein provided shall be borne by the contracting parties jointly in equal moieties.

ARTICLE XV

For mutual convenience in the intimate commercial transactions which are hoped for from the present treaty, the Dominican Government agrees to adopt the dollar of the United States as its unit of currency. The standard silver dollar of the United States will be admitted to circulation in Santo Domingo as legal tender to the amount of $100, and the gold coin of the United States as legal tender to any amount. As soon as the Dominican Republic shall by law have provided for the remonetization of its currency, the coinage of the national mints of the Republic shall be adjusted in quality and fineness to such legal tender: and if the Government of the Dominican Republic should so request, the Government of the United States will cause to be struck at its mints, in conformity with the statutes regulating the national coinage, standard silver dollars of the United States, for circulation in Santo Domingo, from such silver bullion as may be presented to it by the Dominican Government for that purpose, to an amount not exceeding $3,000,000.

ARTICLE XVI

The present Convention shall take effect as soon as it has been ratified by both contracting parties accord-

ing to their respective constitutional procedure; but not until laws necessary to carry it into operation shall have been passed both by the Congress of the United States of America and by the Government of the Dominican Republic, which shall take place within four months from the date of the exchanges of ratifications to which Article XVIII refers.

ARTICLE XVII

Upon the present Convention taking effect, it shall remain in force for six years from the date in which it may come into operation according to the foregoing article, and shall remain in force until either of the contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, and further until the expiration of twelve months from the date of such notification. Each of the contracting parties is at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of said term of seven years or at any time thereafter, or before as provided in Article XIII of this Convention.

ARTICLE XVIII

The ratifications of the present Convention shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done in duplicate in the City of Washington in the English and Spanish languages this fourth day of December in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four.

(SEAL.) FREDK. T. FRELINGHUYSEN.
(SEAL.) MANUEL DE J. GALVAN.

F

PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, FOR THE SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION OF CERTAIN QUESTIONS AS TO THE PAYMENT OF THE SUM HEREINAFTER AGREED TO BE PAID BY THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLAIMS OF THE SAN DOMINGO IMPROVEMENT COMPANY OF NEW YORK, A CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS ALLIED COMPANIES.

Whereas, differences exist between the Dominican Government and the "San Domingo Improvement Company" and its allied companies; and

Whereas, as the result of those differences, the interests of the Improvement Company and its allied companies, viz: "The San Domingo Finance Company of New York," "The Company of The Central Dominican Railway," both being corporations created under the laws of New Jersey, and the National Bank of San Domingo, a company originally organized under a French charter, the two latter companies being owned and controlled by the San Domingo Finance Company, are seriously affected; and

Whereas, it is agreed, as the basis of the present settlement, that the Improvement Company and its allied Companies shall withdraw from the Dominican Republic, and

that they shall be duly indemnified by the latter for the relinquishment of their rights, properties and interests,

The United States of America and the Dominican Republic through their respective representatives W. F. Powell, Chargé d'Affaires, and Juan Fco. Sánchez, Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I

It being hereby agreed that the Dominican Government shall pay to the Government of the United States the sum of $4,500,000 (four millions five hundred thousand dollars), in American gold, on terms to be fixed by the arbitrators, said payment to be made and accepted as full indemnity for the relinquishment by the companies abovementioned of all their rights, properties and interest, and in full settlement of all accounts, claims and differences between the Dominican Government and the said companies; the terms on which the indemnity thus agreed upon shall be paid shall be referred to a board of three arbitrators, one to be named by the President of the United States, one by the President of the Dominican Republic, and the third by the President of the United States and the President of the Dominican Republic jointly; but if, within sixty days after the signature of the present protocol, the third arbitrator shall not have been so named, he shall then be selected by the Dominican Government from members of the United States Supreme Court or the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, from names presented.

In case of the death, absence or incapacity of any arbitrator, or in the event of his ceasing or omitting to act, the vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the

original appointment, the period of sixty days to be calculated from the date of the happening of the vacancy.

ARTICLE II

The arbitrators shall meet in the city of Washington, within sixty days after the date of the appointment of the third arbitrator.

The vote of the majority shall suffice for the decision of all questions submitted to the tribunal, including the final award.

ARTICLE III

Within six months after the signature of this protocol, each party shall present to the other and to its agent, and also to each of the arbitrators, two printed copies of its case, accompanied with the documents and evidence on which it relies, together with the affidavits of their respective witnesses.

Within a further period of two months, either party may, in like manner, present a counter-case, with additional documents and evidence and affidavits, in reply to the case, documents and evidence of the other party.

If the other party shall, in its case or counter-case, refer to any document in its exclusive possession without annexing a copy, it shall, upon the request of the other party, furnish the latter with a copy; and either party may call upon the other through the arbitrators, to produce the originals or certified copies of any papers adduced as evidence.

ARTICLE IV

Within two months after the expiration of the term allowed for the filing of counter-cases, each Government

may, by its agent, as well as by additional counsel, argue its cause before the arbitrators, both orally and in writing. Each side shall furnish to the other copies of any written arguments, and each party shall be at liberty to make a written reply, provided that such reply be submitted within the two months specified.

ARTICLE V

The Companies above mentioned shall cede and transfer to the Dominican Government, and the latter shall acquire from the Companies, the properties mentioned herein, the times, terms and conditions of the delivery of which shall be fixed by the arbitrators:

1. All the rights and interests which they may possess in the section of the Central Dominican Railway already constructed, as well as all rights and interests which they may have in the extension of the railways from Santiago to Moca, and from Moca to San Francisco de Macorís.

2. All rights and interests which they may have in the National Bank.

3. All bonds of the Republic of which they may be the holders, the amount of which shall not exceed £850,000, nominal (eight hundred and fifty thousands sterling pounds), nominal, and shall be no less than £825,000 (eight hundred and twenty-five thousands sterling pounds nominal).

It is understood that all these bonds are of the class bearing four per cent annual interests excepting as to £24,000 (twenty-four thousand sterling pounds) two and three-quarter per cent bonds, which shall be accepted at the rate of sixteen 2¾ per cent bonds for eleven 4 per cent bonds. A list of the bonds shall accompany the case of the United States.

ARTICLE VI

It is agreed, as the basis of the award to be made by the arbitrators, that the sum specified in Article I hereof shall be paid in monthly installments, the amount and manner of collection of which shall be fixed by the tribunal. The award shall bear interest from the date of its rendition at the city of Washington.

The Dominican Government having, in its recent negotiations with the American Companies, proposed to pay, on account of its indebtedness to them, a minimum sum of $225,000 (two hundred and twenty-five thousands dollars) per annum, which was to be increased on a sliding scale, it is agreed that the Dominican Government shall, pending the present arbitration, and beginning with the 1st of January, 1903, pay to the Government of the United States for the use of the American Companies, the sum of $225,000 (two hundred and twenty-five thousands dollars) per annum, in equal monthly installments, the aggregate amount so paid, at the date of the award, to be taken into account by the arbitrators.

ARTICLE VII

The award of the tribunal shall be rendered within a year from the date of the signature of the present protocol. It shall be in writing, and shall be final and conclusive.

ARTICLE VIII

Reasonable compensation to the arbitrators for their services and all expenses incident to the arbitration, in-

cluding the cost of such clerical aid as may be necessary, shall be paid by the Governments in equal moieties.

Done in quadruplicate, in English and Spanish, at San Domingo City, this 31st day of January, 1903.

(SEAL.) JNO FCO SÁNCHEZ.
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.

(SEAL.) W. F. POWELL.
Chargé d'Affaires.

AGREEMENT TO THE NAMING OF ARBITRATORS

It is hereby agreed, on the part of the Dominican Government, through Juan Francisco Sánchez, Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, and the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of North America, in the person of W. F. Powell, each acting for his respective Government, that neither of the signatory parties to this Protocol for International Arbitration, to which has been referred certain disagreements existing between the Dominican Government on the one side, and the Santo Domingo Improvement Company on the other, shall name its Arbitrator as stated in said Protocol, until after a period of ninety (90) days from the date of signing the same, in order to allow the Dominican Government to come to an agreement with the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, and the date referred to in the appointment of the third Arbitrator shall bear same as that expressed above.

To the above we agree, and with good faith to carry the same into effect, have hereunto affixed our names and attached thereto the Seals of our respective Offices.

Done this 31st day of January, 1903.

(SEAL.) JNO FCO. SÁNCHEZ.
Secretary of State for Foreign Relations of the Republic of San Domingo.

(SEAL.) W. P. POWELL.
Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of North America.

G

PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE COLLECTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CUSTOMS REVENUES OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

The Dominican Government in view of the debts which burden the Republic, the imminent peril and urgent menace of intervention on the part of nations whose citizens have claims already established or to be established, finding itself, as it does, unable peremptorily to fulfill its obligations on account of the condition to which political disturbances and other causes have brought the Treasury, the result being that these obligations are falling due without its having been possible to pay them, or even the interest thereon, desires to reach an arrangement with all its creditors and that the government itself succeed in assuring the regular receipt of revenues sufficient for the payment of its internal administration and the maintenance of its administrative autonomy without any interruption by the exigencies of foreign creditors or by internal political disturbances and,

Whereas, The Government of the United States of America, viewing any attempt on the part of the governments outside of this hemisphere to oppress or control the destiny of the Dominican Republic as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States, is in compliance with the request of the Dominican Government, disposed to lend its assistance toward effecting a satisfactory arrangement with all the creditors of the Dominican Government, agreeing to respect the complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Government represented by the secretary of state for foreign relations, Citizen Juan Francisco Sánchez, and the secretary of state for finance and commerce, Citizen Federico Velasquez, and the United States Government represented by its minister resident, Thomas C. Dawson, have agreed and covenanted as follows:

ARTICLE I

The United States Government agrees to attempt the adjustment of all the obligations of the Dominican Government, foreign as well as domestic; the adjustment of the payment and of the conditions of amortization; the consideration of conflicting and unreasonable claims, and the determination of the validity and amount of all pending claims.

If, in order to reach such adjustment, it shall be considered necessary to name one or more commissions, the Dominican Government shall be represented on said commissions.

ARTICLE II

In order to enable the United States Government to render the assistance above mentioned, it shall take charge

of the existing custom-houses and those which may hereafter be created, shall name the employees necessary to their management, and shall collect and take charge of all custom-house receipts.

These employees shall be subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Government may appoint in each of the custom-houses an officer for the purpose of making an inspection on behalf of Dominican interests.

ARTICLE III

Out of the revenues which shall be collected in all the custom-houses of the Republic, the Government of the United States shall deliver to the Dominican Government a sum, which shall not be less than 45 per cent of the total amount collected, for the purpose of meeting the needs of the public service, and which the Dominican Government shall receive in monthly payments from the date of the taking possession of the custom-houses by the officials of the United States, divided into four installments in the following manner:

Forty-five per cent of the total sum collected monthly in periods ending on the 8th, 15th, 22d, and the last day of each month.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States will apply the 55 per cent which it retains toward the payment of—

A. The employees of all the custom-houses.

B. The interest, amortization, and installments of the Dominican debt, foreign and domestic, in accordance with what is hereinbefore provided, according as it shall be fixed and liquidated.

C. The whole surplus which may remain at the end of each fiscal year shall be delivered to the Government of the Dominican Republic, or shall be devoted to the payment of its debts, if it shall so determine.

ARTICLE V

The collectors in the custom-houses shall send monthly to the contaduria-general and the Department of the Treasury statements of the corresponding income and outgo, and annually a general statement which shall embrace the total of what has been collected and paid out.

ARTICLE VI

Any reform of the system of duties and taxes shall be made in agreement with the President of the United States, and therefore the present tariff and port dues may not be reduced except with his consent, as long as the whole of the debt which the Government of the United States takes charge of shall not have been completely paid, with the exception of the export duties upon national products which the Dominican Government remains authorized to abolish or reduce immediately, but not to increase said export duties or its public debt without the consent of the President of the United States.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the United States, at the request of the Dominican Republic, shall grant the latter such other assistance as the former may deem proper to restore the credit, preserve the order, increase the efficiency of the civil administration, and advance the material progress and welfare of the Dominican Republic.

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement shall continue in force during the time required for the amortization of the debt of which the Government of the United States takes charge.

ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall take effect after its approval by the United States Senate and the Congress of the Dominican Republic.

Done in four originals, two being in the Spanish language, and two in the English and the representatives of the high contracting parties signing them in the city of Santo Domingo, February the seventh, nineteen hundred and five.

THOMAS C. DAWSON
JUAN FCO. SÁNCHEZ
FEDRI. VELASQUEZ

H.

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PROVIDING FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE COLLECTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CUSTOMS REVENUES OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Whereas, a convention between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic providing for the assistance of the United States in the collection and application of the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipo-

tentiaries at the City of Santo Domingo, on the eighth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and seven, the original of which convention, being in the English and Spanish language, is word for word as follows:

Whereas during disturbed political conditions in the Dominican Republic debts and claims have been created, some by revolutionary governments, many of doubtful validity in whole or in part, and amounting in all to over $30,000,000 nominal or face value:

And Whereas the same conditions have prevented the peaceable and continuous collection and application of National revenues for payment of interest or principal of such debts or for liquidation and settlement of such claims; and the said debts and claims continually increase by accretion of interest and are a grievous burden upon the people of the Dominican Republic and a barrier to their improvement and prosperity;

And Whereas the Dominican Government has now effected a conditional adjustment and settlement of said debts and claims under which all its foreign creditors have agreed to accept about $12,407,000 for debts and claims amounting to about $21,184,000 of nominal or face value, and the holders of internal debts or claims of about $2,028,258 nominal or face value have agreed to accept about $645,827 therefor, and the remaining holders of internal debts or claims on the same basis as the assents already given will receive about $2,400,000 therefor, which sum the Dominican Government has fixed and determined as the amount which it will pay to such remaining internal debt holders; making the total payments under such adjustment and settlement, including interest as adjusted and claims not yet liquidated, amount to not more than about $17,000,000.

And Whereas a part of such plan of settlement is the ssue and sale of bonds of the Dominican Republic to the mount of $20,000,000 bearing five per cent interest pay- ble in fifty years and redeemable after ten years at 102½ nd requiring payment of at least one per cent per annum or amortization, the proceeds of said bonds, together with uch funds as are now deposited for the benefit of creditors rom customs revenues of the Dominican Republic here- ofore received, after payment of the expenses of such djustment, to be applied first to the payment of said debts nd claims as adjusted and second out of the balance re- naining to the retirement and extinction of certain con- essions and harbor monopolies which are a burden and indrance to the commerce of the country and third the ntire balance still remaining to the construction of ertain railroads and bridges and other public improve- ments necessary to the industrial development of the ountry;

And Whereas the whole of said plan is conditioned and dependent upon the assistance of the United States in the ollection of customs revenues of the Dominican Republic nd the application thereof so far as necessary to the in- erest upon and the amortization and redemption of said onds, and the Dominican Republic has requested the Jnited States to give and the United States is willing to ive such assistance:

The Dominican Government represented by its Minister f State for Foreign Relations, Emiliano Tejera, and its Minister of State for Finance and Commerce, Federico Velasquez H., and the United States Government, repre- ented by Thomas C. Dawson, Minister Resident and Con- ul General of the United States to the Dominican Repub- ic, have agreed:

ARTICLE I

That the President of the United States shall appoint a General Receiver of Dominican Customs, who, with such Assistant Receivers and other employees of the Receivership as shall be appointed by the President of the United States in his discretion, shall collect all the customs duties accruing at the several customs houses of the Dominican Republic until the payment or retirement of any and all bonds issued by the Dominican Government in accordance with the plan and under the limitations as to terms and amounts hereinbefore recited; and said General Receiver shall apply the sums so collected, as follows:

First, to paying the expenses of the receivership; second, to the payment of interest upon said bonds; third, to the payment of the annual sums provided for amortization of said bonds including interest upon all bonds held in sinking fund; fourth, to the purchase and cancellation or the retirement and cancellation pursuant to the terms thereof of any of said bonds as may be directed by the Dominican Government; fifth, the remainder to be paid to the Dominican Government.

The method of distributing the current collections of revenue in order to accomplish the application thereof as hereinbefore provided shall be as follows:

The expenses of the receivership shall be paid by the Receiver as they arise. The allowances to the General Receiver and his assistants for the expenses of collecting the revenues shall not exceed five per cent unless by agreement between the two Governments.

On the first day of each calendar month the sum of $100,000 shall be paid over by the Receiver to the Fiscal Agent of the loan, and the remaining collection of the last

preceding month shall be paid over to the Dominican Government, or applied to the sinking fund for the purchase or redemption of bonds, as the Dominican Government shall direct.

Provided, that in case the customs revenues collected by the General Receiver shall in any year exceed the sum of $3,000,000, one half of the surplus above such sum of $3,000,000 shall be applied to the sinking fund for the redemption of bonds.

ARTICLE II

The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver and his assistants, and will give to them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to the extent of its powers. The Government of the United States will give to the General Receiver and his assistants such protection as it may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.

ARTICLE III

Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modifica-

tion, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rates of duties have been for each of such two years in excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.

ARTICLE IV

The accounts of the General Receiver shall be rendered monthly to the Contaduria General of the Dominican Republic and to the State Department of the United States and shall be subject to examination and verification by the appropriate officers of the Dominican and the United States Governments.

ARTICLE V

This agreement shall take effect after its approval by the Senate of the United States and the Congress of the Dominican Republic.

Done in four originals, two being in the English language, and two in the Spanish, and the representatives of the high contracting parties signing them in the City of Santo Domingo this 8th day of February, in the Year of our Lord 1907.

THOMAS C. DAWSON
EMILIANO TEJERA
FEDERICO VELASQUEZ H.

And whereas the said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the City of Washington, on the eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred seven;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end

that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this 25th day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred
(Seal) and seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and thirty-second.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

By the President:
ROBERT BACON
Acting Secretary of State.

I.

CONVENTION OF RATIFICATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT OF EVACUATION OF JUNE 30, 1922

Whereas a convention of ratification between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic as contained in the agreement of evacuation of June thirty, nineteen hundred and twenty-two, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at Santo Domingo on the twelfth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-four, the original of which convention, being in the English and Spanish languages, is word for word as follows:

Whereas, in the month of May, 1916, the territory of the Dominican Republic was occupied by the forces of the United States of America, during which occupation there was established, in substitution of the Dominican Government, a Military Government which issued governmental regulations under the name of Executive Orders and Resolutions and Administrative Regulations, and also celebrated several contracts by virtue of said Executive Orders or by virtue of some existing laws of the Republic;

Whereas, the Dominican Republic has always maintained its right to self-government, the disoccupation of its territory and the integrity of its sovereignty and independence; and the Government of the United States has declared that, on occupying the territory of the Dominican Republic, it never had, nor has at present, the purpose of attacking the sovereignty and independence of the Dominican Nation; and these rights and declarations gave rise to a Plan or *Modus Operandi* of Evacuation signed on June 30, 1922, by Monseñor A. Nouel, General Horacio Vasquez, Don Federico Velasquez y H., Don Elías Brache, *hijo,* and Don Francisco J. Peynado, and the Department of State, represented by the Honorable William W. Russell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States in the Dominican Republic, and the Honorable Sumner Welles, Commissioner of the President of the United States, which met with the approval of the Dominican people, and which approval was confirmed at the elections that took place on March 15, of the present year;

Whereas, although the Dominican Republic has never delegated authority to any foreign power to legislate for it, still, it understands that the internal interests of the Republic require the validation or ratification of several of

the Executive Orders and Resolutions, published in the Official Gazette, as well as the Administrative Regulations and Contracts of the Military Government celebrated by virtue of said Orders or of any Law of the Republic; and, on its part, the United States considers that it is also to its interest that said acts be validated or ratified; for these reasons one of the stipulations in the above-mentioned Plan of Evacuation provides for the celebration of a Treaty or Convention of Ratification or Validation of said Orders, Resolutions, Regulations and Contracts;

Therefore, the United States of America and the Dominican Republic, desirous of celebrating the above-mentioned Treaty or Convention, have named for this purpose their Plenipotentiaries as follows:

The President of the United States, William W. Russell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States in Santo Domingo, and,

The Provisional President of the Dominican Republic, Don Horacio Vasquez, Don Federico Velasquez y H., and Don Francisco J. Peynado, who, after having exchanged their full powers, and after having found them in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

The Dominican Government hereby recognizes the validity of all the Executive Orders and Resolutions, promulgated by the Military Government and published in the Official Gazette, which may have levied taxes, authorized expenditures, or established rights on behalf of third persons, and the administrative regulations issued, and contracts which may have been entered into, in accordance with those Orders or with any law of the

Republic. Those Executive Orders and Resolutions, Administrative Regulations and Contracts are those listed below:

. . . . . .

The Dominican Government likewise agrees that those Executive Orders, those resolutions, those administrative regulations and those contracts shall remain in full force and effect unless and until they are abrogated by those bodies which, in accordance with the Dominican Constitution, can legislate. But, this ratification, in so far as concerns those of the above mentioned Executive Orders, resolutions, administrative regulations, and contracts, which have been modified or abrogated by other Executive Orders, resolutions, or administrative regulations of the Military Government, only refers to the legal effects which they created while they were in force.

The Dominican Government further agrees that neither the subsequent abrogation of those Executive Orders, resolutions, administrative regulations, or contracts, or any other law, Executive Order, or other official act of the Dominican Government, shall affect the validity or security of rights acquired in accordance with those orders, those resolutions, those administrative regulations and those contracts of the Military Government; the controversies which may arise related with those rights acquired will be determined solely by the Dominican Courts, subject, however, in accordance with the generally accepted rules and principles of international law, to the right of diplomatic intervention if those Courts should be responsible for cases of notorious injustice or denial of justice. The determination of such cases in which the interest of the United States and the Dominican Republic

only are concerned shall, should the two Governments disagree, be by arbitration. In the carrying out of this agreement, in each individual case, the High Contracting Parties, once the necessity of arbitration is determined, shall conclude a special agreement defining clearly the scope of the dispute, the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and the periods to be fixed for the formation of the arbitral tribunal and the several stages of the procedure. It is understood that on the part of the United States, such special agreements will be made by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, and on the part of the Dominican Republic shall be subject to the procedure required by the Constitution and laws thereof.

ARTICLE II

The Dominican Government, in accordance with the provisions of Article I, specifically recognizes the bond issue of 1918 and the twenty-year five and one-half per cent Customs Administration Sinking Fund Gold Bond Issue authorized in 1922, as legal, binding, and irrevocable obligations of the Republic, and pledges its full faith and credit to the maintenance of the service of those bond issues. With reference to the stipulation contained in Article 10 of the Executive Order No. 735, in accordance with which the loan of five and one-half per cent authorized in 1922 was issued, which provides:

'That the present customs tariff will not be changed during the life of this loan without previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the Government of the United States;'

the two Governments concerned agree in interpreting this stipulation in the sense that, in accordance with article 3 of the Convention of 1907, a previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States shall be necessary to modify the import duties of the Dominican Republic, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rates of duties have been, for each of such two years, in excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.

ARTICLE III

The Dominican Government and the Government of the United States agree that the Convention signed on February 8, 1907, between the United States and the Dominican Republic, shall remain in force so long as any bonds of the issues of 1918 and 1922 shall remain unpaid, and that the duties of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs appointed in accordance with that Convention shall be extended to include the application of the revenues pledged for the service of those bond issues in accordance with the terms of the Executive Orders and of the contracts under which the bonds were issued.

ARTICLE IV

This arrangement shall take effect after its approval by the Senate of the United States and the Congress of the Dominican Republic.

Done in four originals, two in the English language, and two in the Spanish, and the representatives of the High Contracting Powers signing them in the City of Santo Domingo, this twelfth day of June, nineteen hundred and twenty-four.

(SEAL) WILLIAM W. RUSSELL
(SEAL) HORACIO VASQUEZ
(SEAL) FED. VELASQUEZ Y H.
(SEAL) FRAN. J. PEYNADO

And Whereas the said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the city of Santo Domingo on the fourth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five;

Now, Therefore, be it known that I, Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and cause the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this eighth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine
(Seal) hundred and twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and fiftieth.

CALVIN COOLIDGE

By the President:
FRANK B. KELLOGG
Secretary of State.

J.

Convention Between the United States and the Dominican Republic to Replace the Convention of February 8, 1907, Between the Two Governments Providing for the Assistance of the United States in the Collection and Application of the Customs Revenues of the Dominican Republic

Whereas a Convention between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic to replace the Convention of February 8, 1907, between the two Governments providing for the assistance of the United States in the collection and application of the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at Washington on the twenty-seventh day of December, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-four, the original of which Convention, being in the English and Spanish languages, is word for word as follows:

Whereas a convention between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic providing for the assistance of the United States in the collection and application of the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at the City of Santo Domingo, on the eighth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and seven, and

Whereas that convention was entered into to enable the Dominican Government to carry out a plan of settlement for the adjustment of debts and claims against the Government; and

Whereas, in accordance with that plan of settlement, the Dominican Republic issued in 1908, bonds to the amount of $20,000,000 bearing 5 per cent interest, payable in 50 years and redeemable after 10 years at 102½, and requiring payment of at least 1 per cent per annum for amortization; and

Whereas additional obligations have been incurred by the Dominican Government in the form of the issuance, in 1918, of bonds to the amount of $5,000,000, bearing 5 per cent interest, payable in 20 years, and redeemable at par on each interest date as the amount of amortization fund available on such interest dates will permit, and requiring payment of at least 5 per cent per annum for amortization; and in the form of the issuance of bonds, in 1922, to the amount of $10,000,000, bearing 5½ per cent interest payable in 20 years, and redeemable after 8 years at 101, and requiring payment after such period of at least $563,916.67 per annum for amortization; and

Whereas certain of the terms of the contracts under which these bonds have been issued have proven by experience unduly onerous to the Dominican Republic and have compelled it to devote a larger portion of the customs revenues to provide the interest and sinking fund charges pledged to the service of such bonds than is deemed advisable or necessary; and

Whereas it is the desire of the Dominican Government and appears to be to the best interest of the Dominican Republic to issue bonds to a total amount of $25,000,000, in order to provide for the refunding on terms more advantageous to the Republic of its obligations represented by the bonds of the three issues above mentioned still outstanding and for a balance remaining after such operation is concluded to be devoted to permanent public im-

provements and to other projects designed to further the economic and industrial development of the country; and

Whereas the whole of this plan is conditioned and dependent upon the assistance of the United States in the collection of customs revenues of the Dominican Republic and the application thereof so far as necessary to the interest upon and the amortization and redemption of said bonds, and the Dominican Republic has requested the United States to give and the United States is willing to give such assistance:

The United States of America, represented by Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States of America; and the Dominican Republic, represented by Señor José del Carmen Ariza, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Dominican Republic in Washington, have agreed:

ARTICLE I

That the President of the United States shall appoint a General Receiver of Dominican Customs, who, with such Assistant Receivers and other employees of the Receivership as shall be appointed by the President of the United States in his discretion, shall collect all the customs duties accruing at the several customs houses of the Dominican Republic until the payment or retirement of any and all bonds issued by the Dominican Government in accordance with the plan and under the limitations as to terms and amounts hereinbefore recited; and said General Receiver shall apply the same so collected, as follows:

First, to paying the expenses of the receivership; second, to the payment of interest upon all bonds outstanding; third, to the payment of the annual sums provided for

amortization of said bonds including interest upon all bonds held in sinking fund; fourth, to the purchase and cancellation or the retirement and cancellation pursuant to the terms thereof of any of said bonds as may be directed by the Dominican Government; fifth, the remainder to be paid to the Dominican Government.

The method of distributing the current collections of revenue in order to accomplish the application thereof as hereinbefore provided shall be as follows:

The expenses of the receivership shall be paid by the Receiver as they arise. The allowances to the General Receiver and his assistants for the expenses of collecting the revenues shall not exceed five per cent unless by agreement between the two Governments.

On the first day of each calendar month shall be paid over by the Receiver to the Fiscal Agent of the loan a sum equal to one twelfth of the annual interest of all the bonds issued and of the annual sums provided for amortization of said bonds and the remaining collection of the last preceding month shall be paid over to the Dominican Government, or applied to the sinking fund for the purchase or redemption of bonds or for other purposes as the Dominican Government shall direct.

Provided, that in case the customs revenues collected by the General Receiver shall in any year exceed the sum of $4,000,000, 10 per cent of the surplus above such sum of $4,000,000 shall be applied to the sinking fund for the redemption of bonds.

ARTICLE II

The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver

and his assistants, and will give to them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to the extent of its powers. The Government of the United States will give to the General Receiver and his assistants such protection as it may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.

ARTICLE III

Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt, its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States.

ARTICLE IV

The Dominican Government agrees that the import duties will at no time be modified to such an extent that, on the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modifications, the total net customs receipts would not at such altered rates have amounted for each of such two years to at least 1½ times the amount necessary to provide for the interest and sinking fund charges upon its public debt.

ARTICLE V

The accounts of the General Receiver shall be rendered monthly to the Ministry of Finance and Commerce of the Dominican Republic and to the State Department of the United States and shall be subject to examination and verification by the appropriate officers of the Dominican and the United States Governments.

ARTICLE VI

The determination of any controversy which may arise between the Contracting Parties in the carrying out of the provisions of this Convention shall, should the two Governments be unable to come to an agreement through diplomatic channels, be by arbitration. In the carrying out of this agreement in each individual case, the Contracting Parties, once the necessity of arbitration is determined, shall conclude a special agreement defining clearly the scope of the dispute, the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and the periods to be fixed for the formation of the arbitral tribunal and the several stages of the procedure. The special agreement providing for arbitration shall, in all cases, be signed within a period of three months from the date upon which either one of the Contracting Parties shall notify the other Contracting Party of its desire to resort to arbitration. It is understood that on the part of the United States, such special agreements will be made by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereto, and on the part of the Dominican Republic, shall be subject to the procedure required by the Constitution and laws thereof.

ARTICLE VII

This agreement shall take effect after its approval by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective Constitutional methods. Upon the exchange of ratifications of this convention, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible, the Convention between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic providing for the assistance of the United States in the

collection and application of the customs revenues, concluded and signed at the City of Santo Domingo on the 8th day of February, 1907, shall be deemed to be abrogated.

Done in duplicate in the English and Spanish languages at the City of Washington this 27th day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-four.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (Seal)
J. C. ARIZA (Seal)

And Whereas the said Convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the city of Washington on the twenty-fourth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five;

Now Therefore, be it known that I, Calvin Coolidge, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this twenty-sixth day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and fiftieth.

CALVIN COOLIDGE

By the President:
FRANK B. KELLOGG
Secretary of State.

APPENDIX II

RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS OF BOARDS OF INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF MARINE OFFICERS

A.

REFERENCE (b), TESTIMONY OF DR. A. CORADÍN, RE JOSÉ MARIA RINCÓN:

FACTS:

1. According to the testimony adduced before the Board, José Maria Rincón, a native Dominican of about 80 years of age, was taken prisoner, tied by the neck, dragged quite a distance, shot, hung by the neck and finally killed by one Angel Peralez.

2. Angel Peralez was not a member of the Marine Corps or the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, but was either a Dominican or Porto Rican citizen at times employed by the Forces of Occupation.

3. That this outrage is alleged to have taken place in the presence of Capt. Thad T. Taylor, M.C. (one time Major, G.N.D.).

4. That Dr. Alejandro Coradín, who testified before the Senate Select Committee, stated before the Committee that the outrage occurred in Feb., in April and in June, 1917,—only one of which dates could possibly be true; also that Peralez was a Lieutenant acting under the orders of the American Forces, contradicted himself to such an extent that none of his statements are worthy of credence.

5. A witness, Julio Llueveres, recommended by Dr. A. Coradín as an eyewitness to the affair, testified very similarly to Dr. Coradín, but placed the scene of the occur-

rence at the opposite side of the church from where it had been placed by Dr. Coradín.

6. That if either Coradín's or Llueveres' story is true, it is a physical impossibility for the other to have witnessed the occurrence. One places the occurrence around the south end of the church, the other around the north end, the church being between the two witnesses.

OPINIONS: Upon which recommendations are based:

1. The board is of the opinion that Dr. Alejandro Coradín's story is made out of rumors he had heard of the treatment accorded to José Maria Rincón.

2. That, if the said Rincón was outrageously treated it was done as an unauthorized act by a Dominican or Porto Rican citizen named Angel Peralez; whose whereabouts are at present unknown.

3. That simple justice requires that Capt. Thad T. Taylor, U.S.M.C., be informed that he has been accused of aiding and abetting the commission of a cruel and outrageous act upon a defenseless Dominican subject.

5. That Dr. Coradín, so far as he himself is concerned, has shown himself both before the Senate Select Committee and before this Board as a person unworthy of belief by any right thinking person.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That this matter be referred to Capt. Thad T. Taylor, U.S.M.C., who is alleged to have been present, and to Col. Thorpe, who was in charge of operations in the Eastern District at the time, June 22, 1917, of the alleged occurrence.

REFERENCE (c), TESTIMONY OF JESUS M. VASQUEZ:

FACTS:

1. Agapito José, a Syrian merchant, was made prisoner by the Marine Forces of Occupation on April 14, 1918, and was shot and killed on April 17, 1918, and was buried the same night.

2. Capt. Thad T. Taylor, U.S.M.C. (the then Major, Guardian Nacional Dominicana), and Capt. Merkel, U.S.M.C. (since deceased), were with the Force of Occupation which effected the capture and death of Agapito José.

5. That Jesus M. Vasquez alleged that Capt. Thad T. Taylor, U.S.M.C., mutilated the body of Agapito José.

OPINIONS:

1. That Capt. Taylor and Merkel suspected Agapito José of being in league with the bandits who assassinated Capt. Knox, Guardia Nacional Dominicana, and so caused his arrest and confinement.

2. That Agapito José, while en route from the Marine Headquarters at Hato Mayor to a place of confinement (the jail), was shot and killed by the Marine Guard escorting him (Corporal Bert and Private Blake).

3. That neither Capt. Merkel nor Capt. Taylor were present at the actual scene of the shooting at the time, but that both arrived at the scene immediately after the shooting.

4. That Springfield bullets fired at very short range mutilated the body of Agapito José to such an extent that some of the internal organs were exposed.

5. That Capt. Merkel or Capt. Taylor, after the shoot-

ing, examined the body, using a stick or knife to lift the clothing, but that the statement that Capt. Taylor cut the body with a knife is untrue.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That further investigation be conducted at such place where Capt. Thad T. Taylor may appear before a board of investigation as defendant.

2. That declarations be procured from the following: Col. Geo. C. Thorpe, Russel Buck, ex-Capt., ex-Lieutenant C. C. Simmons, Cpl. Thomas J. Bert and Private Serrhel I. Blake.

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The preparation of this book could not have been undertaken had it been necessary to depend solely upon published material. With the exception of occasional pamphlets and articles published in the Dominican press dealing with historical subjects, and with the exception of such summarized works of reference as, for example, the history of Don Bernardo Pichardo, and the history of Don Manuel Ubaldo Gómez, the literature of the Dominican Republic has been devoid of any detailed and authoritative historical publication treating of the events of the past forty years. The reason for this is primarily due to the fact that during the Dictatorship of President Heureaux the censorship of the Government was so rigid that no truthful depiction of the times could have been published, and that during the years which have elapsed since the Dictator's death, Dominican authors have been greatly restrained in publishing their estimates of contemporaneous events, owing as much to personal as to political motives. It has consequently been necessary for me in preparing the history of the past forty years of the Dominican Republic to rely principally upon two general sources —the archives of the Department of State of the United States, and the information obtained from prominent Dominicans who have taken part themselves in the shaping of Dominican history during those years. For my access to the archives of the Department of State I am deeply indebted to the authorization granted me by the Honorable Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State of the United States. A study of the Departmental archives has thrown new light upon the earlier years of the independence of the Dominican Republic. It has proved of even greater value in composing the narration of the latter years of Dominican history.

It would be impossible for me to express the extent of my obligation to His Excellency, General Horacio Vasquez, President of the Dominican Republic, for the assistance which he personally has rendered me in providing me with full and detailed information of his own participation in the history of the past forty years, in which he has played so great a part. He has given me generously both of his time and of his attention, and although he has studiously refrained from permitting the information which he has granted me to be coloured by his personal feelings regarding the men who have shared with him the direction of the destinies of the Republic in the twentieth century, the importance of his assistance in the determination of the facts recorded in this book cannot be overestimated.

My most grateful acknowledgments are likewise due to His Excellency, Don Federico Velasquez y Hernandez, Vice President of the Dominican Republic, for the assistance and the encouragement which I have received from him, and I am likewise under particularly great obligations to the Honorable Francisco J. Peynado for the invaluable aid which I have obtained through his revision of the historical accuracy of the chapters which deal with the last forty years of the history of the Republic. I am also under special obligation to the Most Reverend Monseñor Armando A. Lamarche Marchena of La Vega, R. D., and to Licenciado C. Armando Rodriguez, Santo Domingo, who has been most generous in affording me information derived from his own unique collection of historical archives. There are many other friends, both American and Dominican, to whom I am deeply indebted for their assistance, and it would be impossible for me to omit referring specifically to Mr. H. R. A. Grieser of Santiago, R. D., who

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The bibliography which is appended herewith is believed to be inclusive of all works of importance concerning the Dominican Republic which have been published in the Dominican Republic and in the United States during the past century. There are omitted, however, from this list a number of works published in Spain, particularly during the years subsequent to the Spanish Occupation of Santo Domingo, as well as a considerable number of works published in other European countries during the last years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth century. These latter publications, while of interest to the student concerned with a minute survey of the earlier history of the American Republics in their relation to Europe, have not been considered of particular value in the preparation of this work, which deals more specifically with the relations between the United States and the American Republics. They have not been referred to in the compilation of this book, and have consequently been omitted from the bibliography listed below.

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